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Abstract 
This thesis examines the reporting of uncertainty in financial statements. This is an 
increasingly important issue for accounting policy-makers as they seek to create 
financial statements that reflect the substance and economic reality of events in an 
uncertain world. Several currently proposed disclosures of uncertainty are examined. 
They comprise the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements and the 
disclosure of the uncertainty surrounding estimates of assets and liabilities. Drawing 
on theories of decision-making under uncertainty, the thesis adopts an experimental 
approach to the exploration of the effect of these disclosures on the perceptions and 
confidence of users of financial statements. 
As a result of its origins in the current context of the reporting of uncertainty, the 
research findings are pertinent to the development of disclosures of uncertainty. The 
research finds that the disclosure of uncertainty matters. Moreover, the framing of 
such disclosure has an effect on perception and confidence. The characteristics of the 
reporting entity and perceptions of the reliability of financial statement items are also 
important influences on the impact of such disclosures. The thesis concludes by 
suggesting that the clear disclosure of uncertainty leads to a fuller view of the reporting 
entity. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is the introduction to a thesis which is concerned with the disclosure of 
uncertainty in financial reporting. The next section, section 1.2, briefly indicates the origins of 
such concerns. Section 1.3 explores the structure and layout of the thesis. This exploration 
selVes also to describe the development of the research question and hypotheses as well as its 
design and implementation. Section 1.4 summarises the main findings of the research. Such a 
summary further accentuates the importance and relevance of the research to the 
contemporary development of accounting choices in the context of uncertainty. The chapter 
concludes briefly in section 1.5. 
1.2 FINANCIAL REPORTING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF UNCERTAINTY 
The focus of this thesis is the reporting of uncertainty in financial statements. In this instance, 
as chapter 2 will discuss, uncertainty is defined as a lack of information: the difference 
'between what is known and what needs to be known' (Mack, 1971, p.I). Financial reporting 
has been confronted with the problem of uncertainty for several decades. It remains, 
however, central to the problems currently facing standard-setters and preparers. 
. I 
Dewhirst (1981) comments on the existence of different 'world views' in financial reporting. 
One of the differentiating characteristics of such world views is (p. 231) 'the conception of the 
purpose, role and hence nature and subject matter of public accounting.' Stamp (1980, pp. 
124-125), for example, argues that 
accounting is concerned with representation of economic reality ... 
'Economic reality' seems clear enough . . . Yet, when we think 
carefully about the measurement of the value of this economic 
reality - the task that is entrusted to accountants - it becomes clear 
that this is not something that can be done in unambiguous fashion . 
. . Clearly, measures of economic reality cannot be unambiguous. 
Stamp (1980) and Tweedie and Whittington (1990) comment that uncertainty is at the heart 
of the central problems of financial reporting: problems of recognition and measurement. The 
ability to recognise an item in financial statements rests on sufficient evidence of the existence 
ot: for example, a benefit (in the case of an asset) and an obligation (in the case of a liability). 
Furthermore, it also depends on whether that benefit or obligation can be measured with 
sufficient reliability (ASB, 1995b). Therefore, uncertainty regarding the existence of an item 
or its measurement may lead to the non-recognition of that item in the financial statements. 
This research addresses the manner in which such items might be disclosed in the light of 
uncertainty. 
The nature of uncertainty lies not only in measurement and recognition but also in the world 
itself Another view of the world, and of accounting within it, is that 'in communicating 
reality, we construct reality' (Hines, 1988, p. 251). Decision science has also been grappling 
with such issues: 'disorder, jumble, and confusion from certainty itself (Townsend, 1992, 
p.66) and its theories contribute to this research. Bertrand Russell wrote in the introduction 
to the History o/Western Philosophy (1961) that modem philosophy's main task is to teach 
man to live without certainty and yet not be paralysed by hesitation. This thesis attempts to 
·2 
address, within a behavioural context, some of the issues which arise from financial statements 
without certainty. 
1.3 THE RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
This section sets out the layout and structure of the thesis. In doing so, it also indicates the 
evolution and development of the thesis, its approach to the research problem and the manner 
in which the thesis deals with the research findings. The next section will explore the main 
research findings and their implications. 
Chapter 2 explores the emerging recogntion of the immutability of uncertainty in financial 
reporting. This is especially so in the context of the search for economic reality and substance. 
The chapter then explores the evolution of policies addressing uncertainty in financial 
statements with a view to drawing from that evolution a framework (in chapter 5) within 
which the disclosure of uncertainty might be explored. Central to such an exploration is the 
view that uncertainty is central to financial reporting because uncertainty is characteristic of 
the human condition and of the world in which financial reporting belongs. 
Chapter 3 therefore exammes research regarding uncertainty and human behaviour and 
decision-making. The chapter identifies in particular current theories of decision-making 
under uncertainty which contribute both to the development of research hypotheses (in chapter 
6) but also to the construction of the research instrument (in chapter 7). 
Having established a behavioural context for the research, chapter 4 discusses previous 
accounting research in the context of uncertainty and, in some detail, previous behavioural 
research in the area. Specifically, the chapter focuses on existing disclosures and potential 
new disclosures of information regarding uncertainty. The chapter contributes to an 
appreciation of the research question, the approach to that question and, further, to the unique 
policy-driven, contemporary nature of the thesis. 
·3 
Having established the relevance of the research (in chapter 2), its behavioural context (in 
chapter 3) and previous research in the area (in chapter 4), chapter 5 identifies the proposed 
research approach. The approach adopted is experimental. Drawing on policy proposals in 
chapter 2 and their potential behavioural effects introduced in chapter 3, chapter 5 sets out the 
framework within which the disclosure of uncertainty is tested. This concerns, first, the 
disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements as suggested, for example, by Boritz 
(1990) and the Cadbury Report (The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, 1992). It also concerns the disclosure of uncertainty regarding specific 
significant estimates in financial statements as proposed, for example, by the Accounting 
Standards Board ('ASB') (ASB, 1995b; 1997b). Prompted by the ASB's suggestions, these 
disclosures are three-fold. Uncertainty of recognition in financial statements stems from the 
uncertain occurrence and the uncertain outcome of an event. The first disclosure reveals the 
existence of such an uncertainty (leading to a potential loss), the second establishes an 
estimated range of probability for the occurrence of the event while the third discloses the 
range of potential outcomes should the loss occur. Drawing on the asymmetric treatment in 
financial reporting of assets and liabilities, these disclosures are examined in the context of 
both assets (stock) and liabilities (provisions). They are also explored in the light of reporting 
entities with differing characteristics (revolving around the level of debt and the trend of 
turnover). 
The outline of the research approach in chapter 5 allows chapter 6 to develop the specific 
hypotheses of the research given the broad research question identified and explored in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4. These hyPotheses state that the disclosures outlined in chapter 5 will 
affect the assessments of performance and position of the reporting entities by the 
experimental subjects. Further, the expressions of confidence in those assessments by the 
experimental subjects are examined. The hypotheses also suggest that the effect of the 
disclosures will differ in the light of the characteristics of the reporting entities. Differences 
between the impact of the disclosure of uncertain assets and uncertain liabilities are also 
hypothesised. It is also hypothesised that expectations of the reliability of financial statements 
and of the reliability of elements of financial statements have a role in fashioning the potential 
4 
effect of, first, the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements and, second, the 
differences between the disclosure ofuncertaill assets and uncertain liabilities. 
Having established the research approach and the research hypotheses in chapter 5 and 6 
respectively, chapter 7 discusses the construction of the research instrument which will test the 
hypotheses outlined given the research approach. It also indicates the pilot-testing of the 
research instrument and the initial findings and refinements of the instrument based on such 
pilot-testing. 
Chapters 8 to 10 outline the main findings of the research in detail. Chapter 8 is concerned 
with the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements, chapter 9 with the 
disclosure of the uncertain nature of assets and chapter 10 with the disclosure of the uncertain 
nature of liabilities. Chapter 11 deals with a by-product of the research question: the effect of 
the characteristics of the experimental subjects (particularly gender and experience) on their 
assessments of performance and position of the reporting entities and on their expressions of 
confidence in those assessments. 
Each chapter (of chapters 8 to 11) outlines in some detail the research findings specific to that 
chapter. The next section, section 1.4, summarises in broad terms the main findings of the 
research and their implications for accounting policy-makers. The concluding chapter, chapter 
12, examines the implications of these findings in more detail. 
1.4 THE RESEARCH FINDINGS: A SUMMARY 
This section constitutes a summary of the main research findings discussed in more depth and 
in broader terms in chapters 8 to 11. It also serves to accentuate at the outset the importance 
of this research to policy-makers in the current context of financial reporting. The main 
findings ofthe research may be summarised, in brief terms, as follows: 
5 
• Uncertainty matters. 
It has emerged from this research that the disclosure of uncertainty, the revelation of what is 
not recognised in financial statements due to insufficient evidence of existence or value, 
matters. Specifically, the disclosure of additional information concernin:g a remote event 
..' : . .' .' ~' . 
whose outcome is inestimable has an effect on the perceptions and confidence of decision-
• ~. • I. i . . ' .. , :', 1:.':,. . : ,1 ~. : ~ . '. . 
makers. The concern of accounting policy-makers (such as the ASB, the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants ('CICA') and the Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ('AcSEC') and others (such as Boritz) 
with uncertainty therefore appears warranted. 
• The framing of the disclosure of uncertainty matters. 
The manner in which uncertainty is revealed and discussed has differing effects on perceptions 
and confidence. In particular, the quantification of the estimated range probability of 
occurrence of an uncertain event had a marked effect on the assessments and confidence of the 
experimental subjects. This finding has implications not only for how uncertainty might be 
disclosed but also for when disclosure might occur. This finding is discussed in more detail in 
section 12.3.l. 
• Expectations of reliability matter more than assets and liabilities per se. 
The research finds that initial eXpectations of the reliability of financial statement items fashion 
subsequent reaction to the disclosure of uncertainty. This is particularly so in the context of 
the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements in general (outlined in chapter 8) 
and in the differing reactions to the disclosure of uncertain assets and liabilities (explored in 
chapter 10). Hence, the role of the disclosure regarding the uncertain nature of financial 
statements in particular may be to educate users of financial statements of the character of 
those financial statements rather than to inform them of the reporting entity. 
6 
Furthermore, assets are generally perceived as being less reliable than liabilities. Reaction to 
the disclosure of uncertain assets and liabilities appear to derive from prior expectations of 
reliability rather than from perceptions of assets and liabilities as assets and liabilities. This 
finding is discussed in more detail in sections 10.4.2 and 12.3.3. 
• The characteristics of the reporting entity matter. 
A consistent finding in the context of each disclosure is that the characteristics (in particular 
the extent of debt) of the reporting entities appear to effect the relative importance attached to 
each disclosure. As a result, the research suggests that considerations of materiality and 
disclosure policy should consider (as the ASB, 1995b suggests) the context of the uncertainty 
as well as its significance in terms of size or incidence. 
1.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has outlined the research question and its relevance to financial reporting as it 
enters the twenty-first century. That relevance is created by an increasing concern that 
financial statements should be useful and should report, in some form, the substance of the 
events which fashion the performance and position of the reporting entity. The research 
remains relevant by focusing on contemporary suggestions in the evolution towards the 
disclosure of uncertainty in financial statements. By doing so, the research reveals a number 
of issues which are important in the continuing development of such disclosure. The chapters 
that follow set out the historical, current and behavioural background to such issues and the 
manner in which these issues are unveiled. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter, which is in three main sections, examines in detail the relevance of research on 
uncertainty in the context of financial statements. It does so in two ways: first, in Section 2.2, by 
discussing how uncertainty influences the decisions of the stakeholders of the reporting entity. 
Secondly, Section 2.3 explores the central concepts and boundaries of financial reporting in the 
light of uncertainty. The final ~ction, Section 2.4, examines how financial statements and / or 
annual reports might more adequately reflect such uncertainty. Chapters 6 and 7 will draw on this 
section to form a specific framework of the reporting of uncertainty within which the thesis will 
proceed. 
A number of recent accounting publications and pronouncements have concerned themselves with 
the disclosure of risk and uncertainty in financial statements and/or annual reports. The Cadbury 
Report (Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992) and the Auditing 
Practices Board's The,Future Development of Auditing - A Paper to Promote Public Debate in the 
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United Kingdom (APB, 1992), the Financial Reporting Commission in Ireland (1992), the 
MacDonald Commission in Canada (CICA, 1988) and, in the US, the Proposed Statement of 
Principle: The Disclosure of Risks and Uncertainties and Financial FleXibility of the AcSEC 
(AcSEC, 1993) all argue, to a differing extent and with differing success, for increased 
consideration of uncertainty and risk in the context of financial reporting. 
Uncertainty is what Keynes (1933, p. 339) terms 'part of our human outfit' ... 'an essential 
element of our human condition' (Tversky, 1989, p. 148). Freear (1977), tracing the history of 
accounting, notes that one of the factors leading to the expansion of accounting was the increased 
complexity and uncertainty of business. Hendriksen (1977, p. 128) descnoing uncertainty as a 
'measurement constraint', contends that 'uncertainty in accounting arises from two main sources': 
the allocation of amounts between past and future periods and the measurement of wealth which 
requires the estimation of future uncertain amounts. 
The primary motivation for examining how financial accounting might grapple with uncertainty is 
that it is interesting. It is interesting not only to this author but also to the discipline. That this is 
the case is well-illustrated by drawing on a number of arguments put forward in a 1990 journal 
article by Tweedie and Whittington (T&W). Echoing Hendriksen, T&W (1990, p. 91) classifY the 
current problems of financial reporting under 'two conventional headings: recognition problems 
and measurement problems.' They go on to obselVe (p. 98) that uncertainty is an issue affecting 
both of these problems: 'uncertainty affects not only whether an item is recognised in the accounts, 
but also how it is recognised.' Ironically, therefore, while accounting grew out of complexity and 
uncertainty, complexity and the resulting uncertainty are central to the challenges facing accounting 
in an environment which has 'become more complex and competitive'. (Zeff and Keller, 1985, p. 
460) 
T &W (1990, p. 91) outline what they see as the broad consensus regarding the purpose of financial 
reports. One of these broadly agreed notions about financial reports is that they are intended to 
provide users with information for decision making. Users are defined broadly by the ASB 
(1995b). They include, for example, employees, those in the environment of the reporting entity, 
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customers and the public. 
If one defines accounting as a discipline that is concerned with information and with infonning 
decision makers, (ASB, 1995b) the influence of uncertainty on the discipline is clear. Arguing that 
there is broad agreement that financial reports should provide information to users, T &W comment 
that users seek 'economic relevance.' While noting that the ICAS group (McMonnies, 1988) 
'bravely pins its faith in identifying economic reality', T & W continue that 'economic reality' carries 
with it connotations that are 'inappropriate in a realistic setting of uncertainty.' This finds echoes, 
though not exact parallels, in Stamp's argument (1980) that as economic reality is complex and 
ambiguous, its presentation in financial statements cannot be unambiguous. It seems that to be 
useful in decision making, information must represent some form of what has variously been tenned 
'substance' or 'reality' but that in doing so accounting information must struggle with the 
uncertainty or ambiguity of that substance. 
Uncertainty, then, is central to financial reporting. Users are concerned with uncertainty. They are 
also concerned with 'economic relevance', which in an uncertain world, is uncertain. The problems 
of financial accounting have uncertainty as a common theme. This is hardly surprising as 
accounting is a human activity and uncertainty is what Keynes tenns (1933, p. 339) 'part of our 
human outfit.' What is ironic is that while accounting exists because of uncertainty, it is also 
constrained because of uncertainty. Research in tins area is therefore interesting in a discipline that 
struggles with uncertainty. It leads one to wonder whether the role of accounting is not to 
eIiminate but to illuminate uncertainty, whether there is a certainty surrounding single numbers and 
whether that is financial reporting's strength or its weakness. 
A compelling and pithy definition of uncertainty is provided by Mack (1971, p. 1) who comments 
that 'uncertainty ... is the gap between what is known and what needs to be known.' This 'gap' 
is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and will be developed in chapter 6 (specifically in Figure 6.2) to establish 
some of the hypotheses of this research. 
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Figure 2.1:Mack's definition oflUlcertainty (after Mack, 1971, p. 1) 
Uncertainty 'gap' 
.-
.-
-. 
.'''~ 
What we know (information) 
What we 
need to know 
Mack's definition of lUlcertainty finds an echo in financial reporting: Boritz (1990, p. 44) 
comments that 'lUlcertainties [in the use of financial statements] may arise from reliance on 
information which is incomplete': in grappling with lUlcertainty, financial reporting grapples with 
the gap between what the user knows and what the user needs to know. Such lUlcertainty is 
included in the category of information lUlcertainty by Boritz and is discussed in Section 5.2. At 
this stage, however, one is led to consider what the American Accounting Association (AAA, 
(1973, p. 63) termed 'the behavioural interactions of the accolUlting data and the decision maker', 
what May and SlUldem (1976, p. 760) describe as the 'black box' which links 'accounting outputs 
to aggregate market consequences. ' 
. 
2.2 UNCERTAINTY AND THE DECISIONS OF STAKEHOLDERS 
'No sentient entity', write Crowe and Hom (1967, p. 466), 'can exist in a totally 'riskless' reality. 
As long as an entity has wants, its capacity to satisfy these wants is in jeopardy. The aspects of 
reality which may lead to loss are cOlUltless.' Risk not only exists because of wants but also 
because of the converse: a lack of resources to achieve those wants (Doderlein, 1987, p. 6). 
Likewise, lUlcertainty is defined in the light of Figure 2.1 as a lack of information to make informed 
decisions. 
Discussing risk on the basis that risk is 'the possibility that a sentient entity will incur loss', Crowe 
and Hom (1967, pp. 462 and 465), wonder: 'Can a corporation be considered as a sentient entity 
capable of wanting?' Quite apart from the legal recognition of the body corporate, Crowe and 
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Hom conclude (p. 465) that 
if a group entity is composed of individual sentient entities, then the composite 
of the wants of these constituent entities can be regarded for purposes of 
convenience as the 'wants' of the group entity. 
Any consideration of uncertainty in a financial reporting context, cannot· avoid considering 
therefore: 
a) who are the constituent entities or stakeholders of the entity? and 
b) what are their infonnation needs? 
2.2.1 The constituent entities or stakeholders of the reporting entity 
The stakeholders of the modem organisation are the groups who are affected by or can affect the 
organisation (Freeman, 1984, p. 1). Freeman includes within the stakeholders of the modem 
organisation not only its owners but customers, employees, suppliers, governments, competitors, 
consumer advocates, environmentalists, other special interest groups and the media. The APB's 
The Future Development of Auditing - A Paper to Promote Public Debate (APB, 1992) urges the 
extension of the perspective of financial statements to include all these stakeholders of the reporting 
entity. 
The users of accounting infonnation defined by the ASB are similalrly wide-ranging. The ASB 
(1995b, p. 36) include present and potential investors, employees, lenders, suppliers and other trade 
creditors, customers, governments and their agencies and the public as among the users of financial 
statements. These users have also been recognised by ASOBAT (1966), TIle Trueblood Report 
(AlCPA, 1973), and The Corporate Report (1975) among others. As a result, the users of 
financial statements are a diverse group. The ability of financial statements alone to meet the 
infonnation needs of such users is limited giving rise to uncertainty itself and to the use of various 
other sources of infonnation by users (Lee and Tweedie, 1977 and 1981; Baker and Haslem, 
1973). 
Indeed, the very objective of financial statements is limited by the ASB to the provision of 
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'infonnation about the financial position, petfonnance and financial adaptability of an enterprise 
that is useful to a wide range of users assessing the stewardship of management for making 
economic decisions [my emphasis].' (ASB, 1995b, p. 35) This objective of financial statements is 
narrower than, for example, the twelve objectives set out by the Trueblood Committee (AICPA, 
1973). As a result, a distinction must be drawn between 
1. risks and uncertainties which have an impact on the reported financial peIfonnance and position 
of the reporting entity (which the financial statements give infonnation about) and 
2. those risks and uncertainties which affect the relationship, perceived and real. between the entity 
and its stakeholders. 
This research, drawing on the definition of uncertainty explored in Figure 2.1 and the defined 
objectives of financial statements, focusses on the first of these elements of uncertainty: the 
uncertainty attaching to the recognition and disclosure of the financial peIfonnance of the reporting 
entity. The ASB (1995b) characteris es shareholders as the primary user of financial statements and 
also argues that the needs of other stakeholders are served through the satisfaction of the needs of 
shareholders. Section 2.2.2 illustrates this view (in the instance of this research), outlining in 
particular the needs of shareholders in the context of uncertainty. Similarly, the research as it 
develops in this and later chapters concentrates primarily on shareholders' perceptions of the 
reporting entity. Section 2.3 explores in more detail the problems faced by financial statements in 
addressing uncertainty while section 2.4 outlines proposals to address these problems. 
2.2.2 The wants ofstakeholde.rs in the context of un certainty 
The infonnation needs of users has been widely researched using a number of different approaches 
(see for example Wolk, Francis and Teamey, 1984, p. 188). Figure 2.2 summarises the ASB's 
discussion of the needs of these users, with a particular emphasis on their need for infonnation 
concerning risk and uncertainty. The following subsections (2.2.3 to 2.2.6) analyse each of these in 
tum particularly in the context of the reporting of the financial position and peIfonnance of the 
reporting entity before section 2.3 explores the challenge uncertainty poses for accounting policy· 
makers. 
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Investor • Risk inherent in, and return provided by, investment 
• Ability of enterprise to pay dividends 
• Performance of management 
Employees and their representatives • Stability and profitability of their employer 
Lenders 
Suppliers and other trade creditors 
Customers 
Government and their agencies 
Public 
• Health and safety in employment 
• Ability of the enterprise to provide adequate 
remuneration, retirement benefits and satisfying 
employment opportunities 
• Ability to pay loans and interest when due 
• Ability to pay amounts owing when due 
• Going concern of the enterprise (especially when they 
have a long-term involvement with, or are dependent 
on, the enterprise) 
• Activities of the enterprise 
• Regulation, taxation policies, collection of statistics 
• Trends and recent developments in the prosperity of 
the enterprise and (for example) the range of its 
activities, environmental impact of the entity's 
processes and products 
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2.2.3 Uncertainty and the information needs of shareholders 
TIle owner or shareholder has traditionally been regarded as bearing the greatest risk in a business 
entity. 'The risk [the shareholders] bear justifies their exercising the decisive influence over the 
running of the company by appointing the management' (Stahl, 1976, p. 174 (quoted in Jonsson, 
1978)}. The owner, unlike others, is only entitled to the residue of net assets (the 'ownership 
interest'). When times are bad, the owner suffers first; conversely in the good times, the owner 
reaps the reward. The owner is, therefore, most exposed to and most interested in Wlcertainty and 
the impact of that Wlcertainty on the entity. 
The concern with risk in the general context of investment decision-making finds its origins in the 
work of Markowitz (1952 and 1959) and is supported by the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
developed by Fama (1965, 1970) Markowitz prescribed that investors value a portfolio of shares 
based on two dimensions - return (amoWlt) and risk (potentially measured in a variety of ways). 
He further demonstrated that investors could maintain the same return on their portfolio but reduce 
the risk attached to that portfolio by diversifYing into shares whose expected returns are not closely 
correlated with returns on their existing portfolio. Markowitz's seminal arguments were followed 
by numerous extensions and refinements (e.g. Tobin, 1958; Sharpe, 1964, 1970; Fama, 1965, 
1968; Lintner, 1965). Sharpe (1964, p. 427), in developing a theory of market equihoriwn ill 
conditions of risk, assumed 'that an individual views the outcome of any investment in probabilistic 
terms; that is, he thinks of the possible results in terms of some probability distribution. In 
assessing the desirability of a particular investment, however, he is willing to act on the basis of 
only two parameters of this distribution - its expected value and [for example] its standard 
deviation. ' 
Shortly after the promulgation of this theory, research papers concerned with market-determined 
and accoWlting-determined risk measures appeared in the academic literature (e.g. Beaver, Kettler 
and Scholes, 1970; Breen and Lerner, 1973; Gonedes, 1973; Lev, 1974; Lev and Kunitzky, 
1974; Bildersee, 1975). Several accounting variables were found to be indicative of the market's 
perception of the risk ?f an entity, including earnings variability and volatility, the size of the entity, 
15 
its growth and its financial and operating leverage. TIlese measures of uncertainty will be utilised in 
the characterisation of the reporting entities which comprise part of the research instrument 
developed in chapter 7. 
A Committee of the AAA asserted (AAA, 1972, p. 410) that 'at the level of the 'individual investor 
who faces a given set of security prices, the role of infonnation is to aid in the selection of the 
optimal portfolio of securities' and also 'that the role of accounting data becomes its predictive 
ability with respect to beta.' (p. 424) Beaver (1973, p.55) extended this argwnent saying that 'in 
an efficient market, the usefulness of financial statement data to individual investors is not to find 
mis-priced securities, since they are nonexistent. What then is the value, if any? The value lies in 
the ability of financial statement data to aid in risk prediction.' While arguing that the investor is 
concerned with assessing risk as well as return, Beaver's contention appears to suggest that risk is 
the fundamental variable of concern to investors: 
Many portfolio managers and their clients have moved away from a 
'beat-the-market', high-turnover philosophy to one where the emphasis 
is placed upon risk management and the minimisation of operating 
costs (p.52). 
Mumford (1989, p. 385) states the case in starker terms: 
In the light of modem capital market theory, maybe shareholders want 
or need nothing more by way of formal financial reports than the latest 
'bottom-line' earnings figure and a statement of the company's ex post 
market 'beta' and ex ante target 'beta' independently monitored. 
These propositions are not new. Knight (1921, Chapter 9) argued that profit is the reward of 
uncertain enterprise. More recently Bhide and Stephenson (1992, p. 194) write that 'business 
owners . . . underwrite investments where the historical record provides little basis for predicting 
outcomes and the payoff functions are truly uncertain.' 
Outside the context of the capital market and the publicly-quoted company, Griffin (1982, p. 42) 
argues that 'for investors who are not well-diversified information about company specific risk is 
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paramount.' Kripke (1979), while suggesting that shareholders should seek to diversifY (which 
'limits the usefulness ofindividual security disclosures' (p. 92», argues that financial reporting has 
a responsibility to the non-diversified as well as the diversified shareholder. Furthermore, 
Dyckman, Downes and Magee (1975, p. 90) write that 
a substantial number of individual investors are not well-diversified, and' 
there is no a priori reason to assume such behaviour irrationaL 
particularly if the world is not adequately reflected by the simplified 
economic models which support the EMIl Under such conditions 
good information concerning risk takes on increased importance if 
investors are to minimise transaction costs while retaining their desired 
portfolio strategy involving risk and return. 
2.2.4 The employee as stakeholder 
In assessing the hierarchy of risk-takers within and without the reporting entity, the shareholder 
has, as has been noted, been perceived as the primary risk-taker, at least in financial terms. 
However, employees of a company 'can in fact be assumed to have a very considerable interest 
indeed in the company being run in a way that reduces to a minimum the risks' taken by them 
(Jonsson, 1978, p. 377). Employees may of course be shareholders directly or indirectly (Briston 
and Dobbins, 1978; Drucker, 1980) and have an owner's interest in the risk of the entity. Jonsson 
(p. 374), however, has identified some of the risks borne (if not taken) by employees as employees: 
1. The risk of damaging ,health whilst working, 
2. The risk of becoming unemployed due to a company's closure and 
3. The risk of being forced to move [in search of employment] from a locality 
where there is a permanent shortage of job vacancies. 
While these risks are not entirely financiaL they are no less profound than the risks of shareholders. 
It could be argued, in fact, that the risks faced by employees are more profound than those faced 
by shareholders. If (as Doderlein (1987) points out) risk remains because of a lack of resources, 
employees' resources. may be more limited, or at least less mobile, than those of owners. 
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Circumstances may render employees dependent on the individual entity: employees cannot 
normally vest their employment in a number of entities and therefore cannot normally diversifY. In 
the latter part of the 20th Century (if not through history), labour is in oversupply while capital 
remains in demand. In particular, the currency of labour, its skills, are less mobile and more 
specific than the monetary currency of capital - this stratification of the labour market is good for 
some and bad for others. 
The risks faced by employees do however imply uncertainty for shareholders as well These 
implications arise from some of the risks borne by employees: 
1. the employee's risk of damaging hislher health while working may result in liabilities to the 
reporting entity in the form of litigation awards and/or increased insurance premiums and a 
requirement under legislation to render the workplace safer; 
2. the employee's risk of becoming unemployed due to a company's closure may result in 
increased redundancy payments and, therefore, less net assets available for ultimate distribution 
to the owners, and 
3. the skills stratification of the workforce implies that the reporting entity must pay a premium to 
attract employees whose skills are in short supply. Such a premium is not a risk premium but a 
fimction of the market, although obviously a consideration of the prospective employee whose 
skills are in short supply is the risk of the employment for which he/she may demand 
compensation. 
2.2.5 Lenders, creditors and customers as stakeholders 
In the context of the decision to grant credit, 
the use of financial analysis [of financial statements] basically comes down to a 
decision on whether or not the customer can pay in the future. Financial 
statements divulge trends in the business and help credit managers in their 
decision-making process. (Cole, 1984, p. 404) 
The decisions made by lenders and creditors using the information contained in financial statements 
are divided by Staubus (1977) into two groups: the basic, lend or not lend decision and the 
. 
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secondary decisions such as security, restrictive covenants, interest rates and matUlity dates. 
Included among those secondary decisions of lenders is the creation and enforcement of the tenns 
of a loan and, ultimately, the possible liquidation of the entity. TIle implications of such decisions 
are generally no less dramatic than the decisions of investors. They also create risks of their own 
by affecting the gearing and interest cover of the entity, its ability to finance growth and ultimately, 
peruaps, its SUIVivaL 
The interests of customers are similar to those of suppliers: 'the continuance of an enterprise, 
especially when they have a long-term involvement with, or are dependent on, the enterprise.' 
(ASB, 1995b, p. 37) As the uncertainty faced by these customers is similar to that faced by lenders 
and creditors, the type of information usefully disclosed is the same for lenders as for customers. 
(Customers will also be interested in information useful in for example price negotiations, as well as 
uncertainty surrounding product quality and customer care. TItis kind of information does not 
relate to financial statements per se and is therefore not considered here.) 
2.2.6 Uncertainty and other stakeholders 
Other stakeholders of financial statements comprise the public, governments and their 
representatives as well as competitors of the entity. 'Enterprises may make a substantial 
contribution to the local economy.' (ASB, 1995b, p. 37) They may also have a significant impact 
on the local, national or international environment and the safety of consumers. A feature of the 
involvement of others as stakeholders is the involuntary nature of such an involvement and, often, 
the absence of a reward attached to the risk of involvement. The local community as a community 
(rather than as, say, employees) is often affected involuntarily by an entity purely by being its 
neighbour. They have little influence over the entity yet can be influenced by the activities of the 
entity more than any other user. Douglas (1985) and Rowe (1977) argue that such involuntary, 
often powerless, users have legitimate rights, in justice, to information concerning a neighbouring 
entity. Rescher (1983, p. 167) develops the argument further: 'the course of recent development 
has seen the gradual evolution of a 'right to know' when one is being put at risk. ' 
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This 'right to know' could be extended to accoWlting. Bedford (1974, pp. 13-14), for example, 
remarks on 'the rampant surge of the 'public right to know' doctrine' in accowlting. It has 
parallels in the doctrine of'infonned consent' in the consideration of medical negligence set out in 
Walsh v. Family Planning Services Limited: 
Where there is a risk, however exceptional or remote, of great consequence 
involving severe pain stretching for an appreciable time into the future and 
involving future operative procedures, such possible consequences should be 
explained in the clearest language to the prospective patient. (Per O'Aaherty 
and Egan 11; Hedennan concurring in Walsh v. Family Planning Services 
Limited, The Irish Law Reports, 1992, p. 497) 
Interestingly, considering the lack of influence of some other users over the reporting entity, the 
duty to infonn in a medical context is less when the procedure is not elective, when the user has 
less influence, less choice. This makes practical sense in a medical setting. However, the 
accountants' conceptual framework, write Gray, Owen and Maunders (1987, p. 73) is 'ill-equipped 
. . . to cope with the broader social dimension.' The next section discusses how accounting 
currently copes with the broad dimensions of uncertainty. 
2.3 UNCERTAINTY AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
Having identified the uncertain nature of financial statements and the uncertain nature of the reality 
of stakeholders, this section explores in more depth the uncertainty surrounding accounting 
numbers and, further, how such uncertainty is currently dealt with in financial statements. One of 
the central themes of the introductory section of this chapter which is elaborated on in this section 
is that both uncertain occurrences and outcomes are the stuff of uncertainty in the context of 
judgment, recognition and disclosure in accounting. These uncertain outcomes and occurrences 
are created and circumscribed by the risks of the business in which the reporting entity operates. 
This section (Section 2.3) explores these issues in more depth in an effort to establish in the next 
section (Section 2.4) a framework within which uncertainty might be disclosed in financial 
statements. 
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Morgenstern (1960, p. 74) classifies the figures produced by financial statements as 
a) figures recording possession or handling of monies (cash or cash equivalents) and 
b) figures involving valuation 'which are necessarily the outcome of theories, opinions, 
conventions, traditions, examples set by others etc. ' 
Figures in Class a), he argues, will generally be available to a high degree of accuracy, while figures 
in Class b) require 'a sale and transaction before they assume the monetary form given them in the 
accounts'. The balance sheet, he continues, is in the form of 'layers' ofWlcertainty with differing 
levels of uncertainty attaching to each layer. This particular characterisation of the balance sheet 
leads to a suggestion regarding the presentation of the balance sheet which will be discussed in 
section 2.4. It also serves, however, to focus on the nature of Wlcertainties regarding each 
component of the conventional balance sheet as set out in Figure 2.3 (adapted from Pratt (1982, 
pp. 200-260». As equity is the residual of assets and liabilities (ASB, 1995b, p. 61) and 'all other 
elements of financial statements (such as revenues, expenses, gains and losses, etc.) are defined in 
terms of changes in assets and liabilities' (Jolmson, 1994, p. 2), the Wlcertainty affecting assets and 
liabilities have implications for all those other elements of financial statements. 
One common aspect of the assets and liabilities depicted in Figure 2.3 is that their very definition 
(and existence) as future benefits and future obligations respectively depend on the occurrence and 
outcome of future events. Defining assets as rights or other access to future economic benefits 
controlled by an entity as a result of past transactions or events and defining liabilities as obligations 
to transfer economic benefits as a result of past transactions or events (ASB 1994a, p. 9) renders 
their very existence dependent' on an Wlcertain future event and creates doubt in financial 
statements. 
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Figure 2.3: The Components of the Balance Sheet and ll1eir Related Uncertainties 
BALANCE SHEET CAPTION 
Fixed Assets 
Stock 
Debtors and Prepayments 
Cash 
Creditors, accruals and provisions2 
SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY 
Existencel ; nature and classification; beneficial 
ownership; cost, particularly in the case of self-
produced assets, intangible assets etc.; value to 
the business; ultimate and current realisable 
value and / or market value; useful life (and 
resulting period of depreciation / 
amortisation); obsolescence; appropriateness 
of capitalisation (e.g. in the case of intangibles, 
leases etc.) which may depend on, among 
other factors, the ultimate recovery of cost 
(e.g. research and development) or economic 
substance (e.g. leases). 
Existence l ; beneficial ownership; appropriate 
recognition; stage of completion (for 
presentation but also recognition in the case of 
e.g. long-term contracts); cost; net realisable 
value; obsolescence. 
Existence l ; appropriate recognition; timing 
and amount of ultimate recoverability in cash 
(including foreign currency amounts). 
Existence l ; in the case of foreign currency 
amounts, amount of ultimate realisation in the 
currency of the entity. 
Existence; appropriate and complete 
recognition; timing and amount of ultimate 
obligation (including amounts m foreign 
currencies); appropriate classification. 
1 'Evidence that an entity has rights or access to benefits (and hence has an asset) is given if the 
entity is exposed to the risks inherent in the benefits, taking into account the likelihood of those 
risks having a commercial effect in practice' (ASB, 1994, para. 17) 
2 The accounting basis for the creation of provisions for future events is discussed in Johnson 
(1994). 
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According to Mock and Vertinsky (1985, p. 6) doubts about data in accowlting may be admitted 
or ignored based on shared rules of the language of accounting. Such shared rules include notions 
such as consistency and professional consensus and are fonned by accounting standards and 
GAAP. Indeed, the existence of accounting standards should help in guiding the treatment of 
complex events, contribute to wlifonnity and comparability and, in that sense, reduce uncertainty. 
One of the first standards of the ASC, SSAP 2 Disclosure of Accounting Policies, set out four 
'fundamental accounting concepts' which, it stated, 'are the broad basic assumptions which 
underlie the periodic financial accounts of business enterprises' (ASC, 1971, para. 14). One of 
these concepts was 'prudence' which the ASC (1971, para. 14) defined in the following tenns: 
revenue and profits are not anticipated, but are recognised by inclusion in the 
profit and loss account only when realised in the fonn either of cash or of other 
assets the ultimate cash realisation of which can be assessed with reasonable 
certainty; provision is made for all known. liabilities (expenses and losses) 
whether the amount of these is known. with certainty or is a best estimate in the 
light of the infonnation available. 
These fundamental concepts, the ASC (1971, para. 14) argues, 'are regarded as having general 
acceptability'. They had evolved as ideas underpinning the practice of financial reporting before the 
issue of SSAP 2 and have undergone further development since. 
The adoption of a conselVative or prudent approach to recognition was essentially a way of dealing 
with uncertainty (Moonitz (1961), Rappaport (1973». The AICPA (1970, p. 9089) classified 
'conselVatism' as a constraining principle in its APB Statement 4, arguing that such 'modifying 
conventions . . . have evolved to deal with some of the most difficult and controversial problem 
areas in accowlting.' 
Sterling (1967) called conselVatism the dominant principle of accounting. Several writers have 
considered the source of conselVatism. Littleton (1941), for example, argues that 'lower-of-cost-
or-market' has its origins in the desire to minimise stocks for tax purposes. Wolk, Francis and 
Tearney (1984, p. 121) suggest that conselVatism or prudence arises from the conflict between 
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aCCOtUltants and optimistic clients. They go on to comment (p. 121), however, that 'as the 
conceptual fOtUldations of accowlting change in accordance with new theoretical approaches, it is 
quite likely that conservatism, as a dominating principle, will decline in importance'. 
Within the ASB's draft Statement of Principles, the ASB (l995b) recognises that prudence is a 
reaction to uncertainty: 'uncertainties are recognised by the disclosure of their nature and extent and 
by the exercise of prudence in the preparation of financial statements' (p. 46) and that (p. 81) 'the 
application of prudence may mean that a potential loss (and any related liability) subject to 
uncertainty of measurement should be recognised at an amount higher than [a] minimum amount' 
that is reasonably assured. 
The ASB's draft Statement conversely marks an evolution of the description of prudence to the 
extent that it cautions (p. 46) that 'the exercise of prudence does not allow . . . the creation of 
hidden reserves or excessive provisions, the deliberate understatement of assets or income, or the 
dehoerate overstatement of liabilities or expenses'. While this was hardly ever the intention of the 
broad concept of prudence, in its application it had resulted in '( 1) slower revenue recognition, (2) 
faster expense recognition, (3) lower asset valuation, (4) higher liability valuation' (Wolk, Francis 
and Teamey, 1984, p. 121). 
The concept is refined and defined by the ASB (1995b, p. 46) as: 
the inclusion of a degree of caution in the exercise of the judgements needed in 
making the estimates required under conditions of uncertainty, such that 
income or assets are not overstated and expenses or liabilities are not 
understated. 
Such an asymmetric approach to the recognition and measurement of gains and losses is reflected 
in SSAP 18. One of the accoWlting standards specifically dealing with uncertainty is SSAP 18 
Accounting for Contingencies. The Standard applies only 'to conditions existing at the balance 
sheet date, where the outcome will be confirmed only on the occurrence or non-occurrence of one 
or more uncertain future events' (ASe, 1980, para. 1). SSAP 18 defines and discloses uncertainty 
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on a narrow basis by requiring the accrual or disclosure of a single reasonably accurate measure or 
(where the amount is not estimable) alternatively the disclosure of the contingency and its related 
uncertainty with no estimate of outcome. The Standard applies layers of disclosure, prudently 
prescribing a different treatment for gains and losses, as set out in Figure 2.4. 
FRED 14: Provisions and Contingencies (which would revise SSAP 18 ifimplemented) comments 
(ASB, 1997b, p. 15) that 'the concept of prudence requires stronger evidence for recognising a 
gain than a loss and often results in a loss (and any associated liability) being recognised where a 
gain (and any associated asset) would not be recognised'. 
Figure 2.4: SSAP 18 and uncertainty. 
Outcome Likelihood of occurrence Accounting treatment 
Loss Virtually certain Recognise 
Probable Recognise 
Not probable but not remote Disclose 
Gain Virtually certain Recognise 
Probable Disclose 
Loss I gain Remote Do not recognise or disclose 
This approach to recognition would appear to imply that decision-makers would react differently to 
contingent gains and losses or contingent assets and liabilities: that decision-makers would like to 
see contingent losses recognised sooner than contingent gains or contingent assets to be finner than 
contingent liabilities. This research will avoid the distinction between gains and losses for the 
reasons identified in a behavioural context in chapter 3. It wil~ however, attempt to assess whether 
decision-makers react differently to information concerning uncertain assets and Wlcertain 
liabilities. Perceptions of the reliability of particular asset and liability items will be discussed. The 
role of such perceptions in forming assessments of performance and position given the disclosures 
outlined will also be examined. Chapter 6 will develop research hypotheses in this context. 
Chapter 10 will draw on these hypotheses to examine differences in decisions arising from the 
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disclosure ofWlcertaill assets and liabilities. 
More recently, the dual nature of Wlcertaillty is recognised by the ASB (l995b, p. 68) in its draft 
Statement of Principles which states that 'recognition is triggered where a past event [realisation / 
occurrence] indicates that there has been a measurable change [outcome] in the' assets or liabilities 
of the entity.' The ASB (1995b, p. 67) outlines the criteria necessary to allow recognition of an 
asset or liability in financial statements: 
if 
(a) there is sufficient evidence of the existence of the item (including, where 
appropriate, evidence that a future inflow or outflow will occur); and 
(b) the item can be measured at a monetary amoWlt with sufficient reliability. 
In other words, only when there is adequate (but not necessarily conclusive) evidence of a 
transaction or event can the impact of that transaction or event be recognised in the financial 
statements. However, unlike the ASC in SSAP 18, the ASB (1995b, p. 78) concedes that where 
assets and liabilities cannot be estimated with sufficient reliability the disclosure of ' the significant 
assumptions used, the range of possible outcomes, the basis of measurement and the principal 
factors that affect what the outcome will be' is necessary. 
Tweedie and Whittington (1990, p. 91) note that 'a theme which pelVades [the recognition 
problems faced by financial reporting] is that of Wlcertainty about future events and how to deal 
with it.' Recognition, therefore, is dependent on evidence concerning both past andfuture events: 
Certainly the accoWltant cannot entirely escape the need to recognise current 
and future conditions; every decision to carry forward an amoWlt as an asset 
instead of an expired cost necessarily turns on future conditions. (Vatter, 1966, 
p.84) 
2.3.1 Uncertainty of events and the recognition of events 
As a result, events, are the key to recognition. The critical aspect of the event is not only its 
occurrence but the ability to extract from it sufficient evidence regarding the impact of the event on 
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the financial position of the entity to allow it to be recognised on a reliable basis. 'Recognition is 
triggered where a past event indicates that there has been a measurable change in the assets or 
liabilities of the entity.' (ASB, 1992b, para. 9) Uncertainty affects recognition in two ways: 
uncertainty as to the occurrence of an event and uncertainty as to the impact of such an OCCWTence 
on assets and liabilities. 
Arising from these tests of recognition, what constitutes sufficient evidence to allow recognition of 
an asset or liability is itself uncertain. The consideration of the issue is 'nothing more than the 
intelligent application of a definition' (Sterling, 1985, p.43). This would particularly apply to the 
judgment-based assets ('Class b'» of Morgenstern's layered balance sheet. The probability of the 
OccWTence and/or outcome of an event is central to such a consideration: 
A well formed definition connects a symbol (word 0,," numeral) with 
phenomena. It provides criteria that allow one to decide whether a particular 
phenomenon is or is not within the ambit of the definition. It partitions 
phenomena into two classes: those that satisfY the criteria and those that do 
not. (Sterling, 1985, p. 43) 
That the occWTence of the event is 'probable' comprises part of the recognition criteria of the 
MSB (1992), ASB (1992a, 1995a, 1995b), CICA Handbook, IASC (1994) and part of the 
definition of assets of the FASB (1984 and 1985). FRS 5 (ASB, 1994a) uses the phrase 'most 
likely' in setting out how substance should be determined. Such definitions and criteria, ill the 
words of Sterling, connect a word (e.g. 'probable') with the occurrence of an event and then 
disclose the outcome or impact of that event. 
However 'the available literature indicates that there is large variability in the mapping of phrases to 
numbers' (Budescu and Wallsten, 1985, p. 391). Chesley and Wier (1985) found that this 
variability persisted between the accounting and legal professions. (Lawyers are specifically 
mentioned as advisers as to the probability of an event in SSAP 18.) Intelligent application and 
professional judgment therefore of what constitutes the threshold for disclosure 'is an area that 
should be a cause for concern.' (Chesley, 1986, p. 180) 
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Similarly, this use of probability gives rise to the issue of the basis on which the probability is 
measured. The Task Force on Future Events (Johnson, 1994, pp. 10-l2) distinguished between 3 
bases on which to judge probability: 
• a modal probability approach which focuses on the event which has the highest probability of 
occurrence. Under this approach, high-risk assets and remote liabilities are ignored. 
• a cumulative probability approach which also focuses on the probability of occurrence only, but 
on the cumulative probability of occurrence. 
• a weighted probability approach which also takes into account the magnitude of each possible 
outcome ie. focuses on occurrence and outcome. 
The approach currently suggested by the ASB is: 
a) 'Evidence is required both that the change in assets and liabilities ... has occurred ... and it 
can be measured as a monetary amount with sufficient reliability' (ASB, 1995b, p. 67) and 
(through SSAP 18), 
b) 'A material contingent loss should be accrued in financial statements where it is probable that a 
future event will confirm a loss which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy.' (ASC, 1980, 
para. 15) 
Recognition, therefore, is not based on these criteria considered together (ie. as a composite or 
'weighted probability') but there must be sufficient evidence of occurrence alone ('modal 
probability') and of the monetary value of the amount to be measured. This issue raises 'challenges 
about how to interpret not only the past event . . . but also the probability of future events and 
sacrifices as called for in the recognition criteria' (Johnson, 1994, p. 13). 
Two more recent accounting standards also deal with uncertainty, though indirectly and in 
markedly different ways. FRS 4 Capital Instruments states, for example, that 'conversion of debt 
should not be anticipated' even ifconversion is likely (ASB, 1993b, para 25). On the other hand, 
FRS 5 Reporting the Substance of Transactions requires that 'in determining the substance of a 
transaction, all its aspects and implications should be identified and greater weight given to those 
more likely [my emphasis] to have a commercial effect in practice [and also] it is necessary to 
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identifY whether the transaction has given rise to new assets or liabilities for the reporting entity and 
whether it has changed the entity's existing assets and liabilities.' (ASB, 1994a, paras. 14 and 16) 
Ifan objective of financial statements (and the cash flow statement in particular) is to assist users in 
their assessment of the financial position, performance and future cash flows of the reporting entity, 
(ASB, 1995b) the crucial consideration in judging the impact of uncertainties is their effect on 
financial position and perfOImance and future cash flows, rather than their accounting (or legal) 
effect per se. The thrust of FRS 5 (ASB, 1994a) has been to reflect the substance of risks and 
rewards in financial statements. Tests of evidence of existence of assets under the Standard include 
consideration of exposure to risks? The impact of risk in all its aspects and implications will, 
therefore, be increasingly reflected in the financial statements of reporting entities. 
In that way, the substance of business demands that the peIVasiveness of uncertainty must also be 
recognised. One implication of the peIVasiveness of uncertainty is that the analysis of uncertainty 
'requires an attempt to assess the combined effect of many events andlor variables' (AAA, 1974, p. 
205). Ho and Pike (1991, p. 230) argue, in a capital budgeting setting, that 'even ifindividual risks 
are known, their combined effect should also be considered': 
The uncertainty in business activity can be perceived as having many, 
frequently interdependent, dimensions. The means of analyzing uncertainty 
inherent in business activity requires an attempt to assess the combined effect 
of many events andlorvariables. (AAA, 1973, p. 205) 
In the earlier draft of its Statement of Principles, the ASB (1992b, para. 21) recognised that 
The environment in which entities operate is inherently uncertain and for many 
r past events there is either a lack of certainty that there has been a change in the 
entity's assets or liabilities, or a lack of certainty as to the monetary amount of 
the change. It is this lack of certainty that gives rise to recognition problems. 
3 See footnote 1. 
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Skinner (1987, p. l32) calls this uncertainty 'event uncertainty'. Events happen within the context 
of the business in which the reporting entity operates. 'Facts arise only in context' (Vatter, 1965, 
p.81). This is recognised by Boritz (1990, p. 60): 
Some uncertainties are systematic, in the sense that certain types of business 
activities are often understood by those in the know to be subject to major 
classes of wtcertainty. For example, wholesale and retail businesses may be 
subject to changes in product appeal, seasonal factors, and economic 
conditions in geographic locations of their major markets; ... manufacturing 
companies may be subject to technological changes threatening product 
obsolescence, changes in customer demand, and changes in sources of supply; 
financial enterprises may be subject to fluctuations in interest rates, credit 
losses, securities prices, and foreign currency exchange rates. 
Rappaport (1973, p. 177) argues that 'the cost-matching decision ... reflects the accountant's 
broad perception of the relative risks associated with cost outlays.' Such a perception 'should 
embrace non-financial uncertainties . . . uncertainties surrounding corporate goals, employee 
morale, environmental responsibility and companyfmdustry image' (Ho and Pike, 1992, p. 230) as 
well as the fundamental consideration of going concern. 
The problems of recognition cannot be divorced from the nature of the events and transactions 
which a reporting entity undertakes or from the uncertainty within which the reporting entity 
operates. Companies exporting to Iraq, for example, may have less evidence for the recognition of 
trade receivables than companies selling locally; companies experiencing rapid technological 
change may experience more problems in measuring changes in the net realisable value of stocks 
than companies not experiencing such rapid change. 
Recognition is triggered by the occurrence of an event which can be measured with sufficient 
reliability or objectivity (e.g. a sales event). The nature of the events of an enterprise dictates, 
therefore, whether those events trigger recognition. Uncertainties affecting recognition are a 
function of events, which are in turn a function of the uncertainties of the business within which an 
entity operates. We can here, therefore, draw together the distinction made earlier between the 
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risks affecting the financial position and perfOlmance of the reporting entity and the risks faced by 
its stakeholders. The uncertain nature of financial reporting as created by problems of recognition 
and measurement is underpinned by the uncertain nature of the events of the reporting entity's 
business and the uncertainty it creates for its stakeholders. If financial statements have a primary 
responsibility to shareholders, (Stahl, 1976) as a result they have a responsibility to reveal the 
responses of stakeholders to the risks created by the reporting entity. Those responses are the 
events that create assets and liabilities. The risks of stakeholders are also the risks of the reporting 
entity itself They are the risks ofbu~iness. 
2.3.2 The risks of business 
Risk is an eliminable part of human existence . .. From the moment we gain a 
foothold on life, we have something to lose ... Risks are [therefore] not only 
peIVasive but protean. In one sense of this term there are as many 'kinds of 
risks' as there are kinds of negativities in human affairs. (Rescher, 1983, p. 9) 
Although an attempt to classny risk may be futile, a brief attempt will be made here to enumerate 
some of the risks facing reporting entities in general The ASB's Operating and Financial Review 
(OPR) offers some examples of items that may be relevant in the consideration of the 'principal 
risks and uncertainties in the main lines ofbusilless ... depending on the nature of the business' and 
suggests that they should be discussed where applicable in the OPR Such items include 'scarcity 
of raw materials; skill shortages and expertise of uncertain supply; patents, licences or franchises; 
dependence on major suppliers or customers; product liability; health and safety; environmental 
protection costs and potential environmental liabilities; self-insurance; exchange rate fluctuations 
and rates of inflation differing between costs and revenues, or between different markets.' (ASB, 
1993a, para. 12) The OPR refers to such factors under the heading 'dynamics of the business'. 
Weetman, Collins and Davie (1994, p. 70) found that the analysts they interviewed 'confirmed that 
any item on the list could be relevant in a specific situation but it was unlikely that all items would 
be relevant all the time.' One broker's analyst commented that the OPR's examples (and they are 
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only examples) could also include wage negotiations, competitive position and pricing policy. 
Boyadjian and Warren (1987) share this concern with the risks of business adding that 'the very 
core of corporate viability is strategic business risk . . . By strategic business risk we mean the 
viability of a firm within its industry and indeed the viability of that industry within the economy.' 
(pp. 276 and 282) This approach is illustrated by Foster (1986, p. 265) analysing an entity's 
prospects with respect to the prospects of the economy at large and the prospects of its industry 
within that economy. 
Weetman et al. (1994, p. 35) also found that fund managers needed an 'expression from 
management of what factors will drive the business'. It appears this need is partly to gain an insight 
into management's assessment of uncertainties and risk, partly to assess management's awareness 
and competence in assessing risks. This need, perhaps, arises from the knowledge that 
the ultimate source of the failing finn is ... exhibited by an intemalising process 
that largely ignores the external realities which the finn was born to cope with. 
We have suggested a cluster of telltale signs in this area which should alert 
both lender and investor that a wary attitude is indicated. (Boyadjian and 
Warren, 1987, p. 291) 
This 'cluster' is termed the fatigue risk model and includes business risk, financial risk (ie. financial 
leverage), asset value risk, cost base risk (ie. operating leverage) and centrally 'metal fatigue risk in 
management'. This model may be developed further in the sense that when business declines, 
entities with high financial and/or operating leverage are vulnerable. For lenders the only ultimate 
recourse is in asset value (which gives rise to asset risk). An awareness by management of business 
risk, and an ability to react to such risk, is therefore a crucial consideration in the interdependent 
interaction of risk. 
'Metal fatigue risk in management' is characterised by Boyadjian and Warren as frequent executive 
shuflles and reorganisation, use of consultants, dominance of organisational issues over business 
priorities and frequent redefinition of objectives. The view that 'the prime cause of [company] 
failure is bad management' is supported by Argenti (I976, p. 125). He also argues that bad 
management results in a deficient accoWlting system and, 'vastly more important', an inability to 
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respond to change. He classifies such changes as competitive, politica~ socia~ economic and 
technological saying that 'it is often said that changes in technology are the most influential today. 
While this must be true in some industries I personally believe it to be a very weak generalization' 
(pp. 128-129). Some of the components of these changes are outlined in Figure 2.5. Stakeholders, 
those that can affect the business, are the source of many of those changes ... from those changes 
come some of the risks of the reporting entity. 
Figure 2.5: Argenti's classification of change. 
Competitive Political Social Economic 
Change Change Change Change 
• Emergence • Affect on • Attitude to • Currency 
of foreign production work movement 
low-cost resources • Lifestyle, • Economic 
producers • New demograph cycle 
• Merger of quotas, ics etc. • Inflation 
competitor duties, • Attitudes • Interest 
firms taxes, to pollution rates 
• New levies and and • Patterns of 
ranges of legislation consumer disposable 
competing • Changes in protection mcome 
products political 
• New attitudes 
companym towards 
the industry business in 
general and 
some 
industries 
m 
particular 
The inability of financial accounting to deal with such change may be illustrated in the example of 
one element of economic change: currency movements. Pope and Marshall (1991, pp. 57-58), in a 
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review of the disclosure of the management of exchange rate and interest rate risk, note that 
Exchange rates and interest rates are the main sources of financial price risk 
faced by most companies, although price risk in other global markets such as 
oil and other commodities can also be very important. Changes in interest rates 
and exchange rates can have major impacts upon reported earnings and cash 
flows unless management has taken steps to hedge the risk exposure. 
In the case of exchange rate risk, they go on (p. 59) to distinguish between 
a) transaction exposure: 'temporary transaction exposure will occur whenever a sale, purchase or 
other transaction, e.g. a known foreign exchange payment, is denominated in a foreign currency 
and due to be completed at some future point in time.' 
b) translation exposure: 'translation exposure arises on the conversion into sterling equivalents (for 
UK companies) of amounts fixed in foreign currencies for accounting purposes', and 
c) economic exposure: 'this exposure is the most difficult to determine as it results from the 
structure of the business, its competitive position and how costs, output, prices and therefore 
profits are influenced by exchange rate movements. ' 
Wihlborg (1980, p. 24) defines the accounting exposure to exchange rate changes as foreign 
currency assets minus foreign currency liabilities translated at the current (year end) exchange 
rate(s). The larger the exposure the larger the potential exchange rate gains or losses in the profit 
and loss account. The exchange rate at which the asset or liability will mature is uncertain. The 
year-end exchange rate is advocated by SSAP 20 as the appropriate exchange rate to use in the 
translation of year-end positions 'as it is, generally, 'the best estimate' (ASC, 1983, para. 9) of the 
amount at which the asset or liability will mature, 
Belk and GIaum (1990, p. 4) write that 'accounting exposure does not give a true picture of the 
effects of exchange rate changes on the economic value of the firm, and the gains and losses 
measured are purely of a paper nature.' Pope and Marshall (1990, pp 59-60), while agreeing that 
'translations do not represent real movements of cash between different currencies', argue that the 
financial statements which result from such foreign currency translation 'can affect a company's 
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borrowing capacity and therefore have an indirect cash impact.' The importance attached to 
translation exposure is underlined by Collier, Davis, Coates and Longden (1990) who found that 
currency managers are more risk averse to such exposure than to transaction exposure. These 
arguments support the case for wider recognition in financial statements of the effect of exchange 
rate risk than simply the translation of balances. 
Peters (1989, p. 27) agrees that accountancy is unable to recognise or measure the changes 
experienced by business, observing that 'to-day's management wisdom is pr~d.icated on stability. 
None of its tools - basi", accounting practices, patterns of organisation, fommlation of strategy or 
workforce care - can cope with the new rates of change.' Boyadjian and Warren's central thesis is 
that (p. 275): 
the financial stateinents of companies are not valuation statements and, perhaps 
more important, ... the conventions of accountancy are simply too primitive to 
capture or render with much validity or accuracy the intangtble realities and 
subtle vagaries that drive the dynamics of the modern corporation. 
The ASB's Discussion Paper on the OFR conceded that 
Although the financial statements _are complete in themselves, their complexity 
and that of the underlying business is often such that their usefulness is limited 
unless accompanied by interpretation and discussion by management of the 
enterprise's business, the risks to which that business is exposed and the 
structure of its financing. (ASB, 1992d, para. 2) 
Although the need for accounting is 'to help [users] make decisions' (AAA, 1973, p. 212), Ronen 
(1977) concludes that 'the entire burden of assessing uncertain prospects falls on the user' because 
'presiding over [accountancy] is the myth of certainty.' What can be done within the limits of 
accountancy to dispe~ if not disclose the nature ot: the 'myth of certainty'? 
The next section will all~wp\ co synthesise a range of suggestions which have bt!en llJA.it! Ul wis 
regard. 
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2.4 REFLECTING UNCERTAINTY IN FINANCIAL REPORTING 
As well as admitting or ignoring doubt, as suggested by Mock and Vertinsky (1985), doubt may 
also be quantified based on a consistent and agreed framework. Suggestions concerning how such 
doubts may be admitted and/or quantified are based on varying degrees of fineness. They include 
i) the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements, including a disclosure of significant 
estimates which are subject to uncertainty, 
ii) the discussion of the major risks and uncertainties arising from the nature of the business, 
iii) the preparation of probabilistic financial statements 
iv) the use of the concepts of estimation theory, 
v) the disclosure of probabilities or ranges of uncertainty concerning the occurrence and outcome 
of events, 
vi) the disclosure of a 'layered' balance sheet distinguishing between items measured with a high 
degree of certainty and items measured or estimated on the basis of judgment, and 
vii)the separation of recognition and realisation. 
The central concerns of recognition and measurement are dealt with differently and to differing 
degrees by these suggestions. The first five categories appear to recognise that the consideration of 
recognition and measurement are not mutually exclusive and address, generally (in the case of the 
first two) or specifically (in the case of the next three), how the uncertainty of recognition and 
measurement could be addressed and disclosed. The sixth clarifies the problems of measurement in 
financial statements while the last broadens the consideration of recognition. 
These suggestions will now be considered in turn. That consideration will concentrate in particular 
on those suggestions which may be viewed as evolutionary rather than revolutionary in keeping 
with the undertaking by the ASB 'to take account of the desire of the financial community for 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary change in the reporting process.' (ASB, 1991c, para. 7) 
Furthermore, the consideration is constrained by an awareness that 'accounting is needed to help 
[users] make decisions, not to make decisions for [users].' (AAA, 1973, p. 212) 
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i) The disclosure of the uncertain natu.re of financial statements 
TIle first suggestion sets out to do no more than admit doubt and reveal in some way the extent of 
doubt. This form of disclosure is, to an extent, embodied ill the Directors' Responsibility 
Statement and the general understanding of what constitutes a 'true and fair view'. It is not the 
objective of the former to disclose the nature of financial statements per se but to clarify the 
responsibilities of the directors with regard to published financial statements. By doing so, 
however, it does set out that the financial statements are prepared on the basis of 'suitable 
accounting policies, consistently applied and supported by reasonable and prudent judgements and 
estimates' (Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, Note 12). 
Skinner (1987, p. 134) remarks that 'uncertainty is pervasive, and the user offinancial statements 
ought to be presumed to have sufficient acquaintance with the world to know that. ' Sophisticated 
users of financial statements are aware that 'a true and fair view' does not imply certainty. Indeed, 
the exact meaning of the phrase itselfis uncertain. (Morse and MarshalL 1983). However 
to the man in the street ... the words 'true and fair' are likely to signify that the 
accounts give a true statement of facts. He will be likely to associate 'facts' 
with 'actual profit' and 'actual values'. (Edey, 1971,p. 440) 
As well as arguing that the preparers offinancial have a responsibility to non-diversified as well as 
diversified shareholders (as Kripke (1979) does) one may wonder whether financial reporting has a 
duty to the 'person in the street' as well as to the reasonably well-informed user. This broader 
question is outside the scope of this paper. However, how well-informed users are or what 
percentage of users are well-informed is unclear. The seminal surveys by Lee and Tweedie (1977 
and 1981) found a poor level of understanding of the general nature of reported financial 
statements in the case of half of both institutional investors and private shareholders. 
In the light of the search for 'actual profit and actual values', Gonedes and Dopuch (1979, p. 48) 
assert that 'accounting numbers may be viewed as random variables' and that 'no income model 
can be derived for a world of uncertainty'. Several alternatives have been advanced to clarify the 
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random nature of financial statements in a world of uncertainty. Among these is the proposal of 
the AICPA Task Force on Risks and Uncertainties to disclose an explanation that the preparation 
of financial statements requires the use of estimates by management (AI CPA, 1987). An example 
of this disclosure is given in Figure 2.6. Boritz (1990, p. 55) recommends the inclusion of a 
'management report' with all general purpose financial statements. This report.would contain the 
disclosures currently included in the Directors' Responsibility Statement as well as an indication 
that 'historical financial information requires the use of approximations and estimates based on 
professional judgments. ' 
Figure 2.6: IDustration of the disclosure of the Basis of Financial Statement Preparation (AICPA 
Task Force on Risks and Uncertainties, 1987, p. 13) 
The preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles requires management to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported 
amounts of assets and liabilities at the reporting date and revenues and expenses during the 
reporting period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. 
As well as suggesting the disclosure that financial statements are a product of estimates by 
management, both Boritz and the AICPA Task Force suggest that financial statements should 
provide sufficient disclosure and discussion of significant estimates to allow users to assess those 
estimates. Such disclosures would include, for example, the assumptions on which the estimate is 
based, the estimation methods used and would distinguish between fixed and variable components 
of the estimate (Boritz, 1990, p. 72). An illustration of such a disclosure is given in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7: llIustration of the disclosure of significant estimates in the financial statements 
(AlCPA Task Force, 1987, p. 15 and Boritz, 1990, p. 75). 
At December 31, 1987, because new competition has caused wlanticipated reductions in 
demand for one of its products, XYZ has inventories in excess of its current requirements that 
are reported at $6 million in the accompanying balance sheet. Management has developed a 
programme to reduce the quantities to desired levels and believes no loss is probable on their 
disposition. XYZ's ability to recover the cost of the inventories depends, however, on the 
success of its program, which may be affected by competitive and other factors beyond its 
control 
This particular disclosure is not unprecedented. It is in the nature of disclosures concerning the 
uncertainty ot: say, bank support and its implications for going concern, or even in the nature of the 
disclosure of contingencies. Indeed, the illustration of it does not reveal the nature of the estimate 
or the method of estimation. Furthermore, ifuncertainty is pervasive and financial statements are 
surrounded by uncertainty and estimatio~ which estimates should be disclosed and which should 
not? 
A significant estimate requiring disclosure is one used to determine the carrying 
amount of an asset or a liability that, based on facts and circumstances existing 
at the balance sheet date, is particularly susceptible to changes that could result 
in a material adjustment to results of operations in the near term . . . The 
criteria for significance do not depend on the amowlt that has been reported in 
the financial statements, ~ut rather are based on the significance of the estimate 
and the degree of its variability. (AlCPA, 1987, p. 13) 
Unlike the criteria for the disclosure of contingencies, therefore, which is 'determined by its 
expected outcome' (ASC, 1980, para. 3), the disclosure of significant estimates would be 
determined by their perceived significance and variability. The impact of the variability of the 
estimate should, at the reporting date, be near term as disclosures whose impact is only long-term 
are less relevant, reliable and significant. 
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ii) The discussion of the major risks and uncertainties arising from the nature of the business 
The first suggested approach to uncertainty in financial reporting concentrates 011 the nature of 
financial statements themselves. The second focusses on the nature of the business in which the 
reporting entity operates. The AICPA Task Force suggested the disclosure of the nature of the 
operations of the reporting entity as well as 'current vulnerability due to concentrations of assets, 
customers or suppliers.' (AICPA, 1987, p. 5) Such disclosures, it could be argued, are implicitly 
required by SSAP 25 and by the requirements of both the Stock Exchange and company law. TIle 
purpose of providing segmental information is to 
to provide information to assist the users of financial statements: 
(a) to appreciate more thoroughly the results and financial position of the entity 
by permitting a better understanding of the entity's past performance and 
thus a better assessment of its future prospects; and 
(b) to be aware of the impact that changes in significant components of a 
business may have on the business as a whole. (ASC, 1990, para. 1) 
While the Standard does not have the assessment of risk as an explicit objective, the disclosure of 
segmental information has been identified by several commentators as an important indicator of 
risk (e.g. Pope and Marshal~ 1991, p. 60; Boritz, 1990, p. 60) and the usefulness of such 
information has also been extensively researched (e.g. Baldwin, 1984; Balakrishnan, Harris and 
Sen, 1990). It is interesting to note that the determination of reportable business segments may be 
based on different classes of business or different geographical areas that 'are subject to different 
degrees of risk' (ASC, 1990, para. 8) although this is one of four aspects which may be 
considered when defining a segment. 
Segmental information is, however, by its nature, an indicator of the risk attached to being involved 
during the reporting period in a certain geographical area or in a certain class of business. While 
these segments are the source of some risks, they are not the source of all risks. They are 
indicators furthennore of historical industry-specific risk, area-specific risk and some related risks 
such as exchange risk. and give an indication of company-specific risk only to the extent of the 
involvement of the company in the industry or geographical area. Hussain and Skerratt (1992) 
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model the value of segmental infonnation based on the ability to assess from it the perfonnance (in 
the sense of profits and activity) of the reporting entity relative to the rest of the industry in which it 
operates. Such an indicator of relative perfonnance is also suggested by Thornton (1983, p. 14): 
One possibility [of disclosing unhedged contingencies] would be for every finn 
to disclose the estimated correlation coefficient between its contingencies and 
some market-wide index such as gross national product or returns on a stock 
market index. 
The intention of the AICPA Task. Force disclosure, however, is to inform the user about risk 'other 
than one that is generally known to be associated with the industry or trade in which the entity 
operates' (AICPA, 1987, p. 19) Such a disclosure may take the form of those presented in Figure 
2.8. 
Figure 2.8: illustration of a disclosure of information related to concentrations 
(AICPA, 1987, p. 20). 
At December 31, 1987, approximately 12 percent of the bank's loan portfolio comprises loans 
to independent oil and gas ventures. Including oil and gas venture loans, approximately 85% of 
the bank's loan portfolio is with customers located in the state of Texas. 
Felt Pharmaceutical Company is a national phannaceutical manufacturer with sales throughout 
the United States. The patent on one of its major products expires next year. This product 
accounts for 35 percent of the company's revenues and a higher percentage ofits gross profit. 
Again, it could be argued that such disclosure is already provided and would be required in a broad 
sense in order to present a 'true and fair view' of the entity's financial position or to reflect dle 
substance of transactions. AlB, for example, provides the disclosure set out in Figure 2.9 in Note 
13 of its 1991 Annual Report. 
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Figure 2.9: AlB Disclosure of risk an uncertainty arising from the business 
(Source: AlB Annual Report 1991, p. 38). 
1991 
Latin American debt US $m 
The Group's out standings are to the following cOlUltries: 
Mexico 92.4 
Venezuela 23.9 
Chile 15.9 
Ilra2ll 5.4 
Other Latin American countries* 17.1 
155.3 
1R£99.8 
1990 
US$m 
96.8 
33.3 
16.3 
7.6 
19.9 
ill...2 
1R£110.2 
* 'Other Latin American countries' are Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. 
The Group's provisions against Latin American debt represents 65% of the Group's outstandings 
to these countries. The secondary market value of this portfolio at 31 st. March 1991 exceeds its 
written down value by US $50m 
'The goal of generally accepted accounting principles is to provide financial statement data which 
faithfully portray the realities of enterprise operations and financial conditions' write Mautz and 
Sharaf{l961, p. 203) who continue that such presentation can be achieved by realistic recognition 
of enterprise transactions, and their effects, as they occur. This principle is embodied in the APB's 
SAS 600 Auditors' Reports on Financial Statements. This Statement considers the implications of 
uncertainty for the auditors' consideration of the true and fair view. The Statement requires that 
auditors consider whether the view given by the financial statements could be affected by inherent 
uncertainties which, in their opinion, are fundamental (APB, 1993, para. 54). In the context of the 
audit report, inherent uncertainties are those which affect a wide range of components of the 
financial statements (and not just one). Inherent uncertainties should be dealt with by appropriate 
accounting policies and adequately disclosed. They become fundamental when they threaten the 
going concern assumption or when their effect on the financial statements is 'unusually great' 
(para. 64). 
A central question to be addressed in this context is 'what level and type of uncertainty triggers 
disclosure and / or recognition?' The answer to this question decides the extent of the disclosure 
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of uncertainty in financial statements. The AICPA (1987) and Boritz (1990) propose the 
disclosure of 'significant estimates'. The ASB in its draft Statement of Principles (ASB, 1995b) 
requires sufficient evidence for recognition and in the absence of such evidence disclosure of the 
nature of the estimate. The APB (1993) requires the consideration of inherent or fimdamental 
uncertainty. Each threshold is defined differently and applied by the exercise of professional 
judgment. 
Also central to such considerations is the timing of the event (past or future), its impact on the 
financial statements, uncertainty regarding its occurrence and its outcome but also whether 
uncertainty is created by a particular event or by circumstances in general Skinner (1987, pp. 133-
134) makes that distinction between general risks and specific risks and continues: 'it is 
uncontentious that general risks attnbutable to the business carried on are not required to be 
descnbed in financial statements . . . That being said, it is a different situation when a general 
business risk threatens to become an immediate claim or risk. , 
Thornton (1983, p. 15) draws a distinction between uncertainties arising from endogenous and 
exogenous circumstances. Uncertainties which he describes as endogenous are those 'risks that a 
well-informed entrepreneur would expect to face in his chosen line or lines of business' while risks 
or uncertainties that would not be expected in the particular line of business are descnbed as 
exogenous. Thornton takes the view that the reporting of specific endogenous uncertainties is 
'redundant ifnormal business risks are already implicit in the history of the firm's operating results 
and in the history of its security prices. ' This conclusion is supported by portfolio theory which 
would distinguish between risks which are general to the market (,market risk') and risks which are 
specific to the entity ('unique risk'). Well-diversified shareholders, through their portfolio, 
minimise the risk of holding shares in a specific entity. They would be concerned therefore only 
with the market risk arising from exogenous uncertainties. The disclosure of exogenous rather 
than endogenous risks would, he argues, be useful in that context. 
The assumption is, of course, that shareholders are the only users that need information concerning 
uncertainty or that shareholders are well-diversified. Section 2.2 discussed that contention and 
43 
concluded that users are a widely heterogeneous group with different needs, knowledge and 
different levels of influence with regard to the reporting entity. Even among shareholders 
themselves 
there IS extensive diversity. Shareholders include diversified versus 
Wldiversified, those using professional financial advisers and those who do not, 
those knowledgeable about financial statements versus those informed, and 
actual versus potential owners of securities. (Wolk et al., 1984, p. 180) 
The world or market of users (whatever about of securities) is not perfect. The Wlcertainties that 
an entrepreneur would expect to face are not necessarily known to users at large. 
This may lead to differences in reaction among users to endogenous (known) and exogenous 
(WlknOwn) Wlcertainties. Disclosures regarding known risks, for example, may lead to greater 
confidence and agreement concerning the uncertainty facing the entity. On the other hand, 
disclosures of hitherto unknown risks may lead to less confidence and less agreement and to a 
search for information and reassurance from other sources besides the financial statements. The 
construction of the research hypotheses in chapter 6 elaborates on some of these issues. 
The ASB attempts, through the OFR, to establish 'a framework for the directors to discuss and 
analyse the business's performance and the factors underlying its results and financial position, in 
order to assist users to assess for themselves the future potential of the business' (ASB, 1993a, 
para. 1). As part of this framework, the OFR should include discussion of: 
• trends and factors underlying the business that have affected the results but 
are not expected to cOntinue in the future; and 
• known events, trends and uncertainties that are expected to have an impact 
on the business in the future.(ASB, 1993a, para. 3) 
The OFR thus distinguishes between what might be termed discontinued and continuing trends and 
Wlcertainties. This distinction (rather than the distinction between the general and the specific, the 
exogenous and the endogenous) is crucial to the user in assessing the future potential of the 
business and which reflects the concern within FRS 3 'to assist [users] forming a basis for their 
assessment of future results and cash flows.' (ASB, 1992c, para. 1) 
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The OFR, like the Management and Discussion Analysis in the US, is outside the general-purpose 
financial statements, something which was discouraged by Boritz (1990). The OFR therefore is 
general and discursive. If uncertainty creates difficulty for measurement and quantification, 
perhaps that uncertainty can only be addressed by broad, qualitative disclosures. This approach, 
however, has implications for the mutual understanding of the disclosure. Users' understanding of 
and preference for qualitative (as opposed to quantitative information) and descriptive (as opposed 
to technical) information differs between groups (Wethe~ck, 1967; Chesley, 1986; Du Pree, 1985; 
Lewis, Parker, Pound and Sutcliffe, 1986). These differences have implications for the relevance 
(in the sense of reaction to) and understandability of disclosure and will form part of the research 
objectives in chapters 6, 9 and 10. 
iii) Probabilistic financial statements 
The Committee on Concepts and Standards - External Financial Reporting of the AAA (1973, 
pp. 219-222) suggested the presentation of 'full-scale probabilistic statements'. Such statements 
'are based on reducing a discrete probability distn'bution for each year to a single value, the mean, 
and then the present worth of the means are discounted to find a present value of the future cash 
flows. ' The problem of recognising events at a particular time and realising the resultant gain or 
loss is one of allocation (e.g. of gains or losses to a particular time-period). 
Thomas (1974, p. 50) argues that 'most amortisation and contn'bution allocations are either totally 
or indeterminately ambiguous.' In response to the critical problem of the arbitrariness of allocation, 
which arises from uncertainty and indeterminacy, Milburn (1988) explores the use of the 
calculation of assets and liabilities on a present value basis. Relaxing 'the assumption of perfect 
certainty', Milburn (p. 39) argues that the discount rate used in present value calculations 
comprises the risk-free rate plus allowances for expectations and risk concerning the recoverability 
of the investment, the inflation rate and a liquidity/preference premium. The ASB in a Working 
Paper on Discounting in Financial Reporting comments (ASB, 1997a, p, 5) that 'in order to 
determine what discount rate should be used in any particular situation, it is necessary to consider 
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the implications of risk'. The discoWlt rate therefore allows the preparers and users of financial 
statements to adjust for the effect of perceived Wlcertainty. TIle objective oftlIe ASB's Working 
Paper is not to reflect Wlcertainty per se but to reflect the time value of money ill the valuation of 
an asset or liability (ASB, 1997a, p. 2). As such, probabilistic financial statements are not central to 
the current evolution of accoWlting thought as reflected for example in Measurement in Financial 
Statements of the ASB' s draft Statement of Principles. This as yet revolutionary suggestion is 
explored in more detail by Milburn (1988). As this research is policy-driven and evolutionary in 
nature and is not specifically concerned with discOWlting as a valuation too~ it is not proposed to 
delve further into the potential of probabilistic financial statements when developing the research 
hypotheses in chapter 6. 
iv) &timation Theory 
The notion of present value and/or probabilistic financial statements is not far removed from 
estimation theory as described by Thomas (1974) and proposed by, for example, Brief and Owen 
(1968, 1969). Thomas (p. 98) provides the following example which best illustrates this theory: 
Let us suppose that current inflows total $10,000,000, and that the accoWltant 
exogenously estimates the firms long-fWl rate ofretum on current inflows to be 
7 per cent. Net income would, then. be reported as being $10,000,000 * 
7%=$700,000, and total expenses would be reported as being $10,000,000 _ 
$700,000 = $9,300,000 ... 
Let us suppose that the accoWltant exogenously estimates the fum's 10ng-fWl 
rate of return on invested capital to be 10 per cent. Total assets would be 
reported at an amount that is consistent with this rate of return: 
$700,000/10%=$7,000,000 ... 
Let us suppose that monetary assets totalled $2,900,000; then, nonmonetary 
assets would be reported at the amoWlt, $7,000,000 - $2,900,000 = 
$4,100,000. TIlls amount corresponds to what ordinarily would be reported as 
the total net book value of all inventories, prepayments, plant and equipment. 
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Estimation theory does not eliminate WI certainty. (No approach to accowlting can eliminate 
Wlcertainty according to Thomas) It does, however, aim to go some way toward constructing 
financial reports 'in a manner consistent with the reader's specific estimation needs' and eliminate 
'the distortions caused by the use of arbitrary allocations' (Thomas, 1974, p. 98). The intention of 
the theory is not primarily to address uncertainty but to address the problem of allocation. In doing 
so it addresses Wlcertainty in a narrow, albeit radical, way. The heterogeneous nature of users' 
needs (including estimation needs) in the context of pervasive uncertainty demands a broader, 
though less radical approach, which would represent an evolution rather than a revolution in 
accounting practice. 
v) Disclosure of ranges of uncertainty 
A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory (1966, p. 65), in a section on the scope of future 
accoWlting, commented that 
Another aspect of multiple valuations involves the use of non-detenninistic or 
quantum ranges with or without probabilistic measures. In view of 
Wlcertainties surrounding business activities and the measurement of their 
impact, the use of non-detenninistic measures is likely to become a part of an 
expanded accoWlting discipline of the future. 
In the general context of the consideration of risk in decision making Hull (1980, p. 21) remarks 
that 
'pessimistic' and 'optimistic' estimates provide an indication of the uncertainty 
surrounding the best estimate for a particular variable but, for a complete 
description of that uncertainty, a probability distribution is required. 
Such probabilities, continues Hull (pp. 45-48) could be estimated and expressed in the form of a 
fixed interval (and estimating the probability of the occurrence and/or outcome of an event being 
realised within that interval) or a variable interval (estimating an interval surrounding an 
occurrence/outcome with a specified probability). These methods are the most widely used, writes 
HuJ~ in management decision making under Wlcertainty. An example of fixed interval and variable 
47 
interval disclosures of debtors is given in Figure 2.10. 
Figure 2.10: Disclosures of ranges of values - a) fixed interval and b) variable interval 
a) Debtors, net of provision for bad debts, are stated in the balance sheet a~ £150,000. It is 
estimated by the directors with a probability of93% that debtors will realise between £135,000 
and £165,000. 
b) Debtors, net of provision for bad debts, are stated in the balance sheet as £150,000. The 
probability of realising that amount is estimated by the directors as between 91 % and 97%. 
This example illustrates the link between events and the disclosure of uncertainty. Greater 
uncertainty surrounding events (e.g. sales to Iraq, economic recession) will lead to the disclosure of 
a wider range or a lower confidence level concerning particular items. Thomas (1974, p. 51) calls 
financial statements not just statements but assertions. The disclosure of probability ranges or 
confidence intervals reveals the basis on which the assertions in the financial statements are made. 
The accommodation of uncertainty in financial statements in this manner was also mentioned by the 
AICPA Objectives Report (1973) and by other writers such as Bedford (1965), Devine (1966), 
Vatter (1966) and Thornton (1983). Thornton (p. 37) writes: 
In the context of financial reporting, the decision tree approach to uncertainty 
may also be a useful rule of thumb that can be used to frame the public 
disclosure of some important kinds of contingencies. Under this approach, the 
contingent impacts of events on the firm's financial statements are the 
outcomes at the ends of the branches. The probabilities on the branches are 
subjectively assigned by management ... For many contingencies, it may not 
be possible for management to assign numerical probabilities with precision. 
Even so, it can still be useful to disclose the tree, perhaps in a highly simplified 
form, then to indicate whether the contingencies are likely or unlikely. 
This approach has two advantages according to Thornton: first, it distinguishes clearly between 
occurrence and outcome (helping perhaps to solve the problem of zero-infinity events) and second, 
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it clearly divides the fimction of preparer and auditor, the preparer assigning the probabilities and 
the auditor assessing the reasonableness of that assignment and the impact of the events on the 
financial statements. 
Recognising that 'the accountant's attempts to disclose precision are crude indeed', Devine (1966, 
p. 22) argues that 
a little-explored alternative estimates probability numbers for both the amount 
to be paid and the possibility of having to pay at all and derives an expected 
value for the unfavourable prospect. 
It was indeed 'little-explored' at that time. Subsequent research (explored in detail in chapter 4) 
represents variations on the theme of the disclosure of probability measures. Oliver (1972), 
Bimberg and Slevin (1976), Keys (1978), Chen and Summers (1981) and Coats and Chesser 
(1982) arrived at various conclusions depending on the structure oftbe infonnation provided and 
nature of the participants. Bimberg and Slevin, for example, concluded (p. 153) that 'the presence 
of a formal confidence interval statement did not yield significant differences in the subject's 
decision' as 'apparently the skilled user of financial statements already possesses a notion of the 
relative size of the confidence interval around the point estimate from past experience.' (p. 156) 
Chen and Summers (1981, p. 13) found, however, that 'removing the appearance of certainty from 
accounting affects decision making behaviour.' They also comment that 'a mere indication of the 
uncertain nature of the reported figure does not necessarily provide subjects with more infonnation 
that the conventional single-valued accounting figure. ' 
Less radical echoes of these proposals resound more recently in the ASB's draft Statement of 
Principles. The ASB comments that uncertainty creates variability in outcome (if not doubts 
regarding occurrence). This variability can be reduced by evidence such as a transaction price, a 
market-based measure or by measuring the value of a group of homogenous but not identical 
outcomes of which the outcome in question would be a part. 
The draft (ASB, 1995b, p. 78) continues, however,that: 
Where assets and liabilities are subject to uncertainty, simply reporting a single 
amount may create an impression of certainty of outcome that does not in fact 
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exist. Hence, where the effect of ullcertainty is potentially significant, clear 
disclosure of the degree of uncertainty surrounding the estimate is necessary. 
Such disclosure might include the significant assumptions used, the range of 
possible outcomes. the basis of measurement and the principal factors that affect 
what the outcome will be. 
FRED 14: Contingencies and Provisions (ASB, 1997b, p. 27) proposes a similar disclosure of 
contingencies. 
These suggestions are somewhat similar to those advanced by Vatter (1965) and also by Bedford 
(1966, pp. 61-62), who advocated that 'the range of possible error should be disclosed'. He 
extended the disclosure, however, to include the disclosure in the form of a standard deviation 'the 
tendency of variations to deviate from anyone count.' This would provide some information 
regarding the 'reliability (confidence levels) and precision (error ranges within which the true 
figures are expected) of accounting numbers.' (Bloom, 1980, p. 12) 
vi) The balance sheet as layers of certainty 
As well as suggesting the disclosure of 'a fairly extensive description of how [a range of 
expectations of a value] was established' Vatter (1965, p. 87) suggests that financial statements 
shoulddistingWsh 
between those things which accountants do measure objectively, and those 
other items that cause trouble because of the estimates and judgments that are 
inevitable. 
The process of accounting is a process of aggregation and measurement. 'Economic resources' 
writes Ijiri (1966, p. 154), 'can be classified into a number of classes in such a way that items in 
each class have identical properties and can be measured by a suitable physical measure.' As a 
result, 'an individual balance sheet is therefore a configuration made up of parts.' (Morgenstern, 
1963, p. 82) Each of these parts, argues Morgenstern, can be measured with differing probability. 
Ca~ for example, can be measured with a probability of one, while there may be more certainty 
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concerning the measurement of: say, government securities than the measurement of debtors. 
Morgenstern (p. 82) calls 'the amounts with probability of one the 'kernel' or 'core' of the balance 
sheet. All others are farther and farther away from the core'. The modem balance sheet, by 
convention and legislation, distinguishes between fixed assets and current assets. Fixed assets are 
classified as tangtole, intangible and financial Current assets comprise stock, debtors and 
prepayments and bank and cash. The order in which they are presented reflect their position in the 
trade cycle: fixed assets are purchased to produce stock which is sold (if on credit) to debtors who 
(eventually) pay cash. Such a presentation reflects the nature of the assets and their distance from 
realisation as cash (and the further that distance the more uncertain the ultimate realisation of the 
asset may be). It does not, however, specifically reflect the uncertainty or risk attached to those 
assets as outlined at the beginning of this paper. Different types of asset (fixed, current etc.) may 
have different uncertainties attached to their existence and valuation. Some fixed assets may be 
more certain than some current assets and so on. As a result, the pervasiveness of uncertainty may 
result in a proliferation of balance sheet captions and disclosures. There is a need for some 
threshold of significance for uncertainty to be recognised and I or disclosed. This particular 
suggestion discloses layers of uncertainty in the balance sheet. Another, which does establish a 
threshold (or thresholds) for recognition and separates recognition and disclosure, proposes layers 
of uncertainty in the profit and loss account. 
Vii) The separation o/recognition and realisation 
The Committee on Concepts and Standards - &temal Financial Reporting of the AAA (1973) 
asked a question which is central to the discussion of uncertainty and measurement in financial 
statements: 'in a world of uncertainty at what point can income be measured with sufficient 
reliability to warrant entering it into the accounts and reporting it in the income statement?' (AAA, 
1973, p. 213) Commenting that any realisation in financial statements requires the uncertainty 
concerning an event to pass below some professionally determined threshold, one of the solutions 
put forward by the Committee is to separate recognition and realisation, to 'broaden the realisation 
distinctions made within the accounts themselves' (p. 216). In that context, more uncertainty may 
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be tolerated regarding the evidence required to recognise an item than to account for its realisatioll. 
As a result, events may be recognised but not realised. The threshold level for realisatioll would 
then be more stringent: 'realisation serves but one purpose - to inform the reader that the 
probability of receiving recognised value changes is now almost certain.' (p. 218) An example of 
an income statement conforming to these revised criteria is offered in Figure 2.11. 
Figure 2.11: Suggested income statement resulting from a separation of realisation and 
recognition. 
Revenue recognised during the period 
Less: Expenses recognised during the period 
Operating income recognised during the period 
Less: Income recognised but not realised 
Plus: Income recognised in prior periods but realised during the period 
Operating income realised during the period 
The reflection of uncertainty in this manner could equally be advanced as a reflection of changing 
prices (which would lead to differences in the amounts ifnot the events recognised and realised). 
The factors determining realisation and recognition remain unaddressed and undisclosed. This 
approach merely serves to 'broaden the treatment of uncertainty in accounting records' (AAA, 
1973, p. 216) not necessarily to clarifY or share it. Given the layered format of the profit and loss 
account introduced by FRS 3, the addition of more layers is unlikely to clarifY further an entity's 
performance. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has set out in some detail the increasing importance of uncertainty to the stakeholders 
of the modem reporting entity, the inherently uncertain nature offinancial statements and hence the 
relevance of research concerning uncertainty to the accounting discipline. Financial reporting has 
evolved to include within its objectives decision-usefulness and, further, the view that in order to 
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meet the needs of users financial statments sbould reflect the substance rather than the fonn of 
financial transactions. Therefore, where the substance of the world is increasingly Wlceltaill, 
uncertainty is increasingly important to the evolution of financial reporting. 
A number of suggestions concerning how financial statements might reflect uncertainty were then 
outlined Some of these were, such as the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial 
statements, the discussion of the major risks and uncertainties arising from the nature of the 
business and the disclosure of probabilities or ranges of uncertainty, evolutionary and pragmatic. 
Others were more revolutionary and abstract. Chapter 5 will outline in more detail the specific 
contnlmtion of these suggestions to the development of the research in accordance with its policy-
driven objectives. 
It: as Keynes argued (quoted in section 2.1), uncertainty is part of the human condition, further 
consideration of uncertainty requires perllaps an exploration of the reaction of individuals to 
uncertainty. The following chapter reviews the broad literature concerning decision-making within 
the context of uncertainty before chapter 4 outlines previous work in the area specific to the 
accounting discipline. 
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3.1 INTRODUCfION 
Chapter 2 outlined in general terms the development and evolution of accounting thought with 
regard to uncertainty. In doing so, it established (in section 2.2) the relevance and (in section 2.3) 
the context of research regarding uncertainty in financial reporting. The proposals in chapter 2 
addressed risk and uncertainty in different ways. In particular, policy proposals concerning 
uncertainty adopted different nuances. Accounting standards concentrate on the risk of particular 
events. SSAP 18 specifically excludes the uncertainties concerning aspects of the financial 
statements. The OFR (in the UK and Ireland) and (in the US) Management Discussion & AnalySis 
(MD&A) indicate a general, discursive consideration of key risks. They do not therefore attempt 
to implement the suggestion of ASOBAT. The contention of KIoman (who has more of an affinity 
with risk science than with accounting) that 'tomorrow we may live in the world according to 
GARP (generally accepted risk principles)' (KIoman, 1990, p. 10) is more aspiration than reality. 
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The decision-making literature is itself littered with uncertainty and peppered with paradox. Even 
an agreed definition of uncertainty and risk is illusive. A distinction is drawn between risk and 
uncertainty. However, 'there does not seem to any general agreement about which concept should 
be associated with which word.' (Edwards, 1954, p.27) Edwards characterises risk in terms of 
knowledge of the probability of an event occurring and uncertainty as a lack o'f the knowledge of 
such a probability. March and Shapira, drawing from Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965), write that 
'risk is most commonly conceived as reflecting variation in the distribution of possible outcomes, 
their likelihoods, and their subjective values' (1987 p. 1404) and later (1992, p. 172) that 'riskiness 
is associated with lack of certainty'. Byrne, Chames, Cooper and Kortanek (1968, p. 18) 
'conceptualise 'risk' as emerging from the fact that some of the information which is pertinent to a 
decision can best be known only in the form of specified probability distributions. The resulting 
pOSSibility of deviations from any estimate of the events governed by such probability distnbutions 
is then the basic phenomenon which we shall suppose gives rise to risk. ' 
It has been said that the changes in the SEC MD&A requirements were 'intended to give an 
investor an opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of management' (Dieter and 
Sandefur, 1989, p. 70). Accounting thought appears, in these terms, to have evolved from a 
.suggested disclosure ofrisk in theory (AAA, 1966, p. 65; Dau, 1978, p. 53; Keane, 1987, pp. 34 
and 35) to a disclosure, in practice, of uncertainty (ASB, 1993a, 1995; APB, 1992; AsSEC, 1993) 
In the OPR, (ASB, 1993a) risk is an expression of uncertainty. 
An important characteristic of such expressions is that 'probabilities do not exist as characteristics 
of the physical world; they are a person's statement about his degrees of belief' (Phillips, 1970, p. 
255). This argument, which is supported by de Finetti (1964), forms a central part of our attempt 
to characterise the process of disclosure in the context of uncertainty: whether such disclosures can 
be isolated from their preparer, whether probabilities are a 'statement of degrees of belief', or 
whether 'probability is not subjective. It is not, that is to say, subject to human caprice. A 
proposition is not probable because we think it so.' (Keynes, 1921, p. 4) This draws the distinction, 
perhaps, between emotion and reason which 'have been recognised to be adversaries from the very 
beginnings of Western thought.' (Kogan and Wallach, 1964, p. 1) 
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Such distinctions emphasise the problem arising from the approach adopted by the standard-setting 
bodies which has been identified by Beaver, Kennelly and Voss (1968) as a need to: 
a) 'define the decision models (or processes) of potential users ofaccoWlting data' (p. 679) 
and also by Anton (1964, p. 6): 
b) 'who will be the decision-maker and [what will be] the Wlcertainty of his context.' 
Singer and Singer (1985, p. 114) suggest that 'for those engaged in preparing financial reports or 
financial information for decision support, a greater awareness of the habits of thought of the 
various users of the information, as well as the social and political context in which it will be used, 
could be to everyone's advantage.' 
This chapter considers the habits of thought of users (in the Section 3.2) and, ultimately, (in 
Section 3.3) their context. In particular, the first section examines the evolution of descriptions and 
theories of decision-making over a number of centuries. More recent theories of decision-making 
have emphasised the context of decisions. Section 3.3 introduces some of these theories in a broad 
organisational context of accoWlting. Further, more specific studies of that context are discussed in 
the following chapter. The chapter concludes in Section 3.4 by drawing together briefly some of 
the ideas explored in this and the previous chapter to introduce the framework within which the 
research then proceeds. 
3.2 DECISION MODELS, THE DECISION-MAKER AND UNCERTAINfY 
The discussion in chapter 2 drew on two different propositions in accounting and finance: the 
decision-usefulness approach (of which predictive ability is a component) and the Efficient Markets 
HWothesis (which leads to capital asset pricing theory). Two further comments in these fields 
concentrate on the contribution that decision theory may make in the setting of these propositions. 
The AAA Committee on Accounting Theory Constroction and Verification argued that 'the 
predictive ability approach has been an essentially impersonal approach to the information needs for 
decisions; it has ignored the behavioural interactions of the accounting data and the decision-
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maker.' (AAA, 1971, p, 63) Gooding (1975, p. 1301) bas written that 'in capital asset pricing 
theory, investors are assumed to base their asset decisions on expected risks and retums. Although 
this theory has been widely accepted in the academic community, the behavioural assmnption 
underlying the theory has not been directly tested by surveying actual investors regarding their 
decision processes. ' 
The importance of risk in financial reporting was discussed in chapter 2 in the context of aggregate, 
market efficiency. It may seem incongruous, therefore, to disaggregate that market into the 
individuals that, together, comprise that market. Gonedes and Dopuch (1974, p. 106) argue that 
'the attainment of equilibrium in a market is induced by the workings of the system as a whole or 
aggregate behaviour and not by the actions of particular individuals.' The external validity of such 
an approach has been questioned by, among others, Underdown and Taylor (1985, p. 118) and 
Wolk et. al. (1984, p. 205) on the basis that it is hard to generate a general theory of the market 
from samples of individuals from within that market. Individual decision-making is dependent, as 
we shall see, on its context. (Schoemaker, (1990); Lipshitz (1993» The reservation is not so much 
that the whole may exceed the sum of the parts, but that the parts may be so diverse and intangtble 
that their aggregation may be invalid. 
Beaver, however, while recognising the weaknesses of behavioural research (Beaver et aI, 1968) 
supports the notion that 'evidence is needed on how individual investors, as opposed to the 
aggregate prices, react to information ... The application of behavioural science ... offers promise 
here ... Further research is needed to examine to what extent financial statement data are helpful 
to individual investors assessing the risk of a security' (Beaver, 1973, pp. 54-55.) May and 
Sundem (1976, p. 760) describe the process by which accounting information impacts on the 
capital markets as summarised in Figure 3.1: 
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Figure 3.1: Accounting infonnation and the capital markets (after May and Sundem, 1976) 
Process 1 Unanticipated ACCOIDlting Signals (New Infonnation) 
Process 2 Individual Expectations Revised 
Process 3 Individual Actions 
Process 4 Aggregate SupplylDemand for Securities 
Process 5 Share Price Changes 
They characterise processes 2 to 4 as a 'black box' and complain that security price-based research 
concentrates on processes 1 and 5, , 'leapfrogging' from accounting outputs to aggregate market 
consequences', to the exclusion of individual decision-making and the aggregate actions that result 
from such decision-making. Behavioural research is further supported by ASOBAT referring to 
the question of 'how different accounting measurements will influence the thinking of decision-
makers' (p. 70). This concern is supported by Tweedie and Whittington's obselVation (1990, p. 
98) that 'the informational approach may help' to provide an insight into the recognition and 
measurement issues arising from uncertainty. No claim is made as to the conclusiveness of this 
approach: a SUlVey of the rich, diverse decision-making literature 'may help': it 'offers promise'. 
This chapter will concentrate on May and Sundem's second and third processes by discussing 
individuals' risk expectations / perception and, also, the action that follows from such perception. 
3.2.1 Risk expectations 
Howard (1988, p. 681) characterises the decision analysis process as shown in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: The Decision Analysis Process (Howard, 1988, p. 680) 
1--'" Fonnulate t--_ ... Evaluate t---toI Appraise 1----.. .. '1 
Refine 
The analysis / logical evaluation component, he writes, has been represented in mathematical fonn 
by Bayes' theorem As pointed out by Einhorn (1976, p. 196), however, the field of behavioural 
science is an 'intersection of psychology, economics, statistics, and management sciences.' It is 
therefore characterised by differing perspectives as well as differing, though not mutually exclusive, 
aims, assumptions and conclusions. Take, for example, perspectives of probability: 
A statistician's aim, as statisticians work at present, is to obtain plauSible 
conclusions from data subject to random fluctuations. He necessarily has to study 
probability, since conclusions from such data can never be certain. Now when 
(psychologists) speak of probability (they) usually mean an attitude of mind ... 
To a psychologist, it is of interest to study how such attitudes come about, and 
how strong they are, and why different people think differently. But to a 
statistician, such variability from person to person is a nuisance.' (Smith, 1974, 
p.175) 
Kogan and Wallach conclude (1964, p. 206) that 'motivational influences may intrude upon 
thinking in various ways and to varying degrees. It is at this point that our results bear upon the 
long-standing problem of the relative dominance of external and internal detenninants in thinking 
processes. ' Freud is one of the advocates of the doctrine which argues that 'thinking activities 
emerge from a motivational source. Man comes to take account of the environment's features only 
grudgingly as an indirect route toward achieving motivational gratifications.' (Kogan and Wallach, 
1964, p. 206) Gestalt-theory on the other hand argues that humans think within their environment 
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and that successful adaptation to the environment is a feature of mature cognitive processes (see 
for example, Piaget (1951) and Wertheimer (1961». 
Although this distiuction rests in the field of psychology, its legacy remains in the manner in which 
the vastly various views of decision-making under uncertainty are discussed: views of the 
environment, whether it is single-stage, dynamic or chaotic, deterministic or probabilistic, 
ambiguous or uncertain; and also, views of the decision-maker and decision-making within that 
environment or what Newell and Simon (1972) term the 'problem-space'. 
3.2.2 The 'problem-space' 
'Since the cognitive revolution', writes Lopes (1994, p. 198), 'psychologists have seen people as 
systems for encoding and processing information.' This view is re-enforced by Newell and Simon's 
Human Problem Solving which concludes 'Humans, when engaged in problem-solving in the kinds 
of tasks we have considered, are representable as information processing systems [IPS].' (Newell 
and Simon, 1972, p.788). Newell and Simon continue (pp. 788-789): 
The shape of the theory we propose can be captured by four propositions: 
1. A few, and only a few, gross characteristics of the human IPS are invariant 
over task and problem-solver. 
2. These characteristics are sufficient to determine that a task environment is 
represented (in the IPS) as a problem space, and that problem solving takes 
place in the problem space. 
3. The structure of the task environment determines the possible structures of 
the problem space. 
4. The structure of the problem space determines the possible programs that 
can be used for problem solving. 
The role of financial accounting in the problem space is, essentially, to provide financial information 
useful to decision-makers (ASC, 1975; AICPA, 1973; ASB, 1995b). Newell and Simon liken the 
search for information within the problem space to hill-climbing: 
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In climbing a (not-too-precipitous) hill a good heuristic rule is 
always to go upward. If a particular spot is higher, reaching it 
probably represents progress toward the top. nle time it takes to 
reach the top will depend on the height of the hill and its steepness, 
but not on its circumference or area - not on the size of the total 
problem space. (Simon and Newell, 1970, p. 152) 
The issue of whether the objective is actually to make progress towards the top or some other goal 
is a motivational one, and will be addressed in Section 3.3. Of relevance in the consideration of the 
task environment, however, is the nature of that environment: whether static or dynamic (Edwards, 
1961; Simon and Newell, 1970). The distinction between static and dynamic decision 
environments could also be termed a distinction between decision-making in the short-run and in 
the long-run (Lopes, 1981). Short-run models of decision-making imagine a world of single 
choices, while long-run theories are concerned with a sequence of choices where the outcome of 
one choice may affect future choices. Rapoport and Wallsten (1979, pp. 172-173) distinguish 
between 'single-stage and multi-stage tasks depending on the number of decisions the decision 
maker (DM) is required to make ... The DM together with his environment constitute a 'system' 
which may be in one of several states. ' 
Edwards (1954 and 1961) and Lopes (1994) provide a comprehensive review of early, single-state 
decision theories. The theories range from expected value and expected utility to subjective 
expected value and subjective expected utility. A persistent theme in such theories is the notion of 
mathematical expectation. Choices have consequences which can be characterised in terms of 
probabilities. The decision-maker is faced with a choice of two outcomes, XI having a probability 
of PI and X2 having a probability of P2. A dilemma of decision theorists has been to hypothesise as 
to what worth (value or utility, subjective or not?) can be attached to such a choice and, later, the 
decision-makers preference for such a choice vis-a-vis other choices. As with accounting theory 
and practice, the approaches to this dilemma have evolved, though over centuries rather than 
decades. 
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Early (l7th Century) assessments of what this choice was worth concluded that it was worth its 
expected value (EV), where EV = PIXI + ... + p~j where ps is the probability of event Xj. Such an 
assessment was challenged by Bernoulli's St.Petersburg paradox: 
Appealing to intuition, Bernoulli says that the cash value of a 
person's wealth is not its true, or moral worth to him ... the dollar 
that might be precious to a pauper would be nearly worthless to a 
millionaire. (Savage, 1954, p. 92) 
From this paradox came the proposition called expected utility (EU). The subjective worth of 
money, it was argued, is not necessarily its objective worth. This principle remained almost 
dormant (Lopes, 1994, p.201; Edwards, 1954, p.29) until its re-appearance in another form in von 
Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944 and 1947). A consequence of axioms developed by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern was the proposition that a person's preferences can be represented by 
the utility of money and that the maximisation ofEU can be a model of the person's preferences. A 
further extension referred to the decision-makers attitude towards risk as risk averse. A person 
who is risk averse will always prefer a certain amount equal to the expected monetary value of an 
uncertain prospect, rather than the expected monetary value of that prospect (for example, a 
certain £50 rather than a 50/50 chance of £100 or 0). Utility is then a concave fimction of money 
(Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971). 
Having met with favour in the domain of economics, the concepts of EU were broadened, most 
notably by Savage (1954) who replaced objective probabilities with subjective probabilities. In 
doing so, he was not unique: In psychology, Tversky (1967) also distinguished between 
'objective' and 'subjective' probability. Tversky expressed a decision-maker's subjective expected 
utility as EU = PIU(XJ + ... + Psu(x) where ps was the subjectively assessed probability of the 
occurrence of Xj and u(x) was its utility. Not only, therefore, was the worth of an outcome 
subjective, so also was the probability of the outcome. Expected utility became subjective 
expected utility (SEU). 
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The implications of the SEU theory were that just as some outcomes may be preferred over others 
some probabilities may be preferred over others. A series of experiments by Edwards in the 1950s, 
reported in both the economic and psychological literature (Edwards, 1953 and 1954), suggested 
'that subjects, when they bet, prefer some probabilities to others, and that these preferences cannot 
be accounted for by utility considerations.' (Edwards, 1954, p.34) Decision-making under 
uncertainty was not as straight-forward as theretofore hypothesised. 
Subjective utility implied subjective objectives. This became a coherent strand in decision theory. 
Allais (1953), illustrating yet another paradox of utility theory, showed that people do not conform 
to the constraints ofEU. Using the choice of a wonderful outcome happening for certain and an 
even more wonderful outcome possibly happening, Allais demonstrated that people may sacrifice 
the even more wonderful outcome for certainty even if the certain outcome is less wonderful. The 
implication of such a sacrifice, is, perhaps, that people satisfice. Newell and Simon argued, in an 
entirely different strand of decision theory, that the large problem spaces 'associated with the 
problem called 'life' , (Newell and Simon, 1970, p. 151) constrained decision-makers from 
processing information in a way that would allow them to optimise or 'maximise utility' and that 
decision-makers were destined to satisfice: to find a solution rather than the best solution. 
The strands of early decision theory are regarded by Coombs and Pruitt (1960) as not reflecting 
theories of preference or value previously proposed by Fisher (1906) and Edwards (1953). 
Drawing on the notion of subjective expected utility (SEU), two concepts known as probability 
preference and variance preference were developed. 'It was suggested that individuals base their 
decisions not only on expectation but also on the dispersion of the pOSSIble outcomes, ie for a 
given expectation an individual may prefer certain amounts of variance over others.' (Coombs and 
Pruitt, 1960, p. 265) Coombs and Pruitt studied this hypothesis and concluded (p.276) that 'while 
[the subject] will always prefer more expectation (other things being equal), he may have a utility 
for risk which will exhIbit itself as a preference for certain amounts of variance or skewness. ' 
Interestingly in the context of capital markets and portfolio theory, Coombs and Pruitt's subjects 
were 'told to treat each bet separately, as ifit were the only one offered. This was done in the hope 
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of avoiding multiple-bet strategies such as choosing a few of each kind of bet to keep a 'balanced 
portfolio' , (p. 268). The study, therefore, was divorced from the context of the maintenance of a 
portfolio and also, perhaps, remained in the domain of single-state decision theory. The example of 
Coombs and Pruitt's assumptions serves to underline the primary problem of developing a research 
structure within the context of single-stage decision theory such as EV or EU: that it is essentially 
single-stage. Such theory cannot incorporate what chapter 2 argued is fundamentally an uncertain, 
complex world. As a result, the development of such theories are traced with a view to 
illuminating the origins of dynamic theories in Section 3.2.3 which attempt in some way to 
incorporate the infinite complexities of the environment as well as with a view to constructing 
detailed hypotheses or frameworks of the research. 
Echoing Phillips, (1970, quoted earlier p. 55), Hampton, Moore and Thomas (1973, p. 33) 
conclude that 'the early interest expressed by psychologists for the relationship between 'objective' 
and 'subjective' probability is of limited interest today if one accepts that decision analysis requires 
the assessment of a probability that reflects the beliefs of the decision maker based on the 
information available to him at the time of the decision [my emphasis].' In the context of this 
particular discussion, we are essentially considering the constraints and characteristics of the 
information available to the decision-maker. In that regard, we are considering the 'problem called 
'life' ': a problem which is not well represented by a single-state decision-making model 
In real life decisions occur in sequences, and information available 
for later decision is likely to be contingent on the nature and 
consequences of earlier ones. The study of decision processes in 
such changing situations might be called the study of dynamic 
decision making. (Edwards, 1961, p. 84) 
In developing their decision-field theory, Busemeyer and Townsend (1993, p. 436) underline the 
importance of the single-state theories in the evolution of other theories of decision-making under 
uncertainty. Armed with the foundations of theories based on single-state decision environments, it 
is to the more realistic, dynamic world that we are now called. 
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3.2.3 The dynamic, diverse dimension 
Where theories which assume single states of the world are limited in their view of the world, so 
also are they limited in number. Dynamic theories of decision-making are as ~erse as the world 
which they try to describe. They draw also from a wide range of disciplines and perspectives. TIle 
perspective of this thesis is that described earlier when quoting Beaver and Anton: the uncertain 
context of the potential user of accounting data. In the light of that perspective, we will confine 
ourselves to the consideration of those theories of decision-making which shed light on uncertainty 
and the accoWlting context. 
The notion of the value of accoWlting information was discussed in Section 2.1. Becker and 
McClintock (1967, p. 107) argue that 
human behaviour is governed in large by values, ie. by the 
attractiveness of alternatives . . . It seems reasonable to assume 
that, whenever a person prefers one object or activity to another, 
he places a higher 'value' on that chosen as compared to the one 
rejected. Even when the choice is not conscious, we might assume 
that his preference is governed by a 'pleasure-seeking' or 'pain 
avoidance' principle. Yet people often make responses that are not 
in their best interests. They later regret that they chose a particular 
action. Still, it seems unreasonable to believe that they deliberately 
chose a response that they knew had lower value to them It is 
more likely that such 'mistakes' are due to misperceptions, or to 
changes in the person's value system 
This contention brings together some of the strands of decision-theory which have been described 
earlier: that objectives are subjective (Tversky) and that human decision-making is limited 
(Newell&Simon). Furthermore, just as risk and return are two sides of the same coin, (AAA, 
1972) the framework of accounting information also has (at least) two sides: firstly, the user's 
'value system' (or pteferences) and secondly, the users perception (or misperception) of the 
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accounting (and other) information available. This is what the AAA (1973) called 'the behavioral 
interactions of the accounting data and the decision-maker' ... what May and SWldem (1973) 
characterised in Figure 3.1 as the 'black box' of the process of transformation from an item of 
information to a resultant change in share price. 
These 'behavioural interactions' have been represented differently by Bnmswik (1952) and Litterer 
(1965). Bnmswik's 'Lens Model' is reproduced in Figure 3.3. As chapter 4 notes, Ashton (1982) 
uses the Lens Model to classifY behavioural studies in accoWlting. This modeL rather than 
mapping the interaction between the individual and the information presented, divides the world in 
two 'systems': the environmental or 'predictive ability' system (the left-hand side), and the 
behavioural or decision-maker system (the right-hand side). Central to the modeL again, is the 
information set (comprising various cues) available to the decision-maker (e.g. economic growth, 
competition, labour relations). The left-hand side is also termed the 'mechanical model' and 
represents the statistician's best prediction of the event to be predicted using the cues available. 
The right-hand side, on the other hand, is also known as the 'judgment model' or 'policy-capturing 
model' and is representative of the statistician's best estimate of the decision-maker'sjudgment. A 
useful example of the system is given by Hogarth (1980, p.7): 
For example, consider judgements in the form of your prediction of next year's 
revenue of your organisation. The first system [the left-hand side] is the economic 
system within which your organisation operates (including the actions taken by 
your organisation, competitors, etc.). This system can be said to generate (i.e. 
produce) the outcomes ·you are trying to predict, that is revenue. The second 
system [the right-hand side] represents your mind. It indicates the relationships 
you perceive or imagine between cues in the environment, e.g. anticipated trends 
and competitive reactions, and your prediction of revenue . . . Accuracy of 
prediction clearly depends on the extent to which the 'model of the environment' is 
matched by the 'model of the person' Le. in terms of cues, relationships between 
cues, and between cues and the target event, as well as the relative importance of 
the cues. 
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Figure 3.3: Bnmswik's Lens Model 
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On the left-hand side, the correlation or validity coefficient, rie, represents the relationship between 
each cue and the event to be predicted. The left-hand side may be summarised by the multiple 
regression equation: 
where f'e is the predicted event, Xi are the cues used and bi is the weight assigned to each cue by 
the model re, the relationship between Y' .. (the predicted event) and Y,. (the event itself), is a 
measure of environmental predictability. 
The right-hand side of the model may be represented by the multiple regression equation: 
Y'. = bs/X/ + bs~2 + ... + bsXi 
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where Y~ is the predicted judgment, Xi are the cues used and hi is the weight assigned to each cue 
by the model rei represents the relationship between each cue and the decision-maker'sjudgment. 
r8 measures the extent to which Y~ (the predicted judgment) differs from Y, (the judgment itself) 
and is considered a measure of the decision-maker's consistency. 
The mode~ first developed in 1940, has undergone several interpretatio\1s and refinements in the 
intervening period. Hogarth (1980, p. 9) concludes that 'through the conceptual device of 
Brunswik's lens model - that accuracy of judgment depends upon the exteq.t to which the mind 
mirrors the environment-it attempts to predict.' Belkaoui (1989, p. 5) develops the model further: 
'assuming nonlinearity is negligible, the lens model equation explains achievement as follows: 
ra = G~R.r 
In other words, achievement [raj depends on accuracy of cue weighing [G], predictability of the 
environment or predictive ability of the information [R,], and predictability of the individual [Rr] 
(consistency). ' 
Litterer's mode~ shown in Figure 3.4, attempts to map the manner in which perceptions are 
formed. Information (e.g. accounting data) and past experience (of the decision-maker) are the 
inputs to the model These inputs are distilled by three 'mechanisms' of perception - selectivity, 
interpretation and closure. 
Figure 3.4: Litterer's Model of Perception Formation (Litterer, 1965, p. 64) 
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Kast and Rosenzweig (1970, pp. 217-218) discuss these mechanisms in the following tenns: 
The concept of selective perception is important because 
voluminous information is received and processed. Individuals 
must select information which is supportive and satisfYing. 
The same stimulus can be interpreted differently by several 
individuals. Internretation depends on past experience and the 
value system of each particular person. An attitudinal set or 
propensity to think or act in a certain way provides a framework 
for interpreting various stimuli Not only does the individual 
perceive selectively, he interprets the situation in ways which will 
be supportive. 
The process of closure in perception formation related to the 
tendency of individuals to have a complete of any given situation. 
Thus a person may perceive more than the information seems to 
indicate. He adds to the information input whatever seems 
appropriate in order to close the system and make it meaningful .. 
. Closure and interpretation have a feedback to selectivity and 
hence affect the fimctioning of this mechanism in subsequent 
information processing. 
In descnoing these mechanisms, Kast and Rosenzweig (1970) underline the importance of the 
information input and the decision-maker's past experience in moulding the processes (or 
mechanisms) that ultimately create the decision-maker's perception of the information input. 
Selection is made by the decision-maker of information which is 'supportive and satisfYing'. 
(Brock, Albert and Becker (1970) argue that this selection is of information that is 'novel' and 
'useful'.) The interpretation of the information input is made on the basis of 'the past experience 
and values of each particular person' (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1970, p. 218). 
Both of these mechanisms reflect what Becker and McClintock (1967) descnoed as the factors 
governing human behaviour: the attractiveness of alternatives which is a fimction of the values of 
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the decision-maker. The concept of closure is an important one in that it suggests that the 
information set, as presented, is in some way incomplete and requires the use of inferences or other 
sources of information in order to 'close' or complete the set. Such 'inferences may be based on 
direct observation of events or on reports from indirect sources about the occurrence of events' 
(Snapper and Fryback, 1971, p. 401). The existence of an incomplete information set and the 
proposition that this in itself leads to some form of ambiguity or uncertainty is an important one 
which is central to the development of the hypotheses of this thesis in chapter 6. These ideas 
regarding the role of the decision-maker, the importance of prior expectations and the context of 
the decision contribute in particular to the disclosure of uncertainty adopted in chapter 5, the 
hypotheses in chapter 6 and the testing of such disclosures in chapters 9 and lOin particular. The 
next section (Section 3.2.3.1) introduces some further elements of decision theory, extending those 
discussed thus far, which will also contnbute to the development and testing of the research 
hypotheses. 
3.2.3.1 Impreciseness, Incomplete Information and Ambiguity 
Of note in the context of this thesis is the importance placed by Brunswik and others on the 
environment and the characteristics of the environment in decision-making, a distinction not made 
by Litterer whose model considers information and the past experience of the decision-maker as 
inputs to the process of perception. Both models distinguish clearly between the environmental 
cues / information and the decision-maker, what Lenzen (1952, pp. 29-30) calls the 'partition 
between object and observer'.· Brunswik in a section called 'The 'World of Things' and its 
Residue of Ambiguity (1952, p. 7) argues that 
one of the most cogent reasons for the conceptual separation of 
stimulus and response in the psychology of perception is the fact 
[represented by both the Lens model and Utterer's model] that the 
cognitive mechanism is far from perfect or fool-proof 
We have therefore observed that not only are expected utilities subjective but that, because of the 
'partition between object and observer' (Lenzen, 1952, pp. 29-30), infonnation may indeed contain 
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a 'residue of ambiguity'. Dermer (1973, p. 512) defines ambiguity as 'tmcertainty of meaning, and 
ambiguous situations are those which cannot be adequately structured or categorised by an 
individual' Nurmi (1983, p. 106) distinguishes between 'impreciseness due to randonmess' and 
'impreciseness due to the employment of inexact notions ... ie. impreciseness due to fuzziness.' 
He also distinguishes between three 'sub-types' of impreciseness - ambiguity, randomness and 
vagueness. Vagueness 'may concern concepts or sentences' while with ambiguity 'the concept in 
question lacks univocal meaning.' The consequence of such theories of ambiguity has been the 
development of theories concerning 'decision-weights' which attempt to take account of 
ambiguity. 
The notion of decision-weights arises from yet another paradox - the Ellsberg paradox. EIlsberg 
(1961) argued that probabilities in themselves do not completely represent the various uncertainties 
encountered by decision-makers. Ellsberg creates the scenario of two urns, each containing 100 
red and black balls. The proportion of red balls to black balls in Urn 1 is unknown while there are 
50 red balls and 50 black balls in Urn 2. A gamble is offered giving £ 1 00 if one bets on red and red 
is drawn from an urn; likewise for black. One gets nothing if one bets on the wrong colour. Most 
decision-makers would be indifferent between bets in the same urn ie. between red and black in 
Urn 1 or between red and black in Urn 2. However, when offered a choice between urns (ie. 
between red in Urn 1 and red in Urn 2 or black in Urn 1 and black in urn 2), Ellsberg suggests that 
most decision-makers prefer Urn 2 (with a 50/50 chance) to Urn 1 (with an unknown chance). 
Uncertainty about uncertainty (called 'probability of probabilities' by Marschak (1975» is an 
influential characteristic of the decision context. It adds to what Ellsberg (1961) and Fellner (1961) 
call the 'ambiguity' of that context. This in tum may effect 'expressed confidence in estimates'. 
The hypotheses set out in chapter 6 and explored in chapters 8 to 11 draw on such suggestions 
concerning confidence: 
Ambiguity is a subjective variable, but it should be possible to 
identifY 'objectively' some situations likely to present high 
ambiguity, by noting situations where available information is 
scanty or obviously unreliable or highly conflicting; or where 
expressed expectations of different individuals differ widely; or 
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where expressed confidence in estimates tends to be low. TItuS, as 
compared with the effects of familiar production decisions or well-
known random processes (like coin-flipping or roulette), the results 
of Research and Development, or the performance of a new 
president, or the tactics of an unfamiliar opponent are all likely to 
appear ambiguous. (Ellsberg, 1961, pp. 660-661) 
To such ambiguous situations could be added the financial reporting process. Not only can the 
environment be risky and uncertain but the perception of it and the communication of such risk can 
have an uncertainty of its own particularly in the manner currently suggested for such disclosures. 
Chesley (1976, p. 27) points out that in the absence of a relative frequency of probabilities with 
which to objectively determine probability, the determination and communication of probabilities 
(as well as reaction to it) is subjective. Furthermore, Chandra (1974, p. 741), in a questionnaire-
based study, found that 'accountants generally do not value information for equity investment 
decisions the same as security analysts do', a finding supported in an accountant / auditor versus 
banker / analyst study by Firth (1978). Thus, when the AAA (1971) writes about the 'behavioural 
interaction between the information data and the decision-maker' it can only be just that: a form of 
interaction. Viewing the company through the eyes of management is a more complex process 
than Dieter and Sandefur (1989, p. 70) quoted earlier seem to suggest. 
Decision-makers act as what Hogarth (1975, p. 271) calls 'intuitive statisticians'. Hogarth goes on 
to say that 'from the assessors viewpoint no assessment can be 'wrong' provided it is coherent and 
effected with due care and consideration of all known, relevant facts . . . However, from the 
viewpoint of the assessor - and sometimes to the assessor himself - probability assessment might 
seem to be more or less accurate in the light of subsequent events.' In a comprehensive review of 
research concerning itself with the cognitive processes of man as the intuitive statistician, Hogarth 
refers to the consequences of Newell and Simon's characterisation of man as having limited 
information processing capacity. These consequences resemble those modelled by Litterer: 
In summary, man is a selective, stepwise information-processing 
system with limited capacity, and, as I shall argue, he is ill-equipped 
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for assessing subjective probabilities distributions. Furthennore, 
man frequently just ignores Wlcertainty Given limited 
information processing ability, man clearly needs to structure his 
environment. The organizing 'Gestalt' forces of symmetry, 
closure, proximity, good continuation and common fate' are 
powerful and, it seems, not restricted to the perceptual domain. 
Furthetmore, they abhor randomness. (Hogarth, 1975, p. 273) 
This abhorrence of randomness has been obselVed in chess and music. The fact that (in chess) the 
human 'does not have the speed, memory or precision of organization to examine 800,000 moves' 
(Newell and Simon, 1972, p. 707) means that 'people appear to have a strong propensity, whether 
innate or learned, to discover patterns in temporal sequences presented by the environment, and to 
use these evidences of pattern for prediction . . . The urge to find pattern extends to phenomena 
where one may well doubt whether a pattern exists (e.g. in the movements of the stock market).' 
(Simon and Sumner, 1968, p.220) 
A study of such urges was carried out by Eggleton (1976 and 1982). Eggleton's hypothesis can be 
inferred from the title ofhis paper Patterns, Prototypes and Predictions: that in making predictions 
people seek patterns of which central tendency and variability are prototypical Eggleton concludes 
that subjects' decision-making behaviour is characterised by a search for patterns based on an 
assessment of the central tendency of (in this instance) a time-series. Subjects distinguished 
between a pattern which they perceived as random and one which they perceived followed a trend. 
Where the time series was random, a prediction was based on the obselVed central tendency. 
When there was a trend in the series, subjects' predictions were based on an upward adjustment of 
the central tendency or on more recent obselVations. 
Such problem-solving behaviour has been tetmed 'heuristic search' (Newell and Simon, 1972, p. 
101). Returning to the theories in Newell and Simon's Human Problem SolVing and in particular 
the importance of , problem-space' in the context ofproblem-solving: 
Problems with immense spaces infoIm us that the amoWlt of search 
required to find solutions, making use of available structure [or 
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pattern] bears little or no relation to the size of the entire space. To 
a major extent, the power of heuristics resides in their capability for 
examining small, promising regions of the entire space and simply 
ignoring the rest. We need not be concerned with how large the 
haystack is, if we can identifY a small part of it in which we' are 
quite sure to find a needle' (Simon & Newel~ 1970, p. 151) 
Heiner (1983, p. 585) calls such heuristics 'smaller behavioW'al repertoires' which are used because 
the decision-maker 'cannot decipher all the complexities of the decision-problems they face [the 
'immense problem spaces' descnbed by Newell and Simon], which literally prevents them from 
selecting most preferred alternatives. ' Early attempts at the development of heW'istics as 
explanations of behavioW' in the face of uncertainty have proved robust. They have provided a 
foundation for broader theories ofbehavioW' in the context oflUlcertainty. The following section 
charts the development and extension of such theories of decision-making from theories of 
hemistics and biases. 
3.2.3.2 Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 
Recognising that the 'assessment of uncertainty is often based on the intuitive judgments of 
human beings', Tversky (1974, pp. 148 & 156) draws on research by Kahneman and himself 
to describe 
three heW'istics, or mental operations, that are employed m 
judgment lUlder lUlcertainty. (i) An assessment of 
representativeness or similarity, which is usually employed when 
people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A 
belongs to a class or process B. (ii) An assessment of the 
availability of instances or scenarios which is often performed 
when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the 
plausibility of a particular development. (iii) An adjustment from a 
starting point [or 'anchor'], which is usually employed in numerical 
estimation when a relevant value is available [my emphasis]. 
These heuristics are discussed in more detail in Kahlleman, Slovic and Tversky's Judgment 
under uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1982). They are considered here only to the extent 
that they contribute directly or indirectly to the development of this thesis. Specifically, the 
representativeness heuristic contributes to hypotheses in chapter 6 concerning the effect on 
perception of characteristics (such as high gearing and high growth) of the reporting entities. 
The adjustment heuristic leads to theories of decision-making in the context of gains and 
losses. This contributes to the design of the research instrument in chapter 7. Moreover, 
these ideas advance the general consideration of broader theories of decision-making under 
uncertainty such as Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory. 
Piaget (1951, p. 3) hypothesises 'there is representation when an absent model is imitated'. 
Representativeness is illustrated by Tversky and Kahneman (1982, p. 4) with the following 
example: 
Consider an individual who has been descnoed by a former 
neighbour as follows: 'Steve is very shy and withdrawn, invariably 
helpful, but with little interest in people, or in the world of reality. 
A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and structure, and a 
passion for detail' How do people assess the probability that 
Steve is engaged in a particular occupation from a list of 
possibilities (for example, farmer, salesman, airline pilot, librarian, 
or physician)? How do people order these occupations from most 
to least likely? In the representativeness heuristic, the probability 
that Steve is a horarian, for example, is assessed by the degree to 
which he is representativeness of: or similar to, the stereotype of a 
librarian. 
In another instance, pertinent in the context of business, Kahneman and Tversky (1972, p. 451) 
write that 'in thinking about the chances that a company will go out of business . . . we have in 
mind a model of the company ... and we evaluate as most likely those outcomes which represent 
the essential features of the corresponding model' Rather than utilising 'the appropriate formal 
rule' (Snapper and Fryback, 1971, p. 401) of Bayes' Theorem and prior probabilities, man 'is not 
Bayesian at all' (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, p. 450). 
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Johnson, however, (1983, p. 92) in an experimental setting 'raises several questions about the 
descriptive accuracy of the representative heuristic' alone in the very context of predicting 
corporate bankruptcy. On the other hand, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) summarise several 
studies confinning representativeness while Swieringa, Gibbins, Larsson and Sweeney (1976, pp. 
181-182) postulate that 'people's use of the representativeness heuristic may represent a 
simplification ot: rather than a departure from, the normative Bayesian approach.' Tversky makes 
a defence of the embattled decision-maker which is very pertinent in the context of the disclosure 
ofinfonnation regarding probabilities and risk when he writes (1974, p. 157) that 'the failure to 
develop valid statistical intuition is probably due to the fact that events are normally not coded in a 
manner that is conducive to the learning of statistical rules ... When events are coded into natural 
categories, the probabilities or relative frequencies of these categories are learned without 
difficulty.' (Tversky, 1974, p. 157) 
It would appear that the process of aggregation and communication of 'fallible information' has 
implications for the manner in which information is used in decision-making, implications that will 
be discussed later in this section. Further, this process contnbutes to the specific hypotheses of the 
research developed in chapter 6. In particular, they are important in the context of the effect (if 
any) of the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements on perceptions ofperformance 
and position of the reporting entity explored in chapter 8. In addition, particular reported entities 
may be perceived as representing other 'absent' categories of reported entities which in turn may 
fashion perceptions. This influence on perception will form the foundation for hypotheses 
(discussed in section 6.2.3 and examined in section 8.3.3) concerning the importance of the 
characteristics of the reporting entity in the assessment of performance and position. 
Another heuristic postulated by Kahneman and Tversky is the adjustment heuristic, also called 
anchoring and adjustment. 'In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial 
value that is adjusted to yield the final answer.' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982, p .14) The 
heuristics descnbed thus far represent rules relied on by decision-makers to infer probability, or 
close the infonnation set, in the absence of complete information. They do not form a 
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comprehensive theory of decision-making WIder lU1certainty. TIle anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic does, however, link these descriptions with attempts to describe in a more comprehensive 
way decision-behaviour WIder WIcertainty. These theories include those of Keynes, Kahneman and 
Tversky's and Einhorn and Hogarth. 'Anchoring and adjustment' and its contnbution to such 
theories, as well as these theories themselves, are explored further in the following sections. 
3.2.3.3 Keynes and Probability 
One of the early proponents of such theories was Keynes (1921). Considering both randomness 
and ambiguity, he argues (p. 344) that 
the doctrine that the 'mathematical expectations' of alternative 
courses of action are the proper measures of our degrees of 
preference is open to a certain amoWIt of doubt on two grounds -
first because it ignores what I have termed ... the 'weights' of the 
arguments, namely, the amount of evidence upon which each 
probability is fOWIded; and, second, because it ignores the element 
of 'risk' and assumes that an even chance of heaven or hell is 
precisely as much to be desired as the attainment of a state of 
mediocrity. 
With regard to the lack of consideration of the 'weights' of the argument, Keynes asks (p. 345) 'if 
two probabilities are equal in degree, ought we, in choosing our course of action, to prefer that one 
which is based on a greater degree of knowledge? . . . the degree of completeness of the 
information upon which a probability is based does seem to be relevant, as well as the actual 
magnitude of the probability, in making decisions.' Keynes (p. 348) then develops a decision rule 
which he calls a 'conventional coefficient ofrisk and weight' denoted as c. The rule replaces the 
conventional rule that 
with 
EV = c/x/ + ... + caXjwhere C = 2pw O:sc, W, P, q, :s 1 
(1+q)(l+W) 
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and where P = the probability of success, q = the probability of failure (p + q = 1) and w = the 
'weight of evidence'. w could also be termed a measrne of ambiguity or incompleteness of the 
infonnation (Brady and Lee, 1991, p. 244). The more vague the infonnation, the lower the value 
ofw and consequently the less certain the outcome. Keynes (1921, p. 347) concludes that 'there 
seems, at any rate, a good deal to be said for the conclusion that, other things being equal that 
course of action is preferable, which involves least risk and about the results of which we have the 
most complete knowledge'. Commenting on Keynes' decision rule, Brady and Lee (1991, p. 250) 
offer the opinion that it is 'at least equal in explanatory power, simplicity of use, and generality to 
any other 'modem' decision rule or approach, be it Kahneman and Tversky's or Einhorn and 
Hogarth's. ' 
3.2.3.4 Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky's seminal discussion of Prospect Theory (1979) begins (pp. 263-264) with 
a critique ofEU theory, describing EU theory as based on three tenets: 
(i) Expectation: U = PI U(XI) + ... + ps u(Xj). 
(ii) Asset integration: (XI, PI; ..• ;xp ps) is acceptable at asset 
position wifand onlyifU(w + XI, PI;" . W + xp pJ. 
That is, a prospect is acceptable is acceptable if the utility from 
integrating the prospect with one's assets exceeds the utility of 
those assets alone. Thus, the domain of the utility function is final 
states (which include one's asset position) rather than gains or 
losses ... 
(iii) Risk aversion: U is concave (un < 0). 
Kahneman and Tversky argue that these tenets are violated by several phenomena or effects: 
a) the certainty effect where certain outcomes are overweighed relative to outcomes which are 
merely probable (also known as Allais' paradox (after Allais (1953) and discussed earlier). 
b) the reflection effect whose implications are that risk aversion when outcomes are expressed as 
gains (the positive domain) is accompanied by risk seeking when outcomes are expressed as losses 
(the negative domain)llnd that preferences are therefore inconsistent with EU theory. 
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c) the isolation effect (another form of heuristic previously described by Tversky (1972» where 
decision-makers disregard aspects of choices that are common among alternatives to simplifY 
choice. 
A central and crucial component of Kahneman and Tversky's critique of EU theory draws on 
earlier work by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and Markowitz (1952). 'People normally 
perceive outcomes as gains and losses, rather than as final states of wealth and welfare. Gains and 
losses, of course, are defined relative to some neutral reference point [or 'anchor'?]' The reference 
point usually corresponds to the current asset position, in which case gains and losses coincide with 
the actual amounts that are received or paid.' (Kabneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 274) This 
contention conforms to studies carried out by Slovic (1967) and Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) 
who found that decision-makers 'were choosing according to rules such as 'minimize posSlble loss' 
or 'maximize posSlble gain' rather than basing their preferences on variance per se' (Slovic, 1972, 
p. 794). Thus, riskiness is not perceived as a function of variance (as was suggested, for example, 
by Coombs and Pruitt (1960) and Eggleton (1976» but as the amount of the loss and the 
probability ofloss. 
These findings have also been supported by MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) and March and 
Shapira (1987). The former conclude (p. 268) that 'the most common two-stage decision-thinking 
used the attnbutes 'chance of major gain' as the constraint and the 'expected return' as the goal' 
The latter, in two studies of risk perceptions by managers, found (p. 1407) that 'risk is seen as 
associated with negative outcomes' rather than with what Kabneman and Tversky phrase 'final 
states of wealth and welfare.' 
The manner in which choices are made is divided into two phases by Kahneman and Tversky: the 
editing phase and the evaluation phase. The editing phase consists of several operations which are 
themselves a form of heuristics. These operations 'organize and reformulate the options so as to 
simplify subsequent evaluation and choice.' (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 274) The editing 
phase is followed by the evaluation phase. Having reduced and redefined the choices available, the 
decision-maker is faced with the task of attaching a value to each choice. This evaluation phase is 
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where Kahneman and TverskYs Prospect Theory is particularly useful in the context of the 
reporting of infonnation. It contends that the value, v, attached to each choice by the decision-
maker is a function of the value scale and, a crucial addition first mooted by Edwards (1962) (and 
in another way, Keynes (1921» a 'decision-weight'. 
The value scale, v, comprises two arguments: 'the asset position that selVes as a reference point, 
and the magnitude of the change (positive or negative) from that reference point.' (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979, p. 277) . This has parallels with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic: starting at 
an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The value scale, v, assigns a number v(x) 
to each outcome which represents the subjective value of that outcome to the decision-maker. 
This value function challenges EU theory's tenet that the decision-maker is risk-averse (that u is 
concave (un < 0» by arguing that decision-makers are generally risk averse in the domain of gains 
and risk-seekers in the domain of losses. As a result of this finding, the research framework 
developed in chapters 5 and 7 will focus on the disclosure of losses only rather than gains and 
losses. 
Kahneman and Tversky (p. 279) summarise their proposal in this regard as follows: 'the value 
function is (i) defined on deviations from the reference point; (ii) generally concave for gains and 
convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than for gains.' A value fimction representing these three 
properties is given in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5: Kahneman and Tversky's Value Function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
VALUE 
LOSSES GAINS 
The latter characteristic is supported by Galanter and Pliner (1974, p. 75) who contend that the 
pain of losing a sum of money seems greater than the pleasure of winning the same amount. 
Becker and McClintock (1967) alluded to preferences governed by 'pleasure-seeking' and pain-
avoidance' and subsequent regret. Such tendencies are further explained by Bell (1982) and 
Loomes and Sugden (1982) through what they call 'Regret Theory'. Loomes and Sugden (p. 822) 
suggest that a significant influence in situations of uncertainty 'is an individual's capacity to 
anticipate feelings of regret and rejoicing.' They argue that their theory explains a rational form of 
behaviour although the behaviour contravenes the axioms ofEU theory. 
The development by Kahneman and Tversky of the concept of decision-weights is a response to 
influences on the decision-context other than ambiguity. However, 'the theory can also be 
extended to the typical situation of choice where the probabilities of outcomes are not explicitly 
given.' (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 288) Decision weights (termed np), they write (p. 280), 
'measure the impact of events' on the desirability of prospects, and not merely the perceived 
likelihood of these events.' The properties of the weighting fimctioll are characterised by 
Kahneman and Tversky as: 
• n is an increasing fimction of p, with n( 0) = 0 and n( 1 ) = 1. 
• very low probabilities are generally over-weighted, that is n(p»p for small p. 
• n is not well-behaved near the end-points (ie. where (}--p-l). 
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• for all O<p<I, n(p)+n(l-p)<1 (called 'subcertainty'). In other words, the sum of the weightings 
of the prospects being considered may be less than 1, implying an uneasiness regarding the 
outcome, any outcome, being considered. 
This latter property is significant in considering ambiguous situations as the weights attached to 
particular events in such situations 'exhibit the essential properties that were ascribed to the 
weighting function. For example, if A and B are complementary events and neither is certain, 
n(A)+n(B) should be less than unity - a natural analogue to subcertainty ... Indeed, the work of 
Ellsberg and Fellner implies that vagueness reduces decision weights. Consequently, subcertainty 
should be more pronounced for vague [or inferred probabilities as in the financial reporting 
context] rather than for clear probabilities' (Kahneman and Tversky, 1978, pp. 288-289). These 
ideas of , sub certainty' touch again on the effect of ambiguity and Wlcertainty on confidence which 
is hypothesised in chapter 6. 
3.2.3.5 Einhorn and Hogarth's Venture Theory 
Einhorn and Hogarth's 'version of the ambiguity model . . . bears a striking resemblance to the 
decision-weight function of Prospect Theory.' (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986, p. 235). TIleir model 
also attempts to explain Ellsberg's paradox but primarily recalls the historical development of 
decision theory by attempting 'to explore the nature of probability * utility interactions' (Hogarth 
and Einhorn, 1990, p. 781) In doing so, it offers us a context in which to explore the behavioural 
interactions of 'accoWlting data ,and the decision-maker' (AAA, 1971) in the context of risk and 
uncertainty. It was noted earlier that models of decision-making under uncertainty draw to a 
certain extent on Kahneman and Tversky's anchoring and adjustment heuristic. This is particularly 
so in the case of Einhorn and Hogarth's Venture Theory. Where Kahneman and Tversky refer to 
their representativeness and adjustment heuristics as using 'mental effort - in one form or another' 
(1972, p. 452), Einhorn and Hogarth (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990, p. 783) refer to a fundamental 
part of their Venture Theory as 'mental simulation.' Furthermore, their 'model postulates an 
anchoring-and-adjustment strategy for assessing probabilities. This involves an initial assessment 
82 
denoted PA and an adjustment to reflect the ambiguity in the situation.' (Einhorn and Hogarth, 
1985,p.436) 
TIlis process is denoted by the equation 
S(PA) = PA + k, 
where S(PA) represents the judgment resulting from the strategy adopted and k is the net effect of 
the adjustment process from the anchor PA. Einhorn and Hogarth (1985, p. 436-437) argue that 
the adjustment, k, is affected by three factors: 
1. The level of PA; that is because S(PA) varies between 0 and 1, [the equation] implies that - PA:::S 
k:::S (1- PA)' This means that the direction of the adjustment must be due, in part, to the value 
of PA. Indeed, when PA = 0, k> 0, and the adjustment (if there is one) must be upward; when 
PA = 1, k < 0, so that the adjustment must be downward; when PA=F 0, 1, adjustments can be 
up or down. 
2. The amount of ambiguity perceived in the situation. This affects the absolute size of the 
adjustment that is captured by a parameter Q (0 < Q < 1); that is the greater the perceived 
ambiguity, the larger the adjustment. 
3. The person's attitude toward ambiguity in the circumstances. This is reflected in the tendency 
to give differential attention or weight to values of p that are greater or smaller than the initial 
estimate, PA. Attitude toward ambiguity is denoted by b, and this parameter, together with 
PA, determines the sign of the net effect of the adjustment (i e. when k is positive or negative). 
The authors then go on (p. 440) to develop a schema of the inference or closure of the information 
set involving 'a judge assessing the likelihood of the occurrence of an event based on reports 
received from a source of limited reliability', what Cohen (1964, Chapter 2) calls 'weighing the 
evidence'. This schema (Figure 3.6) is particularly appropriate in the context of a discussion 
'identifying the principal risks and uncertainties in the main lines of business, together with a 
commentary on the approach to managing these risks and, in qualitative terms, the nature of the 
potential impact on results' (ASB, 1993a, para. 12) in a voluntarily prepared and unaudited OFR. 
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Figure 3.6: Einhorn and Hogarth's decision-making schema (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1990) 
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How likely did A occur? 
The task identified has the following elements (from Einhorn and Hogarth, p. 440): 
(I)An event occurs. 
(2)The event is sensed by the obseIVers (e.g. witnesses to an accident, [or e.g. the 
directors of a reporting entity]) who, in principle, can be characterised by levels of 
sensitivity and bias which are unknown to the judge ... 
(3) The obseIVers report what they saw [e.g. in the financial statements]. A· 
denotes the report of Event A, and B* denotes the report of Event B, where the 
decision rule is to report A· if the obseIVation is above some critical value Xc, 
[materiality, SSAP 18's 'likely' etc.] and B othetwise. The reports can therefore be 
conceptualised as coming from a signal-detection task. 
(4) Because there are n obseIVers, n reports are collected These reports can be 
thought of as outcomes of n obseIVers reporting on a single trial in a single-
detection task. Furthermore, because we do not differentiate between the n 
obseIVers, we refer to them as coming from a single source [e.g. the financial 
statements]. 
(5) The judge receives the information in the form of/reports for a hypothesis (i.e., 
/reports of A*) and c reports ofan alternative (i.e. c reports ofB*), where/ + c = 
n, and p = jln. The content of the scenario, however, is assumed to give the judge 
some information as to what values of p to expect in a sample size of n. 
Specifically we argue that expectations concerning p are influenced by (a) the 
dissimilarity between Events A and B and (b) the credIbility of the source. 
(6) The assessment of the likelihood of A results from the combining of p and n 
with one's expectations concerning the range ofposSlble values ofp. 
The fifth and sixth elements of the schema give the process the attnbutes of risk (rather than 
uncertainty) disclosure given Edwards' definition of risk and uncertainty. 
The model recognises three distinct sources of ambiguity: 
1. the dissimilarity between Events A and B, 
2. the credIbility of the source, and 
3. the number of reports, or sample size, n. 
The importance of the credIbility of the source in the decision-making process informs the 
development of the context of the research in chapter 5. In particular, the potential for elements of 
the annual report (such as, for example, the Chairman's Statement / OFR and the balance sheet and 
profit and loss account) to differ in credibility means that the research will be framed around the 
financial statements themselves rather than those other elements of the annual report. 
Extending their theory further (and bringing it closer to a usable model of reporting), Hogarth and 
Einhorn (1990, p. 783) write that the initial value of the probability (the anchor, PA) 'may be a 
figure based on historical data [time series of reported numbers], provided by experts [directors or 
their advisers], or a judgment founded on other sources of information including memory.' The 
amount of mental simulation involved in the adjustment is a function of outcome uncertainty, the 
size of payoffs, and ambiguity, and the direction of the adjustment is a function of the location ofpA 
and the relative weight given to imaginary (or Kahneman and Tversky's available) values above or 
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below PA. The latter is quite similar to Kahneman and Tversky's decision weights in that the 
'weighting of values above or below the anchor' (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990, p. 793) is affected 
by individual differences and the context of the decision. 
Einhorn and Hogarth's proposition is similar to both Keynes' decision-rule and Kahneman and 
Tversky's Prospect Theory. At the heart of all three theories is the contention that 'ambiguity' or 
'vagueness' affects the perception of choices faced by decision-makers. This ambiguity writes 
Ellsberg (1961, p. 658) is 'a quality depending on the amount, type, reliability and 'unanimity' of 
information, and giving rise to one's degree of 'confidence' in an estimate of relative likelihoods.' 
Ambiguity informs the decision-makers' assessment. It also contnbutes to their degree of 
confidence in their assessment or perception. Continuing the exploration, this confidence is a 
function of ambiguity which in itself is a function of the amount, type, reliability and unanimity of 
information. In this context lies a focus for the consideration of the usefu.lness and value of 
disclosures of information concerning probabilities and uncertainty in annual reports. 
This issue is discussed by Kahneman and Tversky and Einhorn and Hogarth in the domain of their 
own theories. Such discussion takes the form of an attempt to formulate attitudes toward 
uncertainty and ambiguity. Kahneman and Tversky challenge the postulates of classical decision 
theory, arguing as outlined earlier, that the utility curve is not concave but is concave for gains and 
convex for losses. Hogarth and Einhorn (1990, p. 788) 'specify further' Kahneman and Tversky's 
contention and conclude that 
for gains, there are two forces that induce tendencies toward risk 
aversIon. These' are the concavity of [Kahneman and Tversky's] 
prospect theory function, and the general underweighting of 
probabilities of probabilities implied by the venture function ... For 
losses, there are two forces that conflict in their impact on risk 
attitudes. On the one hand, the convex nature of the prospect 
theory value function over losses implies risk seeking. On the other 
.. , probabilities are generally overweighed thereby implying a force 
toward risk aversion. 
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These elements of the decision theories outlined will fashion a research approach in chapters 5, 6 
and 7 which will, for example, (because of the asymmetry of attitude to gains and losses) be 
restricted to the consideration only oflosses while at the same time will question (in chapter 10) the 
rationale of the prudence concept of asymmetrical treatment of assets and liabilities. The research 
instrument in chapter 7 will also encompass measures of attitude toward the information source 
that is the financial statements. Building on the theories concerning, for example, cue weighting, 
the research will explore the effect on decision-making of differences in attitude toward financial 
statements. Further, reliability of source will be controlled by ensuring that the information 
disclosed arises from the audited elements of financial statements. 
It is clear that attitude to risk is a complex conundrum. Schoemaker (1990, p. 1451) 
writes that numerous theories and experiments have attempted to describe 
people's risk-taking behaviour in both simple and complex tasks . . . The 
limitations of existing models suggest that risk-taking entails a broad range of 
factors. . . belief differences, aspiration levels, value differences, context and 
process factors, as well as portfolio considerations. 
Supporting Schoemaker's view, Lipshitz (1993, p. 103) argues that the answer to the question 
'how do people actually decide in realistic settings?' is to a great extent context-dependent. It is to 
work carried out in the organisational and accounting context that we now turn. This context is 
considered, first, in the broad framework of decision-making in the next section, and second, in 
specific studies of decision-making in the light of accounting information concerning uncertainty in 
the chapter 4. 
3.3 THE COGNITIVE CONTEXT 
Russell and Montague-Jones (1990, p. 5) estimate that 65% of UK listed companies are owned by 
institutional investors. Sheridan and Kendall (1992, pp. 92-93) quote a survey in The Independent 
newspaper which 'reckoned that private individuals owned only 16.1 per cent of equities on the 
London stock exchan~e in 1991 ... Every major company's report and accounts confums this.' 
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When discussing the context of the use of financial reports, the institutional context is, therefore, 
important. This section will review the research carried out in a general institutional context. 
Chapter 4 will then discuss work carried out in the particular context of accoWlting and investment 
decision-making leading to the establishment of the hypotheses of the research in chapter 6. These 
hypotheses will draw on the theories discussed in this chapter. 
3.3.1 The organisational/institutional context 
Studies of risk-taking and perception in organisational contexts have been carried out by March 
and Shapira (1987 and 1992) and MacCrimmon and WehrWlg (1986). March and Shapira (1987, 
p. 1409) found that 'managerial risk taking propensities vary across individuals and across 
contexts.' However, motivational factors discovered by them indicate 'a greater variation in risk 
taking attnbutable to contextual factors.' This was supported by MacCrimmon and Wehrung 
(1987, p. 125) who found 'a greater willingness to take risks in business gambles than in personal 
gambles based on our assessment of their comparability. However, the observed differences in risk 
propensity may be due to differences in the perceived differences of these investments rather than 
differences regarding personal and business responses. ' 
March and Shapira (1987, p. 1410) summarise early studies of risk taking by managers which 
found that 
• managers avoid risk rather than accept it (Cyert and March, 1963) 
• they delay decisions and dele,gate them to others (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986) 
• they believe that risks can be reduced by using skills to control the dangers (Strickland, Lewicki 
and Katz, 1966) 
• they try to modify the risk descriptions, partly by securing new information, partly by attacking 
the problem with different perspectives. 
March and Shapira's work focuses to a greater extent on risk-taking rather than risk perception, on 
action more than thought. As such, it allows us to advance our consideration of risk disclosures 
from cognition to actiQn. They agree not only that managers fail to follow the canons of decision 
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theory, but also that the ways they think about risk do not easily fit into classical theoretical 
conceptions of risk. 
These observations make standard conceptions of risk, with their emphasis on trait differences 
among individual decision makers (e.g. Hogarth and Einhorn (1990, p'. 783) 'individual 
differences') problematic as bases for talking about managerial risk taking behaviour. To a 
substantial extent, probability estimates are treated as unreliable and subject to post-decision 
contro~ and considerations of trade-offs are framed by attention factors that considerably affect 
action. Managers look for alternatives that can be managed to meet targets, rather than assess or 
accept risks. (1987, p. 1414) 
This tendency to view as the achievement or non-achievement of a target return is also commented 
on by Steil (1993) in the institutional context of foreign exchange risk management and is 
supported by empirical evidence from Fishburn (1977), Laughhunn, Payne and Crum (1980) and 
Holthausen (1981). It is somewhat similar to the theories ofKahneman and Tversky and Einhorn 
and Hogarth in that risk is assessed based on an adjustment from an anchor, but the anchor is a 
target return rather than current position or a reported probability. This again echoes the findings of 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986, p. 151) who conclude that 'expected gain and loss provided 
considerable power in explaining the rankings' of (albeit personal) investment alternatives. This 
transforms the definition of risk from the classical one of variability of returns through Prospect 
Theory's risk of a gain or loss to one which views risk as the probability of earning a return above 
or below a target level It corresponds to a heuristic commented on by Newell and Simon (after 
Duncker, 1945): 
The particular heuristic system that finds differences between 
current and desired situations, finds an operator relevant to each 
difference, and applies the operator to reduce the difference is 
usually called means-ends analysis . . . Our own data analyses 
reveal means-ends analysis to be a prominent form of heuristic 
organization in some tasks - proving theorems, for example. 
(Newell and Simon, 1970, p. 152) 
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March and Shapira's finclings are also somewhat similar to Kahneman and Tversky's, as they find 
that the utility CUIVe (or attitude to risk) is not concave. Instead of finding that decision makers are 
risk averse for gains and risk seekers for losses from the decision maker's current position, 
however, March and Shapira argue that decision makers are risk averse above the target (or 
aspiration) level and risk averse below the target level. This also, it would appear, has implications 
for attitude towards ambiguity: 
as a risk-taker's resources (above a target) increase, the unreliability 
in outcomes that is tolerated becomes greater and greater . . . 
(W)henever cumulated resources are below the focal reference 
point . . . variability is set so that the risk taken increases 
monotonically with (negative) distance from the focal point. 
(March and Shapira, 1992, p. 173) 
They also emphasise the importance of the 'survival point' (where cumulated resources are close to 
zero) in risk-taking. Decision makers exln'bit 'decreasing risk taking as survival is increasingly 
threatened ... Most risk takers spend most of their histories barely surviving and taking very little 
risk' (pp. 175 & 176) 
These studies have implications in the context of the capital market and portfolio theory. First, if: 
as the American Accounting Association (1972, p. 417) argued, 'the assessment of relative risk in 
turn implies a setting of the price for the security, such that the expected return is commensurate 
with the risk' and if (Dyckman et al. 1975, p. 8), 'investors will be concerned with their 
expectations for their portfolios, . and all individual securities will be evaluated with respect to their 
relationship to these portfolios', target (or aspiration level) would appear to exist for a portfolio, 
the risk and return of additional securities added to the portfolio being measured against this 
aspiration level in a manner similar to March and Shapira's findings regarding target returns and 
Venture Theory's anchoring-and-adjustment. Second, institutional investors belong, by very 
definition, to institutions. The constraints and characteristics of the institution, March and Shapira 
(1987) argue, are an important influence on investors' behaviour in the face of information 
disclosed in an accounting setting. 
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3.4 CONCLUSION 
Chapter 2 introduced the debate concerning the importance of uncertainty in human, and therefore, 
accounting experience. This chapter explored the development of the literature concerning human 
reactions to uncertainty and the reporting of it and the contnbution of models of decision-making 
to theories of decision-making under uncertainty. That exploration noted (through, for example, 
Schoemaker (1990), Lipshitz (1993) and March and Shapira (1987 and 1992» that the gap of 
uncertainty introduced in Figure 2.1 exists in what Newell and Simon (1972) term the 'problem-
space'. This space creates its own specific needs, uncertainties and subjectivities. One of these 
spaces is the problem space of accounting. The following chapter, chapter 4, outlines research 
specific to the problem space of accounting. 
The thesis draws on this research and various aspects of the exploration in this chapter to develop 
the foundations of hypotheses which will be constructed in chapter 6 and tested in chapters 8 to 10. 
In particular, the impact of ambiguous disclosure of uncertainty on decision-making and 
confidence (or 'subcertainty') will be explored. The representativeness heuristic outlined in section 
3.2.3 prompts the hypotheses concerning the influence on perception of the characteristics of the 
reporting entity in section 6.2.3. Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (in Figure 3.5) argues 
that decision-makers reactions to gains and losses are asymmetric: that decision-makers are 
generally risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. As the 
research results would potentiall¥ be confounded by such asymmetrical reactions, the disclosures of 
uncertainty comprising this research will relate to losses only. 
The suggestion of Litterer's model (Figure 3.4) that decision-makers choose from a broad 
information set based on, for example, past experience will inform the extent of disclosure in the 
research instrument developed in chapter 7. Further, in this context, the need for 'closure' 
portrayed in Litterer's model (Figure 3.4) will be used in section 6.3 to contnbute to a view of the 
development of an 'intersubjective' view of the world. 
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4.1 INfRODUcnON 
Douglas, in Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences (1984, p. 28), suggests that 'when 
an established discipline applies itself to a new field, something inevitably happens to its methods: 
Sometimes a new rule-of-thumb [or heuristic] is transferred, sometimes only a metaphor.' In the 
application of decision science (or 'human information processing') to accounting, these metaphors 
have been classified by Ashton (1982) as 'Lens Studies in Accounting' and 'SEU [Subjective 
Expected Utility] Studies in Accounting'. Both of these areas have been introduced in chapter 3. 
Lens Studies, conforming to refinements ofBrunswik's modeL have mainly been used in the area of 
auditing (internal controL materiality judgments and audit report perceptions), management 
accounting (budgeting and control) and, pertinently in this context, in the study of the assessment 
and prediction of share prices using (among other information) accounting information. SEU 
studies, comprising a wider, more diverse field of decision science provides a richer framework for 
the study of reaction to accoWlting information in its various settings. 
Chapter 3 identified the broad framework within which such decision theories developed. As part 
of such a development, the importance of the context of decision-making was emphasised. This 
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chapter discusses previous research of decision-making under uncertainty in the accounting 
context. The main strands of the developments in the area are summarised in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1: Summary of key strands of research concerning uncertainty and financial reporting 
FINANCE / ECONOMICS 
Efficient market hypothesis Other 
eg Markowitz (1952 and 1959) eg Knight (1921) 
& Fama (1965 and 1970) / 
1 ~CCOUNTING 
Risk-determined accounting measures ~ DeCision-usefulness 
eg Beaver. Ittler & Scholes (1970) 
1 
Empirical studies .... ----... Standard-setting / 1 \ eg OFR, MD&A, SSAP 18. Statement of Principles 
Market-based Surveys Experimentallbehavioural 
(Summarised in Figure 4.2) 
As noted in chapter 2, the importance of uncertainty in investment and other decision-making 
arose initially in theories of economics. Such views found their way into the accounting disCipline 
by way of the consideration of accounting measures which might inform users of risk and 
uncertainty by, for example, Beaver et al. (1970). These studies in themselves spawned market-
based and other studies of the yalue of different elements of financial statements. In particular, 
such research examined the ability offinancial statement numbers to encapsulate a view of the risk 
facing a reporting entity. These empirical studies will be explored in Sections 4.2 and 4.3) of this 
chapter. 
Of interest in the context of this thesis are two categories of studies: 
(1) Studies involving the determination of the value of: and users' use of: information concerning 
risk and uncertainty currently disclosed in financial statements and annual reports (whether 
implicit or explicit). These studies involve capital-market based research (Section 4.2.1), 
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swveys of users' perceptions and opinions (Section 4.2.2) as well as experimentaL laboratory 
studies of models of decision-making (Section 4.2.3). 
(2) Studies exploring the value and use of new information regarding risk and Wlcertainty which 
may potentially be disclosed in financial statements and annual reports. Included in this 
category are swveys of users (Section 4.3.1) and experimentaL laboratory studies (Section 
4.3.2). As chapter 5 will suggest an experimental approach to the research, these experimental 
studies will be discussed in some detail 
The next sectio~ Section 4.2, explores studies of the value of currently disclosed information. 
Section 4.3 examines studies concerning the value of new information and additional disclosures. 
The chapter concludes in Section 4.4 by identifying briefly the contnlmtion of these studies to the 
development of the research approach and by summarising the main attnbutes of the research 
approach in chapter 5 which will distinguish the research from previous studies. 
Chapter 5 will then draw on specific proposals within the standard-setting process to develop an 
evolutionary, policy-driven framework within which the research will proceed. 
4.2 CURRENTLY-DISCLOSED INFORMATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF 
RISK 
4.2.1 Market-based research. 
Market-based studies of the relevance of currently disclosed information measure the correlation of 
risk indicators in financial statements and beta (e.g. Beaver et al. (1970), Farrelly, Ferris and 
Reichenstein (1985) and Ferris, Hiramatsu and Kimoto (1990)). Early discussion of risk (e.g. 
Beaver et at.) concentrated on market-wide CAPM-based beta as a measure of risk. Such an 
approach has been questioned by Blume and Friend (1973) and Farrelly (1981) on the groWlds 
'that the beta coefficient measures only part of what investors mean by risk' (Blume and Friend, 
1973, p. 32). Later studies, therefore, attempted to measure the correlation between information 
in financial statements indicated by users as indicative of risk and the beta coefficient. They have 
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also used measures of risk other than beta, which Farrelly et af. (1985) consider an objective, but 
ex-post measure of risk. These studies have been summarised and extended by Mear and Firth 
(1988) and Capstaff(1991) 
Mear and Firth conclude (p. 340) that 'accounting reports do convey, at least in' an implicit fashion, 
information relevant for the assessment of ex ante risk' while Capstaff (p. 197) finds that 
'accounting information was ... relevant to analysts' risk perceptions in the UK which is consistent 
with the findings in the USA and Japan.' Capstaff also found differing correlations between 
market beta and accounting measures of risk. In the UK, for example, none of the variance in 
market beta was explained by accounting measures while in the US the relationship was significant 
(Farrelly et af.). Such findings justify the departure from the practice of depending on beta alone 
as a measure of risk. They also led to the use of both swvey/questionnaire and market-based 
research itself in determining existing indicators of risk in financial statements. 
4.2.2 Survey-based research 
An important caveat to the swvey-based approach in this context is one of the findings of studies 
by MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) and March and Shapira (1987): that the perception of 
managers of their own risk propensities was not entirely accurate. In swvey-based research, 
subjects (normally, but not exclusively, user groups) are asked to examine lists of information 
which are (or could be) disclosed and to rank them in importance. Courtis (1992) summarises 
such swveys and discusses their, reliability. The use of currently-disclosed information by private 
investors is comprehensively swveyed by Lee and Tweedie (1977 and 1981) and Arnold and 
Moizer (1986). More narrowly defined studies have been carried out by Benjamin and Stanga 
(1977), FIrth (1978) and McCaslin and Stanga (1986). These studies compared and contrasted the 
different information and measurement needs of users, the latter two agreeing that the information 
needs of bankers and analysts, as revealed by their swvey responses, were largely similar. 
Chandra (1974, p.21) found that perception of information currently disclosed differed between 
accountants and analy~s. Some of the explanations for this finding offered by Chandra are worthy 
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of note in the context of the discussion of risk and lUlcertainty. Chandra (p. 741) suggests that 
investors operate in a different time frame than accountants: 
The user group deals in a dynamic security market. Tools and 
techniques of investment analysis change to meet the new challenges of 
the market. Users are under constant pressure to improve their' 
techniques. The preparer group is not subject to the same kind of 
pressure. .. [Another] factor contributing to the lack of consensus 
may be a tendency by accountants to adhere to the established order 
rather than experiment with new ideas and approaches . . . What is 
needed to amend such a situation is more research on user models and 
recognition by the profession of the importance of the user and his 
information needs. 
4.2.3 Experimental/laboratory studies of models of decision-making 
Snowball (1986, p. 50) provides a discussion and analysis of 'accounting laboratory experiments 
on human judgment': 'The 120 studies involving accounting laboratory experiments on human 
judgments represent 6.9% of the total article published during 1964-1984. More than two-thirds 
of the studies were published in the period 1976-1984.' Snowball classifies the studies as 
concentrating on judgments by managers, by auditors and by external report users. This discussion 
will be oriented towards the latter. A wide range of studies examined for the most part the use of 
existing, currently available infOqnation, both financial and non-financial. (e.g. Slovic, Fleissner and 
Bauman, 1972; McGhee, Shields and Bimberg, 1978; Libby, 1979; Abdel-Khalik and EI-Sheshai, 
1980 and Lewis, Pattern and Green (1988». Other studies of a generally descriptive nature (e.g. 
'How do Financial Analysts Make Decisions?' (Bouwman, Frishkoff and Frishkofl: 1987» have 
been carried out by Gooding (1972) and Gniewosz (1990). 
Libby (1979a) examined the effect on bankers' decision-making of the disclosure of uncertainty and 
/ or a subject-to audit qualification. This study was replicated in a Canadian setting by Abdel-
Khalik, Graul and Newton (1986, p. 341): 'The findings of both studies consistently indicate that 
disclosure of uncertainties due to contingencies is considered relevant information by bankers. 
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However, the addition of a qualified opinion in the audit report . . . has no significant impact on 
bankers' decisions, given the disclosure of the wlcertainties alone.' libby (1979b, p. 51) fOWId that 
'disclosure of a major uncertainty due to litigation combined with supplementalnon-accoWltillg 
information concerning the uncertainty had a major impact on bankers' risk assessments.' The 
study also suggested that a simple heuristic was being used in evaluating information regarding 
uncertainty: 
The most likely outcome of the uncertainty was estimated and treated 
as certain in the estimation of future cash flows . . . This strategy, 
which involves the substitution of the bast guess in place of a 
probability distnlmtion, is similar to the approach taken in simple 
capital budgeting models and is consistent with the results from studies 
of decisions based on probabilistic data. (LIbby, 1979b, p. 51) 
A significant contnbution with regard to the manner in which subjects make investment decision 
has been made by Slovic (1972) who confirms, as noted in chapter 3, (p. 794) that 
recent evidence suggests that the subjects in [the experiments carried 
out by psychologists] were choosing according to decision rules such 
as 'minimize pOSSlble loss' or 'maximize pOSSIble gain', rather than 
basing their preferences on variances per se ... 
Slovic's observation, drawn from decision theory generally, is also commented on earlier in the 
context of the perception of shares by Green and Maheshwari (1969). Their study attempted to 
discover whether decision-makers' perceptions of ordinary shares 'were related to hypothesised 
attributes of mean and variance of return' (p. 439). They found that 'perceived risk and perceived 
growth are quite pervasive in subjects' perceptions of the similarities and differences among 
stocks.' (p. 445) Interestingly, their findings regarding the influence of the decision-makers utility 
function on portfolio selection were inconclusive. In a similar study, Gooding (1973 and 1975) 
found that 'investors' average stock perceptions are highly related to risk and return measures' 
(1975, p. 1314). 
Ronen (1971), Hirsch (1978) and Snowball and Brown (1979) also tested whether decision-
makers in a variety of contexts complied with the risk-return criteria of SEU and capital market 
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theory and found decision-behaviour to be less consistent and more complex than SEU 
hypothesised. Greer (1974, p. 502), after studying classical utility theory in the context of 
corporate decision makers and simulated (non-equity) investment opportw1ities, concluded that 
'there appears to be substantial conflict between the decision processes used by actual decision 
makers and existing utility theory.' In the context of the use of accounting information, therefore, 
Slovic's comments appear to hold true. 
Ironically, then, having hatched the idea that knowledge of risk, as measured by variability of 
returns, is important to investors at a general, aggregate leve~ it appears that at the level of the 
decision maker, risk may not be perceived solely as the variability of returns. When climbing a 
mountain (as portrayed Newell and Simon in chapter 3), for example, we not only want to reach 
the top, we are also afraid falling (as argued by March and Shapira and Loomes and Sugden's 
Regret Theory in chapter 3). May and Sundem's 'black box' displays different and more complex 
characteristics than simply an aggregation to a share price. The extensions and refinements of 
classical decision theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky, Einhorn and Hogarth and others 
appear, therefore, to offer promise when considering expanding the information set to include new 
explicit information concerning risk. 
4.3 TIlE POTENTIAL FOR NEW INFORMATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF 
RISK 
The studies discussed this far were concerned with the use of existing information. Several studies 
have also looked at the potentUiI value and relevance of other information in financial decision-
making. Two strands of research are particularly pertinent: that which looks at the use of 
budgeted/forecast information in general and that which concerns itselfwith disclosures in the form 
of confidence intervals and I or probabilities. 
4.3.1 Survey-based researclt 
Chenhall and luchau (1977) extend survey-based research of existing accounting information by 
considering (p. 111) 'information that is or may be generated from both within and outside the 
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corporate reporting framework.' Based on a survey of investors, their findings are interesting in 
this context in that the investors surveyed ranked as highly important such Wlcertain factors as the 
future economic outlook of the company and the industry of which the firm is a part. Information 
concerning the specific risk of losing money on shares held in the company was ranked as 
moderately important, 9th in 37 items mentioned in the survey. Budget statements ofperformance 
and position were ranked 13th. 
Courtis (1992) summarised survey-based studies of financial disclosure and measured the 
robustness of their economic interpretations. In doing so, he found (p. 42) that 'information items 
with an expectation orientation are, as a group, perceived to be more important than items with an 
historic (sic.) or current period orientatioIl.' WIthin that group of 'expectational information', 
contingent liabilities, the future economic outlook of the economy and expected future sales 
growth were ranked highly. A survey of financial analysts by Buzby (1977) led him to conclude 
(p. 433) 'that an opportunity exists for an expansion of the extent of disclosure in the annual 
reports of small and medium size companies [which formed the basis for his study]' 
On the other hand, Farrelly (1981) surveyed financial executives to ascertain their views 
concerning the disclosure of capital investment plans and found that only 30% agreed that such 
plans should be disclosed, the main concern being the lack of reliability (or ambiguity?) of such 
disclosures. The reliability of forecasts also concerned Birnberg and Dopuch (1963) and Ijiri 
(1968). Also of concern (Birnberg, 1976) was the lack of behavioural evidence that users would 
benefit from additional disclosures. Studies offering such behavioural evidence are considered 
next. 
4.3.2 Users and additional disclosures 
Studies of additional disclosures have focussed mainly on the investment and lending decision. 
This focus has not been exclusive as several studies, including experimental studies, have examined 
the effects of disclosure on other users, particularly employees. (For example, Mautz (1990) 
explored the influence of inflation-adjusted disclosures in a collective bargaining context.) 
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A study by Danos, Holt and Imhoff (1 989, p. 245) 'confinned the overall importance of historical 
and fOlWard-looking accounting infonnation in the lending decision process.' Gonedes and 
Dopuch (1976), refening to the SEC's interest in forecast disclosures, concluded (p. 133) that: 
the debate over required forecast disclosure is of interest if forecasts 
convey information pertinent to establishing the firms' equilibrium" 
values. Our empirical results on income forecasts are inconsistent with 
the statement that those forecasts convey no such information. 
McDonald (1973), in an inconclusive study, reviewed the reliability of published forecasts, 
commenting initially (p. 502) that 'disclosure of earnings predictions has not been attacked on the 
basis of relevancy.' 1bis remark stems from considerable comment at the time regarding the 
disclosure of budgets which Cooper, Dopuch and Keller (1968, p. 641) contended would 
'encompass proposals for alternative measurements without requiring an abandonment or even 
alteration in presently used bases of financial reporting', knitting together the revolutionary and 
evolutionary proposals by ASOBAT regarding alternative measures and additional disclosures 
explored in section 2.4. 
Several experimental studies have looked specifically at ASOBATs suggestions regarding the 
disclosure of uncertainty. The objectives and methods of such research is summarised in Figure 
4.2. 
As noted in chapter 2, the accounting literature in the late '60s, early '70s had supported the 
reporting ofunceertainty through some form of probabilistic statements in accounting. Chapter 2 
further commented that elements of thse proposals have re-emerged in FRS 6 (ASB, 1994b) and 
the draft Statement of Principles (ASB, 1995b). Oliver (1972, p. 155) set out to obtain 
infonnation in an experimental setting on the 'effects of a change from conventional financial 
statements to a form of probabilistic financial statements'. 
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Figure 4.2: Swnmary of research concerning the disclosure of measures ofWlcertaillty in financial 
statements. 
Author(s) Subjects Group design Informatioo Task(s) H ypctheses (110) RcsuJt(s) 
pres<nled 
Oliver (1972) 123 professiooal - 2-group pre- - B'kgroWld * Bet and woo;e - Loan dccisioos - 110 n~ r'<iected 
bankers tet 001 y cootrol info. 00 the allocatioo of equa1bdw~ 
group design ecooomyand loan funding groups 
-Randomly industry ($200,000 - Bet and wor.;e 
assigned 
- 2 years of available, dccisioo equa1 
financial $225,000 bdweaJ groups 
statements requeted) 
-One group 
given 
symmetrical 
interval 
statements 
(audited, 90% 
coofidence ) 
Bimbergand 100 MBA - 2x2 groups of -Noo- 'A targd level - Coofidence - Ho supported. 
Slevin (1976) students 25 aCOOWlting [or goal) for a intervals do n~ -h appeared 
-Randomly cootext dccisioo' add to intuitioo that subj ed.s 
assigned -2sctsof5 regarding the overreacted to 
priornoo- relative size of ina-eased 
symmetrical the interval variability 
fmdin[l;i BrOWld the point 
- 2 different estimate 
disclosures: we 
group given a 
95% coofidencc 
interval, the 
other group 
given DO 
coofidencc 
interval 
Keys (1978) 57 commercial - Solomoo Four- Two scts of *lHnooth loan - Various *Cooc\uded 
bank loan Group Design three year dccisioo and 4- that coofidence 
officers fmancial year loan interval 
statements, ooe dccisioo: financial 
sdwiih 
- loanIno loan statemmts did 
coofidencc • interet rate n~ affect loan 
intervals, the 
- amOWlt loaned dccisioo 
other 
cooventiooal 
Chen and 82 MBA - 4 groups 1. Dderminiltic • ~are price in • See discussioo, ·See disaJssioo, 
Summers students rqJ~ed 2. I interval an investment pp, 105-106 pp. 105-106. 
(1981) measure with DO level of cootext 
- Assigned 00 coofidencc * Cost in a 
the basis of 3. I interval managemmt 
attittude to with 90% aCOOWlting 
accounting coofidwcc level coolext 
informatioo, 4. 3 intervals * Allocatioo of 
risk attitude, with 90%,95% limited funds 
cognitive and 99% * Satisfacli<DI 
complexity and coofidwcc coofidencc reo 
presooality levels dccisioo 
- Perceived 
difficuhy of task 
* Attitude 
toward data 
101 
The 123 participants in Oliver's study were professional bankers. They were assigned at random 
to two groups, a control group and an experimental group. Each group was given (p. 159) 
(I) 'fabricated background information on the national economy, an industry, and hypothetical 
companies from that industry, and 
(2) two years of comparative financial statements for each company.' 
The experimental group was given financial statements and common size statements with some 
elements stated as inteIVals (e.g. in the income statement cost of goods sold and operating 
expenses were stated as inteIVals) along with an audit report stating that the level of confidence in 
the estimates was 90%. The control group was given financial statements and common size 
statements containing the mean of each inteIVal Subjects were given a maximum of $200,000 to 
loan to the two companies (they could decide not to loan all this amount). One company had 
requested $70,000 to $105,000, the other $80,000 to $120,000. The subjects were asked to state 
what the best and worst loan allocation would be. 
Oliver hypothesised that the best and worse decisions would be equal between the two groups. 
Using chi-square and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests at a 0.05 confidence level, he concluded that the 
hypotheses outlined could not be rejected. 
Bimberg and Slevin's (1976) study extended Oliver's study, pointing out (p. 153) that Oliver's 
intervals 'apparently were symmetrical' and arguing that a 'stronger manipulation" of the variables 
was required. The subjects were 100 MBA students. The context was not an accounting context. 
The subjects were divided into 4 groups of25. 'Each subject was given a problem which required 
him / her to set a target level for his I her decision and to establish a formal decision rule.' The 
information given to the subjects differed in two ways: 
(1) variability (the scores of 5 MBA students at another school) which was high (standard 
deviation of24) and low (standard deviation of8) and 
(2) disclosure (one group was given a best estimate of the outcome with a 95% confidence 
inteIVal while the other group was given no information). 
In that way a 2x2 experimental design was established. 
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Bimberg and Slevin concluded that the disclosure of the explicit confidence inteIVal had little effect 
on the subjects' estimates. It appeared however that subjects overreacted when the variability of 
the prior scores increased. They commented (p. 156) that 'apparently the skilled user of financial 
statements already possesses a notion of the relative size of the inteIVal arowld the point estimate 
from past experience.' 1bis led them to comment that situations when the user had little 
experience of the context could be worth investigating. A study of the nature of learning in the 
light of confidence inteIVals and changes in the underlying process would also be useful 
Keys' (1978) study also extended Oliver's study. Specifically Keys made changes to Oliver's 
research design to ascertain whether Oliver's findings could be attnbuted to the specific 
characteristics of the experimental design (e.g. confidence inteIVals, the terms of the loan decision). 
The experimental design was pilot tested. Subjects were presented with the financial statements of 
unidentified actual companies in the same sector whose net assets ranged between $1 million and 
$10 million. Three years of audited financial statements were presented. The subjects were 57 
commercial bank loan officers working in small to medium sized banks in Illinois. They were 
divided into 4 groups. The Solomon Four-Group Design was used. Two groups were pretested, 
one receiving confidence interval financial statements, the other receiving conventional statements. 
All four groups were posttested, two receiving confidence inteIVal financial statements, two 
receiving conventional financial statements. 
Subjects were asked to decide on a loan application for $150,000 secured on machinery of the 
company, including the term of the loan and the interest rate to be charged. Two loans had been 
requested, one for six months ~d the other for four years. Both were to finance increases in 
inventory. Keys analysed the variance and covariance of results and concluded that the confidence 
interval financial statements did not affect commercial bank loan decisions. 
Libby (1979b) set out to assess the impact of uncertainty reporting on the loan decision. A 
previous study by the same author (Libby, 1979a) had found that uncertainty qualifications in the 
audit report indicate 
(1) an increase in loan risk and 
(2) a demand for more information regarding the uncertainty. 
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TIle later study (which is more pertinent to this research as it relates to Wlcertainty reporting in the 
financial statements rather than in the audit report) was concerned with the effect of the disclosure 
of a material uncertainty with supplemental information regarding that WI certainty. 20 loan 
applications were devised combining 3 different pieces of information: 
(1) financial statements: two years of financial statements were presented with five year financial 
summaries. 25% of these would qualifY for a loan at the maximum rate charged by the bank 
while the other 75% would qualifY at the minimum rate but would be affected by uncertainty. 
(This corresponded with findings regarding firms generally.) 
(2) management evaluations including organisation of the fum, background of executives and 
accounting and marketing capabilities. Half of these were favourable and half were 
unfavourable. 
(3) three different uncertainty disclosures: no disclosure with an unqualified audit opinion, 
uncertainty regarding litigation with an unqualified audit opinion and uncertainty regarding 
litigation with a qualified audit opinion. Where the uncertainty was disclosed it was 
accompanied by supplemental information concerning the likely outcome of the litigation. Half 
of these were positive and halfwere negative. This supplemental information was regarded by 
Libby as a competing source of information and its presence was seen by him as a strength of 
the study. He commented (1979b, p. 37) that 'statistical decision theory indicates that 
increased variance in the population increases the value of additional sample information. ' 
participants were 34 experienced loan officers from 4 financial institutions. They were randomly 
assigned to two different groups. Each group was mailed 12 loan applications. One group 
received the 4 cases \Were no Uncertainty was disclosed and the 8 cases where uncertainty was 
disclosed by way of footnote and supplemental information only. The other group received the 
same 4 no disclosure cases and the 8 cases \Were disclosure was by way of footnote, audit report 
and supplemental information. Background information was provided comprising in each case the 
company history, industry conditions and projections and the loan proposal This background 
information was common to each of the 12 cases that participants received. 
The participants were asked two questions: 
(I) would they grant the loan and 
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(2) if they would grant the loan, the interest rate premium that they would charge or, if they would 
not grant the loan, the interest rate premium which they believed would be charged by another 
source. 
Libby (p. 56) found that 'the disclosure of a major uncertainty due to litigation combined with 
supplemental nonaccounting infonnation concerning the uncertainty had a' major impact on 
bankers' risk assessments'. The addition of the qualified audit report did not appear to have a 
similar effect on the loan decision. He also commented that participants possibly tended to 
calculate the most likely outcome of the uncertainty and treat that as certain in calculating future 
cash flows. 
A study by Abdel-Khalik et. al. (1986) replicated and extended that of Libby (1979b). The 
variables used in this study were three forms of audit report (unqualified, subject-to and 'two-
sided', the latter being a clean opinion for Canadian shareholders and a subject-to opinion for US 
shareholders) and two common types ofloss (tax assessment and litigation). The participants were 
64 Canadian commercial loan officers from seven large banks. The participants were each given 
the financial statements of three hypothetical companies (developed from Canadian corporations 
and controlled for size, capitalisation ratios and past profit trends). A three-year simulation was 
presented with audit reports varying over the three years. Subjects were divided into two groups, 
the difference between the two groups being the year of introduction of the 'two-sided' audit 
report (year 2 in the case of one group and year 3 in the case of the other). Similarity between the 
two groups was confirmed using initial-year judgments based on the same information. The 
findings of this study (p. 381) were similar to those of Libby: 'the disclosure of uncertainties due to 
contingencies is considered relevant infonnation by bankers. However the addition of a qualified 
audit opinion in the audit report . . . has no significant impact on bankers' decisions given the 
disclosure of the uncertainties alone.' 
Chen and Summers (1981) reported on the findings in a Ph.D. dissertation by Chen in the 
University of Texas at Austin in 1974 (Chen, 1974). The subjects were 82 MBA students. 
Subjects were divided into 4 groups based on attitude toward accounting data (ie. perception of 
its credibility), risk-taking tendency, cognitive complexity and personality. Each group was given 
four types ofinfonnation in 2 different contexts .. The types ofinfonnation given were as follows: 
( I ) detenninistic infonnation, 
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(2) one inteIVal with no level of confidence, 
(3) one inteIVal with 85% level of confidence, and 
( 4) three inteIVals with 90%, 95% and 99% levels of confidence. 
The information was given in a random order. The decision contexts were, first, share price 
determination in an investment context based on single period financial statements with more than 
30 values and, second, cost determination in a management accoWlting context based on 3 values. 
The range of past price (or cost) behaviour was also given. Subjects were asked to estimate the 
price (cost), the range of possible price (or cost) variations and the amoWlt of capital which would 
be allocated to the investment (or project). Post-decision feelings toward the decision (ie. 
confidence and satisfaction), perception of the task (e.g. difficulty) and attitude toward the data 
provided (e.g. worth of data, demand for additional data) were also elicited. 
The investigation fOWld no significant difference between estimates of price (or cost) based on the 
type of information given. Significant differences were fOWld in the post-decision feelings towards 
the decisions made (significant at 0.01 level) and in perceptions toward the decision task 
(significant 0.00 I level). Subjects generally felt more confident with their decisions when 
probabilistic information was provided. ACCOWlting data was also used to a greater extent when in 
probabilistic form. However, disclosure of confidence levels with ranges of possible values was 
preferred to ranges of values alone. 
Much of the research represents variations on the theme of the disclosure of probability measures, 
by Oliver (1972), Bimberg and Slevin (1976), Keys (1978) and Chen and Summers (1981). They 
arrived at various conclusions depending on the structure of the information provided and nature 
of the participants. 
Bimberg and Slevin, for example, concluded (p. 153) that 'the presence of a formal confidence 
inteIVal statement did not yield significant differences in the subject's decision' as 'apparently the 
skilled user of financial statements already possesses a notion of the relative size of the confidence 
inteIVal around the point estimate from past experience' (p. 156). Chen and Summers (1981, p. 
13) foWld, however, that 'removing the appearance of certainty from accoWlting affects decision 
making behaviour.' They also comment that 'a mere indication of the Wlcertain nature of the 
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reported figure does not necessarily provide subjects with more infonnation that the conventional 
single-valued accounting figure. ' 
Thus it appears that not only do investors act on the basis of expected value and standard deviation 
as Shrupe (1964, p. 427) points out, they also have an idea of the deviation implied in the expected 
return. Crucially, however, several of the theories discussed in chapter 3 question not only the 
action implied by this hypothesis but also that the perception and motivation of individual decision 
makers is more complex than that suggested. Bimberg and Slevin do, however, indicate instances 
when the use of confidence intervals in financial statements may be useful: when the user has little 
if any past experience of the item in question and secondly, when the underlying process changes. 
The latter is considered quite prevalent by Foster (1986, p. 213) particularly when attempting to 
reproduce a process (specifically a time series) having 'estimation efficiency.' The former enters 
into the realm of research carried out on 'functional fixation'. 
Birnberg (1976) responded to the specific suggestion that accounting numbers be communicated 
as ranges rather than single numbers. He pointed out that such disclosure may lead to 'information 
overload': 'proposals to expend the information supplied to consumers [ofaccountiug information] 
should be viewed critically' (p. 220). He also argued (p. 219) that 
individuals exlnbit a persistence of set ('fixity') from one period to 
another. This means that the income statement is viewed as, 
essentially, the same document summarising the same categories of 
events from one period to another. Should a major change occur in 
those events that are inclUded in the income statement ... there will be 
a time lag before the consumer of the financial data will recognize that 
the profit figure may have been calculated in a different fashion. 
Such fixity (termed 'functional fixation') bridges the consideration of existing information and new 
information. It argues that when changes in disclosure do occur, that users cannot adapt to such 
change in the short-term. Among the studies of functional fixation are those carried out by 
Schroder, Driver and Streufert (1967), Revsine (1970), Ashton (1976), Chang and Bimberg 
(1977), Abdel-Khalik and Keller (1979) and Swieringa et al. (1979). Mautz (1990) studied the 
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effects of inflation-adjusted disclosures on perceptions of ability to pay fomld that such disclosures 
have little effect and speculates (p. 289) that this may be due to the lack of familiarity of the 
experimental subjects with the additional disclosures. The implications of familiarity (and lack of 
familiarity) will be further explored in chapter 11 in the context of the differences between the 
reactions of users of financial statements and others to the disclosure of uncertainty. 
Particularly useful in the context of uncertainty and financial reporting is the distinction by Miller 
(1972) between the 'conceptual structures' of decision-makers. An important issue, therefore, in 
the consideration of the use of information is differences in the use of information by individuals 
and / or groups. Danos et. al. (1986) compared the use of published management forecasts by 
bond raters ( expert judges) and by nonexperienced judges. A similar study was carried out by 
Anderson (1988) whose findings suggested that professionals (analysts) and non-professionals 
used data differently. Chapters 5 and 11 indicate how such differences might be overcome 
(chapter 5) and exploited (chapter 11) in the context of this research. 
Gooding (1973) attempted to capture, descriptively, the investment decision-making behaviour of 
groups of investors. As well the finding descnbed earlier, he also found (1973, p. 254) that three 
groups of investors (portfolio managers, investment professors, and nonprofessional investors) did 
not seem to use different information when evaluating ordinary shares. A further hwothesis, 
however, found that 'although all three investor groups may have used risk and return dimensions 
to judge the dissimilarities of the nine stocks, the perceptual differences between portfolio 
managers and nonprofessionals were more pronounced and probably more important. The finding 
that individuals have more heterogeneous perceptions than do portfolio managers, implies that 
price changes could become more pronounced in markets dominated by professionals' (1975, p. 
1314) (as they would tend to have a more homogeneous view of the world). 
Such a finding finds an interesting corollary in de Finetti's representation tlleorem descnbed in 
Gardenfors and Sahlin (1988, p. 4). The thrust of this tlleorem is that 'even if two decision makers 
start out with widely different initial distributions . . . they will end up arbitrarily close to each 
other, if given sufficient time to experiment witl1 the coin. Even though de Finetti does not believe 
that there are such thIngs as 'objective' probabilities, one could sat that his representation theorem 
shows that everyone's subjective probability distributions would converge towards an 
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intersubjective probability distribution if given more and more information about what the world is 
actually like.' Similarly, Danos et al. (1989, p. 245) fOWld that 'lenders continue to register 
significant increases in confidence as additional data are received' although they reach a very high 
level of confidence based on 'highly summarised financial accoWlting information and other general 
background data' and 'seldom does subsequent information cause them to alter their initial ... 
judgment'. Hines (1991, p. 319) argues that the development of a conceptual framework 'is a 
process of reasoning, maintaining the assumption of an objective, intersubjective world as central' 
The disclosure of additional information concerning uncertainty may, paradoxically, reduce 
ambiguity and uncertainty and lead to a more shared perception of the world. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
That notion of 'intersubjective reality' renders this research different from other research carried 
out in the area. Further, the research which will be described in Section 5.2 differs from previous 
research in the area of financial reporting and uncertainty in a nwnber of other respects. 
This chapter outlined previous research in the area of uncertainty in the accounting and investment 
context. In particular, it focussed on research which examined the dic10sure of new information 
regarding uncertainty. It identified the main approaches, findings and problems that charateristised 
such research. In doing so, it assists in distinguishing the unique characterstics of this research and 
also possible approaches to examining the research problem 
This research will be policy-driven. As such, it is based on proposals currently in accoWlting 
standards or other documents regarding the disclosure of uncertainty. As is evident in Sections 4.2 
and 4.3 (and as will be argued in Chapter 5), experimental research can make a particular 
contnbution to the exploration of new, additional forms of disclosure. Such disclosures will be 
identified in chapter 5, drawing on proposals discussed in Chapter 2, theories of decision-making 
examined in chapter 3 and previous research in the area explored in this chapter. They will 
incorporate the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements and that they are based on 
estimates by management. These disclosures have not been tested in this form elsewhere. It also 
includes a disclosure of uncertain assets and liabilities where there is a careful distinction drawn 
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between the wlcertainty of occurrence and outcome. TIle disclosure within each of these distinct 
categories will then be expanded so that differences between the disclosure of outcome and 
occurrence can be explored. 
Research by authors such as Oliver (1972) and Chen and Summers (1981), for example, revolved 
around uncertainty of outcome with fixed intervals (if at all) regarding occurrence. The disclosures 
that will be proposed in chapter 5 are focussed on specific material instances of Wlcertainty (as 
suggested by FRS 6) of assets and liabilities. This allows the research to explore differences 
between disclosures ofWlcertain assets and liabilities in the context of the ASB's perception of the 
nature of assets and liabilities and the evidence necessary to recognise assets and liabilities. Finally 
(though ofpemaps lesser importance) there is the context: the era of accoWlting thought within 
which the research takes place, the experience and background of the subjects involved and the 
fact that most if not all other research in this particular area took place in the US / Canadian 
context. 
These characteristics of the research individually and together render this research different and, 
given its policy consciousness, worthwhile. Having established its context, the following chapter 
explores how this research is specifically focussed and implemented. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 2 and 3 identified the research question of this thesis as, in broad terms, the importance of 
the disclosure of uncertainty in financial reporting and its effect on perceptions in an accounting 
context. This chapter outlines the research approach adopted in exploring this question. The 
identification of the approach to the research question allows the establishment of the research 
hypotheses in chapter 6. These hypotheses will be developed within a behaviouraL decision-
making context, drawing on theories outlined in Chapter 3. Chapter 7, sets out the manner in 
which the research hypotheses will be tested. 
This chapter is in three main sections. The first of these, Section 5.2, outlines briefly the search for 
a framework within which to develop the research hypotheses. Section 5.3 describes the specific 
research method adopted in the research. The approach suggested is experimental Section 5.4 
then outlines some of the general issues raised by such experiments and how these issues are dealt 
with. It also identifies some of the limitations arising from the approach and outlines research 
designs which minimise those limitations. 
III 
5.2 THE SPECIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
In his review of ASOBAT, Sterling wrote that 'the theory of accounting is subject to 
revolutionary change but the practice of accounting must be evolutionary' (Sterling, 1967, p. 
99). This contention remained in the ASB's Statement of Aims one of which was 'to take 
account of the desire of the financial community for evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
change in the reporting process' (ASB, 1991c, para. 7). Section 2.4 outlined a number of 
proposals concerning the disclosure of uncertainty. This section examines such proposals with 
a view to establishing a specific basis within which the issue of the disclosure of uncertainty 
may be addressed. At all times, the research aims to be practical by testing in a feasible 
manner current developments and suggestions regarding the disclosure of uncertainty. 
Chapter 2 outlined the rise of decision-usefulness in influencing policy-making and standard-
setting in accounting. The decision-usefulness paradigm informed the adoption of substance 
over form and the emergence of the view that users needed information concerning risk and 
uncertainty. Such considerations fashioned accounting standards and pronouncements and 
injected into the agenda of policy-makers the need to disclose information regarding 
uncertainty in some form. The first section of this chapter draws on such current 
developments to narrow the consideration of uncertainty outlined in chapter 2 to a specific 
framework which is implemented in chapter 7 and discussed in chapters 8 to 11. Chapter 12, 
in concluding, discusses some of the limitations (including the inevitable narrowness) of the 
research. 
5.2.1 The classification ofuncertainty 
Having explored broad and general issues in the research in chapters 2 to 4, the research must form 
an apparatus within which to test those issues. 'The urge to find pattern' found by Simon and 
Sumner (1968) (described in chapter 3) also aptly describes the search for a framework within 
which to test uncertainty in the accounting context. This search initially sets out to classifY 
and characterise the manifestation of uncertainty in accounting. The influence of uncertainty 
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on financial accounting has been classified in many ways including, for example, by Boritz 
(1990), Pope and Marshall (1991) and by the AICPA (1994). 
As noted in chapter 3, Pope and Marshall (1991, p. 59), in a review of the disclosure of the 
management of exchange rate and interest rate risk distinguish between 
a) transaction exposure: 
b) translation exposure, and 
c) economic exposure. 
Belk and Glaum (1990, p. 4) call translation exposure 'accounting exposure' and comment 
that 'accounting exposure does not give a true picture of the effects of exchange rate changes 
on the economic value of the firm, and the gains and losses measured are purely of a paper 
nature. ' Such arguments, and those outlined in chapter 2, support the case for wider 
recognition in financial statements of the effect of exchange rate risk, for example, than simply 
the translation of balances. 
The AICPA Statement of Position: Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and Uncertainties 
(1994) suggests some such wider disclosures. The Statement (p. v) 
requires reporting entities to include m their financial statements 
disclosures about -
• The nature of their operations. 
• Use of estimates in the preparation offinancial statements. 
In addition . . . it requires entities to include in their financial statements 
disclosures about -
• Certain significant estimates. 
• Current vulnerability due to certain concentrations. 
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The latter two disclosures are required only if the estimates in the financial statements may 
change in the near term due to one or more confirming events and the effect of the change 
would be material to the financial statements. 
Boritz's (1990) classification is somewhat similar to that of the AICPA. Boritz (1990, p. 27) 
comments that 'several sources of risk are commonly referred to in the context of financial 
reporting. These risks are sometimes called 'business risks' to distinguish them from the 
'information risks' that are faced by users of financial information in addition to those risks'. 
This classification is compelling as it mirrors Nurmi's characterisation (1983, p. 106) of 
ambiguity as arising from randomness in the environment (business risk) and ambiguity in the 
presentation of that randomness (information risk). It also echoes Urbany, Dickson and 
Wilkie's (1989, p. 208) findings that uncertainty may be classified on two dimensions: 
'uncertainty regarding what is known about the alternatives (knowledge uncertainty) and 
uncertainty regarding which alternative to choose (choice uncertainty),. 
Boritz then goes on (p. 44) to identify 'classes of uncertainty that financial reporting can 
address' as: 
1. Uncertainty about the Nature and Role of Financial Statements: 'such uncertainty may 
result, in part, from a misunderstanding of the nature, purpose and method of preparation 
of financial statements', 
2. Uncertainty about the Nature of Business Operations Portrayed in the Financial 
Statements: 'uncertainties may flow from the unpredictability of business activities in the 
face oftechnologica~ financial and other competitive changes in the economy'; 
3. Uncertainty due to Limitations of Financial Statement Measurements and Disclosures: 
'Uncertainties may arise from reliance on information which is incomplete, 
incomprehensible, irrelevant, unreliable or not comparable.' 
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Boritz elaborates that such uncertainties may result from: 
a) limitations of methods used to measure current position and past results, 
b) incompleteness of information disclosures, 
c) limitations of methods to predict and/or estimate potential losses (bec~use of 
past actions) whose resolution depends on future events - termed 
contingencies, 
d) weaknesses in the understandability of information disclosures, and 
e) limitations of the methods used to audit or review financial information. 
4. Uncertainty about Management's Motives and Intentions: 'the uncertainty that some 
groups of users, as outsiders, experience about the impact of management motives and 
intentions on the information contained in the financial statements and other related 
information. ' 
Drawing on Boritz's broad dichotomy of risk as information risk and business risk and the 
classes of uncertainty in a financial reporting context, Figure 5.1 brings together the 
uncertainties faced by users of financial statements. 
Figure 5.1: Classification of uncertainties (Boritz, 1990) 
Uncertainty of ______ 
Business 
Information 
uncertainty 
------
Nature of business operations 
Management's motives&intentions 
Nature of financial statements 
Limitations of financial 
statement measurement 
and disclosures 
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111is classification differs! is broader than that of Pope and Marshall. Pope and Marshall's 
(1990) classification of uncertainty is a subset of both information risk ('translation exposure') 
and business risk ('transaction exposure'). Their concentration on particular elements of the 
risk attaching to foreign exchange may be broadened into the general uncertainty of financial 
reporting. 
5.2.2 Reflecting uncertainty in financial statements 
As noted in section 2.4, there are many ways to reflect (ie. recognise and / or disclose) such 
uncertainties in financial statements and / or annual reports. These include proposals by 
Vatter (1965), ASOBAT (1966), Brief and Owen (1968, 1969), the AAA Committee on 
Concepts and Standards - External Financial Reporting (1973), Milburn (1988), Boritz 
(1990) and the AICPA (1994). 
Several of these suggestions, while interesting, involve significant change in the way events 
are recognised, valued and presented in financial statements. Brief and Owen, for example, 
suggest the use of estimation theory involving models of probability, while Milburn proposes 
the use of discounting in a comprehensive manner. The Committee on Concepts and 
Standards - External Financial Reporting (AAA, 1973, pp. 219-222) suggested the 
presentation of 'full-scale probabilistic statements'. Such statements 'are based on reducing a 
discrete probability distribution' for each year to a single value, the mean, and then the present 
worth of the means are discounted to find a present value of the future cash flows.' 
While information concerning uncertainty involves additional disclosures, these disclosures 
should be within the current parameters of financial reporting. This is critical from the point 
of view of understandability and acceptability. Furthermore, such an approach is mindful of 
Birnberg's (1976) warning (outlined in chapter 4) regarding the expansion of the information 
supplied to users of financial statements or the initiation of major change in the events 
presented in financiarstatements. It also reflects the objective of standard-setters that change 
in accounting should be evolutionary rather than revolutionary (ASH, 199Ic). 
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In this research, concrete ways in which to reflect the uncertainties identified by Boritz 
('business risk' and 'information risk') are developed by identifying suggestions within 
existing accounting standards and pronouncements. These include the OFR (ASB, 1993a), 
the accounting standards of the ASB, the Cadbury Report (Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992), and the AlCPA Statement of Position (1994). 
5.2.2.1 Disclosure of 'business risk' 
Chapter 2 explored in general terms the attempts by the OFR to establish 'a framework for the 
directors to discuss and analyse the business's performance and the factors underlying its 
results and financial position' (ASB, 1993a, para. 3). The AICPA Statement of Position 
(AcSEC, 1994) suggests the disclosure of the nature of the operations of the reporting entity. 
These disclosures are disclosures of business risk, disclosures relating to the risks arising from 
the nature of business operations and management's motives and intentions. Examples of such 
disclosures are the launch of a new product with uncertain prospects, research and 
development expenditure, the entry or exit of a competitor from the market or the death of a 
founding or key executive. 
Developing sufficient disclosures that can be consistently applied in this context is problematic 
for various reasons. First, dis~losure in such a broad context may take different forms. The 
most likely form of disclosure is by way of narrative where words may adopt a different 
meaning to each reader: the framing of the disclosure, rather than the disclosure itseU: may 
create its own uncertainty, influencing perception and behaviour. 
Second, the link between such disclosures and particular elements of financial statements, the 
future performance of the entity and the share price is also not clear. Third, the disclosure of 
a product launch or withdrawal for example may itselfhave uncertain effects. Good news and 
bad news may have gifferent potential: for example, a product launch has an unlimited effect 
on turnover while the effect of a product withdrawal is limited to the current turnover of that 
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product. Finally, the OFR proposes (but does not require) that such uncertainties be disclosed 
within the annual report but not within the audited financial statements. Although the auditor 
may assess whether the information disclosed is not inconsistent with the financial statements, 
the disclosure is unaudited. This causes further 'noise' as the perception of the reliability of 
the information disclosed may depend on factors other than the disclosure. While none of 
these problems would lead one to avoid testing disclosure in this area, together they suggest 
that disclosure in the area is difficult to construct in a controlled way, that the link between 
such disclosure and perception is unclear and is potentially confounded by other variables. 
5.2.2.2 Disclosure of 'information risk' 
Financial statements are a way of presenting the transactions of a reporting entity and their 
consequences. As products of an uncertain world, they are themselves uncertain. As 
standard-setters attempt to represent more faithfully the complexities of the uncertain world, 
the risk that financial statements themselves may become more ambiguous (,information risk') 
increases. Such ambiguity affects financial statements, broadly, in two ways. 
1. The financial statements themselves are uncertain (as explored in this section) and, 
2. There is uncertainty regarding the recognition, measurement and disclosure of elements 
within the financial statements (section 5.2.2.3). 
The research approach is to examine these particular uncertainties in detail. 
Disclosure concerning the uncertain nature of financial statements has been suggested by the 
AICPA Statement of Position (1994). This disclosure is shown in Figure 2.6. It is similar to 
disclosure contained in the Directors' Responsibility Statement. It is not the objective of the 
Directors' Responsibility Statement to disclose the nature of financial statements but to clarify 
the responsibilities of the directors concerning published financial statements. In doing so, 
however, it does reveal that the financial statements are prepared based on 'suitable 
accounting policies, consistently applied and supported by reasonable and prudent judgements 
and estimates' (Conunittee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, Note 
12). Where accounting policies are the manifestation of accounting choice, tIus disclosure is 
118 
the manifestation of the uncertainties resulting from accounting choice. Tlus disclosure does 
not change the uncertainty surrounding financial statements: it merely reveals it. 
It could be argued that sophisticated users of financial statements are aware that a 'true and 
fair view' does not imply certainty. However, 'to the man in the street ... the words 'true 
and fair' are likely to signify that the accounts give a true statement of facts. He will be likely 
to associate facts with 'actual profit' and 'actual values" (Edey, 1971, p. 440). Nobes and 
Parker (1991) found differences in directors' understanding of 'true and fair' and of their 
respoDSlbilities with regard to financial statements. Lee ( 1994) argued that some ambiguity existed 
concerning the nature offinancial statements and the 'labels' attached to such statements. As part 
of the implementation of the research, the level of sophistication and experience of the users 
involved and the reaction to this disclosure from users with different levels of 'sophistication' 
will be assessed. 
Furthermore, several suggestions have emanated from different bodies concerning the disclosure of 
the uncertain nature offinancial statements. The MacDonald Commission in Canada (CICA, 1988, 
p. 11) asserted that 'it required little investigation to convince us that a homogeneous public with 
homogeneous expectations does not exist ... Even within the financial community we can discern 
different segments whose views are likely to differ depending on their depth of knowledge about 
financial reporting and their particular experience with it. ' 
The AICPA in a Discussion Paper issued by its Task Force on Risks and Uncertainties (1987, p. 12) 
finds a 
need to communicate explicitly to users of financial reports that the inescapable 
use of estimates in the preparation of historical financial information results in 
the presentation of a considerable number of approximate rather than exact 
amounts. If users understand better the inherent limitations on precision in 
financial statements, they will be better able to make decisions. 
It continues that such .estimates are more difficult in times of economic volatility. Furthermore, the 
AICPA argues, that though many users of financial statements are aware of the uncertain nature of 
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financial statements, many others are not. In its subsequent Statement of Position, the AICPA 
(AcSEC, 1994, p. 41) commented that 'relatively few respondents expressed concerns regarding 
the disclosure of ... the use of estimates in the preparation of financial statements'. 
As well as suggesting the disclosure that financial statements are a product of estimates by 
management, both Boritz and the AICPA suggest that financial statements should provide 
sufficient disclosure of significant uncertainties to allow users to assess those uncertainties. 
This view was evident as early as 1966 in the AICPA's Committee on A Statement of Basic 
Accounting Theory (ASOBAT). The Committee \\-Tote, in a section on the scope of future 
accounting (AAA, 1969, p. 65): 
Another aspect of multiple valuations involves the use of non - deterministic 
or quantum ranges with or without probabilistic measures. In view of 
uncertainties surrounding business activities and the measurement of their 
impact, the use of such non-deterministic measures is likely to become a part 
of an expanded accounting discipline of the future. 
Such an argument, in its acceptance that the problems of accounting concern 'uncertainties of 
business and the measurement if their impact', recognises (as did Tweedie and Whittington 
(1990) discussed in chapter 2) the dual nature of uncertainty. 
5.2.2.3 The dual nature of unc.ertainty 
The essential elements of uncertainty, \Wites Rescher (1983), are the uncertain chance of the 
realisation or occurrence of an event and the outcome of that event if realised. 
That uncertainty is of such a dual nature is reflected in the ASB's draft Statement of PrinCiples 
(ASB, 1995b, p. 68) which states that 'recognition is triggered where a past event 
[ occurrence] gives rise to a measurable change [ outcome] in the assets or liabilities of the 
entity.' The ASB, in FRS 5 Reporting the Substance of Transactions (ASB, 1994a, p. 13), 
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outlines in greater detail the criteria necessary to allow recognition of an asset or liability in 
financial statements: 
Where a transaction results in an item that meets the definition of an asset or 
liability, that item should be recognised in the balance sheet if; 
(a) there is sufficient evidence of the existence of the item (including where 
appropriate, evidence that a future inflow or outflow will occur); and 
(b) the item can be measured at a monetary amount with sufficient reliability. 
Again the dual requirement of evidence of occurrence and outcome is evident. 
As noted in chapter 2, the ASB demands greater evidence for the existence of an asset than 
for the existence ofa liability (ASB, 1995a, 1995b and 1997b). This asymmetrical approach is 
also found in SSAP 18 Accounting for Contingencies. Applying only 'to conditions existing 
at the balance sheet date, where the outcome will be confirmed only on the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of one or more uncertain future events' (ASC, 1980, para. 1), the Standard 
requires recognition or disclosure based on uncertainty of occurrence as set out in Figure 2.4. 
The recognition of gains and losses hinges on considerations of whether those gains and losses 
are remote, possible or probable. Uncertainty of outcome is addressed by the requirement 
that, in the case of gains and losses, the gain or loss must be estimable with 'reasonable 
accuracy' (ASC, 1980, para. 15). If the outcome is 'inestimable', uncertain gains and losses 
which are not remote (ie. which are possible or probable) should be disclosed, but with no 
indication of the (inestimable) outcome. 
That the occurrence of an event is 'probable' comprises part of the recognition criteria of the 
Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB, 1992), the Accounting Standards Board in 
the UK (ASB, 1994a), the Canadian Institute Chartered Accountants Handbook (CICA), the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC, 1994) and part of the definition of 
assets ofthe Financial Accounting Standards Board in the US (FASB, 1984 and 1985). FRS 
5 (ASB, 1994a) uses the phrase 'most likely' in setting out how the substance ofa transaction 
should be determined. Such definitions, in the words of Sterling (1985), connect a word (e.g. 
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remote, possible or probable) with the uncertain occurrence of an event and then recognise or 
disclose the outcome of that event in the financial statements. 'The available literature 
indicates that there is large variability in the mapping of phrases to numbers' (Budescu and 
Wallsten, 1985, p. 391). Budescu and Wallsten (1985), Chesley and Wier (1985), Chesley 
(1986) and Larsson and Chesley (1986) suggest that 'phrases are not as crisp as numbers': 
phrases are 'imprecise', 'vague', 'fuzzy' (Budescu and Wallsten, 1985, p. 403) and, as Nurmi 
(1983) might write, ambiguous. 
Contingent losses which are probable are recognised in the financial statements. Other non-
remote contingent losses are disclosed. Contingent gains are not recognised in the financial 
statements, are only disclosed when probable and only recognised when reasonably certain. 
Uncertain gains and losses (and hence assets and liabilities (ASC, 1980~ ASB, 1997b» are, 
therefore, for the most part, treated asymmetrically. Exceptions arise when the potential 
occurrence of the event is remote or reasonably certain. Remote gains and losses are neither 
recognised nor disclosed. Reasonably certain gains and losses are recognised. The ASB's 
Exposure Draft on the Statement of Principles (ASB, 1995b, p. 75) maintains this prudent 
tradition stating that 'prudence has the effect that less evidence of occurrence and reliability of 
measurement is required for the recognition of a loss than for a gain.' 
One of the objectives of this research therefore is to assess differences between uncertain 
assets and liabilities. However, the research will focus on losses only due to the asymmetric 
attitude to gains and losses identified in chapter and represented specifically in Kahneman and 
Tversky's Value Function (Figure 3.5). As detailed in section 7.2, the research intends to 
explore remote uncertainties as these, although they exist, are not reflected currently in 
financial statements. 
As noted in chapter 2, the uncertainty of such events could be estimated and expressed in the fonn 
of a fixed interval (and estimating the probability of the occurrence and I or outcome of an event 
being realised within ~at interval) or a variable interval (estimating an interval surrounding an 
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occurrence/outcome with a specified probability). An example of fixed intelVal and variable 
intelVal disclosures of debtors is given in Figure 2.10. 
These methods are the most widely used, writes Hull, in management decision making under 
uncertainty. Others, for example, Thornton (1983, p. 37), have also suggested incorporating tools 
of management decision making in the disclosure of uncertain events and outcomes. The 
accommodation of uncertainty in financial statements in such a manner had also been mentioned by 
the AICPA Objectives Report (1973) and by other writers such as Bedford (1965), Devine (1966) 
and Vatter (1966) and more recently by Thornton (1983). It may be noted that this approach 
recognises the dual nature of uncertainty: the uncertainty regarding whether an event will occur 
('event uncertainty') and uncertainty regarding the outcome of that event should it occur 
(,outcome uncertainty'). These uncertainties are central to the dual accounting problems of 
recognition and valuation: whether to recognise an event and how to value its outcome. The 
disclosures adopted in this research will attempt to reflect such duality. 
Devine (1966, p. 22) argued that 
a little-explored alternative estimates probability numbers for both the amount 
to be paid and the pOSSIbility of having to pay at all and derives an expected 
value for the unfavourable prospect. 
The AICPA's Statement of Position (AcSEC, 1994) suggests that financial statements should 
provide sufficient discussion. of significant uncertainties to allow users to assess these 
uncertainties. The ASB in its draft Statement of Principles (1995b) comments that if 
sufficient evidence is not available regarding the outcome of a transaction (i.e. if the outcome 
is inestimable) and 
where assets and liabilities are subject to uncertainty, simply reporting a single 
amount may create an impression of certainty of outcome that may not in fact 
exist. Hence where the effect of the uncertainty is potentially significant, clear 
disclosure of the degree of uncertainty SUITOlUlding the estimate is necessary. 
Such disclosure might include the significant assumptions used, the range of 
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possible outcomes, the basis of measurement and the principal factors that 
affect what the outcome will be. (ASB, 1995b, p. 78) 
The CICA ED Measurement Uncertainty (CICA, 1993) contains the same suggestion. A 
similar disclosure set out by paragraph 24 of FRS 6 Acquisitions and Mergers provides more 
information concerning contingent or deferred consideration (ASB, 1994b, p. 17): 'The nature 
of any deferred consideration should be stated including, for contingent consideration, the 
range of possible outcomes and the principal factors that affect the outcome.' They have, 
however, been restricted to particular instances of future events or contingencies when outcomes 
or occurrence of outcomes are unknown. Hence, it is not the intention of standard-setters that the 
disclosure of ranges of uncertainty should have universal application. Suggestions within 
accounting standards currently are restricted to particular circumstances of high uncertainty where 
to present potential outcomes as 'single numbers' may be misleading. 
Similarly, the AICPA Statement of Position: Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and 
Uncertainties (AsSEC, 1994, p. 5) 'requires disclosures regarding estimates used in the 
determination of the carrying amounts of assets or liabilities or in disclosure of gain or loss 
contingencies'. Such disclosures would only be made, the Statement suggests (p. 5), 
when known information available prior to issuance of the financial statements 
indicates that both of the following criteria are met: 
a. It is at least reasonably possible that the estimate of the effect on 
the financial statements of a conditio~ situatio~ or set of 
circumstances that existed at the date of the financial statements 
will change in the near term due to one or more future confirming 
events. 
b. The effect of the change would be material to the financial 
statements. 
The additional disclosures of remote and inestimable events that comprises the research instrument 
will be based on these suggestions. In the first instance, the disclosure of the uncertain nature of 
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financial statements (as in Figure 2.6) and, secondly, the controlled disclosure of the Wlcertainty 
surrounding certain elements of financial statements (drawing from the disclosure in Figure 2.10). 
In the second case, the disclosure will recognise the dual nature of uncertainty by distinguishing 
between lUlcertain (remote) outcome and lUlcertain (inestimable) occurrence. ' 
The disclosure will therefore comprise three basic elements: 
1. The disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements; 
2. The disclosure of a significant estimate with regard to the inestimable outcome and remote 
occurrence of a decrease in an asset; and (in order to assess potential differences resulting 
from the disclosure of uncertain' assets and liabilities) 
3. Similar to 2, the disclosure of a significant estimate with regard to the inestimable outcome 
and remote occurrence of an increase in a liability. 
By comforming with current timbre of accolUlting standards or principles noted earlier and by 
disclosing (separately) the uncertain nature of a specific asset and a specific liability for a number of 
reporting entities, this research differs from that ot: for example, Chen (1974), Keys (1978) and 
others outlined in chapter 4 in the extent of its disclosure and in its hypotheses. 
Chapter 7 (section 7.2 particularly) discusses the specific development of the research instrument in 
this manner. The next section outlines the approach to testing the effect of these disclosures. 
5.3 THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
'The manner of translating theory to implementation is a critical determinant of the quality of the 
overall research effort.' (Wallace, 1991, p. 14). Wallace (1991) and Caplan (1972) identify a 
variety of empirical research methods of research. These include experiments, observation, 
interviews and swveys. Ryan, Scapens and Theobald (1992) also discuss research methods in the 
context of accolUlting and finance, in particular market-based studies, survey-based research and 
experimental research. Wallace (1991, p. 9) comments that a key element of research design is 'the 
source of data relevant to the research question;' 
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The research question in this research is attempting to capture the effect of disclosures of 
Wlcertainty in the accoWlting context. (Specific hypotheses are outlined in chapter 6.) Prior 
research in the area of assessing the value of accoWlting infonnation has utilised swvey techniques 
(e.g. Lee and Tweedie (1977 and 1981), Farrelly (1981) and Moizer and Arnold (1984», market-
based research (e.g. Ball and Brown (1968), Beaver (1968) Gonedes (1971), protocol analysis 
(Day (1986» and experiments. The results of these studies were discussed in chapter 4. 
The disclosures in this research have a number of characteristics which together render 
experimental methods particularly useful in the context of the disclosure of uncertainty: 
a) The disclosure of new infonnation on uncertainty: 
The framework within which the disclosures are studied is evolutionary and constitutes an 
extension of: rather than a radical departure from, current accounting conventions. The 
disclosures are, however, largely based on proposals within the standard-setting process but, where 
implemented (for example, in the case of contingent or deferred consideration Wlder FRS 6 
(1994b», are likely to be few and sporadic. The disclosures proposed do not currently appear on a 
systematic basis in the financial statements of reporting entities. Pope and Marshall (1990), for 
example, while finding evidence of increased disclosure of 'new financial instruments', fOWld 
substantial variation in the manner and extent of disclosure. Much of these disclosures were in 
narrative, unaudited financial reviews. They concluded (p. 61) that disclosures of Wlcertainty in 
this context 'will be the subject of ongoing research and debate as disclosure practices in this area 
evolve.' The disclosures proposed are constructed, artificiaL Market reaction to such disclosures 
or field experiments are therefore not pOSSIble as the disclosures do not exist in the market or the 
field. 
Helmstadter (1970, p. 118) comments that a 'distinct advantage of the experimental approach is 
that it is not limited to, the particular combinations and magnitudes of variables and the timing that 
occurs in natural events. Because of this the experimental approach can add a great deal to 
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science.' The disclosures which are the subject of this research add to the illfonnation disclosed in 
a financial reporting context. Similarly, the experimental approach can add to our ooderstanding of 
the role of such disclosures in fonning the perceptions of users of financial statements. 
b) The need for control: 
One of the requirements of this research has been identified as the control of the disclosure 
regarding oocertainty. Uncertainty is a constant: the disclosure of it is varied. In the context of 
experiments, Roth (1988, p. 974) comments 'the economic environment is very fully ooder the 
control of the experimenter'. Roth argues that 'it is precisely this control of the environment and 
access to the [decision-making] agents (sufficient to obselVe and measUre attributes that are not 
controlled) that give laboratory experiments their power'. Coolican (1994, p. 69) also comments 
that 'if the aim of the experiment is to reduce relevant extraneous variables by strict control then 
this is best achieved in a laboratory setting, particularly where highly accurate recordings of human 
cognitive functions (such as memory, perception, selective attention) is required'. 
c) The decision-making context of the research: 
As noted in chapters 2 and 4, the disclosure of information regarding the risks and uncertainties 
faced by reporting entities has fOood support among accowlting practitioners. The Financial 
Reporting Commission in the Republic of Ireland (The Ryan Commission, 1992), the Cadbury 
commission (1992) and the AICPA (1994) each proposed with differing emphasis, after some 
deliberation and (albeit ooscientific) public discussion, the disclosure in some form of the uncertain 
nature of financial statements. The ASB comments in FRS 6 (ASB, 1994b, p. 54) that 'a large 
majority of the respondents to FRED 6 [which formed the basis of FRS 6] agreed with the 
proposals it contained'. While this agreement pertained to the wide variety of proposals of which 
the proposal regarding disclosure of inestimable amounts was only one, that proposal swvived in 
the Standard and therefore would appear not to have attracted significant opposition at least. 
Farrelly (1981) conducted a sUlVey of the opinions of investors regarding the disclosure of 
uncertainty regarding the fixed assets of reporting entities. She found support for the notion of 
127 
disclosing such uncertainties. Having established that these kinds of disclosures carry some 
support. the objective of this research is to extend the exploration of such disclosures by studying 
the reactions, ifany, of users offinancial statements to disclosures of uncertainty. 
The disclosure of uncertainty is in this instance a stimulus. The research hopes to explore reaction, 
if any, to such a stimulus. Coolican (1994, p. 70) defends laboratory experiments by stating that 'in 
the study of brain processes, or of human performance, stimulus detection and so on, [the 
laboratory] is the only place where highly technical and accurate measurement can be made. ' 
Research regarding uncertainty may have the objective of exploring opinions (through 
swveys), market reaction (through market-based research) or individual reaction (through 
field or laboratory experimentation or protocol analysis). This research adopts the latter 
objective and, for the reasons outlined, proposes to use laboratory experiments as the method 
of examining the reactions of individuals who are users of financial statements to such 
disclosures. The next section discusses this approach in more detail. 
5.4 THE EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK 
5.4.1 The experimental design 
Various experimental designs are discussed in a seminal article by Campbell (1957). A discussion 
of some of these designs, and their weaknesses, will illustrate the potential COnfOlUlding variables in 
behavioural experiments and how they might be limited. Such a discussion will also selVe to 
explain why the experiments of this research were designed as proposed. 
128 
One potential experimental design is a 'one group pretest-posttest design'. This design would be as 
follows: 
XI 0 1 X2 O2 ••• XN~ 
where X I = no disclosure, X2= (for example) the disclosure of the nature of finmcial statements and 
0 1 • •• DN = subjects' reaction respectively. 
In constructing this type of experiment, the experimenter is attempting to assess the influence of X 
on the perceptions or behaviour of the decision maker. In this design, as Campbell points out 
(1957, p. 298), there are however several 'extraneous variables left uncontrolled which ... become 
rival explanations of any difference between 0 1 and O2 confounded with the posSible effect of X. ' 
The most immediate of these is that the participant reacts purely to the fact of disclosure rather than 
to its form or content. Intuitively it would appear that most incremental disclosures would elicit a 
reaction and therefore appear relevant. Other effects include an 'ordering effect' and a 'demand 
effect'. The first of these suggests that participants will be influenced by the order in which the 
disclosures are presented rather than the disclosures themselves. The second (hypothesised in the 
field of psychology by Orne (1962» suggests that, by exposing participants to all the disclosures, 
they may discern the objective of the experiment and react accordingly. The 'major cost' of within-
subjects design writes Libby (1979, p. 41) is 'what is called 'experimental demand', where 
knowledge of the manipulation allows the subject to uncover the experimenter's hypothesis and to 
behave accordingly. ' 
A response to such limitations has been to conduct experiments over a period of time, to allow for 
example a period of months to elapse between XI and X 2. This gives rise to further confounding 
variables such as history, maturation and mortality. The first of these describes the potential effect 
of newS (other than X) on the participants. Second, the participants may mature, becoming older, 
wiser, hungrier, more tired. Third, some participants may not be available for various reasons for 
the later experiment. The latter two of these effects imply that, effectively, the group at XI may not 
the same group as at X2• 
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All of these confounding effects are compounded by the fact that the experiment proposed is not 
only in two parts but in eight parts as will be outlined in chapter 7. A further limitation of the one 
group design specific to the accounting context is that a fundamental assumption of accowlting is 
that accounting treatment and disclosure should be consistent. To vary disclosure across 
companies within the same group of participants is to violate that assumption. 
These potential limitations would strongly suggest that a between-group design should be used. 
This design would vary the disclosures presented to participants between groups instead of within 
groups. This approach is not without its limitations. The most significant of these is the question 
of whether differences between the reactions of the groups are due to differences between groups 
rather than the disclosures themselves. 
Campbell and others (e.g. Donaldson and Suppes, 1957; Forcese and Richer, 1970 and Kinney, 
1986) suggest that this confounding factor may be limited by the random allocation of participants 
to each group and by having large enough groups that individual differences will be diluted. 
However, Kinney (1986) cautions that such random assignment of subjects may lead to 
confounding variables influencing the performance of some groups more than others. Malliotra 
(1988, p. 228) while commenting that 'randomization is the preferred procedure for ensuring the 
prior equality of experimental groups' continues that 'it is possible, though, to check whether 
randomization has been effective by measuring the possible extraneous variables and comparing 
them across experimental grOUP&·' 
Further steps were therefore taken to ensure that differences between groups were not significant. 
Of crucial importance in this experiment were the participant's ability to use accounting infonnation 
(the aptitude of the participants) and the participant's ex ante perception of the reliability of 
accounting information (the attitude of the participants). Two tasks will be designed as reproduced 
in the appendix to chapter 7 to assess whether the aptitude and attitude of the participants in each 
group was not significantly different and to allow conclusions to be drawn based on the responses 
of each group. 
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The first of these asks a set of multiple choice questions to assess the aptitude of participants. TIle 
second task elicits participants' attitude to the reliability of various elements of financial statements 
on a bi-polar scale. This is similar to the approach fOWld by Selto and Cooper (1990) in their 
review of the control ofrisk attitudes and an approach discussed by Sherifand Hovland (1961, p. 
13) in their exploration of the measurement of attitude in generaL Although they fOWld no 
consistent strategy for controlling subjective risk in accounting research, they did find attempts to 
measure risk attitudes ex-ante or ex-post so that the effect of attitude could be controlled (Selto and 
Cooper, 1990, p. 230). Likewise, Schepanski, Tubbs and Grimland (1992, p. 141) found such 
'methodological devices' to be useful in controlling for initial differences between groups. Such 
instruments were also used by Puto (1987) in his research concerning the effect of initial reference 
points (such as expectation) on buying decisions. 
Both of these tasks will be performed before the experiments themselves. As a result, care will be 
taken to construct tasks which are general in nature (for example, with one exception not asking for 
the use of ratios) so that participants are not subsequently led in a particular direction by the tasks 
assigned. Differences in aptitude among subjects will be controlled by excluding those subjects 
who do not obtain a satisfactory score (greater than 2 out of 5) in the aptitude test. Attention will 
be given to differences in subjects' attitude to financial statement items in the exploration of their 
assessment of the uncertainty disclosed in the research. This is an approach suggested by Kinney 
(1986, p. 343). 
To summarise, a between-groups experimental design is proposed with some consideration of 
measuring and controlling between-groups to mitigate some of the limitations of between-group 
design as outlined. The next section considers a further issue regarding the experimental design: 
that of incentives. 
13 I 
5.4.2 The research design and incentives 
Another consideration in the experimental design is the need to provide incentives. Experiments 
carried out by behavioural scientists, for example, do not place a great emphasis on the need for 
incentives. The areas of economics and finance (e.g. Thaler, 1987; Roth, 1988; Thaler and 
Johnson, 1990), however, emphasise the need for incentives to render the experimental process 
more realistic, with the caveat that no incentive schemes are better than inappropriate ones. 
In the context of these experiments, two issues are worthy of consideration. The first of these was 
that central to the thinking of the research was that there was not necessarily an objective reality, a 
right answer. To indicate otherwise to subjects by rewarding 'right answers' would be to 
undermine that thinking, to mislead participants and, perhaps, to re-establish the demand effects 
discussed earlier. As Joyce argues (1989, p. 150), 'monetary incentives cannot be employed 
because the 'correct' answer is not known.' 
Second, the work of MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986), March and Shapira (1992) and Steil 
(1993) suggests that incentive mechanisms in organisations are complex and various and that 
behaviour in organisations is influenced by such incentives and targets. Such incentive mechanisms 
would be costly and difficult, if not impossible, to replicate in an experimental setting. 
Furthermore, as Joyce (1989, p. 150) comments 'the potential reward that university researchers 
can realistically offer ... for gopd performance is more likely to be viewed as an insult than as an 
incentive. ' 
Incentives will be available to participants to encourage their earnest participation m the 
experiments. The incentives, however, will be available to those who participated fully in the 
experiments and not based on 'adequate', 'satisfactory' or 'correct' responses. Participants who 
participate fully will be entered in a lottery where there is a 1 in 10 chance of winning prizes ranging 
from £100 to £10. This approach is adopted so as to increase the stakes involved without imposing 
inordinately high cost,:; on the experimenter. This lottery-type system is similar to the approach 
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used by, for example, Evans, Heiman-Hoffinan and Rau (1994). Bolle (1990) provides evidence 
that lottety-type incentive schemes do not affect the decision-makers' performance. 
5.4.3 . Description of experimental subjects 
291 subjects took part in the research (66.7% of those contacted). The aver~ge age of the subjects 
was just over 23 years of age. 189 (64.9%) of the subjects were attending a course of study in 
Dublin City University (see Table 5.1). 86 (29.6%) were third year students of the B.A in 
Accounting and Fmance degree, 39 (13.4%) were MBS in Accounting students, a further 40 
(13.7%) were students on the MSc. in Investment and Treasury, 1 was attending another course 
while the remaining 23 were MBA students. Each of these courses are specialisms in accounting 
(the B.A in Accounting and Finance and the MBS in Accounting) or have a strong element of 
analysis of accounting information. Subjects such as these were used, for example, by Chen (1974) 
and Bimberg and Slevin (1976) who used MBA students and Chesley (1986) who used MBA and 
chartered accounting students. 
The remaining 102 subjects were graduates who were not attending a course of study at DCU, 66 
being graduates of the MBS in Accounting, 27 graduates of the MSc in Investment and Treasury 
and the remaining 10 being graduates of the BA in Accounting and Finance and other courses .. As 
most (though not all) of those attending the MBS in Accounting, the MSc in Investment and 
Treasury and the MBA were graduates, the subjects comprised 189 graduates and 102 non-
graduates (87 of which were undergraduates). 
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Table 5.1: Course attendance of experimental subjects. 
Course attended No. 
NONE 
BA in Accounting and Finance 
MBS in Accounting 
MSc. in Investment &Treasury 
MBA 
OTHER 
Total 
102 
86 
39 
40 
23 
1 
291 
% 
35.1 
29.6 
13.4 
13.7 
7.9 
0.3 
100.0 
136 (46.7%) of the subjects were in employment (see Table 5.2). The average years in their 
current employment of these subjects was 2.97 years, ranging from 1 year to 23 years. 40 (13.7%) 
were employed in 'Big 6' accountancy firms, 17 (5.8%) were in other accountancy firms, 51 
(17.5%) in financial institutions, while the remaining 48 (16.5%) were in manufacturing, seJVice or 
other organisations (of those 34 used financial statements as part of their work). Of those in 
employment, 124 (80%) were in roles which required the use of financial statements (see Table 
5.2). 
53 (19.6%) were members of a profession, 41 of which related to accounting or investment 
research (ie. the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland, the Chartered Institute of 
Management Accounting and the Institute ofInvestment Management and Research). Most of the 
other professionals were engineers. 
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Table 5.2: Employment and use of financial statements of experimental subjects. 
Employment None Use Not 
FS use FS 
None 134 
'Big 6' accountancy finn 37 4 
Other accountancy finn 17 
Financial institution 36 15 
Manufacturing organisation 13 3 
Service organisation 8 2 
Other (e.g. state sector) lL -.2 
.ill ill II 
All subjects were initially tested for their aptitude in the financial reporting context as outlined in 
chapter 7 and reproduced in the Appendix of that chapter. The average score on the aptitude test 
was 3.1 correct answers out of 5. 76 subjects scored 2 or less out of 5 in this test and were not 
used as part of the overall results of the results leaving 215 subjects whose responses will be used in 
the research. The average score on the aptitude test of these remaining subjects was 3.6 out of5 or 
72.1 %. The effects of this filtering will be explored as part of the research results in chapter 11 by 
examining differences, if any, between the subjects' assessments based on their aptitude to 
accounting information. The subjects in the research comprised 166 males (57%) and 125 females 
(43%). Differences between the experimental subjects based on their differing characteristics will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 11. 
The 5tubjects and the context of the research may undennine respectively what Bracht and Glass 
(1968) term its population validity and its ecological validity. The use of student subjects in 
experiments concerning judgments in accounting has been discussed by several authors (e.g. 
Dickhaut, Livingstone and Watson, 1972; Abdel-Khali~ 1974 and Ashton and Kramer, 1980). 
Such discussions appear to discourage the use of student subjects. As studies of judgment in 
accounting are context specific, the literature suggests in particular that the judgment processes and 
values of students do not replicate or represent those of, for example, auditors, accoIDltants, bank 
lenders or investment analysts. 
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Nevertheless a wide-ranging swvey of the literature (particularly the Accounting Review, JourlUll 
of Accounting Research and Accounting. Organizations and Society) by Snowball (1986) found 
that students participated in 70% of the sample studies. This is for reasons of availability but also 
because, in initial studies of effects of information, students are viewed as a 'reasonable starting 
point before proceeding to more detailed, 'real' contexts. Furthermore, Cook and Campbell 
(1979), for example, argue that at times control and availability strengthen internal validity and that 
external validity may, initially, need to be weakened for the sake of such internal validity. 
Regarding its context (and ecological validity), chapter 3 outlined inter alia the importance of the 
institutional context to investment decision-making. March and Shapira (1987, p. 1409), for 
example, found that 'managerial risk taking propensities vary across individuals and across 
contexts.' Each context brings with it its own complexities. However, if each context (including 
for example reward structures) differs, the replication of each of these contexts is most validly 
achieved on a context-by-context basis. Such a replication requires perhaps a foundation such as 
that achieved in this research before embarking on further contextual and institutional explorations. 
The methodology and approach appropriate in such further research (e.g. case studies) may be 
different from those employed here. 
In this research, the experimental subjects were not homogeneous but constituted subjects with 
differing experiences and characteristics. Not all, for example, were students. This may undermine 
the research by creating what Coolican (1994, p. 57) terms 'participant variance: ... unwanted 
variance in participants' performance'. Paradoxically, however, in this research the heterogeneity 
of the subjects serves to mitigage the limitation concerning the representatativeness of the research 
subjects. Participant variance is limited by the random allocation of the subjects to experimental 
groups and controlled for by the collection and consideration of the characteristics of the subjects, 
as descn"bed in chapters 7 and 11 respectively. Chapter 11 explores the variances between the 
performance of participants and finds that this variance is only significant in the case of the effects 
of gender and current educational status on confidence. This limitation is discussed in chapters 11 
and 12 in the light of these findings. 
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A further consideration is whether the disclosure of additional information exposes participants to 
information of a nature and in a fonn possibly not seen by them before. Birnberg (1976) and 
Chang and Birnberg (1977), for example, comment that additional disclosures may lead to 
'information overload' and 'functional fixation'. Users may require a period of learning and 
adaptation to new fonns of accounting treatment and disclosure. On the other hand, Thaler (1987) 
argues that users do not in fact have the opportunity to learn. They are instead sporadically 
exposed to new information which they are expected to understand without necessarily having the 
time to absorb and learn its significance. Furthermore, the research does not concern itself with 
changes in accounting treatment which has been the subject of numerous other pieces of research 
in accounting. It involves the disclosure of new information. The feedback from the pilot group 
(who would not be more sophisticated than the participants of the actual experiments) indicates 
that the information disclosed is not difficult to understand or apply. 
The next chapter outlines the research hypotheses drawing in particular on the behavioural theories 
explored in chapter 3. Chapter 7 then discusses the experimental design and execution of the 
experiments. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the research method adopted. It discussed the framework within which 
uncertainty in a financial reportitig context may be disclosed. That framework is based on two of 
the various suggested methods of disclosing uncertainty outlined in Section 2.4. It also outlined 
the specific disclosures used in the research and the rationale for those disclosures. Specifically 
these involve, firstly, the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements (results of this 
disclosure are examined in chapter 8) and, secondly, disclosure of significant estimates in the 
financial statements regarding the outcome and occurrence of uncertain assets and liabilities 
(examined in chapters 9 and 10). 
The research design was then explored including the experimental method used. In summary, the 
specific method adopted in the research is experimental using subjects drawn from the business 
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student and graduate population of Dublin City University. A between-group design is used with 
lottery-based incentives. 
The outline the approach to the research question in this chapter, enables the detailed development 
of the research hypotheses in the following chapter (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 outlines the design and 
execution of the experiments and experimental tasks to test these hypotheses. Chapters 8, 9, 10 
and 11 will explore the research disclosures and their results in more detail 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the hypotheses of this research. In doing so, the chapter draws 
on the discussion of theories of decision-making in the context of WI certainty in 
chapter 3. These theories are specifically identified and discussed in Sections 6.2 to 
6.4. 
The hypotheses are also developed within the framework of the disclosure of 
uncertainty in chapters 2 and 5. This framework comprised three basic elements: 
1. The disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements; 
2. The disclosure of a significant estimate with regard to the inestimable outcome and 
remote occurrence of a decrease in an asset; and 
3. Similar to 2, the disclosure of a significant estimate with regard to the inestimable 
outcome and uncertain occurrence of an increase in a liability. 
These disclosures, chapter 5 outlined, are to be tested in an experimental context. TIle 
task outlined for the experimental subjects (which will be concretised in the research 
instrument in chapter 7) will be to assess the performance and position of the reporting 
entity (or entities) given such disclosures and also to express their confidence in their 
assessment. 
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This chapter now identifies specific hypotheses with regard to the effect on the 
assessments and confidence of the experimental subjects of these disclosures. Section 
6.2 sets out the hypotheses with regard to the disclosure of the uncertain nature of 
financial statements. Section 6.3 explores the hypotheses concerning the disclosure of 
the uncertain outcome and occurrence of a decrease in an asset, while Section 6.4 
identifies the hypotheses with regard to the uncertain increase in a liability. 
Hypotheses regarding potential differences between disclosures of uncertainty ill the 
domain of assets and liabilities will also be explored in section 6.4. 
Chapter 11 will develop and test some further hypotheses concerning differences 
between the experimental subjects which are in a sense a by-product of the central 
direction of this research. 
The chapter concludes in Section 6.5 with a summary of the chapter and an assessment 
of its contribution to the development of the thesis. 
6.2 THEORIES OF DECISION-MAKING AND THE DISCLOSURE OF 
THE UNCERTAIN NATURE OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
6.2.1 The Einhorn and Jl.ogarth model and ambiguity 
The Einhorn and Hogarth model (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985 and 1986) explored in 
chapter 3 recognises the credibility of the source of information as among three distinct 
sources of ambiguity. Quite apart, therefore, from the context of investment decision-
making, ambiguity or uncertainty concerning the information source (ie. financial 
statements) may influence the decision-makers assimilation of such information. 
Tversky (1974, p .• 148) argues that 'the assessment of uncertainty is often based on the 
intuitive judgments of human beings. Thus, the hwnan subject serves as a measuring 
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device for the assessment of uncertainty, much as the ruler or the pan balance are used to 
measure distance and weight.' In the context of Einhorn and Hogarth's model, this 
measuring device inteIVenes in two instances, as Einhorn and Hogarth's reporter and 
evaluator. Such individual differences among 'reporters' has been dealt with by, amongst 
others, Hofstedt and Hughes (1977), Thomas (1986), Dye (1990), and Newman and 
Sansing (1993) and it is not proposed to delve in detail into this area but to explore the 
evaluators perspective. 
Einhorn and Hogarth's proposition is similar to both Keynes' decision-rule (Keynes, 1921) 
and Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). At the 
heart of all three theories is the contention that 'ambiguity' or 'vagueness' affects the 
perception of choices faced by decision-makers. This ambiguity writes Ellsberg (1961, p. 
258) is 'a quality depending on the amount, type, reliability and 'unanimity' ofinfonnation, 
and giving rise to one's degree of 'confidence' in an estimate of relative likelihoods.' 
Ambiguity gives rise not only to the decision-makers degree of confidence but also to the 
extent to which the decision-makers 'adjustment' varies from an initial 'anchor'. TIl is 
adjustment is a function of ambiguity which in itself is a function of the amount, type, 
reliability and unanimity of information. It may also be tempered by the decision makers 
initial awareness of its ambiguity. In this context lies a focus for the consideration of the 
usefulness and value of disclosures of infonnation concerning the disclosure of the 
uncertain nature of financial statements. 
As introduced in chapter 5, this research proposes the disclosure of the uncertain nature of 
financial statements. The null hypothesis suggests that this message will influence subjects' 
assessment of the petformance and position of the reporting entities in question: 
Bla: The disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements will influence the 
assessment ofpetformance and position of rep orting entities by the experimental 
subjects. 
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The model developed by Einhorn and Hogarth and others explored in section 3.2 also gives 
rise to the hypothesis that confidence in decisions will also be affected by increased 
ambiguity of the infonnation source: 
Blb: The clisclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements will influence the 
confidence of the experimental subjects in their assessment of the perfonnance and 
position of the reporting entity. 
6.2.2 Decision-making and the role of expectations 
Puto (1987) also explores a conceptual model of the decision-making process. HIS concern 
is the framing by consumers of their buying decision, in particular how the reference points 
(or anchors) referred to by Kahneman and Tversky (1984) might be developed. Puto's 
model is reproduced in Figure 6.1. The decision maker's choice, Puto suggests (1987, p. 
303), is moulded by expectations and objectives which create an 'initial reference point'. 
Various environmental factors, such as the sales message (or disclosure) and rewards 
attached to the purchase decision, can shift the initial reference point to the final reference 
point. Puto places the relationship between the final reference point and choice in the 
context ofKahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (1979): choices are framed as either 
gains or losses relative to the final reference point. 
In the context of this research, objectives and rewards are assumed to be constant or non-
existent. As discussed in chapter 5, the experiment is structured in such a way that no clear 
objective( s) are identified other than participation by the subjects. Rewards are similarly 
not linked to objectives or correct answers. The 'message' and initial expectations 
concerning both that message and the 'product' (the reporting entity in question) remain as 
potential 'drivers' of users' assessments. 
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Figure 6.1: Puto's model of the buying decision framing process. 
Expectations 
Sales 
Message 
Puto argues (1987, p. 303) that 
Initial 
Point 
Final 
Point 
Choice 
Buying objectives 
Justification! 
Reward 
buyers approach a purchase decision with a set of expectations about 
the perfonnance of the item being purchased and a set of specific 
buying objectives. New or novice buyers will likely have a smaller and 
possibly less well infonned set of expectations than do those with more 
experience in the product class. Nonetheless the information search 
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process is likely to produce a set of expectations and objectives that 
serves as an initial reference point. 
Several theories in psychology model the influence of initial expectations on choice. TIlese 
include assimilation-contrast theory (Sherit: 1963), adaptation-level theory (Helson, 1964) 
and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The first two of these are quite 
similar. They suggest that decision makers adapt to new information by comparing it with 
an initial reference point (adaptation-level theory) or range (assimilation-contrast theory). 
Environmental signals (for example disclosure) stimulate decision makers to reconsider 
their perceptions. Choice, it is argued, is fashioned by the extent to which the signals 
confum or disconfum original expectations. Signals which fall within expectations may be 
easily assimilated. Reaction to signals which swprise, on the other hand, mayor may not 
result in altered expectations. 
Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory, which was introduced in chapter 3, suggests 
that decision makers compare outcomes to an initial reference point and react differently to 
outcomes which represent gains and losses from that initial reference point. Bringing 
together the arguments of Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory and those of Puto, 
they both hypothesise an important role for initial expectations or beliefs in the decision 
making context. Other research in consumer behaviour (e.g. Frankenburger and Liu, 1994; 
Liefeld and Heslop, 1985 and Blair and Landon, 1981) found tlIat, for example, actual 
price relative to initial expectations of price detennines consumers' assessment of the 
attractiveness of a product. For example, price below the price that was expected may be 
perceived as good news, while price above that which was expected may be seen as bad 
news. Frankenburger and Liu (1994) also found that initial expectations differed between 
those whom they classified as high- and low-knowledge consumers. These initial 
expectations were then found to be an important influence on subsequent decisions. 
Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 41) draw specifically from Kahneman and Tversky's work to 
suggest that the initial judgments of subjects 'may prove remarkably resistant to further 
infonnation ... Attempts to integrate new information may find the individual swprisingly 
'conservative', that is willing to yield ground only grudgingly'. Sherif and Hovland (1961, 
p. 13) also argue that attitude serves 'as a major anchor in judgment'. Such research 
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would appear to suggest that expectations of financial statement reliability may be an 
important determinant of reaction to financial statements and to the disclosure regarding 
the nature of financial statements. 
Helson's adaptation level theory (Helson, 1964) also suggests that past and present 
experience creates an 'adaptation level' against which fresh stimul~ messages or disclosures 
are judged. Similar findings have been postulated by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). They 
argue that belief and attitude, 'a learned disposition to respond in a consistently favourable 
or unfavourable manner with respect to a given object' (p. 6) form an important role in 
behaviour. Other research concerning trading volume in markets (e.g. Karpoft: 1986; 
Ziebart, 1990 and Lang, Litzenberger and Madrigal, 1992) have been interpreted (e.g. by 
Barron, 1995) as suggesting that trading volume is affected by revisions of beliefs among 
analysts. Additional information (such as an earnings annOlUlcement) alters expectations. 
Volume is thus created as market participants trade to adjust their portfolios to reflect their 
new expectations. Such research suggests that expectations anchor subsequent decisions, 
that decisions and assessments of current position can be understood in the light of revised 
expectations and beliefs. This would appear to indicate that assessments of the reporting 
entity in the light of the information and disclosures supplied will depend on initial 
expectations of such information and disclosure. 
Hle: User reaction to the disclosure of the uncertaillnature offillallcial statements will be 
influenced by their expectations of the uncertain nature of financial statements. 
6.2.3 The role of the characteristics o/the reporting entity 
As noted earlier, the AICPA argued that 'such disclosure [as that proposed in Figure 2.6] 
alerts users that uncertainties are present in the financial statements of all reporting entities.' 
This research also sets out to examine whether the disclosure of this uncertainty affects 
perceptions of 'all reporting entities'. 
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TIle disclosure of the Wlceltain nature of financial statements reveals the financial 
statements as a whole as Wlcertain. If it does influence the subjects' assessments, it may 
render the value of the firm in particular as more Wlcertain. Those finns may, as Piaget 
(1964) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their representativeness heuristic outlined in 
section 3.2.3.2 suggest, may be perceived as representing an 'absent model\ Firms with a 
relatively poor position and performance will be more sensitive to Wlcertainty. Finns with 
a strong position and / or strong performance may be perceived as being able to withstand 
the effects of uncertainty more than firms which are seen as marginal or weak. Strong 
position and / or performance allows some leeway for a firm's fortunes to vary from those 
presented in the financial statements. This may not be the case for firms which are 
perceived as less strong. 
In particular, firms with high financial leverage or gearing are inherently more sensitive to 
changes in the value of equity as high gearing indicates a higher sensitivity to volatility. 
Furthermore, as the equity value of the reporting entity falls, gearing increases. This would 
appear to suggest that the effect of changes in expectations regarding the Wlcertain nature 
of financial statements will be more acute in highly geared firms than in those which are 
not. This accords with the view expressed by BraWl, Nelson and Sunier (1995, p. 1575) 
that 'if the value of a leveraged firm drops, its equity will, in genera~ become more 
leveraged, causing the volatility on equitYs rate of return to rise' . 
IUd: The disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements will affect highly 
geared reporting entities to a greater extent than those which are not highly 
geared. 
6.3 INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND THE NEED FOR INFERENCE 
Bruner (in Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p. 157) recognising the need for inference, commented 
that 'the most characteristic thing about mental life ... is that one constantly goes beyond 
the information given'. Newell and Simon's theory of human problem solving (1972) 
argued that the human intellect is limited and needs to use rules oftllUmb or 'heuristics' to 
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make sense of the complexities of the world. Heiner (1983, p. 585) calls sllch hCUlistics 
'smaller behavioural repeltoires' which are used becallse the decision-maker 'cannot 
decipher all the complexities of the decision problems they face.' 
These descriptions of cognitive behaviour are also discussed by Kahneman and Tversky. 
Tversky (1974, pp. 148 &156) describes such 'mental operations' as: heuristics that are 
employed in judgment under uncertainty. While these heuristics have provided a basis for 
some empirical work in accounting particularly in the characterisation of auditing and 
lending decisions, they draw on broader theories of perception including those of BfUllswik 
(1952), Lenzen (1952) and Litterer (1965). Litterer's model (Figure 3.4) is particularly 
helpful in describing the 'mechanism' of perception. This perception influences subsequent 
behaviour. Information (e.g. accounting data) and the experience of the decision-maker are 
inputs to the model Decision-makers select certain information from the voluminous 
information that is received. They interpret that information 'based on (the) past 
experience and value system of each particular person' (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1970, p. 
217). Finally, the decision-maker 'adds to the information input whatever seems 
appropriate in order to close the system and make it meaningful. ' 
Some evidence supporting Utterer's model has been found in accounting and other areas. 
For example, Simon and Sumner (1968, p. 220) write of the search for pattern even where 
'one may well doubt whether a pattern exists (e.g. in the movements of the stock market).' 
The argument of Eggleton (1976 and 1982) can be inferred from the title of his paper 
Patterns, Predictions and Prototypes: that, in making predictions, decision-makers faced 
with a broad range of information seek patterns of which central tendency and variability 
are 'prototypical'. 
The notion that there is a need for closure finds echoes in Mack's definition of 
uncertainty which was introduced in Figure 2.1. This model is developed further in 
Figure 6.2a, arguing that as more information is available, the need for inference or 
'closure' narrows. 
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This finds a further development in the area of statistics. Gardenfors and Sahlin (1988, 
p. 4) describe deFinetti's representation theorem as follows: 'even if two decision 
makers start out with widely different initial distributions . . . they will end up 
arbitrarily close to each other, if given sufficient time to experiment with the coin.' 
Blackwell and Dubins (1962) model the 'merging of opinions' that occurs as more 
information is made available to decision makers. Such a phenomenon is outlined in a 
simplified form in Figure 6.2b: as more information is made available to the decision 
maker, the information 'gap' narrows and the need for 'closure' diminishes. As a 
result, increased information may lead, ceteris paribus, to a more shared view of the 
world. Increased information therefore leads to a stronger consensus lbis 
proposition forms hypotheses H2g and H2h in Table 6.1 which are tested in section 
9.2.5. 
Gardenfors and Sahlin (1988, p. 4) develop this idea further: 'one could say that 
[deFinetti' s] representation theorem shows that everyone's subjective probability 
distribution would converge towards an intersubjective probability distribution if given 
more and more information about what the world is actually like.' It: as Stamp (1980, 
p. 124) writes, 'accounting is concerned with the representation of economic reality', 
increased information may lead to an intersubjective rather than an objective reality, to 
a firmer social rather than physical reality. 
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Figure 6.2: Increased infonnation and intersubjective, social reality 
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Notes: a) When the level of information = p, decision-makers' 'closure' and 
'intersubjective, social reality' = qr. 
b) When the level of infonnation = x (x>p), ceteris paribus, decision-
makers' 'closure' and 'intersubjective, social reality' = zy (zy<qr). 
Not only does this echo Nunni's inclusion of 'unanimity' of infonnation as a factor 
influencing its ambiguity, it is also somewhat similar to the consideration of objectivity 
in accounting. Mattessich (1978 and 1991) distinguishes between the social and 
physical realities .created by accounting representation. Hines (1987) comments that 
'in communicating reality, we construct reality.' She comments further, discussing the 
development of a conceptual framework (1·991, p. 319), that such a framework 
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requires an 'objective, intersubjective' view of the world. Chambers (1964, p. 269), 
arguing that while the meaning of objectivity does include the elimination of biases, 
comments that 'every personal judgment, measurement, statement, has its personal 
background - it is subjective.' Borrowing from Popper (1961), Chambers continues 
that objectivity may be described as 'intersubjective testability.' Philosophers such as 
Husserl (1954) and Dummett (1978) have also emphasised the 'social character of 
meaning' (Dummett, 1978, p. 424): that the search for an objective truth which is not 
acknowledged as such by others 'would appear to involve the same fallacy as 'theyre 
all out of step but our Willie' '. 
This is not only of esoteric interest but is also, if explored further, of interest in the 
context of a market. An active market results from many factors: differences in 
wealth, preference, access to information but also from differences in opinion or 
perception. If the availability of information narrows such differences of opinion, what 
May and Sundem (1976, p. 760) term 'aggregate market consequences' may also be 
affected. This concern with consensus is also examined by Klammer and Reed (1990) in 
the context of the level of disclosure in cash flow statements. They found that increased 
disclosure of cash flows led to increased consensus among bank loan officers. 
Research by Budescu and Wallsten (1985), Chesley and Wier (1985), Chesley (1986) and 
Larsson and Chesley (1986) established that 
phrases are not as crisp as numbers, and therefore they do add a 
dimension to reported opinion that single numbers lack. [However] 
phrases have different locations to different individuals ... phrases 
differ in vagueness ... Thus, it is quite possible that a given phrase will 
imply differential imprecision, vagueness, or fuzziness to different 
individuals. (Budescu and Wallsten, 1985, p. 403) 
Ross and Nisbett (1980) remark that the vividness of messages affects the perceptions of 
them constructed by those receiving such messages. The perceiver, they argue (p. 17), 'is 
an active interpreter, one who resolves ambiguities, makes educated guesses about events 
that cannot be observed directly, and fonns inferences about associations and causal 
relations'. TIle disclosure of uncertain assets in these experiments adds the crispness and 
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the vividness of nWllbers to the ambiguity and the fuzziness of phrases. As outlined ill 
chapters 5 and 7, it will do so on two dimensions: firstly, the probability of a remote event 
(defined as a range of probabilities) and secondly the inestimable outcome of that remote 
event (narrowing 'inestimable' to a range). 
Other research, representing variations on the theme of the disclosure of probability 
measures, has been carried out by Oliver (1972), Bimberg and Slevin (1976), Keys (1978), 
Chen and Summers (1981) and Coats and Chesser (1982). This research, which is 
discussed in detail in chapter 4, arrived at various conclusions depending on the structure of 
the information provided and nature of the participants. Bimberg and Slevin, for example, 
concluded (p. 153) that 'the presence of a formal confidence interval statement did not 
yield significant differences in the subject's decision' as (p. 156) 'apparently the skilled user 
of :financial statements already possesses a notion of the relative size of the confidence 
interval around the point estimate from past experience.' Chen and Swnmers (1981, p. 13) 
found, however, that 'removing the appearance of certainty from accounting affects 
decision making behaviour.' They also comment that 'a mere indication of the uncertain 
nature of the reported figure does not necessarily provide subjects with more infonnation 
than the conventional single-valued accounting figure. ' 
6.3.1 Research hypotheses: uncertain assets. 
The theories of decision-making and confidence fonnation underlying the research 
hypotheses were outlined in chapter 3. Drawing on the research o~ for example, Budescu 
and Wallsten (1985) in the behavioural area and that o~ for example, Chesley (1986), Chen 
(1974) and odlers in accounting, hypotheses IDa to H2f set out in Table 6.1 are proposed. 
The theories characterising uncertainty as a lack of unanimity of infolIDation and of 
additional information potentially leading to greater consensus formalised in Figure 6.2 lead 
to hypotlleses H2g and H2h in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Research hypotheses: uncertain assets 
IDa The disclosure of an asset whose occurrence is remote and whose outcome is 
inestimable will affect the assessment of the performance and position of the 
reporting entities by the experimental subjects. 
IDb The disclosure of an asset whose occurrence is remote and whose outcome is 
inestimable will affect the confidence of the experimental subjects in their 
assessment of the performance and position of the reporting entities. 
H2e The disclosure of the range of probability of a remote event which may affect an 
asset will affect the assessment of the performance and position of the reporting 
entities by the experimental subjects. 
H2d The disclosure of a range of probability of a remote event which may affect an asset 
will affect the confidence of the experimental subjects in their assessment of the 
performance and position of the reporting entities by the experimental subjects. 
rue The disclosure of a range of outcomes of an event whose outcome is inestimable 
will affect the assessment of the performance and position of the reporting entities 
by the experimental subjects. 
IDC The disclosure of a range of outcomes of an event whose outcome is inestimable 
will affect the assessment of the performance and position of the reporting entities 
by the experimental subjects. 
lI2g The disclosure of information concerning the range of probability of a remote event 
will lead to greater consensus among the experimental subjects concerning the 
performance and position of the reporting entities. 
ruh The disclosure of information concerning the range of outcomes of an event whose 
outcome is inestimable will lead to greater consensus among the experimental 
subjects concerning the performance and position of the reporting entities. 
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6.4 HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE DISCLOSURE OF UNCERTAIN 
LIABILITIES 
Similar hypotheses to those proposed in the domain of assets are proposed ill the context of 
liabilities in Table 6.2. These hypotheses reflect the asymmetrical approach to the 
recognition of financial statements outlined in chapter 2 and in section 6.3, based on, for 
example, FRED 14's argument (ASB, 1997b, p. 15) that 'the concept of prudence 
requires stronger evidence for recognising a gain than a loss and often results in a loss 
(and any associated liability) being recognised where a gain (and any associated asset) 
would not be recognised'. 
Table 6.2: Research hypotheses: uncertain liabilities. 
H3a The disclosure of a liability whose occurrence is remote and whose outcome is 
inestimable will affect the assessment of the performance and position of the 
reporting entities by the experimental subjects. 
H3b The disclosure of a liability whose occurrence is remote and whose outcome is 
inestimable will affect the confidence of the experimental subjects in their 
assessment of the performance and position of the reporting entities. 
H3e The disclosure of the range of probability of a remote event which may affect a 
liability will affect the assessment of the performance and position of the reporting 
entities by the experiinental subjects. 
Il3d The disclosure of a range of probability of a remote event which may affect a 
liability will affect the confidence of the experimental subjects in their assessment of 
the performance and position of the reporting entities by the experimental subjects. 
I-
H3e The disclosure of a range of outcomes of an event whose outcome is inestimable 
will affect the assessment of the performance and position of the reporting entities 
by the experimental subjects. 
- TIle disclosure of a range of outcomes of an event whose outcome is inestimable fl3f 
will affect lhe confidence of the experimental subjects in their assessment of the 
performance and position of the reporting entities. 
-
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H3g The disclosure of information concerning the range of probability ofa remote event 
will lead to greater consensus among the experimental subjects concerning the 
performance and position of the reporting entities. 
H3h The disclosure of information concerning the range of outcomes of an event whose 
outcome is inestimable will lead to greater consensus among the experimental 
subjects concerning the performance and position of the repoIting entities. 
6.4.1 Differences,ln Assessments In The Context Of Assets And Liabilities 
As outlined in section 5.2, accounting conventions demand an asymmetric approach to the 
recognition (though not necessarily the measurement) of assets and liabilities. Conventional 
disclosure requires a lower threshold of recognition for liabilities. Such an approach 
manifests itselfin the requirement oC for example, SSAP 2 that liabilities with a greater than 
remote probability be disclosed (ASC, 1971) and the suggestion in a draft of the Statement 
of Principles (ASB, 1995b) and FRED 14 (ASB, 1997b) that more evidence is required for 
the recognition of an asset than the recognition of a liability. 
If more evidence is required for the recognition of an asset than the recognition of a liability, 
we should expect that information regarding uncertain assets will cause more concern than 
the same information regarding uncertain liabilities. In particular, such expectations leads to 
hypotheses H3i to H31 outlined in Table 6.3. 
The ASB's suggestion that greater evidence is required for the recognition of assets than 
liabilities does not explicitly differentiate between occurrence and outcome. The criteria for 
recognition include the constraints of reliable evidence of existence (occurrence) and 
measurement (outcome). Hence there are further potential hypotheses in Table 6.3, 113m 
to H3p, drawing on the apparent equal weight given to evidence of occurrence and 
outcome. 
154 
Table 6.3: Research hypotheses: differences in the assessments of assets and liabilities: 
H3i The assessment of the performance of the reporting entities by the experimental 
subjects who receive the disclosure of information concerning Wlcertain assets will 
be less than the assessment of the performance of the reporting entities by the 
experimental subjects who receive the same information concerning Wlcertain 
liabilities. 
H3j The confidence expressed in their assessment of perfolTIlance by the experimental 
subjects who receive the disclosure of information concerning wlcertain assets will 
be less than the confidence in their assessment ofthe performance of the reporting 
entities by the experimental subjects who receive the same information concerning 
uncertain liabilities. 
H3k The assessment of the position of the reporting entities by the experimental 
subjects who receive the disclosure of information concerning wlcertain assets will 
be less than the assessment of the performance of the reporting entities by the 
experimental subjects who receive the same information concerning Wlcertain 
liabilities. 
H31 The confidence expressed in their assessment of the position of the reporting 
entities by the experimental subjects who receive the disclosure of information 
concerning Wlcertain assets will be less than the confidence in their assessment of 
the performance of the reporting entities by the experimental subjects who receive 
the same informatio~ concerning uncertain liabilities. 
113m The lower assessment of tile position of the reporting entities by the experimental 
subjects who receive the disclosure of information concerning Wlcertain assets 
relative to those receiving information concerning Wlcertain liabilities will not 
differ between the disclosure of outcome and occurrence. 
1130 The lower expression of confidence in the assessment of the position of the 
reporting entities by the experimental subjects who receive the disclosure of 
information concerning uncertain assets relative to those receiving information 
concerning Wlcertain liabilities will not differ between the disclosure of outcome 
and occurrence. 
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H30 TIle lower assessment of the perfonnance of the repOIting entities by the 
experimental subjects who receive the disclosure of infomlation conceming 
uncertain assets relative to those receiving infonnation conceming wlcertain 
liabilities will not differ between the disclosure of outcome and occurrence. 
H3p The lower expression of confidence in the assessment of the perfonnance of the 
reporting entities by the experimental subjects who receive the disclosure of 
information concerning uncertain assets relative to those receiving infonnation 
concerning uncertain liabilities will not differ between the disclosure of outcome 
and occurrence. 
6.S CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the hypotheses of the research. These hypotheses are 
essentially and in broad terms three-fold: 
1. The disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements will affect the 
assessments of performance and position of the reporting entities and the 
confidence expressed in those assessments by the experimental subjects (outlined in 
Section 6.2); 
2. The dislosure of the uncertain outcome and / or occurrence of a decrease / increase 
in an asset / liability respectively will affect the assessments of performance and 
position of the reporting entities and the confidence expressed in those assessments 
by the experimental subjects (outlined in Section 6.3 and 6.4 and Tables 6.1 and 
6.2); and 
3. The asymmetric treatment of assets and liabilities will result in differing effects on 
the assessments and expressions of confidence with respect to assets and liabilities 
(outlined in section 6.4 and Table 6.3). 
The disclosures in question have their origins in policy proposals discussed in chapters 
2 and 5. The hypotheses, on the other hand, are born from theories whose evolution is 
explored in chapter 3 and which are detailed and focussed further in this chapter. 
Chapter 7 regarding the research instrument puts flesh on the research approach 
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discussed in chapter 5 to test the hypotheses outlined in this chapter. Chapter 8 to 10 
discuss the research results with respect to these hypotheses. In particular, chapter 8 
outlines the results of tests of the hypotheses conceming the disclosure of the unceltain 
nature of financial statements (developed in section 6.2). Chapter 9 then explores the 
... 
tests of the hypotheses regarding the disclosure of uncertain assets (from section 6.3). 
Chapter 10 brings this discussion further by examining the hypotheses in the context of 
liabilities and the asymmetrical treatment of assets and liabilities (as outlined in section 
6.4). 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 outlined the general details of the disclosure to be explored in this research: first, that 
financial statements are uncertain (Figure 2.6) and, second, the disclosure of uncertainty attached to 
particular assets and liabilities. Furthermore, the potential was identified in chapter 6 for the 
examination of differences between uncertain assets and liabilities. The use of experimental 
research to test the broad research questions was also proposed and defended in chapter 5. 
Specific research hwotheses were set out in chapter 6. 
TIle specification of the research approach in chapter 5 and of the research hypotheses in chapter 6 
allow this chapter to deal with the development of the research instrument and, in broad terms, the 
execution of the research. The chapter is in three main sections. Section 7.2 reiterates briefly the 
search for a framework within which to test the hwotheses put forward as part of the research. In 
particular, this section specifies the nature of the uncertainty to be disclosed. Section 7.3 outlines 
the detailed design of the research instrument. Section 7.4 sets out the manner in which the 
research was executed. 
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7.2. THE DISCLOSURE OF UNCERTAINTY 
The current position regarding the disclosure of Wlcertainty as set out in accowlting standards is 
discussed in chapter 2 and Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. The primary accoWlting standard dealing with 
uncertain events is SSAP 18 Accountingfor Contingencies. This standard requires the assessment 
of probabilities wi.thin three broad categories. 'Remote' events are neither recognised or disclosed. 
'Probable' events are recognised if they would result in losses (or an increase in liabilities) and 
disclosed if they would result in gains (or an increase in assets). 'Reasonably certain' assets and 
liabilities are recognised. 
As noted in chapters 2 and 5, the ASB demands greater evidence for the existence of an asset than 
for the existence of a liability. This asymmetrical approach is also fOWld in SSAP 18 Accounting 
for Contingencies. The Standard requires recognition or disclosure based on uncertainty of 
occurrence as set out in Figure 2.4. The recognition of gains and losses rests on whether those 
gains and losses are remote, possible or probable. Uncertainty of outcome is addressed by the 
requirement that, in the case of gains and losses, the gain or loss must be estimable with 'reasonable 
accuracy' (ASC, 1980, para. 15). If the outcome is 'inestimable', uncertain gains and losses which 
are not remote (ie. which are possible or probable) should be disclosed, but with no indication of 
the (inestimable) outcome. 
Chapter 3 discussed the work of Chesley (1986, p. 180), for example, who points out that 'the 
accuracy of the interpretation of. . . words by preparers and users of financial statements is an 
area that sllould be of concern. A word such as 'likely' may be interpreted as .70 or .90 by 
various readers. What might be important at .90 may not be at .70'. In particular, he found 
different interpretations of such phrases in different professions (accountants and lawyers) and 
groupS of students (chartered accounting students and MBAs). He therefore goes on to suggest 
(p. 180) that 'perhaps numerical ranges could be promulgated to suggest how one should interpret 
such words rather than presenting other qualitative words in authoritative pronouncements such 
as 'high' or 'slight' as is presently done.' This concern is shared by Tweedie and Whittington 
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(1990, p. 98) who outline the need 'for a more precise definition of ... reasonable certainty 
[required] as a condition for recognition in the accounts.' 
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants issued an Exposure Draft (ED 4 Contingent 
Gains and Losses) in 1993 addressing the issue of contingencies. Although commenting that the 
determination of the appropriate categories of probability is the responsibility of management and 
therefore not posSIble to define with precision, the ED attempts to set out approximate ranges of 
probability for each category. These ranges are outlined in Figure 7.1. The ED also argues for 
the disclosure of a remote event where the outcome of such an event is potentially catastrophic. 
Figure 7.1: Approximate probabilities of events confirming contingencies (CICA, 1993). 
Determined probability Approximate % 
Likely > 50- 99% 
(Virtually certain) (91-99%) 
Neither likely nor unlikely 50% 
Unlikely 1- < 50% 
(Remote) (1- 15%) 
In accordance with SSAP 18, contingent losses which are probable are recognised in the financial 
statements. Other ~on-remote contingent losses are disclosed. Contingent gains are not 
recognised in the financial statements, are only disclosed when probable and only recognised when 
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reasonably certain. Uncertain gains and losses (and hence assets and liabilities) are, therefore, for 
the most part, treated asymmetrically. Exceptions are when the potential occurrence of the event is 
remote or reasonably certain. Remote gains and losses are neither recognised nor disclosed. 
Reasonably certain gains and losses are recognised. 
One of the objectives of the research is to assess differences between Wlcertain assets and liabilities. 
The research intends to explore remote uncertainties as these, although they exist, are not reflected 
currently in financial statements (defined by the CICA ED (CICA, 1993) as a probability of less 
than 15%.) This relatively narrow approach is defenSlole theoretically and pragmatically. On 
theoretical groWlds, as descnbed in chapter 5, Thornton (1983) discusses the problem of 'zero-
infinity' risks: those having a chance of occurrence close to zero but an outcome with almost 
infinite consequences. These remote events need not currently be disclosed in financial statements 
although 'remote percentages of risk. lose their significance to those unfortWlate enough to be 
100% involved.' (McCarthy 1. in Walsh v. Family Planning SeIVices Limited, The High Court of 
Ireland, 1987 No. 1053P) 
Pragmatically, in assessing changes in assets and liabilities, their accoWlting treatment (as well as 
the level of probability which triggers them) should be symmetrical The intention is to explore 
disclosures where there is a remote pOSSloility of an event impacting on specified elements of the 
financial statements. The outcome of the remote event is inestimable. In one instance, this event 
would not be disclosed (as currently), while in other instances more information regarding this 
uncertain event and its outcome' would be disclosed. Such Wlcertainty, it was argued (after, for 
example, Hull and the ASB), encompasses both outcome and occurrence. 
Kahneman and Tversky's Value FWlction in Figure 3.5 (based on the postulates of their Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979» suggests, in brief: that decision makers are risk averse 
when gaining and risk seeking when losing. To avoid such potential confoWlding effects on 
behaviour, potential losses only (i.e. decreases in assets or increases in liabilities) are presented, 
The losses in assets and liabilities were of a nature that would be (potentially though not actually) 
recognised in the profit and loss accoWlt (rather than, say, the Statement of Total Recognised 
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Gains and Losses) of the year under consideration. The losses therefore concern current assets and 
current liabilities. Furthermore, the potential extent oflosses is identical. TIle maximlUn potential 
decrease in an asset for example is limited to the amount at which the asset is stated in the balance 
sheet, while potential liabilities may be unlimited. A liability must therefore idci1tified which could 
be 'capped' so as to limit potential losses. Products sold under guarantee is considered to be such 
a liability. A scenario is presented where sales worth £900,000 have been sold under guarantee. 
There is a remote pOSSIbility of the guarantees arising and, if they arose, the outcome is inestimable 
(although limited to £900,000). In the case of assets, stock worth £900,000 is potentially obsolete. 
There is a remote pOSSIbility of obsolescence and, if the stock is obsolete, the extent of the losses is 
inestimable (although limited to £900,000). 
There are, therefore, two layers of disclosure of information risk. The first layer, comprising one 
disclosure X2, reveals the uncertain nature of financial statements. The second layer, relates to 
assets and liabilities (two sets of disclosure) with three (a broad disclosure followed by a 
clarification of occurrence and outcome) different disclosures in each case. (The second layer thus 
has 2 * 3 = 6 elements.) There are therefore 8 levels of disclosure as follows: 
Xl = no disclosure 
X2= disclosure regarding the uncertain nature of financial statements 
Al = disclosure that there is a remote chance that stock may be obsolete with 
an inestimable outcome 
LI = disclosure that there is remote chance of a liability for sales under 
guarantee with an inestimable outcome 
A2 = as Al with more disclosure regarding the remote chance of OCCtUTence 
L2 = as LI with more disclosure regarding the remote chance of occurrence 
A3 = as A2 with more disclosure concerning the inestimable outcome 
L3 = as L2 with more disclosure concerning the inestimable outcome 
Disclosure X2 was introduced in Figure 2.6. Disclosures Al and LI to A3 and L3 are outlined ill 
Figures 7.2 to 7.7. 
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Figure 7.2: Disclosure Al that there is a remote chance that stock may be obsolete with 
an inestimable outcome 
Extract from the financial statements: 
Stock at 31 December 1995 includes finished goods costing approximately £900,000 which may be 
obsolete (1994: none). The Directors are unable to estimate the net realisable value of this stock. 
The likelihood that this stock is obsolete is remote. In the light of the wlcertainties outlined, no 
provision has been made in the financial statements in respect of this stock. 
Figure 7.3: Disclosure Ll that there is remote chance of a liability for sales under guarantee 
with an inestimable outcome 
Extract from the financial statements at 31 December 1995: 
Some sales of the Company have been made under guarantee (1994: none). nle Directors are 
unable to estimate the ultimate cost of these obligations. The likelihood that a claim will be made 
against the Company in respect of these guarantees is remote. The estimated cost of fulfilling the 
Company's obligations if all guarantees were claimed would not exceed approximately £900,000. 
In the light of the uncertainties outlined, no provision has been made in the financial statements in 
respect of the guarantees. 
Figure 7.4: Disclosure A2 as Al with more disclosure regarding the remote chance of 
occurrence 
Extract from the financial statements at 31 December 1995: 
Stock at 31 December 1995 includes finished goods costing £900,000 which may be obsolete 
(1994: none). The Directors estimate that the likelihood that this stock is obsolete is remote. The 
net realisable value of obsolete stock is normally between 35% and 65% of cost. In the light of the 
Wlcertainties outlined, no provision has been made in the financial statements in respect of tIus 
stock. . 
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Figure 7.5: Disclosure L2 as Ll with more disclosure regarding the remote chance of 
occurrence 
Extract from the financial statements at 31 December 1995: 
Some sales of the Company have been made under guarantee (1994: none). The Directors 
estimate that the likelihood of a claim being made is remote. The cost of claims Wlder guarantees 
are normally between 35% and 65% of the total obligation. TIle estimated cost of fulfilling the 
Company's obligations if all guarantees were claimed would not exceed approximately £900,000. 
In the light of the Wlcertainties outlined, no provision has been made in the financial statements in 
respect of these guarantees. 
Figure 7.6: Disclosure A3 as A2 with more disclosure concerning the inestimable outcome 
Extract from the financial statements at 31 December 1995: 
Stock at 31 December 1995 includes finished goods costing £900,000 which may be obsolete 
(1994: none). Based on past experience, the Directors estimate that the likelihood that this stock is 
obsolete is between 5% and 8%. The net realisable value of obsolete stock is normally between 
35% and 65% of cost. In the light of the Wlcertainties outlined, no provision has been made in the 
financial statements in respect of this stock. 
Figure 7.7 Disclosure L3 as L2 with more disclosure concerning the inestimable outcome 
Extract from the financial statements at 31 December 1995: 
Some sales of the Company have been made under guarantee (1994: none). The estimated cost of 
fulfilling the Company's obligations under guarantees would not exceed £900,000. Based on past 
experience, the Directors estimate that the likelihood of a claim being made is between 5% and 8%. 
The cost of claims Wlder guarantees are normally between 35% and 65% of the total obligation. 
In the light of the Wlcertainties outlined, no provision has been made in the financial statements in 
respect of these guarantees. 
The disclosures evolve from no disclosure (as currently) to disclosures which include disclosures 
proposed in a general context (e.g. by the AICPA and the ASB ) or in a specific context (by the 
ASB in FRS 6). The level of uncertainty does not change: it is merely revealed. The financial 
statements are as uncertain in each disclosure, the disclosure of the Wlcertain nature of financial 
statements (Figure 2.6) merely reveals that this is so. The uncertain events are always remote (and 
therefore not currentI)' disclosed) and inestimable. Further disclosure merely reveals iteratively the 
basis on which judgment is made. TIle research question (developed in as hypotheses in chapter 6) 
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is that such disclosure matters: that it is relevant, in the ASB's (ASB, 1995b, p. 42) tenns that it 
'has the ability to influence the decisions of users'. More specifically, as the role of financial 
statements is to provide information on the financial position, performance and financial 
adaptability of the reporting entity (ASB, 1995b, p. 35), the research examines the effect, ifany, of 
such disclosures on users' perceptions of financial position and performance. 
Subjects are asked to assess the performance and position of each company on a scale which was 
divided into deciles having endpoints of 0 to 100 labelled 'poor' and 'excellent' respectively with a 
midpoint of average. This is similar to the mechanism adopted by Moser (1989). Participants are 
asked to indicate their confidence (on a scale of 0 to 100) in their assessments of performance and 
position. They were not asked to stake any investment or other wealth in the companies. This was 
to avoid the potentially confounding effects of risk attitude discussed, for example, by Selto and 
Cooper (1990). 
7.2.1 Characteristics o/the reporting entities 
In order to enrich the potential findings and to consider the effects of the disclosure on reporting 
entities with differing characteristics as outlined in Hypothesis HId, the disclosure related to five 
different reporting entities. The profit and loss account and balance sheet for three years of five 
companies were presented, each containing only the disclosures outlined. These financial 
statements are reproduced in the Appendix to this chapter. 
Each company is approximately the same size. Each has a share capital of 1,000,000 £1 shares. 
The average turnover of the five reporting entities was £10,693,000 with the average of each 
entity's turnover over the three years in question not more than 18% more or less than that average. 
In order to control for the effects of asymmetrical reaction to gains and losses postulated by, for 
example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) all the entities report profits in excess of the potential 
losses disclosed of £900,000. 
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They are all in the same sector (information technology). This sector is chosen as it is characterised 
by uncertainty and the scenarios of obsolete stock and sales under guarantee are appropriate to the 
sector. The financial structure of one of the companies (e.g. its profitability, liquidity and fixed 
asset levels) is based on a real company of a similar size within the sector, Printech International 
pic. The other companies are limited variations of that structure. The P\E ratio of the sector, 
which comprises only the companies whose financial statements are supplied, is given for each of 
the last two years but not for the current year. 
Each company has different characteristics based on the ratios suggested to be indicative of 
accounting beta by Beaver et al. (1970) (ie. growth, liquidity, gearing, earnings variability and 
earnings covariability). The key characteristics of each entity are presented in Figure 7.8. These 
characteristics are described as follows: 
(1) A high growth company (HG) experienced growth in turnover of 300% over three years 
(approximately 75% on average per annum). This growth is matched by growth in dividends 
and assets (both current and fixed). Due to the constant level of share capita~ the growth in 
fixed assets is financed primarily by borrowings. The growth in current assets led to improved 
liquidity. Although HG is characterised by high debt, this is mitigated by growth in turnover 
and fixed assets, healthy liquidity and interest cover. The ambiguity of HG (ambiguity being 
one of the themes of the research) will be discussed as part of the exploration of the research 
results in section 10.3.3. 
(2) Conversely, a company with declining growth (DEC) shows a decline in turnover of 15% over 
the three years which was also reflected in declining profits. Fixed assets and borrowing also 
declined somewhat. 
(3) A third company (STA) shows relatively static growth (although increasing by about 1.5% per 
annum, this represents static real growth). Similarly, profits remain stagnant. An increased 
level of retained earnings finances increased liquidity and fixed assets. 
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(4) A fourth company (lID) shows a high level of debt along with poor liquidity. This manifests 
itself particularly in no cash in hand, an increasing level of short-tenn and long-tenn creditors 
and a correspondingly increasing level of interest expense in the profit and loss aCCOWlt. Thus, 
HD represents a high level of gearing with a resultant impact on the fixed cost of interest ill the 
profit and loss account. Dividends paid and proposed remain static. 
(5) The fifth company (ND) has no debt (specifically creditors greater than one year) and 
correspondingly no interest expense in the profit and loss accooot. Turnover grew moderately 
by 8% per annum. Profitability and liquidity improved in line with the improvement in 
turnover. 
Figure 7.8: Selected characteristics of reporting entities. 
Company High Growth Declining Stable High debt No debt 
(HG) (DEC) (STA) (liD) (ND) 
Ratio 
Turnover growth High Low Average Average Average 
Interest cover Average High Average Low High 
Liquidity Average Average Average Low High 
DebtlEquity High Average Average High Low 
In summary, therefore, the research instrument attempts to capture a variety of characteristics in the 
five reporting entities which comprise the instrument. Each of the entities has a primary but not 
exclusive characteristic revolving around levels of turnover and borrowing. The nature of the 
industry and the constraints of maintaining a level of profitability in excess of £900,000 resulted in 
some of the reporting entites displaying other characteristics such as high levels of assets. 
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7.3 PILOT-TESTING OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
The research instrument and experimental design was pilot-tested with a group of approximately 
100 undergraduates specialising in accounting. This group (comprising second year undergraduate 
students) was nor subsequently part of the experiment and did not have more experience of 
financial statements than the experimental group. The experiments were discussed with th~ group 
as a whole and, subsequently, with a smaller focus group drawn from the pilot-test group. 
The experimental task in the pilot-test comprised the assessment ofperformance and position and 
also an estimate of future share value of the reporting entities based on the information given. It 
also included an expression of confidence by the subjects in each of these three assessments. The 
elements of the task relating to the estimate of share value (and confidence in that estimate) were 
not continued in the experimental task that comprises the remainder of the research for reasons 
outlined later in this section. 
The resuhs of the pilot test are shown in tables 7.1 to 7.6. 
Table 7.11: Mean assessment of the position of the reporting entities - pilot testing. 
ReporUne entity 
High debt (lID) 
Declinins(DEC) 
Stability (STA) 
High grCM1h (HG) 
No debt (ND) 
Trtal 
1 Kry to tables: 
Cmtrol Une. Al A2 A3 Ll L2 1.3 
(n= 9) (n=ll) (n=Jl) (n=ll) (n=14) (n=9)) (n=ll) (n=14) 
49.4 36.8 43.8 39.1 48.6 47.2 48.2 34.3 
38.9 45.5 40.0 60.9 64.3 47.8 52.0 36.4 
57.8 70.0 68.8 51.4 57.9 68.3 59.1 47.5 
63.9 53.6 60.8 52.7 53.9 71.7 70.9 56.4 
62.8 75.9 71.7 65.0 70.7 75.6 72.3 63.6 
54.6 56.4 57.0 53.8 59.! 62.1 60.5 47.6 
Control: No disclosure. 
Unc.: Disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements as in Figure 2.6. 
AI:· Disclosure of uncertain stock as in Figure 7.2. 
A2: Disclosure of uncertain stock as in Figure 7.4. 
A3: Disclosure of uncertain stock as in Figure 7.6. 
Ll: Disclosure of uncertain guarantee as in Figure 7.3. 
L2: Disclosure of uncertain guarantee as in Figure 7.5. 
L3: Disclosure of uncertain guarantee as in Figure 7.7. 
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Table 7.22: Mean assessment of the performance of the reporting entities - pilo~ testing. 
Reportine entity Cmtrol Unc. AI A2 A3 L1 L2 U 
(n= 9) (n=J J) (n=//) (n=//) (n=/4) (n=9)) (n=Jl) (1/=/4) 
HiI?J1 debt(lID) 41.3 40.0 44.1. 35.5 51.4 60.0 39.5 37.5 
Declining (DEC) 53.3 45.5 44.6 43.2 52.3 40.6 48.0 40.0 
Stability (ST A) 55.6 68.2 62 . .5 49.5 .50.4 63.3 5.5.5 .51.4 
HiI?J1 growth (HG) 64.4 64.5 65.0 50.9 60.7 73.3 47.4 60.4 
No debt (NO) 67.2 65.9 64.6 66.8 64.6 71.7 70.0 69.3 
TOOII 56.4 56.8 56.2 49.2 55.9 61.8 52.1 .51.7 
Table 7.3": Mean expression of confidence in the assessment of the position of the reporting 
entities - pilot testing. 
Reporting entity Cmtrol Unc. Al A2 A3 L1 L2 U 
(n= 9) (n=lJ) (n=Jl) (n=JJ) (n=/4) (n=9) (n=1J) (n=/4) 
HiI?J1 debt (lID) 65.0 70.0 49.5 65.9 63.2 74.4 55.5 72.5 
Declining (DEC) 65.0 67.3 51.4 60.9 64.3 71.7 63.2 68.2 
Stability (ST A) .50.0 70.9 57.3 61.8 65.7 72.2 69.1 68.9 
HiI?J1 growth (IIG) 58.9 65.9 .57.3 65.9 69.3 72.2 68.2 71.8 
No debt (NO) 61.7 68.2 57.9 61.4 66.8 77.8 63.6 67.5 
Trtal 60.1 68.5 55.7 63.1. 65.9 73.7 63.9 69.8 
2 For key to table see footnote 1. 
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Table 7.43: Mean expression of confidence in the assessment of the performance of the 
reporting entities - pilot testing. 
Reporting entity Cootrol Unc. AI A2 A3 LI L2 Ll 
(n= 9) (n=JJ) (II=JJ) (11=11) (11=/4) (11=9) (II=JJ) (,,=/4) 
High debt (lID) 61.7 65.9 55.0 64.1 68.2 66.7 57.3 70.0 
Declining (DEC) 53.3 68.2 46.8 62.3 66.4 73.3 63.2 66.4 
Stability (ST A) 56.7 66.4 57.7 60.0 66.1 67.2 66.4 64.3 
High growth (HG) 58.3 63.6 59.1 63.2 70.7 75.0 65.5 71.4 
Nodcbt(ND) 59.4 64.5 55.0 61.4 66.8 77.2 61.8 66.8 
T<Ul 57.9 65.7 54.7 62.2 67.6 71.9 62.8 67.8 -
Table 7.53: Mean assessment of the future share value of the reporting entities - pilot testing. 
Reporting entity Cootrol Unc. Al A2 A3 LI L2 Ll 
(n= 9) (n=JJ) (n=JJ) (11=11) (n=/4) (11=9)) (n=JJ) (n=/4) 
High debt (lID) 482.0 572.1 670.3 535.7 412.0 682.4 450.0 564.6 
Declining (DEC) 590.0 865.5 928.1 1031.4 492.2 702.2 591.8 1119.5 
Stability (STA) 1213.6 1563.5 2131.2 1428.8 551.0 1227.1 1097.1 1422.9 
High growth (HG) 846.2 992.6 954.6 885.6 567.6 949.0 751.7 1077.1 
No debt (ND) 1344.6 1704.2 1489.6 1441.5 708.7 1.536.6 1263.8 1491.1 
T<Ul 895.3 1139.6 1234.8 1064.6 .546.3 1019 .. .5 830.9 1135.0 
3 for key to table, see Footnote I . 
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Table 7.64 : Mean expression of confidence in the assessment of the future share value of the 
reporting entities - pilot testing. 
Reporting entity Centrol Unc. Al A2 A3 L1 L2 L3 
(n= 9) (n=11) (n=11) (n=JJ) (,,=14) (n=9)) (,,=JJ ) (n=14) 
High debt (lID) 61.2 59.0 57.9 53.0 54.1 67.8 45.9 64.1 
Declining (DEC) 50.6 60.9 48.6 53.0 52.7 63.9 57.5 53.2 
Stability (ST A) 57.5 58.6 50.5 60.9 53.3 63.3 57.3 66.8 
Higp grCM1h (HG) 56.9 59.5 50.0 60.5 56.8 67.8 47.7 69.2 
Nodebt(ND) 52.8 57.3 75.4 51.8 46.8 72.8 52.3 55.4 
TOCal 55.8 59.1 56.5 55.8 52.7 67.1 52.1 61.7 
It appeared from both the comments of the participants in the pilot-test and the results of the pilot-
testing that the estimation ofEPS caused some confusion, with a wide dispersion and no particular 
pattern to the estimates. Many participants enquired as to how the share price might be calculated. 
Others commented that in some instances (lID for example) they could not recommend buying a 
share. The estimation of share price will therefore be disregarded in the execution of the 
experiments. 
The pilot-tests would appear to offer early, tentative foundations for the hypotheses outlined in 
chapter 6. In particular, it appears that the disclosure of lUlcertainty and the framing of such 
disclosure matters. The characteristics of the reporting entity also appears to effect both the 
perceptions of performance and position and the changes in those perceptions between the groups. 
Although no firm or statistical conclusions can be drawn from these tests due to their preliminary 
nature and the relatively small numbers involved, the results offer a basis for proceeeding with the 
experiments as outlined in section 7.4 and in subsequent chapters. 
The comments of the group concerning the understandability of the information disclosed, the 
range of attributes of the five companies and the structure of the tasks were particularly 
encouraging. The participants in the pilot groups found the tasks manageable and understandable 
4 For key to table, see footnote 1. 
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although some commented that the time allowed (approximately 50 minutes) was limited. TIley 
found the rating scales used to express their assessments satisfactory. 
The final design of the research instrument was carefully considered in the light of the comments 
obtained from the pilot and focus groups. In particular, the estimation of share value was 
disregarded. Moreover, the instructions were clarified following some misunderstanding among 
subjects in the pilot group. 
The original instructions included definitions of reliability, performance and position drawn from the 
ASB's draft of the Statement of Principles that existed at the time of the pilot-testing (ASB, 1991a, 
1992a and 1992b). Members of the pilot group commented that these definitions served to confuse 
rather than to clarifY and that such concepts did not require clarification. No definitions of these 
concepts are given in the subsequent experiments which constitute this research. The focus group 
also identified a number of limitations of the research: for example, the limited disclosures, the 
absence offorward-Iooking information and other information which would assist them in assessing 
the performance and position of the reporting entities were specifically mentioned. These 
limitations are discussed in chapter 12. 
The final research instrument is reproduced in the Appendix to this chapter. 
7.4 THE EXECUTION OF THE EXPERIMENTS 
As noted in chapter 5, there were 291 participants in the experiments. These comprised graduates 
of masters and undergraduate programmes in DeU over the previous 3 years and current students 
of the later years of such programmes. (Chapter 5 discussed in detail the benefits and limitations of 
availing of such participants.) 436 people (214 graduates, 93 final year UIldergraduate students and 
129 post-graduate students of Dublin City University Business School ('DCUBS'» were contacted 
and invited to take part in the experiments. To maximise participation, the subjects' were given a 
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choice of two times when they could take part in the experiment (TIlUrsday evening or the 
following Saturday morning). The nature and purpose of the research was not disclosed. 
The experiments took place in DCUBS on a Thursday evening and the following Saturday 
morning. Subsequent testing found no significant difference between the responses of the Thursday 
and Saturday participants. When the participants arrived at DCUBS, they were assigned to a 
location (ie. classroom) in a predetermined random manner. Each location corresponded to a 
different experimental group. There was no contact between groups or subjects throughout the 
experiments. No time limit was given. The experiments took between forty-five and seventy-five 
minutes to complete. 
8 female research post-graduate students in DCUBS acted as administrators of the experiments. 
None of these was from an accounting specialism. (As such, they were not in a position to assist the 
subjects except in accordance with their instructions.) An administrator was assigned to each 
group. Detailed instructions were given to each administrator in advance and the experimental 
procedure, though not its purpose, was discussed. Written instructions were given to each 
participant. These instructions were also read out by the administrator. No further information 
was given to the participants. Each subject was given a folder containing the part a) of the research 
instrument. To facilitate subsequent coding of the results, each folder and each element of the 
research instrument were marked with a letter (for the group) and a number (for the member of the 
group). Letters were assigned haphazardly to groups (for example, the first group was group C) so 
as to avoid potential demand effects by subjects' identification of their order in the process. 
The research instrument, which is reproduced in the Appendix to this chapter, was in two parts. 
Part a) requested profiles of the participants including their age, experience, education and 
employment. It also comprised questions regarding their attitude and aptitude to accoWlting 
information. The questions concerning attitude to financial statement items solicit the views of the 
participants vis~-vis the relaibility of trade debtors, prepayments, stoc~ the net book value offixed 
assets, trade creditors and accruals. TIle questions regarding aptitude are drawn from (though not 
identical to) questions in Coyle (1990).TIle basis for this approach was discussed in section 5.4.1. 
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Once Part a) was completed, this element of the instrument was collected fOffil the participants and 
then (and only then) Part b) was handed out. 
Part b) comprised the financial statements of the five companies which the participants were asked 
to assess. The task involved was to assess the perfoffi1al1ce and position of the reporting entities on 
a bi-polar scale (0 equalling poor, 100 equalling excellent, the mid-point equalling average etc.). 
Subjects were also asked to express their confidence in their assessment also on a bi-polar scale (0 
equalling not very confident, 100 equalling very confident etc.) The companies and the 
perfoffilallce / positon task were assigned in a random order to avoid an ordering effect. 
participants were asked to complete the second part of the research instrument first and to hand 
this to the administrators on completion. The means of the assessments of perfoffi1al1ce and 
position and of the expressions of confidence will be statistically compared by way of t-tests as 
discussed in Coolican (1994, p. 280) and Myers and Well (1991, Chapter 3). 
Responses were anonymous. A sma1I number of 'protocols' was collected from participants 
indicating their reaction to the experimental disclosures, their decision processes and their 
assessment of the realism of the information. Participants were also asked to indicate any views 
they had on the experimental process on the documentation provided. Most commented that the 
assignment was 'interesting' although several felt that the information given was insufficient for 
them to assess the performance and position of the companies adequately. This limitation was also 
identified during the pilot testing of the research instrument and is discussed in the final chapter. 
Specific comments by the participants on each of the disclosures will be discussed when exploring 
the implications of those disclosures. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
11lis chapter has outlined the development of the research instrument used in the research. It 
explored the evolution of the experimental framework adopted amd the rationale for such a 
framework in the light of the diclosures suggested. TIle instrument was refined through a pilot-
testing and brief focus group discussion. TIle execution and results of the pilot-testing wwas 
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discussed in some detail, including the main refinements to the research instrument which resulted. 
The implementation of the experiments was then discussed, including the profile of the participants. 
To reiterate, the subjects are given the research instrument reproduced in the appendix to this 
chapter. The first part of the instrument gathers some information concerning the experience and 
background of the participants, their attitude towards elements of financial statements and their 
aptitude in the use of financial statements. In the second part, the subjects are presented with five 
reporting entities with differing characteristics (high debt, no debt, declining turnover growth, high 
turnover growth and stable growth). They are also presented with differing disclosures of 
uncertainty as outlined in section 7.2. They are asked to assess the performance and position of 
each of the reporting entities given the information available and, further, to express their 
confidence in those assessments of performance and position. 
Having outlined the research method in chapter 5 and analysed the instrument with which such a 
method is implemented, the following chapters (chapters 8, 9 and 11) will explore the research 
disclosures and their results in more detail 
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Appendix to Chapter 7 
The Research Instrument 
PART A 
1. Introduction and instructions 177 
2. Summary information 179 
3. Perceptions of the reliability of financial statement items 181 
4. Aptitude test 183 
PARTB 
5. The financial statements 189 
6. The experimental task 200 
7. Disclosures 203 
Note: The research instrument is outlined in sections here for ease of understanding. Each 
section has a brief introduction at the beginning. The experimental subjects received only the 
elements comprising the research intrument. The instrument was completed in two parts, part 
A and part B as outlined in section 7.4. The research instrument was pilot-tested as described 
in section 7.3. 
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1. Introduction and instructions 
This element ofthe research instrument represents the instructions given to each subject at the 
outset of the experiments. These instructions were also read aloud by the administrator of the 
experimental group. 
These instructions are discussed in section 7.4. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This exercise comprises part of a project researching disclosure in a financial reporting context. 
Your responses will be anonymous and will be used entirely for the re~earch. TIley will not be used 
for any other purpose. You are requested to fill in the details overleaf which are for statistical 
purposes only. Please do not sign your name on the response sheet. 
You are asked to consider the tasks assigned carefully. Please do not communicate with others 
(other than administrator) during the exercise. Thank you for agreeing to participate. 
Those participating fully in the research will be entered in a prize draw with prizes as follows: one 
£100 prize, three £50 prizes, eight £20 prizes and twenty £10 prizes. 
During the exercise, you will not be given any more information other than the information 
contained in the documentation supplied. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will be given the financial statements of five companies. Each company has an issued share 
capital of 1,000,000 shares with a nominal value of £1 each, 
All of the companies are involved in the manufacture and installation of high technology hardware 
and related software. 
You are to assume that you are an investment analyst who has been approached by a client for 
advice regarding these companies. 
The task assigned has two main sections. In Section A, you are asked to indicate your assessment 
of the reliability of several items that appear in financial statements and to answer a number of 
multiple choice questions . 
. When you have completed the tasks assigned in Section A, please indicate to the administrator who· 
will collect your responses. 
In Section B, you are asked to assess the financial performance and position of the companies 
whose financial statements are presented to you. In the context of each decision, you are asked to 
indicate your level of confidence in your assessment on a scale of 0 to 100. 
When you have completed the tasks assigned in Section D, please indicate to the administrator who 
will collect your responses. 
Your comments are welcome. Please write them on front page of Section B. 
178 
2. Summary information 
Summary information of each participant was requested, including age, experience, education and 
employment. The summary infonnation is used to develop a profile of participants discussed in 
chapters 6, 8, 9 and 10. In particular it is used to explore differences between experimental subjects 
in chapter 11. 
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SUMMARY lNFORMA TION 
(This information is for statistical purposes only) 
Age: (please tick) 
Gender: (please circle) 
~20 
31-35 __ 
M F 
21-25 __ 
36-40 __ 
Are you currently attending a course of study (please tick): 
26-30 __ 
>40 
Yes No 
if yes, please indicate which course: ___________ _ 
if yes, please indicate how many years you have been attending the course: __ 
Are you a graduate (please tick): Yes No 
if yes, please indicate which coursers) you are a graduate of 
Are you a member of a professional body, e.g. IIMR, ICAI, CIMA (please tick): 
Yes_ No 
if yes, please indicate which professional bodies you are a member of 
Are you currently employed (please tick): Yes 
if yes, please indicate sector of employment: 
'Big 6' accountancy finn 
Financial institution_ 
SeIVice company 
Other accountancy finn 
Manufacturing company 
Other: (please specify), ____________ _ 
if yes, please indicate position: _________ _ 
if yes, please indicate years in current employment: 
if yes, does your employment require the use offinancial statements: 
No 
Yes __ No 
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3. Perceptions of the reliability of financial statement items 
Participants are asked to indicate their perceptions of the reliability of selected financial statement 
items, in particular specific assets and liabilities. The rationale for the collection of sucb data is 
outlined in section 5.4.3 in the context of the cbaracteristics of the experimental subjects. TIle 
development of this element of the researcb instrument is explored in section 7.4. The effect of the 
perceptions of the reliability of financial statement items on the assessments and confidence of the 
experimental subjects are discussed in sections 8.3.2 and 10.4.2. 
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Several items which normally appear in financial statements are given below. Please 
indicate your opinion of the reliability of these items. 
Accruals 
I I I I I 
o 10 20 30 40 
Very unreliable 
Trade debtors 
I I I I I 
0 10 20 30 40 
Very unreliable 
Trade creditors 
I I I I I 
0 10 20 30 40 
Very unreliable 
Prepayments 
I I I I I 
0 10 20 30 40 
Very unreliable 
Stock 
I I I I I 
0 10 20 30 40 
Very unreliable 
Net book value of tangible fixed assets 
I I I I I 
0 10 20 30 40 
Very unreliable 
I 
50 
Average 
I 
50 
Average 
I 
50 
Average 
I 
50 
Average 
I 
50 
Average 
I 
50 
Average 
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I I I I I 
60 70 80 90 100 
Very reliable 
I I I I I 
60 70 80 90 100 
Very reliable 
I I I I I 
60 70 80 90 100 
Very reliable 
I I I I I 
60 70 80 90 100 
Very reliable 
I I I I I 
60 70 80 90 100 
Very reliable 
I I I I I 
60 70 80 90 100 
Very reliable 
4. Aptitude test 
The aptitude test comprises 5 multiple-choice questions developed as discussed in section 7.4. 
Section 5.4.1 outlined the rationale for this approach. The responses of those participants scoring 
less than 3 out of 5 are excluded from consideration in chapters 8, 9 and 10 while the effect of 
aptitude on perceptions is explored in section 11.3.2. 
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MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS 
Please answer the following multiple choice questions. Choose the answer which is the most 
correct. 
1. Meath pIc had total assets of £40 million at 31 March 1994. During the year to 31 March 1995, 
the company 
(i) made a profit after taxation of £3 million 
(ii) raised capital of £ 1 million 
(iii) paid a dividend of £1 million 
(iv) revalued its freehold property upwards by £3 million. 
What were the total assets of the company at 31 March 19957 
Please circle your choice: 
A £45 million 
B £48 million 
C £46 million 
D £43 million 
E I have obtained a different answer to those above. My answer is 
F I am unable to answer the question 
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2. A company's average debt collection period appears to have worsened from the previous year 
from 15 days to 25 days. 
Which of the following is the best explanation of the deterioration in the debt collection period? 
Please circle your choice: 
A More customers this year than in the previous year 
B More difficult trading conditions than in the 
previous year 
C A reduction in the standard period of credit 
allowed to most customers 
D A larger provision for doubtful debts than in 
the previous year 
E I have obtained a different to those above. My answer is _______ _ 
F I am unable to answer the question 
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3. Extracts from the profit and loss accOlmt of Kildare pIc for the year ended 31 December 1994 
are as follows: 
Turnover 
Gross profit 
Distribution costs 
Administrative expenses 
Operating profit 
Interest payable and similar charges 
Profit on ordinary activities before taxation 
1994 
£000 
231 
44 
13 
J2 
13 
~ 
J 
1993 
£000 
204 
51 
14 
..lQ 
21 
~ 
.l2 
Which one of the following conclusions is most likely based on the information given: 
Please circle your choice: 
A The company sold more goods by volume in 
1994 than in 1993 
B The gross profit margin was higher in 1994 
than in 1993 
C The change in distnlmtion costs in 1994 
over 1993 is due to higher sales turnover 
D Operating profit as a percentage of sales 
fell in 1994 to about 113 of its 1993 level 
E I have obtained a different to those above. My answer is 
F I am unable to answer the question 
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4. Elements of the profit and loss account of Dublin pic are reproduced below: 
1994 1993 
£000 £000 
Turnover 6,029 5,706 
Operating costs (Note 1) 5,386 5,100 
Operating profit 658 606 
Reorganisation costs (25) (9) 
Profit on sale of property 37 14 
Interest payable and 
similar charges -ill) ..illQ) 
Profit on ordinary activities 
before tax ~ .32l 
Note 1: Operating costs 
Raw materials 2,540 2,523 
Other expenses 1,896 1,672 
Staff costs 883 866 
Depreciation 125 126 
Increase in stocks (37) (82) 
Other operating 
income -ill) 
-ill 
Are the following conclusions reasonable based on the information given? 
Conclusion 1 
The improvement in net profit between 1993 and 1994 is mainly due to non-operational reasons. 
Conclusion 2 
The reduction between 1993 and 1994 in the ratio of staff costs to sales is due in large part to a 
reorganisation of operations. . 
Please circle your choice: 
Conclusion 1 Conclusion 2 
A Reasonable Unreasonable 
B Reasonable Reasonable 
C Unreasonable Unreasonable 
D Unreasonable Reasonable 
E I am unable to answer the question 
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5. Extracts from the balance sheet of Cork pIc are as follows: 
£000 £000 
Current assets 
Stock 771 
Debtors 500 
Cash and bank 854 
2,125 
Creditors: amounts falling due within one year 
Bank overdaft and loans 702 
Other creditors 1,470 
~etcUIfentliabilities 
What is Cork pIc's (1) current ratio and (2) quick ratio or acid test ratio? 
Please circle your choice: 
Current ratio Quick ratio 
A 0.98 1.61 
B 1.02 0.62 
c 0.96 0.38 
D 0.98 0.62 
E I have obtained a different answer to those above. My answer is 
F I am unable to answer the question 
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5. The financial statements 
Five sets of financial statements (balance sheet and profit and loss accoWlt) were presented to d1e 
experimental subjects. The characteristics of the reporting entities represent~d in dlese financial 
statements are detailed in Figure 7.8. The effect of these characteristics on the perceptions of the 
experimental subjects are examined throughout chapters in chapters 8, 9 and 10. 
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Company: [No debt IND 
This label was not revealed 
as part of the experiments] 
PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 
DECEMBER 
1993 1994 1995 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Turnover 101858 11152 12,692 
Operating profit 2,794 2,993 3,171 
Interest payable 0 0 0 
Profit on ordinary activities 
before taxation 2,794 2,993 3,171 
Taxation 616 678 787 
Profit on ordinary activities 
after taxation 2,178 2,315 2,384 
Dividends paid 100 120 140 
Profit retained for year 2,078 2,195 2,244 
Retained at beginning of year 4,087 6,165 8,360 
Retained at end of year 6 1165 8 1360 101604 
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BALANCE SHEET AT 31 DECEMBER 
1993 1994 1995 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Fixed assets 2,865 3,408 3,934 
Current assets 
Stock 2,301 2,926 3,273 
Debtors 2,347 2,908 3,441 
Cash at bank and in hand 1,305 2,221 2,923 
5,953 8,055 9,637 
Creditors < 1 year 1,653 2,103 1,967 
Net current assets 4,300 5,952 7,670 
Creditors> 1 year 0 
° 
0 
7,165 9,360 11.604 
Capital and reserves 
Ordinary share capital 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Profit and loss account 6,165 8,360 10,604 
7,165 9,360 11,604 
)9) . 
Company: [Stable growth I 
STA This label was not 
revealed as part of the 
experiments} 
PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 
1993 1994 1995 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Turnover 11 ,548 11 ,656 11,842 
Operating profit 2,656 2,681 2,831 
Interest payable 283 271 308 
Profit on ordinary activities 
before taxation 2,373 2,410 2,523 
Taxation 293 217 319 
Profit on ordinary activities 
after taxation 2,080 2,193 2,204 
Dividends paid and proposed 55 55 65 
Profit retained for year 2,025 2,138 2,139 
Retained at beginning of year 2,963 4,988 7,126 
Retained at end of year 41988 71126 91265 
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BALANCE SHEET AT 31 DECEMBER 
1993 1994 1995 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Fixed assets 2,578 2,930 3,202 
Current assets 
Stock 3,103 3,937 5,264 
Debtors 2,837 3,653 4,948 
Cash at bank and in hand 719 1,103 1,609 
6,659 8,693 11,821 
Creditors < 1 year 2,358 2,681 3,541 
Net current assets 4,301 6,012 8,280 
Creditors> 1 year 891 816 1,217 
5,988 8,126 10.265 
Capital and reserves 
Ordinary share capital 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Profit and loss account 4,988 7,126 9,265 
5,988 8,126 101265 
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Company:[Declining turnover I 
DEC This label was not 
revealed as part of the 
experiments] 
PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 
1993 1994 1995 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Turnover .11 z084 10z308 9,587 
Operating profit 2,788 2,093 1,647 
Interest payable 219 223 175 
Profit on ordinary activities 
before taxation 2,569 1,870 1,472 
Taxation 477 420 360 
Profit on ordinary activities 
after taxation 2,092 1,450 1,112 
Dividends paid and proposed 150 200 250 
Profit retained for year 1,942 1,250 862 
Retained at beginning of year 1,397 3,339 4,589 
Retained at end of year 3z339 4 z589 51451 
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BALANCE SHEET AT 31 DECEMBER 
1993 1994 1995 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Fixed assets 2,836 2,789 2,786 
Current assets 
Stock 2,593 3,003 3,192 
Debtors 2,425 2,844 2,910 
Cash at bank and in hand 258 145 128 
5,276 5,992 6,230 
Creditors < 1 year 2,157 1,994 2,074 
Net current assets 3,119 3,998 4,156 
Creditors> 1 year 1,616 1,198 491 
4,339 5,589 6,451 
Capital and reserves 
Ordinary share capital 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Profit and loss account 3,339 4,589 5,451 
4,339 5,589 6A51 
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Company: [High debt / HD 
This label was not revealed 
as part of the experiments] 
PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 
1993 1994 1995 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Turnover 101668 101713 10,852 
Operating profit 1,340 1,339 1,356 
Interest payable 242 324 327 
Profit on ordinary activities 
before taxation 1,098 1,015 1,029 
Taxation 133 105 110 
Profit on ordinary activities 
after taxation 965 910 919 
Dividends paid and proposed 50 50 50 
Profit retained for year 915 860 869 
Retained at beginning of year 996 1,911 2,771 
Retained at end of year 11911 21771 31640 
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BALANCE SHEET AT 31 DECEMBER 
1993 1994 1995 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Fixed assets 2,167 2,485 2,674 
Current assets 
Stock 4,482 4,824 5,199 
Debtors 3,248 3,638 4,042 
Cash at bank and in hand 0 
° 
0 
7,730 8,462 9,241 
Creditors < 1 year 5,238 5,373 5,438 
Net current assets 2,492 3,089 3,803 
Creditors> 1 year 1,748 1,803 1,837 
2.911 3.771 4.640 
Capital and reserves 
Ordinary share capital 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Profit and loss account 1,911 2,771 3,640 
2,911 3,771 41640 
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Company:[High growth / HG 
This label was not revealed 
as part of the experiments] 
PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 
DECEMBER 
1993 1994 1995 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Turnover 4,452 8,932 13,454 
Operating profit 672 1,924 3,410 
Interest payable 193 360 415 
Profit on ordinary activities 
before taxation 479 1,564 2,995 
Taxation 168 563 989 
Profit on ordinary activities 
after taxation 311 1,001 2,006 
Dividends paid 0 50 100 
Profit retained for year 311 951 1,906 
Retained at beginning of year 507 818 1,770 
Retained at end of year 818 11770 31676 
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BALANCE SHEET AT 31 DECEMBER 
1993 1994 1995 
£'000 £'000 £'000 
Fixed assets 1,658 2,408 3,534 
Current assets 
Stock 1,015 2,657 3,591 
Debtors 927 2,084 3,487 
Cash at bank and in hand 
° 
12 89 
1,942 4,753 7,167 
Creditors < 1 year 846 2,150 2,855 
Net current assets 1,096 2,603 4,312 
Creditors> 1 year 936 2,241 3,170 
1,818 2,770 4,676 
Capital and reserves 
Ordinary share capital 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Profit and loss account 818 1,770 3,676 
1,818 2,770 4,676 
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6. The experimental task 
The development and testing of the experimental task is set out in sections 7.3 and 7.4. TIle 
experimental task for all groups was identica1. 
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My assessment of the fmandal position of the company is (mark a point on the scale): 
I 
o 
poor 
I 
10 
I I 
20 30 
I 
40 
I 
50 
Average 
I I 
60 70 
My level of confidence in this assessment is (mark a point on the scale): 
I 
o 
Very 
unsure 
I 
10 
I I 
20 30 
I 
40 
I 
50 
Average 
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I I 
60 70 
I 
80 
I 
80 
I I 
90 100 
Excellent 
I 
90 
I 
100 
Very 
confident 
My assessment of the performance of the company is (mark a point on the scale): 
I 
o 
Poor 
I 
10 
I I 
20 30 
I 
40 
I 
50 
Average 
I I 
60 70 
My level of confidence in this assessment is (mark a point on the scale): 
I 
o 
Very 
unsure 
I 
10 
I I 
20 30 
I 
40 
I 
50 
Average 
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I I 
60 70 
I 
80 
I 
80 
I I 
90 100 
Excellent 
I I 
90 100 
Very 
confident 
7. Disclosures 
The nature of the disclosures is driven by the research hypotheses developed in chapter 6. For 
illustrative purposes, the disclosure to Group 2 (the uncertain nature offinanciai statements) is 
reproduced here. The other 6 disclosures comprising the disclosures of the uncertain assets and 
liabilities are in Figures 7.2 to 7.7 inclusive. The control group receives no disclosure, only the 
balance sheet and profit and loss account of the reporting entities. 
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Disclosure to Group 2 (as in Figure 2.6) 
Extract from the audited financial statements at 31 December 1995: 
The preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 
requires the Directors to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amoWlts of assets 
and liabilities and the disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at the date of the financial 
statements and the reported amount of revenues and expenses during the reporting period. Actual 
results could differ from those estimates. 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Disclosure concerning the Wlcertain nature of financial statements has been suggested by the 
Statement of position of the AccoWlting Standards Executive Commitee ('AcSEC) of the AICPA 
(AcSEC, 1994). This disclosure is shown in Figure 2.6. This disclosure, argues the AsSEC (1994, 
p. 14), 'is intended to inform users of the inherent Wlcertainties in measuring' the various elements 
of financial statements and that the eventual crystallisation of these elements may differ from the 
original estimates of the directors. 'Such disclosure', it continues, 'alerts users that Wlcertainties 
are present in the financial statements of all reporting entities. ' 
Section 6.2 explored the research hypotheses in the context of the disclosure of the Wlcertain 
nature of financial statements in detail An Wlderstanding of the arguments in favour of the 
disclosure of the Wlcertain nature of financial statements required, first, an exploration of the 
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objectives of financial statements: an understanding of their intended role and audience, their 
relationship with the world and their changing role. It is from such issues that a consideration of 
the need to disclose the uncertain nature of financial statements arose. At the heart of such 
disclosures are assumptions concerning the characteristics of the users of financial statements and 
their role in an uncertain world. 
The hypotheses which were developed from such an exploration in Section 6.2 are as follows: 
Bla: The disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements will influence the assessment of 
performance and position of reporting entities by the experimental subjects. 
BIb: The disclosure of the uncertain nature offinancial statements will influence the confidence of 
the experimental subjects in their assessment of the performance and position of the 
reporting entity. 
Blc: User reaction to the disclosure of the uncertain nature offinancial statements will be 
influenced by their expectations of the uncertain nature of financial statements. 
BId: The disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements will affect highly geared 
reporting entities to a greater extent than those which are not highly geared. 
Having reiterated the hypotheses concerning such disclosures which were developed in chapter 6, 
this chapter discusses the research results regarding these hypotheses. Section 8.2 will examine the 
experimental results in the context of these disclosures and the hypotheses in question. Section 8.3 
considers the implications of the research findings concerning the disclosure of the uncertain nature 
offinancia1 statements. The concluding section, Section 8.4, summarises the chapter and its main 
conclusions. 
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8.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The experimental approach has been discussed in detail in Chapter 5. In this section, the 
characteristics of the experimental subjects are described (in section 8.2.1). This is followed (in 
section 8.2.2) by a brief introduction of the experimental results. 111ese results are then analysed in 
some detail in section 8.3 particularly in the light of the hypotheses outlined. 
The statistical analysis of differences between the control group and the experimental group 
comprise parametric tests of the comparison of means of independent samples. 111ese were 
performed after ensuring that the conditions for parametric tests were met as suggested by, for 
example, Coolican (1994, p. 280). The level of measurement is ordinal It is assumed to be 
normallY distnbuted (n approximating 30). Each group was also positively tested (at the 95% level 
of significance) for homogeneity of variance using Levene's test of equality of variance. 
8.2.1 Description o/tlle experimental subjects 
74 participants were randomly assigned to two groups. The experimental conditions were as 
described in chapter 7. One group (the control group) received the profit and loss account and 
balance sheet of five reporting entities for three years in a random order. The second group (the 
experimental group) received th~ same financial statements in a random order, with the disclosure 
of the uncertain nature offinancial statements as outlined in Figure 2.6. 
Each group had 37 members. The average score of the subjects ill the aptitude assessment 
described in chapter 4 was 3.05 out of 5, 3.19 out of 5 in the control group and 2.92 in the 
experimental group. 8 of those in the control group and 9 in the experimental group scored less 
than 3 out of 5. TIle experimental responses of these subjects will be excluded from further 
consideration. Furthennore, outlying responses will also be excluded, comprising one subject from 
the control group and two from the experimental group. (TIlese responses were from subjects in 
employment who said they did not use financial statements as part of their employment.) This 
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leaves 28 subjects in the control group and 26 in the experimental group. Of the remaining 
subjects, the average score of each group in the aptitude assessment is 3.61 and 3.38 out of 5 
respectively. (A statistical t-test for the comparison of means showed no significant difference in 
these means at a 95% level of significance.) 
The average age of the members of the control group was 22.3 years while the average age of the 
experimental group was 23.1 years. The exclusion of those participants scoring less than 2 out of 5 
in the aptitude assessment does not affect the average age of the participants. Those attending 
courses of study at Dublin City University Business School ('DCUBS') and who were not in 
employment were among those excluded on the basis of their score in the aptitude assessment to a 
greater extent than graduates ofDCUBS (who would be in employment). Those in employment 
therefore fared better in the assessment of aptitude than those not in employment. nlis would 
appear to suggest that the aptitude assessment captured elements of the environment of 
employment of the participants to a greater extent than the classroom environment. 
17 of the control group and 15 of the experimental group were in employment. The average time in 
employment in each group was 21 months. All of those in employment said they used financial 
statements as part of their employment. 11 members of each group were not in employment. 13 
of the control group and 12 of the experimental group were attending a course of study in 
DCUBS. The control group comprised 8 males and 21 females while the experimental group 
included 18 males and 10 females. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 summarise the employment and course 
attendance respectively of the members of each group. 
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Table 8.1: Disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements: Employment of 
experimental subjects. 
Employment category Control Group Experimental Group Total 
None 11 11 22 
'Big 6' accountancy finn 5 1 6 
Other accountancy finn 3 5 8 
Financial institution 4 4 8 
Manufacturing finn 3 2 5 
Setvice finn 2 2 4 
Other employment 1 J 1 
TOTAL 22 ~ 51 
Table 8.2: Disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements: Course attendance by 
the experimental subjects. 
Course attendance Control Group Experimental Group Total 
None 13 12 25 
BA in Accounting & Finance 7 5 12 
MBS in Accounting 3 3 6 
MSc in Investment & Treasury 2 6 8 
MBA 1 ~ § 
TOTAL 22 2.8 51 
8.2.2 Assessments o/the reliability o/financial statement items 
As outlined in chapter 7, participants were asked to express their view of the reliability of various 
financial statement items. These comprised accruals, the net book value of fixed assets, 
prepayments, stock, trade creditors and trade debtors. TIle mean assessments of the reliability of 
each of these items by the control group and the experimental group is given in Table 8.3 including 
their significance at a 95% level in a t-test for the assessment of differences in means. 
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Table 8.3: Disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements: Mean assessment of the 
reliability of financial statement items 
Jilnandal statement item Controleroup Rank· Experimental £roup Rank· t-value·· 
(n=29) (n=28) 
NBV of fixed assdS 52.6 6 50.0 5 .1 
Stock 65.0 4 45.7 6 14.8# 
Trade debtors 79.1 I 73.6 I 1.3 
Prepayments 70.9 3 60.0 3 4.9/1 
Acauais 59.8 5 .5.5.0 4 .7 
Trade aeditors 74.0 2 66.1 2 2.0 
Total 66.9 SS.7 4.11N 
. 
• 1 = most reliable. 6= lewt reliable 
•• HIS foc canparisioo of means: /I indicates significaJt at 95% level of significance. 
The experimental group's' assessment of the reliability offinancial statement items was consistently 
lower than that of the control group. This difference is significant overall and in the case of stock 
and prepayments in particular. The ranking is broadly consistent between the items. nlere is an 
interesting pattern between those who were in employment / used financial statements and those 
who were not / did not use financial statements (Table 8.4). Those who were in employment in 
each group viewed liabilities (ie. accruals and trade creditors) as less reliable and assets (i.e. the net 
book value offixed assets, stock, trade debtors and prepayments) as more reliable than those who 
were not in employment. This issue, as well as gender differences in decisions, is discussed in 
detail in chapter 11. 
Table 8.4: Disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements: Mean assessment of the 
reliability of financial statement items: those who were employed v. those who were not. 
Jilnandal statement item Control group Experimentaleroup (n=28) (n=26) 
Employed N~employed Employed Nr( employed 
(n=17) (n=l1) (n=15) (n=ll) 
Sccre Rank Sccre Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
NaV offtxed assdS 67.1 4 29.5 6 51.3 4 40.0 6 
Stock 64.7 
5 62.3 5 48.7 6 41.8 5 
Trade debtors 81.8 1 
77.7 I 75.3 1 67.3 I 
Prepayments 70.6 3 69.5 3 58.0 3 56.4 3 
AcauaJs 58.2 6 63.2 4 50.0 5 54.5 4 
Trade aeditors 72.4 2 
76.8 2 61.3 2 67.3 I 
',otal 69.1 
63.1 ;:;/.4 S4.6 
• 1 = most reliable. 6= I~ reliable 
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8.2.3 Assessments o/the performance and position o/the reporting entities 
TIle assessments ofperformance and position by the two groups are given in Tables 8.5 and 8.6. 
Table 8.5: Disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements: Mean assessment of the 
performance of the reporting entities 
Reporting entity Control group Experimental group t.-value* 
(n=28) (n=26) 
% change 
Hig]l debt (lID) 45.0 -27% 33.1 3.86# 
Dec\ining(DEC) 44.5 -7% 41.3 0.72 
Stability (Sf A) 61.8 -24% 46.9 3.3# 
Hig]l growth (HG) 65.9 -16% 55.3 1.69-
Nodebt(ND) 66.2 +2% 67.3 0.22 
Overall 56.0 -10% 50.7 
• t-t~ for comparisoo ~ means: II indicates significant at 95% level of significance, - indicates significant at 90% level of significance. 
Table 8.6: Disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements: Mean assessment of the 
position of the reporting entities 
Reporting entity Control group Experimental group t.-value* 
(n=29) (n=28) 
% change 
Hig]l debt (lID) 41.9 -14% 36.2 1.25 
Dec\ining(DEC) 42.7 ~% 40.0 0.78 
Stability (Sf A) 63.9 -16% 53.8 2.4511 
Hig]l growth (HG) 59.3 -11% 52.7 1.15 
No debt (ND) 72.0 +4% 74.6 0.8 
OveraU 55.5 -s·;. 51.0 
• t-t~ for comparisoo of means: II indicates significant at 95% level of significance. 
With one exception (the no debt company ND), the experimental group reached a lower 
assessment of the performances ~d positions of the reporting entities than the control group. This 
difference is significant at a 95% level of significance in the case of the performance and position of 
the stable company and the performance of the borrowing company. It is also significant at the 
90% level of significance in the case of the performance of the high growth company. Overal~ 
therefore, the difference in assessments between the control group and the experimental group is 
most significant in the context of performance. 
Further exploration of these assessments between those who use financial stateme11ts as part of 
their employment ('Use FS') and those who do not use financial statements regularly ('Not use 
FS') is illustrated in Tables 8.7 and 8.8. With few exceptions, those who use financial statements 
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had a higher opinion of the reporting entities than those who do not. 11lis is particularly so in the 
case of performance. Furthermore, the effect of the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial 
statements is particularly marked among those who use financial statements. That effect is also 
more marked in their assessment of performance. 
Table 8.7: Disclosure of the uncertain nature offinancial statements: Mean assessment of the 
performance of the reporting entities - those who use financial statements v. those who do not. 
Reporting entity 
HiI'P debt(IID) 
DeclIDing (DEC) 
Stability (Sf A) 
HiFJl grO'Mh (HG) 
No debt (ND) 
Overall 
Control group 
(n=28) 
UseFS Not use FS 
(n= 17) (n=J1) 
43.5 47.3 
39.4 52.3 
60.0 64.5 
61.7 72.3 
69.4 61.4 
54.8 59.6 
Experimental group 
(1/=26) 
UseFS Not use FS 
(n=J5) (n=J1) 
30.7 36.3 
36.7 48.9 
44.7 50.0 
52.7 59.1 
62.0 74.5 
45.4 53.8 
Table 8.8: Disclosure of the uncertain nature offinancial statements: Mean assessment of the 
position of the reporting entities - those who use financial statements v. those who do not. 
Reporting entity Control group Experimental group 
HiFJl debt (lID) 
DeclIDing (DEC) 
Stability (ST A) 
HiI'P grO'Mh (HG) 
Nodebt(ND) 
Overall 
(n=28) (1/=26) 
Use FS Not use FS Use FS Not use FS 
(n= 17) (n=J1) (n=J5) (n=J1) 
37.1 50.0 3.5.3 37.2 
41.7 44.1 40.0 40.0 
63.5 64.5 51.3 .57.3 
66 . .5 48.2 .53.3 .51.8 
69.4 7.5.9 72.7 77.3 
55.6 56.5 50.5 52.7 
Table 8.9 illustrates the degree of consensus in the assessments of performance and position as 
measured by the variance of such assessments. The disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial 
statement appeared to have no significant effect on the dispersion of assessments. 
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Table 8.9: Disclosure of the uncertain 
assessment of perfonnance and position. 
ReporCine entity Control eroup 
(n=28) 
Variance of 
assessment of 
Penormance Positioo 
IIiJIP debt (lID) 10.5 19.4 
Declining (DEC) 17.0 13.7 
Stability (ST A) 17.9 13.5 
IliJIP growth (HG) 22.0 24.1 
No debt (NO) 29.3 12.5 
Mean variance 19.3 16.6 
nature of financial statements: Variances of the 
Experimental eroup 
(n=26) 
Variance of 
a'lSCS.'illlCJ1t of 
Penormance Positim 
12.2 13.1 
13.9 11.0 
14.9 16.0 
23.6 17.5 
16.5 13.0 
16.1 14.1 
8.2.4 Expression of confidence in assessments ofperformance and position 
As outlined in chapter 7, subjects were also asked to indicate their confidence in their own 
assessment of the perfonnance and position of the reporting entities. TIle results of these 
assessments of confidence are given in Table 8.10. They are further analysed in Table 8.11 
between those who use financial statements as part of their employment and those who do not 
Of are not employed. 
Table 8.10: Disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements: Mean expression of 
confidence in the assessment of performance and position of the reporting entities. 
Reporting entity 
HiJIP debt (lID) 
Declining (DEC) 
Stability (ST A) 
Hi!lJ1 grO'Mh (HG) 
Nodcbt (NO) 
Overall 
Control group 
(n=28) 
Ccnfidwce in 
Penormance . Positioo 
65.7 71.1 
65.2 65.5 
63.2 64.3 
68.6 66.8 
68.4 69.1 
66.2 67.4 
Experimental group 
(11=26) 
Ccnfidwce in 
Penormance Positioo 
63.4 64.3 
61.5 63.8 
60.0 65.0 
64.6 62.7 
65.4 67.3 
63.0 64.6 
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Table 8.11: Disclosure of the Wlcertain nature of financial statements: Mean expression of 
confidence of the assessment of the performance and position of the reporting entities: those 
who use financial statements v. those who do not. 
Reporting entity ExperilUdilal group (n=26) 
CmCidalccin 
Control group 
(n=28) 
Confidence in 
Performance Positim Performance Positioo 
UseFS Not use FSUse FSNot use FS Use FS Not use FS UseFS Not use FS 
(n=17) (n=l1) (0=17) (0=11) (n=15) (n=ll) (n=15) (0=11) 
Higp debt (lID) 65.9 65.4 68.2 75.5 66.7 59.1 68.0 59.1 
Declining (DEC) 61.8 70.4 64.1 67.7 66.0 55.5 65.3 61.8 
Stability (STA) 60.0 68.2 62.4 67.3 64.0 54.5 66.0 63.6 
Higp growth (HG) 66.5 71.8 63.S 71.8 67.3 60.9 65.3 59.1 
No debt (NO) 67.1 70.4 62.3 79.5 66.7 63.6 68.0 66.4 
OveraU 64.3 69.2 64.1 72.4 66.1 58.7 66.5 62.0 
The disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements did not appear to affect the 
confidence of subjects in their assessment of the performance and position of the reporting entities. 
Neither did that confidence vary significantly between the reporting entities. However, there were 
marked differences between expressions of confidence of those who were in employement (all of 
whom use financial statements as part their employment) and those who do not. The expressions 
of confidence of those who did not use financial statements appeared to be consistently and 
markedly affected by the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements. 
8.3 EXPLORATION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
8.3.1 Test of Hypothesis H1a. and Hypothesis RIb 
Hypothesis RIa proposed that the disclosure of the uncertain nature offinancial statements would 
influence perceptions of the performance and position of the reporting entities. The experimental 
group'S mean assessment of position and performance of the reporting entities was lower than that 
of the control group. In several instances, this difference was significant. This difference was most 
marked in the context of performance. It was also most marked among those who use financial 
statements as part of their employment. Hypothesis Rta is, therefore, supported by the 
experimental findings. 
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Chen (1974) and Chen and Summers (1981) disclosed probabilistic accowlting data (not in the 
structure of financial statements) with no indication of probabilities associated with the reported 
figures to a group of experimental subjects. TIley reported no effect on the decisions of subjccts 
when the non-deterministic nature of accoWlting numbers was reported: 'a mere indication of the 
uncertain nature of the reported figues did not provide subjects as much infonnation as the 
conventional single-value accoWlting figures' (Chen, 1974, p. 165). Chen did, however, note that 
the confidence of subjects in their decision was adversely affected by the disclosure of Wlcertainty 
attached to accoWlting numbers. 'TIlls suggests', agrues Chen (1974, p. 195), 'that subjects want 
accountants to tell them either the best estimate they can develop or the range of possible 
variations, with confidence levels on the reported ranges'. 
Bimberg and Slevin (1976, p. 154) suggest that non-reaction to such infonnation (as noted by 
Chen (1974) but not in this research) may result from three factors: first, that the data is irrelevent 
to the potential decision-maker's model, secondly, that the decision maker's lack of experience 
meant that Slhe was Wlable to use the information and, thirdly, Wlcertainty was consistent with 
prior expectations. The latter two reasons suggested by Bimberg and Slevin lead one to consider 
the experience of the experimental subjects as that experience may fashion both their ability to use 
financial statement and their prior expectations. Perhaps ironically, differences between the groups 
were most marked among those who use financial statements. These differences, and potential 
explanations of such differences, are explored in the discussion of the Hypothesis HI b below. 
Prior expectations of the reliability of financial statements were specifically measured prior to the 
experimental task. Differences based on such prior expectations are considered in detail in section 
8.2.3. 
Hypothesis HI b proposed that the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statemcnts would 
affect the confidence expressed by the experimental subjects in their assessments of the reporting 
entities. There were no significant differences in each group's expression of confidence in their 
assessment of perfonnance and position. To this extent, Hwothesis 8tb is unsupported. 
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However, there was a marked difference between the expressions of confidence of those who use 
financial statements and those who do not. The effect of the disclosure on the expressed 
confidence of those using financial statements was mixed and Wlaffected overall while the 
expressed confidence of those who do not use financial statements was markedly and consistently 
lower among the experimental group than among the control group. 
Therefore, there were differences between the assessments of performance and position of the 
control group and the experimental group. Particularly marked were differences in the assessment 
of those among the experimental subjects who use financial statements as part of their employment 
than those who do not (ie. those not in employment). On the other hand, the expressed 
confidence of those who do not use financial statements was affected to a greater extent than is the 
expressed confidence of those who do. 
These findings may appear to conflict: if subjects' assessments were reduced by their view of the 
uncertain nature of financial statements, perhaps their confidence should also be affected. 
However, it appears that an awareness of the uncertain nature of financial statements affects 
assessment and / or confidence. In other words, it is pOSSIble that having scaled down their 
assessment of the performance and position of the reporting entities concerned, subjects are then 
quite confident of their view. Alternatively, if assessment of performance and position had not 
been affected, perhaps subjects would then be less confident of their unadjusted assessments. 
Furthermore, it would appear reasonable that those who were in employment (and use financial 
statements) would have more confidence in their ability to include within their consideration the 
uncertain nature of financial statements. Their familiarity with financial statements may have led 
them to have confidence in their own ability to adjust for the disclosure of their uncertain nature. 
Thus supports the view of Einhorn and Hogarth (1978, p. 402) that 'confidence in judgment is 
built up slowly with experience'. 
Differences in assessments and expressions of confidence in those assessments were particularly 
marked in the context of performance. Performance may be more sensitive to Wlcertain estimates 
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than position. Perfonnance is a function of the opening and closing balance sheet. Hicks' (1961) 
definition of profit, for example, is that it is a product of 'well-offhess' at the beginning and end of 
the period. CeteriS paribus, profit represents the increase in net assets over a period: PI L. = BS. 
_ BSo. Hence uncertain estimates may affect perfonnance (which is a function of current and past 
position) to a greater extent than they affect current position. 
111ese differences between the control group and the experimental group's reaction may be due to a 
nwnber of factors. First, it may be that those involved in the experiment were Wlaware of the fact 
or the implications of the uncertain nature of financial statements. Hence, the views of the Ryan 
Commission, the AICPA and others who advocated the disclosure, inter alia, that financial 
statements are a function of the estimates of management may be supported. It may also support 
the findings of Bailey, Rylinski and Shields (1983) that proposed wording changes to the audit 
report altered the perceptions of financial statements by users of those financial statements. Bailey 
(1981, p. 890) also 'conjectured' that Chartered Financial Analysts were Wlclear as to the source of 
audited financial statements (being 'predisposed to regard the auditor as the source'). 
Second, the disclosure may be seen as a 'surprise' thereby heightening their view of its significance. 
This unfamiliarity is mentioned by Bailey (1981) as a possible explanation of his finding that 
financial analysts did not differ in their reaction to audited and unaudited financial statements. 
Those who do not use financial statements may be less familiar with their regular contents and, 
thus, the disclosure of their uncertain nature may cause them less surprise. 
The disclosure in question was, however, closely modelled on elements of the Directors' 
ResponSIbility Statement which is are regularly disclosed within the annual reports of publicly 
quoted companies in Ireland. Hence, this disclosure, although differing in its current form, is not a 
radical departure in reporting practice. It may not in itself be a cause of significant surprise as a 
result. 
TItirdly, expectations 'of uncertainty differ between those who use financial statements and those 
who do not. Generally, the control group and the experimental group had differing views 
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concerning the reliability of certain financial statement items. The experimental group consistently 
indicated that they viewed certain financial statement items as less reliable than did the control 
group. The research findings indicate that the experimental group had a lower assessment of the 
performance and position of the reporting entities than the control group. To control for the effect 
of such expectations of reliability, a partial correlation was carried out, controlling for total 
reliability. Significant correlation remained between the assessments of the reporting entities as 
outlined in Tables 8.6 and 8.9 (ie. in the context of the STA and the perfOImance onID). Hence, 
the differences in the assessments between the groups did not appear to be affected by their 
expectations of the reliability of the financial statement items. 
The role of these expectations on forming perceptions was the focus ofHlc. 
8.3.2 Test of Hypothesis HIe 
The literature discussed in the early part of this chapter suggests that prior expectations form 
subsequent assessments. Puto (1987), for example, found that buying decisions are driven, inter 
alia, by initial expectations and by the 'message' received by the decision maker. Others, such as 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) and Helson (1964), suggest that decision makers draw from prior 
experience and other stimuli to create an 'anchor', an 'adaptation level' from which decisions are 
changes or adjustments. Such research indicates that where decision-makers are coming from 
informs the decision( s) at which they arrive. 
The initial assessment of the reliability offinancial statement items attempts to capture the attitudes 
of the experimental subjects to these financial statement items. These attitudes give an indication of 
the subjects' awareness of the uncertain nature of financial statements prior to the disclosure of til at 
uncertainty. Hypothesis HIe accordingly proposed that the assessment of the reporting entities' 
perfonnance and position may be formed both by the initial attitude of the experimental subjects to 
financial statement information and by the disclosure of the uncertain nature of such information. 
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In order to assess the correlation of original perceptions of the reliability of financial statement 
items and the subjects' assessment of the perfonnance and position of the reporting entity, a test 
suggested by Sherif and Hovland (1961, p. 150) who classified attitudes expressed on a bi-polar 
scale into various 'positions' was perfolTIled. Overall assessments of the reliability of financial 
statement items were classified into three 'positions' or categories. (lbis overall assessment (,total 
reliability') was reached by calculating the mean of the separate assessments of the reliability of the 
six financial statement items in question.) 
Table 8.12: Disclosure of the uncertain nature offinancial statements: Mean assessments and 
confidence classified by perception of the reliability of financial statements. 
GrOUP' Reliability categoll 
1 A (n=12) 
B (n=11) 
C (n=5) 
2 A (n=3) 
B (n=18) 
C (n=5) 
Assessment 
ofpositirn 
56.5 
53.6 
59.0 
53.9 
51.7 
49.2 
Assessmmt 
ofperfonnance 
55.5 
55.3 
62.4 
57.6 
48.4 
46.0 
Ccnfidwce in Cmfidencein 
assessmentof' 1l-'i.'i<.">SIlIcntof 
positirn perfnl1lumce 
68.5 69.7 
61.5 57.8 
77.6 76.4 
66.7 62.7 
63.9 62.6 
66.0 64.4 
• Group 1 received no disclosure, while group received the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial 
statements. 
b 'A' expressed the relative perception (between 69 and 100) that financial statements were reliable, • B' that 
financial statements were neither reliable nor unreliable (between 56 and 68)" 'C' that financial statements 
were relatively unreliable (0-55). 
Mean total reliability for all the subjects included in the experiments was 61.94 and the standard 
deviation was 12.73. The mean' total reliability was taken as the centre-point of the assessments. 
The middle category was then established as the mean plus / minus half of the standard deviation of 
the mean: the middle category therefore ranged from 55.575 (or 56) to 68.305 (or 68). TIle 
categories of total reliability therefore comprised 0 to 55 (category C, being those who perceive 
financial statements as least: reliable), 56 to 68 (category B or middle category) and 69 to 100 
(category A, or those who perceive financial statements as most reliable). An independent t-test 
for was then performed to test the significance of the differences in means between each category 
of total reliability of the assessments of the performance and position of the reporting entities. 
Table 8.12 summarises the assessments of each category of reliability within groups 1 and 2. 
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Two interesting trends may be obselVed from these results. 111ese trends should be treated 
cautiously as the relatively small numbers involved in categories A and C render statistical tests of 
significance weak. First, those who perceived financial statements as relatively less reliable 
expressed greater confidence in their subsequent assessments usi11g these financial statements than 
those who perceived financial statements as relatively more reliable. This difference within groups 
between experimental subjects with differing characteristics suggests that differences in perceptions 
offinancial statement items (specifically stock and accruals) does fashion perceptions regarding the 
disclosure of the uncertain nature of such items. 
Secondly, the most significant change between groups appears to be between those with less 
confidence in the reliability of financial statements. This is 110t a common trend between the other 
categories. It would appear, therefore, that the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial 
statements undennined the confidence and assessment ofperformance and position of those whose 
initial perceptions were that financial statements were 110t reliable. The disclosure therefore 
confirmed these expectations. They did not, however, appear to alter the expectations of those 
who perceived financial statements as relatively more reliable (ie. categories A and B). Therefore, 
mindful of the caveat regarding the relatively small numbers involved, Hypothesis HIe is supported 
particularly in the case of those whose initial expectation of the reliability of financial statements is 
relatively low. 
8.3.3 Test of Hypotltesis HI d 
It is hypothesised in hypothesis HId that the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial 
statements would affect highly geared reporting entities more than those which are not highly 
geared. The mean assessments of the performance and position of the reporting entities (iucluding 
their ranking) is presented in Tables 8.4 and 8.5 respectively. The characteristics of the companies 
are debt (high debt lID I no debt ND), turnover (growth HG / decline DEC) and stability (STA). 
The subjects in both groups ranked ND as the best company from the point of view of both 
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petionnance and position and HD as the lowest with respect to position. TIle lowest pClionllancc 
varied between DEC (by the control group) and HD (by the experimental group). TIl is would 
appear to suggest not only that debt is perceived as a more important indicator of position than 
high growth or stability but also as an important indicator of petionnance. 
The company portraying stability (STA) is ranked third in petiormance and second in position. 
This would appear not to support the proposals by, for example Ronen and Sadan (1981) and Dye 
(1988) that smoothing of financial ratios is optimal as 'smoothing' reduces the volatility of ratios 
and noise in financial information. Particularly in the context of petionnance, HG displays dramatic 
and, perhaps, erratic growth but is perceived as having a stronger perfonnance than STA 
Significant changes between the two groups occurred in the context of the performance of lID and 
STA (at a 95% level of significance) and HG (at a 90% level of significance). There was also a 
significant difference (at the 95% level of significance) between both groups' assessment of the 
position of STA This consistent caution concerning STA may indicate a particular view of 
financial statements portraying stability in the light of a signal of the uncertain nature of financial 
statements. This disclosure may have been interpreted as a signal from management cautioning the 
reader of the financial statements. This signal may have been perceived as particularly significant 
where reporting entities portrayed high levels of particular characteristics (growth or debt) or 
stability. This may result from Braun et al. 's (1995) view that the assessment of perfonnance and 
position is partly a function of volatility. The uncertain nature of the information may increase the 
volatility of HG and HD and uudermine the stability of STA Although debt appears to be an 
important indicator of position and performance, such varied results do not support Ilid. 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined in some detail the results of the disclosure of the tUlcertain nature of 
financial statements. This disclosure was examined particularly in the context of the objectives of 
financial statements. l1lese objectives are to give the users of financial statements infonllation that 
is useful in making investment decisions. It was argued that information conceming the wlcertain 
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nature of financial statements infonns expectations of the information used ill decision models. 
Initial expectations of such infonnation may playa role in the reaction to such disclosures. 
The research findings show that the assessments of the control group and the experimental group 
differed. There was evidence therefore to support Hypothesis H1a. Further consideration would 
appear to suggest that, in particular, the assessments of performance and position of those who use 
financial statements were affected by the disclosure of the lUlcertain nature of financial statements 
while that disclosure affected the confidence of those not using financial statements. Overall 
confidence was not affected by the experimental disclosure. Such varied findings did not support 
Hypothesis BIb. 
The experimental group initially expressed the view that financial statement items were less reliable 
than did the control group. These assessments were divided into three categories (category A 
perceiving financial statements to be relatively more reliable, category C perceiving financial 
statements to be relatively less reliable and category B in between the two.) Significant differences 
in the reaction to the experimental disclosure emerged between those who perceived financial 
statements to be less reliable. The assessments of this category of subject were markedly lower 
between the control group and the experimental group. The assessments and confidence of the 
other categories were relatively consistent. Hence, Hypothesis HI c was supported in the case of 
those who fOlUld financial statements less reliable. 
Hypothesis HId proposed that the effect of the disclosure would vary between companies. 
Generally, the effect of the disclosure did vary across companies, being particularly marked ill the 
companies showing high level of growth and debt and a high level of stability. This may suggest 
that the disclosure of the uncertain nature offinancial statements tended to accentuate volatility and 
lUldermine stability. Further, it appears that disclosures should not be driven by a view of 
materiality which focusses on the item alone. Materiality also has a context and that context should 
include, perhaps, the characteristics of the reporting entity. 
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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 outlined the various and varied suggestions for dealing with uncertainty concerning 
specific elements of financial statements. Such suggestions have evolved over a nwnber of 
decades: several have been ad?pted by standard-setters and can be found within current or 
proposed accounting standards. Chapter 5 drew on a nwnber of these suggestions to develop a 
pragmatic framework within which uncertainty might be disclosed in financial statements. Chapter 
6 then established a nwnber of hypotheses arising from these disclosures in the case of both assets 
and liabilities. 
This chapter examines the effects of these disclosures of uncertain assets on the perceptions and 
confidence of the experimental subjects. The following chapter (chapter 10) then examines the 
effect of these disclosures in the context of liabilities and also differences between disclosures of 
uncertainty in the domains of assets and liabilities. Chapter 10 includes a discussion of the role of 
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perceptions of the reliability of assets and liabilities in fonning the assessments of the experimental 
subjects. 
The hypotheses examined in this chapter were developed in Section 6.3 and are set out in Table 6.1 
of chapter 6. They are also summarised as they are considered in turn in sections 9.2.3 to 9.2.5 of 
this chapter. These hypotheses draw in particular on the discussion in chapters 3 and 6 conceming 
the need for inference in the light of incomplete or ambiguous infonnation. More specifically, the 
research reported in this chapter examines the impact of the disclosure ill financial statements of 
more complete or less ambiguous regarding stock on decision-making in an uncertain context. 
The layout of the chapter is as follows: Section 9.2 outlines the characteristics of the experimental 
subjects (in section 9.2.1), outlines the research results (in section 9.2.2) and then (in sections 9.2.3 
to 9.2.5) explores the results of the research in the context of the hypotheses set out. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the main implications of these findings in Section 9.4. 
9.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
9.2.1 Description of the experimental groups 
There were 4 experimental groups in the context of these hypotheses, the control group (who 
received the 5 sets of financial statements and no disclosure) and 3 others. TIlese 3 others were in 
the domain of assets. (Further disclosures in the domain of liabilities are discussed in chapter 8.) 
In all 3 of these cases, the maximum exposure was disclosed as £900,000. Group Al received the 
disclosure of the remote possibility of a remote event which may cause an inestimable decrease in 
assets. Group A2 received a disclosure quantifYing the remote probability as between 5% and 8%. 
In all other respects, the disclosure was identical to the disclosure to group A I. Group A3 
received a disclosure quantifYing the inestimable outcome as between 35% and 65% of the 
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maximum exposure. In all other respects, the disclosure was identical to the disclosure to group 
A2. 
Group Al comprised 36 subjects, group A2 38 and group A3 36. As was outlined in chapters 5 
and 6, the experimental subjects were given an aptitude test in advance of their participation in the 
experiments. Those who scored less than 3 out of 5 (or 60%) were excluded from further 
consideration in the context of this chapter. This resulted in usable experimental results for 29 
subjects in group AI, 32 in group A2 and 26 in group A3. 
The average age in group Al was 24.7 years, 24.9 years in group A2 and 23.8 years in group A3. 
The average score in the aptitude test was 3.5,3.5 and 3.8 respectively. Course attendance in each 
group is shown in Table 9.l. Table 9.2 shows the employment and the use of financial statements 
of the members of each group. 
Table 9.1: Disclosure of an uncertain asset: Course attendance of experimental subjects. 
LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE· 
Course Control At A2 A3 
Group 
NONE 13 to 10 
BA in Accounting & Finance 7 
3 
to 
3 
8 
5 
9 
8 
2 
4 
3 
MBS in Accounting 
2 4 6 MSc in Investment & Treasury 
4 2 3 MBA 
Total 29 29 32 26 
Control group: profit and loss account and balance sheet with no disclosure. 
At: profit and loss account and balance sheet with the disclosure of the remote possibility of a remote 
event which may cause an inestimable decrease in stock with a maximium exposure of £900,000 as in 
Figure 7.2. 
A2: as AI, quall$ifying the remote probability as between 5% and 8% as in Figure 7.4. 
A3: as A2, quantifying the inestimable outcome as between 35% and 65% of the maximum exposure 
as in Figure 7.6 
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Table 9.2: Disclosure of an uncertain asset: Employment and use of financial statements of 
the experimental subjects. 
LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE1 
Control 
Group 
11 
Al A2 A3 
Not in employment 
Use financial statements 17 
Do not use financial statements 1 
17 
7 
5 
13 
12 
7 
10 
16 
17 (12) members of group Al were male (female), 21 (11) members of group A2 were male 
(female) while 12 (14) of group A3 were male (female). Differences between male and female 
responses are discussed in chapter 11. 
9.2.2 Discussion of experimental results 
The experimental results are set out in Tables 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, and 9.6. 
Table 9.3: Disclosure of an uncertain asset: Mean assessment of the position of the reporting 
entities 
Control group2 Group Al2 Group A22 Reporting entity Group A3
2 
(n=29) (n=29) (n=32) (n=26) 
% change %change %change 
High debt (HD) 41.9 +8% 45.3 -14% 39.1 +21%@ 47.4 
Declining (DEC) 42.7 +40%@ 59.8 -22%@ 46.5 -5% 44.3 
Stability (ST A) 63.9 -2% 62.4 -12%@ 54.8 -2% 53.7 
High growth (HG) 59.3 -15% 50.7 +8% 54.8 +12% 61.5 
No debt (ND) 72.0 72.1 -1 % 71.2 +2% 72.5 
Overall 55.5 +5% 58.1 -8% 53.3 +5% 55.9 
@= significant at 95% level of confidence. 
Table 9.4: Disclosure of an uncertain asset: Mean assessment of the perfonnance of the 
reporting entities 
Reporting entity Control group2 
(n=29) 
Group Al2 Group A22 
(n=32) 
High debt (HD) 
Declining (DEC) 
Stability (ST A) 
High growth (HG) 
No debt (ND) 
45.0 
44.5 
61.8 
65.9 
66.2 
Overall 56.0 
% change 
+6% 
+25%@ 
-12% 
-10% 
-2% 
@= significant at 95% level of confidence. 
(n=29) 
47.5 
55.4 
54.5 
59.5 
64.6 
% change 
-13% 41.5 
-30%@ 38.7 
+4% 56.8 
59.2 
+5% 67.7 
56.3 -6% 52.8 
% change 
+8% 
+1% 
-9% 
+6% 
-5% 
Group A3% 
(n=26) 
44.7 
39.2 
51.5 
62.8 
64.5 
52.5 
2 For key to the level of disclosure, see footnote 1. As the disclosure evolves from the control group to A 1 to 
A2 to AJ, the % change likewise measures change from the control group to Al to A2 to A3. 
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Table 9.5: Disclosure of an uncertain asset: Mean expression of confidence in the assessment 
of the Eosition of the reEortin8 entities. 
Group AlJ Reporting entity Control group 
J Group A2J Group AY 
(n=29) (n=29) (n=32) (n=26) 
% change % change % change 
High debt (HD) 71.1 -5% 67.4 -8% 62.3 62.0 
Declining (DEC) 65.5 +3% 67.2 -6% 63.2 -1 % 62.5 
Stability (ST A) 64.3 +2% 65.9 -5% 62.4 +2% 63.9 
High growth (HG) 68.6 -2% 67.1 -5% 63.7 +1% 64.6 
No debt (ND) 68.4 68.8 +1% 69.1 -2% 67.7 
Overall 66.2 +2% 67.3 -5% 64.1 64.1 
Table 9.6: Disclosure of an uncertain asset: Mean expression of confidence in the assessment 
of the Eerfonnance of the reporting entities. 
Reporting entity Control group3 Group A1
3 
(n=29) (n = 29) 
% change % change 
High debt (HD) 65.7 -5% 62.5 +2% 
Declining (DEC) 65.2 65.2 -7% 
Stability (ST A) 63.2 63.7 -2% 
High growth (HG) 68.6 -4% 66.1 -15%@ 
No debt (ND) 68.4 68.0 -4% 
Overall 66.2 -2% 65.1 -5% 
@ = significant at 95% level of confidence. 
# = significant at 90% level of confidence. 
9.2.3 Test of Hypothesis H2a and Hypothesis H2b 
Group A2J 
(n=32) 
63.5 
60.5 
62.3 
56.3 
65.6 
61.6 
Group A3J 
(n=26) 
% change 
63.3 
+5% 63.7 
+7% 66.8 
+13%# 63.7 
+5% 68.8 
+6% 65.2 
Hypothesis IDa proposed that the disclosure of a decrease in an asset where the probability of 
OCCWTence of the decrease is remote and where the outcome of the decrease is inestimable would 
affect the assessment of the performance and position of the reporting entities by the experimental 
subjects. Hypothesis H2b proposed that such disclosures would affect the confidence of subjects 
in their assessment. 
3 For key to the level of disclosure, see footnote 1. As the disclosure evolves from the control group to A 1 to 
A2 to AJ, the % change likewise measures change from the control group to Al to A2 to A3. 
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Tables 9.3 and 9.4 set out the mean assessment of the the control group and the groups which 
received the disclosure of the remote, inestimable event affecting stock (Group AI). Tables 9.4 
and 9.5 set out the mean expression of confidence of each of the experimental groups. There was 
no significant or consistent difference between the confidence of the control group and group AI. 
Hypothesis H2b is therefore unsupported. 
With regard to hypothesis H2a, there was no readily apparent common trend in the effect of 
disclosure Al on the assessment of position or perfonnance. Examining Tables 9.3 and 9.4 in 
more detail, however, it may be observed that the disclosure had a positive effect (significant in the 
case of the company with declining turnover) on the reporting entities with a weaker position and 
performance (ie. lID and DEC) and a negative effect (though not significant) in the case of the 
reporting entities with a stronger position and performance (ie HG and ND). Hence the disclosure 
was perceived as good news in the case of the weaker reporting entities and bad news in the case 
of the stronger ones. This finding is consistent with the findings of Danos et. al. (1989) who fowld 
differing patterns of decision-making behaviour when confronted with differing reporting entities. 
FurilieIDlore, the experimental subjects may have been concerned about the potential for stock 
obsolescence in the light of the declining sales of DEC before the disclosure in question. The 
disclosure may have alleviated these concerns. (Further evidence for such a conclusion is fowld in 
the comparison of the disclosure of liabilities in chapter 10.) These conflicting effects result in no 
significant overall effect on assessments by the disclosure of AI. 
The lack of significance (except in the case of DEC discussed below) of the disclosure regarding 
the possibility of a remote, inestimable loss (whether a decrease in assets or an increase in 
liabilities) may be due to the registering of a remote event as highly unlikely, as an event that need 
not be considered in the assessment of performance and position. Altematively, as Bimberg and 
Slevin (1976, p. 154) suggest, perhaps the disclosure was 'consistent with the subject's prior 
assessment ... and therefore provided no new data (information) to the subject'. In this instance, 
the remote loss is not seen as bad news of a significance requiring attention. 
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It does, however, appear to have a significant positive effect in the case of DEC. 111e disclosure of 
the possibility of a remote event increasing the liabilities of such a company may in fact mitigate the 
perceived risk of the company, which may have been seen as susceptible to stock obsolescence in 
the volatile environment of high technology companies. The perceived risk relating to such 
obsolescence may have been limited by the disclosure that any loss arising had a maximum 
potential of £900,000 and that the probability of the crystallisation of obsolescence was remote. 
Such considerations may not have been as vivid in the case of the other reporting entities whose 
growth was relatively stable. 
In summary, the hypotheses that the disclosure of the existence of a remote loss whose outcome 
cannot be estimated would affect the assessment (112a) and / or confidence (1I2b) is not supported 
in the overall context. This would appear to suggest that events to which the word remote are 
attached or whose outcome cannot be estimated are disregarded in the consideration of the 
performance and position of reporting entities. Furthermore, this initial disclosure would appear to 
support the current view within accounting standards (e.g. SSAP 18) that remote events need not 
be disclosed. 
However, the disclosure had differing effects on assessments between the reporting entities. 
Where the reporting entities were perceived as having a relatively strong position and performance, 
the disclosure had a negative though not significant effect. The disclosure had a positive effect ill 
the case of the reporting entities which were initially perceived as having a relatively poor 
performance and position. The disclosure, therefore, appeared to reassure in the case of poor 
perceptions and, paradoxically, to undermine perceptions of good performance. 
The following hypotheses explored further the apparent expectations of the experimental subjects 
concerning remote and (separately) inestimable events. 
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9.2.4 Test of Hypothesis H2c and Hypothesis H2d 
Hypotheses H2e and H2d suggested that the disclosure of a range of probability for a remote 
event leading to an inestimable loss (decrease in an asset) would affect the assessments of subjects 
and their confidence in their assessment. The range of probability which was disclosed for the 
remote event was 5% to 8%. Tables 9.3 and 9.4 present the experimental results relating group 
A2 (the group receiving the disclosure of the range of probability of the occurrence of the remote 
event in the domain of assets). 
There was a marked difference (decrease) in the assessments of position of Group A2 relative to 
groups Al (much received a disclosure of a remote probability of loss). 111is decrease was 
significant at a 95% level of confidence in the case of the performance and position of the declining 
reporting entity (DEC) and in the case of the position of the stable reporting entity (STA). 
Similarly overall confidence decreased, significantly in the case of the assessment of the high 
growth company (HG). 
These results would appear to suggest, in the broad context, that the quantification of remote as a 
range of5% to 8% rather than simply as the word 'remote' undermines subjects' perception of the 
performance and position of some of the reporting entities whose financial statements were 
presented in the experiments. Groups Al and A2 appear to have inferred that remote probability 
represented a probability less than 5% to 8%. Hence the disclosure that management estimated the 
<remote' probability as representing a range of 5% to 8% was 'bad news'. 
'fhis seems to be particularly so in the case of the DEC and STA In the case of DEC, not only 
does the mean assessment of the company decrease but Group A2 also ranked this company lower 
(4th in position and 5th in performance) than did Group Al (3rd in both position and 
llerformance). This restores tlle ranking of the position of the reporting entities by the control 
~oup. 
230 
There is a significant (at a 95% level of confidence) decrease (12%) ill the mean assessmcnt of the 
position of STA This decrease is driven primarily by those within group A2 who use financial 
statements as part of their employment. Tables 9.7 and 9.8 present the mean assessmcnts of 
performance and position of those who use financial statements compared to those who do not. 
The assessment of the position ofSTA is relatively constant between Group Al and those who do 
not use financial statements in Group A2. However, there is a decrease of 21 % between those 
who use financial statements in group A2 and those who do not. 
This significant difference exists in the case of STA although there is little difference overall 
between the assessments of those who use financial statements and those who do not. It would 
appear that more experienced subjects in particular hold a different view of remote and, 
fiuthermore, that this differing view undermined their view of STA in particular. 111is may be as a 
result of a more cautious view of stable performance and position on the part of the more 
experienced subjects. These subjects may either have held the view that the disclosure in question 
suggested smoothing of performance and I or position in the case of the stable company or that it 
undermined its stability in the most current year. This has echoes of the results in chapter 8, where 
the disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements undermined views of the stable 
company and appeared to raise questions of entities with smooth (or smoothed?) income and 
balance sheet growth. 
Table 9.7: Disclosure of an uncertain asset: Assessment of the position of the reporting 
entities: those who use financial statements v. those who do not. 
Reportine Group AI' Group Al' Group Al' 
entity Use FS NotuseFS UseFS Not use FS UseFS Not use FS 
(11=7) (11=22) (11=12) (11=20) (11=10) (II~ l(j) 
<%> <%> <%> 
lID 42.9 +7% 46.1 38.7 +2% 39.3 51.0 -18% 41.7 
DEC 59.3 +1% 60.0 44.6 +7% 47.6 42.6 +11% 47.2 
STA 62.7 -2% 61.4 48.3 +21% 58.6 52.8 +4% 55.0 
IIG 55.0 -10% 49.3 55.0 54.6 61.9 -1% 6\.0 
ND 74.3 -4% 71.4 72.9 -4% 70.2 72.4 72.8 
Total 58.8 _Z°;' 57.6 51.9 +4% 54.1 56.1 -1% 55.5 
For key to levels of disclosure, see footnote I. 
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Table 9.8: Disclosure of an uncertain asset: Assessment of the performance of the reporting 
entities: those who use financial statements v. those who do not. 
Reportine Group AI' Group A2' Group A3
5 
enUty UseFS NotuseFS UseFS Not use FS UseFS Not use FS 
(n=7) (n=22) (n=12) (n=20) (n=10) (/1=16) 
<%> <%> <%> 
lID 42.9 +14% 49.0 42.9 -5% 40.6 48.5 -26% 35.7 
DEC 46.7 +24% 58.0 39.2 -2% 38.5 38.0 +8% 41.\ 
STA .52.9 +4% 55.0 57.9 -3% 56.2 5\.8 -2% 50.9 
IIG 67.1 -15% 56.9 58.3 +2% 59.7 62.6 +1% 63.2 
NO 69.6 -9% 63.1 66.2 +3% 68.5 64.3 64.7 
To ... 1 55.8 +1% S6.4 52.9 S2.7 53.0 -4% Sl.l 
Overal~ it appears therefore that the quantification of 'remote' had a particular effect in the case of 
companies whose turnover growth was either stable or declining (in the instance of the asset 
disclosure). This is somewhat similar to the findings in chapter 8 that the disclosure of the 
uncertain nature of financial statements affected the high growth reporting entity (HG) more 
significantly than other entities. The entities with high debt or no debt were lUlaffected by these 
disclosures. Their position would appear to be more clear-cut to the experimental subjects as they 
were ranked as being in the best and worst respectively. This is consistent with the findings of 
Danos et. al. (1989, p. 244) who fOlUld that 'the perceived risk level of the borrower had a 
significant impact on how subsequent information was subsequently used'. 
The disclosure of a range of probability of remote events affects the assessment of performance 
and position by the experimental subjects. Furthennore, the findings of Hypothesis Hid in chapter 
8 regarding the importance of the characteristics of the reporting entities would appear to be 
echoed in these disclosures also. The disclosure would appear to undermine stability and 
accentuate volatility. In this case, however, volatility includes decline. Those entities with clear 
characteristics of high debt or no debt appear relatively lUlaffected. 
, For key to the levels of disclosure, see footnote 1. 
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9.2.4 Test 0/ Hypothesis H2e and Hypothesis H2/ 
Hyotheses IDe and 112f proposed that the disclosure of a range of outcomes of an event whose 
outcome is inestimable would affect assessments of the reporting entities and confidence in those 
assessments. The mean assessments of Group A3 are presented in Tables 9.3 and 9.4. ll1ese 
groups were given the financial statements of the five reporting entities along with the disclosure of 
the estimated range of outcomes of the decrease (increase) in assets (liabilities) respectively which 
had a probability of occurrence of between 5% and 8%. In other words, the additional disclosure 
to this group comprised the estimated range of outcomes. In all other respects, the disclosures 
were similar to the disclosures to Groups A2. 
Overall there was little difference between the assessments of A2 and AJ. In the case of the bigh 
debt entity (lID), the increase in Group A3's mean assessment of position relative to Group A2 
was significant at a 95% level of confidence. There was also a marked but not significant increase 
in the assessment of the position of the high growth company (HG). Otherwise the mean 
assessments of groups A2 and A3 were broadly similar. 
The effect of the disclosure of the range of outcomes was therefore confined to companies with 
specific characteristics of high growth or high debt. It may be noted from an examination of the 
research instrument in chapter 7 that HG is also characterised by high debt, although this debt level 
is mitigated and supported by twnover and asset growth. Chapter 10 (section 10.3.3) discusses 
this ambiguity further in the context of liabilities. 
The assessments of Group A3, however, being broadly similar to those of Group A2 with the 
additional clarification of the 'inestimable' outcome, appeared therefore to be driven by the 
disclosure to A2 (of the range of probability of a remote event) rather than the disclosure of the 
range of outcomes of that remote event. This implies that the effect of the disclosure ofthe range 
of probability of a remote event carried through to the assessments of Group A3 as there was a 
significant difference between the mean assessments of Group A3 and A I but not between A3 and 
A2. 
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There appeared to be no significant difference between the assessment of position of those who 
use financial statements in Groups A3 and those who do not (Tables 9.7 and 9.8). In the context 
of the performance of the reporting entities, however, those who use financial statements assessed 
the performances ofHD, DEC and STA as significantly lower tllaIl tlIOse who do not use financial 
statements, while they assessed the performances ofHG aIld ND as significantly higher. Overal~ 
however, there was no marked difference in the assessment of performance of both groups. Any 
differences between them were confined to differences between their assessments of tlle repOlting 
entities rather than overall differences resulting from the disclosure of the range of outcomes. 
Those who use financial statements attached more importance to growth and decline of tumover in 
assessing performance than those who did not use financial statements. 
It would appear, given such varied results, that Hypotheses 1I2e and 1l2f are unsupported. The 
most marked differences in the mean assessments of the experimental subjects appear to arise from 
the disclosure of the range of probability of a remote event rather than the range of outcomes of 
the event. The implications of such a finding are two-fold. First, it seems that the range of 
outcomes disclosed (35% - 65%) did not add to or alter the impression of inestimability attached 
to the disclosure given. It seems that it fitted within the understanding of inestimability of the 
experimental subjects or at least did not upset that understanding. 
Secondly, the more concrete effect seems to have arisen from the clarification of the remote '. 
probability ofloss. TIlls confirms the findings noted in the context of the disclosure of the range of 
probability of the remote loss (decrease in assets). Furthennore, the findings suggest that the 
experimental subjects focussed to a more significant extent on the probability of occurrence than its 
outcome. This may be as a result of the disclosure of a maximum potential loss. Hence, even if 
the loss was inestimable, even if it transpired to be the maximum loss, that maximwn loss was 
nevertheless restricted to £900,000. Outcome in the disclosure to Groups A 1 was therefore 
curtailed. It was also perhaps more concrete, more 'crisp' (Larsson and Chesley, 1986) than the 
somewhat more nebulous, vague (Budescu aIld Wallsten, 1985) concept of 'remote'. 
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9.2.5 Test of Hypothesis H2g and Hypothesis H21t 
Hypotheses Hlg and Hlh in Table 6.2 deal with the intersubjective Wlderstanding of the concepts 
included in the disclosures in question. Hypotheses H2g and lUh proposed that the disclosure of 
information concerning the range of probability of a remote event and the range of outcomes 
among inestimable outcomes would lead to greater consensus among tbe experimental subjects. 
These propositions were based on the notion that greater consensus or Wlanimity would arise out 
of increased information concerning concepts such as 'remote' and 'inestimable'. Hence, the 
clarification of the directors' Wlderstanding of remote and inestimable would lead to a more shared 
understanding of such disclosures (after, for example, the illustration in Figure 6.2». 
Tables 9.9 and 9.10 present the standard deviations of the experimental subjects' assessments of the 
petfonnance and position of the reporting entities. 
Table 9.96: Disclosure of an uncertain asset: Standard deviations oftbe assessment(s) of the 
position of the reporting entities 
Reportine entity Control group Group Al GroupAl GroupAJ (n=29) (n=29) (n=32) (1/=26) 
High debt (IID) 19.4 18.2 11.6 18.9 
Declining (DEC) 13.7 12.6 15.5 16.6 
Stability (Sf A) 13.5 14.5 14.4 10.8 
High gr<M1h (HG) 24.1 18.2 16.9 18.0 
No debt (ND) 12.5 12.0 14.6 13.3 
Mean Standard 
16.8 IS.1 Deviation 14.6 IS.S 
Table 9.106: Disclosure of an uncertain asset: Standard deviations of the assessment(s) of the 
£.etformance of the reporting entities 
Reportine entity Control group Group Al Group Al Group AJ (n=28) (1/=29) (1/=32) (1/=26) 
IIigl1 debt (lID) 10.5 15.5 12.7 17.6 
Declining (DEC) 17.0 18.4 14.9 14.1 
Stability (Sf A) 17.9 22.2 16.2 10.9 
High gr<M1h (HG) no 20.7 16.9 18.2 
No debt (NO) 29.3 14.3 12.7 22.4 
Mean Standard 
17.7 18.2 14.7 Deviation 16.6 
6 For key to disclosures, see footnote 1. 
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Standard deviation is used as a measure of consensus. As pointed out by Coolican (1994, p. 228), 
standard deviation is a useful measure of dispersion. The results in Tables 9.9 and 9.10 illustrate 
that once more the most marked changes in the standard deviation of the subjects's assessments of 
both performance and position occurred with respect to Group A2 (decreased standard deviation). 
This suggests that the disclosure of the range of probabilities of the remote event strengthened the 
shared understanding of Group A2. Such differences between reactions in the domains of assets 
and liabilities are discussed in chapter 10. 
Exploring the impact of the disclosures in a general sense, the effects on the standard deviation of 
the assessments of the experimental groups appears to confirm the earlier findings in this chapter 
that the disclosure of the range of probability of a remote event (disclosed to Groups A2) was 
more influential than the other disclosures. It served also to strengthen consensus. It would 
appear therefore that not alone did the experimental subjects have a lower definition of remote than 
5% to 8%. The definition or clarification of remote, as hypothesised, led to a stronger consensus 
and shared view of the position and performance of the reporting entities. As outlined in chapter 5 
earlier, the expectation would be that a range of 5% to 8% would lead to a firmer 'illtersubjective 
reality' than the vaguer adjective 'remote'. The research results support this expectation. 
Hence in those instances where disclosures had an effect on the assessments of the experimental 
subjects, they also seemed to have an effect on the consensus of subjects. Hypotheses H2g and 
H2h are supported to that ext~t. Such effects on consensus are however less marked and less 
consistent when examined for each reporting entity. The pattern of consensus does not follow to 
any significant extent the pattern of assessment with respect to DEC and STA In fact, there is no 
discernible or consistent pattern of consensus in the individual entity context. 
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9.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter set out to explore some proposed disclosures of WI certainty. Chapter 5 introduced 
some of the origins of such disclosures. In particular, more recent suggestions by the ASB and the 
CICA were identified as forming a basis for disclosure in instances of Wlcertaillty. 111ese 
disclosures clarified the remote, inestimable nature of Wlcertain events where the recognition or 
disclosure of point estimates would potentially portray a misleadingly certain view of such 
estimates. 
Research hypotheses were then developed in chapter 6. These hypotheses drew on the notion that 
disclosures more vivid and crisp than concepts such as 'remote' and 'inestimable' would affect the 
assessment of those involved in the experiments constructed. It was also proposed that the 
confidence of the experimental subjects in their assessment would also be affected. Furthemtore, it 
was hypothesised that such disclosures would lead to a more shared view of the world, a firmcr 
intersubjective reality. Such an intersubjective reality would result from a narrower variation of 
assessments of performance and position about the mean. 
As outlined in chapter 7, experimental subjects were randomly assigned to seven groups. A 
between-subjects experimental design was used to disclose the remote protbability of an wlcertain 
event with an inestimable outco?Ie. The Directors' estimates of the remote probability (between 
5% and 8%) and the range of outcomes of the event (between 35% and 65% subject to a 
maximum of£900,000) were then disclosed in a controlled manner. 
The research found that the clarification of the remote nature of an Wlcertain event leading to a loss 
(Group A2) did affect the experimental subjects' assessments in the domain of assets. Hypotheses 
1I2c and H2d were therefore supported. This disclosure also affected the consensus among 
experimental subjects regarding the performance and position of the reporting entities, supporting 
hypotheses H2g and 112h. On the other hand, the disclosure that there was simply a remote 
probability ofloss and that this loss was inestimable did not appear to affect the assessments of the 
experimental subjects. Likewise, subjects' assessf!1cnts did 110t appear to be affected by the 
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disclosure of the estimated range of outcomes. TIlerefore, hypotheses H2a, H2b, H2e and 112f 
were unsupported although in the case of H2a and H2b the effect differed between reporting 
entities. 
The research firstly indicates that the experimental subjects were more concerned with the 
occurrence of the event than with its outcome. TIlls may be partly due to the limitation or 
'capping' of the outcome at £900,000. (The outcome was 'capped' for the reasons outlined in 
chapter 5.) Secondly, it also indicates that subjects' impressions of remote differed from the 
disclosure of remote as between 5% and 8%. Clearly, a shared view of the word 'remote' does 
not exist or at least the clarification of remote as a probability of5% to 8% altered the perception 
of the experimental subjects. This would suggest that the initial view of remote did not accord 
with a probability of 5% to 8%. This has implications for the notion of remote events 
promulgated, for example, by the CICA (As outlined in Figure 7.1, an exposure draft by the 
CICA proposes that remote events should comprise those with a probability of occurrence of less 
than 15%.) 
Such differing views of the meaning of 'remote' may lead to the non-disclosure by management of 
potential events or outcomes (as required by SSAP 18) which would not necessarily be viewed by 
others as remote and would therefore be usefully disclosed or recognised. Improved 
communication would require directors to disclose ranges of probability of uncertain events in 
order to allow users to incorporate such events, if necessary, into their assessment of the 
performance and position of the reporting entity. In practice, this could be limited by introducing 
restrictions on the incidence of disclosure as suggested by FRS 7 (when there is a high level of 
uncertainty regarding occurrence and outcome) or the CICA's ED on Contingencies (when the 
consequences could be catastrophic). 
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10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 9 explored the research results in the context of the disclosure of assets, having drawn on the 
discussion in chapter 2 of the various suggestions for dealing with uncertainty concerning specific 
elements offinancial statements. 11lls chapter examines the results of these disclosures for liabilities. 
As outlined in chapters 2 and 7, changes in assets and liabilities are treated asymmetrically in financial 
accounting. The constraints of prudence dictate that 'a degree of caution' be included 'in the exercise 
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of the judgements needed in making the estimates required Wlder conditions of Wlcertainty, such that 
income or assets are not overstated and expenses or liabilities are not understated'. (ASB, 1995b, p. 46) 
One of the objectives of this research is to assess reactions to the disclosure of Wlcertain assets and 
liabilities within this asymmetric paradigm. This chapter explores the experimental results in this 
context. 
Section 10.2 restates the research hypotheses particular to the exploration of the reaction of the 
experimental subjects to the disclosures in the domain ofliabilities. This restatement is relatively brief as 
it concerns hypotheses developed in chapter 6 and based on the exploration of the thesis in earlier 
chapters (chapters 2, 3 and 8 in particular). The section then outlines the experimental results. 
Section 10.3 discusses these results in the light of the hypotheses concerning the disclosure of an 
uncertain liability. The differences between the results concerning the disclosures in the area of 
liabilities and the disclosure of assets (analysed in chapter 8) are also explored in section 10.4. The role 
of expectations in forming the assessments of subjects will also be discussed. TIle fina~ concluding 
section (Section 10.5) explores some of the implications of the research findings. 
10.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The theories of decision-making and confidence formation WlderJying the research hypotheses were 
outlined in chapter 3. Drawing on this research, the research hypotheses addressed in this chapter were 
developed in chapter 6 and outlined in Table 6.2 of that chapter. These hypotheses are also restated 
briefly as they are considered in tum in this chapter. 
There were 4 experimental groups in the context of these hypotheses, the control group (who received 
the 5 sets offinanciaI statements and no disclosure) and 3 others who received the disclosures outlined in 
chapters 5 and 7. These disclosures concerned liabilities in this instance. In all of these 6 cases, the 
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maximum exposure was disclosed as £900,000. Group Ll received the disclosure of the remote 
possibility of a remote event which may cause an inestimable increase in liabilities. Group L2 received a 
disclosure quantifYing the remote probability as between 5% and 8%. In all other respects, the 
disclosure was identical to the disclosure to groups Al (in chapter 7) and Ll. Group L3 received a 
disclosure quantifYing the inestimable outcome as between 35% and 65% of the maximum exposure. In 
all other respects, the disclosure was identical to the disclosure to groups A2 (in chapter 7) and L2. 
10.2.1 Description of experimental subjects 
Group Ll contained 35 subjects, group L2 36 and group L3 36. As was outlined in chapters 5 and 6, 
the experimental subjects were given an aptitude test in advance of their participation in the experiments. 
Those who scored less than 3 out of 5 (or 60%) were excluded from further consideration in the 
context of this chapter. This left usable experimental results of21 subjects in group LI, 29 in group L2 
and 21 in group L3. 
The average age in group Ll was 21.8 years, 22.1 years in group L2 and 26.1 years in group A3. The 
average score in the aptitude test was 3.6,3.8 and 3.8 respectively. Course attendance in each group is 
shown in Table 10.1. Table 10.2 shows the employment and the use of financial statements of the 
members of each group. 
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Ta ble 10.1: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Course attendance of experimental subjects. 
Course 
NONE 
BA in Accounting & Finance 
MBS in Accounting 
MSc in Investment & Treasury 
MBA 
Total 
Control 
Group 
13 
7 
3 
2 
4 
29 
LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE' 
Ll L2 
9 
6 
2 
3 
1 
21 
11 
10 
3 
3 
2 
29 
L3 
11 
4 
4 
2 
21 
Table 10.2: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Employment and use of financial statements of the 
experimental subjects 
Not in employment 
Use financial statements 
Do not use financial statements 
Control 
Group 
11 
17 
1 
LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE' 
Ll L2 
10 
9 
2 
13 
12 
4 
L3 
6 
10 
5 
8 (13) members of group LI were male (female), 24 (5) members of group L2 were male (female) while 
17 (4) of group L3 were male (female). Differences between male and female responses are discussed in 
chapter 11. 
I Control group: profit and loss account and balance sheet with no disclosure. 
Ll: profit and loss account and balance sheet with the disclosure of the remote possibility of a remote 
event which may cause an inestimable increase in a guarantee with a maximium exposure of £900,000 as 
in Figure 7.3. 
L2: as Ll, quantifying the remote probability as between 5% and 8% as in Figure 7.5. 
L3: as L2, quantifying the inestimable outcome as between 35% and 65% of the maximum exposure as in 
Figure 7.7. 
242 
10.2.2 Outline of experimental results 
The experimental results are set out in Tables 10.3, 10.4, 10.5 and 10.6. 
Table 10.3: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Mean assessment of the position of the reporting 
entities 
Reportine entity 
Higp debt (lID) 
Declining (DEC) 
Stability (ST A) 
Higp grOlMb (HG) 
No debt (ND) 
Control eroup1 
(n=29) 
41.4 
42.9 
63.8 
57.6 
71.9 
% change 
+4% 
+4% 
+17% 
+2% 
Overall 55.5 +10"1. 
@ _ sienlficant at a 90·;' level or confidence. 
##= slenlficant.t 90% level or confidence. 
L11 
(11=21) 
41.0 
44.8 
66.4 
67.4 
73.3 
60.9 
% change 
+12% 
+15% 
-4% 
-23%@ 
-2% 
-9·1. 
Ll1 LJl 
(11=29) (11=21) 
0/0 dlallgc 
45.9 -290/o(a) 32.5 
51.4 +5% 53.8 
63.5 +3% 65.7 
51.6 +16% 60.0 
71.9 +150/011 82.4 
55.4 +8% 59.9 
Table 10.4: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Mean assessment of the perfonnance of the 
reporting entities 
L11 Lll LJ! 
Reporting entity Control group! (n=29) (n=21) n=29) (11=21) 
% change % change % change 
Higp debt (lID) 43.8 +9% 47.9 -2% 46.9 -8% 43.3 
Declining (DEC) 44.3 +4% 46.0 -3% 44.8 +1% 45.2 
Stability (STA) 62.1 +12% 69.8 -140/011 60.2 +8% 65.2 
Higp 8101Mb (HG) 65.0 +7% 69.3 -140/011 59.7 +19%# 71.0 
No debt (ND) 65.0 +10% 71.7 -9% 65.3 +140/011 74.7 
OversU S6.0 +S·I. S8.6 -3% 56.9 +4% 58.9 
1# '" slenificant.t 90% level or confidence. 
Table 10.5: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Expression of confidence in the assessment of the 
position o.fthe reporting ~ntities 
Reportine entity Control eroup LI! 
(1/=29) (n=21) 
% change" 
Higp debt (lID) 71.0 -4% 68.3 
Declining (DEC) 65.7 -2% 64.5 
Stability (ST A) 63.8 +9% 69.8 
Higp 8101Mb (HG) 67.2 -2% 65.7 
No debt (ND) 69.2 68.8 
OversU 67.4 67.4 
1#" sienificant.t 90% level or confidence. 
@ "" sienificant at 95% level or confidence. 
% change 
-9% 
-6% 
-SO/o 
-7% 
-6"1. 
Ll! 
(n=29) 
62.4 
60.7 
64.1 
65.9 
63.8 
63.4 
L3! 
(n=2/) 
% change 
+6% 66.2 
+12% 68.1 
+140/011 73.3 
+5% 69.0 
+2SO/o@ 81.4 
+13% 71.6 
2 For key to disclosures, see footnote 1. As the disclosures evolve from the control group to Ll to L2 to L3, the % 
change likewise measures change from the control group to Ll to L2 to L3. 
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Table 10.6: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Expression of confidence in the assessment ofthe 
performance of the reporting entities 
Reporting entity Control croup' Ll ' 
(1/=29) (1/=21) 
%dlange 
IIig)l debt (lID) 66.2 66.2 
Dec\ining (DEC) 65.0 +13% 73.3 
Stability (STA) 63.1 +8".10 67.9 
High growth (JIG) 68.3 +1% 69.3 
No debt (NO) 68.4 +3% 70.7 
Overall 66.3 -20/0 65.1 
II = significant at 90% level of confidence. 
@ = siEJ1ificant at 95"0 level of confidence. 
%dlange 
-10% 
-17%# 
-\0% 
-11% 
-8% 
-5% 
U' 
(11=29) 
59.3 
60.8 
61.0 
61.4 
64.8 
61.6 
U' 
(1/=21) 
%dlange 
+11% 65.7 
+12% 68.1 
+170/~ 71.4 
+17%@ 71.9 
+150/0/1 74.3 
+6% 65.2 
10.3 THE EFFECT OF THE DISCLOSURE OF UNCERTAIN LIABILITIES 
10.3.1 Test of Hypothesis H3a and Hypothesis H3b 
Hypothesis H3a proposed that the disclosure of an increase in a liability where the probability of 
occurrence of the increase is remote and where the outcome of the increase is inestimable would affect 
perceptions of the performance and position of the reporting entities. Hypothesis H3b proposed that 
such disclosures would affect the confidence of subjects in their assessment. 
Tables 10.3 and 10.4 set out the mean assessment of position and performance respectively of the Ute 
control group and the group which received the disclosure of the remote, inestimable event affecting 
accruals (Group LI). Tables "10.5 and 10.6 set out the mean expression of confidence in those 
assessments of each of the experimental groups. There was no significant difference between the 
confidence of the control group and group Ll. Hypothesis 1I3b is therefore tulsupported TIle lack of 
effect of the dislcosure L 1 is consistent with the absence of effect in the case of A 1 (discussed ill chapter 
9). Hypothesis rub (relating to a similar disclosure regarding assets) was also Wlsupported. 
3 For key to disclosures, see footnote 1. As the disclosures evolve from the control group to LIto L2 to L3, the % 
change likewise measures change from the control group to Ll to L2 to L3. 
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There was no significant difference between the assessment of performance of the control group and 
group Ll. There was however a more marked difference between the assessment of position of the 
control group and group Ll. Group L1 gave a higher assessment of the positioil and performance of the 
reporting entities as a whole than did the control group. The disclosure to group Ll therefore appeared 
to be 'good news'. The difference in the assessment of position was primarily due to the higher 
assessment of the position of the HG. (This difference was significant at an 85% level of confidence.) 
The lack of significance (except in the case of HG discussed below) of the disclosure regarding the 
possibility of a remote, inestimable loss is similar to that in the domain of assets identified in chapter 9. 
Similarly, this lack of significance may be due to the registering of a remote event as highly Wllikely, as 
an event that need not be considered in the assessment of performance and position (whether in the 
context of assets or liabilities). In this instance, the remote loss is not seen as bad news of a significance 
requiring attention. 
It does, however, appear to have a (positive) effect in the case of the HG. The high growth company 
experienced a growth rate of approximately 75% on average during the previous 3 years. High growth 
is identified by Beaver et at. (1975) as being potentially high risk. This would particularly be the case in 
the high technology sector (Lev and Thiagarajan, 1992). One of the risks attached to such companies is 
the danger of overtrading, reflecting on their position more than on performance. It should also be 
noted (as outlined in chapter 7). that the high growth company also has a relatively high level of debt 
(although this is mitigated by growth in underlying assets and turnover). Hence, the position of such a 
company, in particular, may be the subject of concern in the technology sector. (The high growth 
company is ranked 3rd in position but joint first in performance by the control group.) 
The disclosure of the possibility of a remote event increasing the liabilities of such a company may in fact 
mitigate the perceived risk of the high growth company, which may have been seen as susceptible to the 
crystallisation of guarantees granted to customers to fuel its growth in this volatile sector. TIle 
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crystallisation of such guarantees would, in particular, affect the position of the repOIting entity. TIle 
perceived risk relating to guarantees may have been limited by the disclosure that such guarantees had a 
maximum potential of £900,000 and that the probability of the crystallisation of such guarantees was 
remote. Such considerations may not have been as vivid in the case of the other reporting entities whose 
growth was relatively stable or declining. 
In summary, the hypotheses that the disclosure of the existence of a remote loss whose outcome cannot 
be estimated would affect the assessment of performance and position and / or confidence is not 
supported. This would appear to suggest that events to which the word remote are attached or whose 
outcome cannot be estimated are disregarded in the consideration of the performance and position of 
reporting entities. The exception in this instance was the high growth company whose position was 
perceived in a better light in the context of the disclosure to group Ll. The reasons for this increase may 
be specific to the concerns raised by a high growth (and relatively high debt) company in the technology 
sector (e.g. overtrading and crystallisation of guarantees or other undisclosed liabilities). The following 
hypotheses explored the reactions of the experimental groups to further disclosures concerning the 
remote event in question. 
10.3.1 Tests of Hypothesis H3c and Hypothesis H3d 
Hypotheses H3c and H3d suggested that the disclosure of a range of probability for a remote event 
leading to an inestimable loss (an increase in a liability) would affect the assessments of subjects and their 
confidence in their assessment. Tables 10.3 to 10.6 present the experimental results relating to L2 . 
There was a marked decrease in the assessments of position of Group L2 relative to group L I (which 
received a disclosure of a remote probability of loss). This result is consistent with the results noted in 
the context of assets. This disclosure therefore had a consistent and marked effect on the ex-perimental 
subjects in the context of both assets and liabilities. However the difference between the assessments of 
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position of groups LI and L2 was not consistent to all reporting entities as shown in Tables 10.3 and 
10.4. TIlere was an increase in the assessment of the position of HO and DEC and a decrease in the 
assessments of position of the remaining companies (STA. HG and NO). There was, however, a 
consistent fall in the assessment of performance of all reporting entities. This 'fall was most marked in 
the case ofSTA. HG and NO (the same companies where dIe assessment of position fell) and somewhat 
negligtble in the case of HD and DEC. This difference in assessment was significant at a 90% level of 
confidence in the case of the performance and position of dIe declining reporting entity (DEC) and at a 
95% level of confidence in the case of the position of the stable reporting entity (STA). 111ere was a 
consistent fall in confidence in the assessments of the position and performance of all companies. There 
appeared to be no significant variation within groups between the assessments ofiliose who use financial 
statements and those who do not (see Tables 10.7 and 10.8). 
Table 10.7: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Assessment of the position of the reporting 
entities: those who use financial statements v. those who do not 
L14 L24 LJ4 
UseF'S Not use F'S UseF'S Not use F'S UseF'S Not use FS 
(n=9) (n=12) (n=12) (11=17) (n=/O) (n=II) 
Higb debt (lID) 47.2 36.2 45.0 46.5 30.2 34.5 
Declining (DEC) 52.8 38.7 47.5 54.1 52.0 55.5 
Stability (ST A) 66.7 66.2 61.7 64.8 69.0 62.7 
Higb gt'~ (HG) 73.3 62.9 56.2 48.2 62.0 58.2 
No debt (NO) 80.6 67.9 72.9 71.2 85.0 80.0 
Total 64.1 54.4 56.7 57.0 59.6 58.2 
4 For key for disclosures, see footnote 1. 
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Table 10.8: Disclosure of an Wlcertain liability: Assessment of the performance of the reporting 
entities: those who use financial statements v. those who do not. 
u' Ll' LJ' 
UseF'S Not use F'S UseFS Not use FS UseF'S Not usaF'S 
(n=9) (n=12) (n=12) (11=17) (11=10) (1/=11) 
High debt (lID) 51.7 45.0 43.3 49.4 34.0 47.0 
Declining (DEC) 46.7 45.4 40.7 47.6 38.0 51.8 
Stability (STA) 67.8 71.2 57.9 61.8 60.0 70.0 
High grOlMh (JIG) 73.2 66.2 69.2 52.9 79.0 63.6 
Nodcbt (ND) 74.4 69.6 62.9 67.1 78.0 71.8 
Total 62.8 59.5 54.8 55.8 57.8 60.8 
These results would appear to suggest, in the broad context, that the quantification of remote as a range 
of 5% to 8% rather than simply as the word 'remote' undermines subjects' perception of the 
perfonnance and position of some of the reporting entities whose financial statements were presented in 
the experiments. As in the case of assets, groups LI and L2 appear to have inferred that a remote 
probability represented a probability less than 5% to 8%. Hence the disclosure that management 
estimated the 'remote' probability as representing a range of 5% to 8% was 'bad news' with the 
exception of the position oHill and DEC. 
It is perhaps worth noting that HD and DEC are assessed as in the weakest positions (and having the 
weakest perfonnances) by all the experimental groups. The quantification of a 'remote' event may 
reassure in the context of the poor position of these companies: vague notions of remote events alone 
may not instill confidence in the abilities of management or in the financial statements themselves given 
an already poor position. This finding is similar to that in Hypotheses H2a and H2b in chapter 9. 
Weetman et. al. (1994), for exainple, suggest that disclosures in general and the OFR in particular are 
used to construct a view of the credibility and awareness of management of their business position. 
Hence, the disclosure of a remote, inestimable event (as in group LI) in the context of a poor position 
may not instill confidence in the reporting entity in general while, on the other hand, the ability to 
quantifY a remote event may mitigate such lack of confidence. 
5 For key to disclosures, see footnote 1. 
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It appears furthennore that the quantification of 'remote' had a particular effect (a decrease) in the case 
of the reporting entity whose turnover growth was high in the instance of the disclosure of liabilities. 
This is similar to the findings in chapter 8 that the disclosure of the wlcertain nature of financial 
statements affected the high growth reporting entity (HG) more significantly than other entities. TIle 
entities with high debt or no debt were Wlaffected by the L2 (or A2) disclosure. TIleir position would 
appear to be more clear-cut to the experimental subjects as they were ranked as being in the best and 
worst respectively. 
The evidence supports hypotheses H3c and H3d: the disclosure of a range of probability of remote 
events affects the assessment of performance and position by the experimental subjects. Furthermore, 
the findings of Hypothesis Hid in chapter 8 regarding the importance of the characteristics of the 
reporting entities would appear to be echoed in these disclosures also. The disclosure would appear to 
Ulldennine stability and accentuate volatility. Those entities with clear characteristics of high debt or no 
debt appear relatively Wlaffected. 
10.3.3 Tests of Hypothesis H3e and Hypothesis H3/ 
Hypothesis H3e proposed that assessments of the reporting entities would be affected by the disclosure 
of a range of outcomes of an event whose outcome is inevitable. Hypothesis H3f proposed that such a 
disclosure would affect the confidence of the experimental subjects in that assessment. The mean 
assessments of Group 1.3 are presented in Tables 10.3 and 10.4. This group was given the financial 
statements of the five reporting entities along with the disclosure of the estimated range of outcomes of 
the increase in liabilities which had a probability of occurrence of between 5% and 8%. In other words, 
the additional discosure to this group comprised the estimated range of outcomes. In all other respects, 
the disclosures were similar to the disclosures to Group L2. 
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There were some significant differences between the assessments ofL2 and L3. TIle overall assessments 
of Group L3 of the performance and position of the reporting entities were higher than those of Group 
L2. This increase was maintained across all reporting entities with the exception of 110 whose 
assessment decreased (significantly in the case of position). There was a particularly marked increase in 
the assessments of the performance and position ofHG and NO. As may be noted in Tables 10.3 and 
10.4 and also from their characteristics, HD and NO are at both ends of the spectrum of the reporting 
entities: HD having the lowest position and performance and a high level of debt and NO having the 
highest position and performance and no debt. Similarly, the perfonnance and position are affected in a 
converse manner, with the perception of the position and performance of HD weakened by the 
disclosure in L3 and the position and performance ofND strengthened by the same disclosure. 
Throughout the experiments, subjects were asked to comment on the experimental instrument or write 
any workings they might have on the documentation supplied. In the case of disclosures A3 and L3, 
several participants calculated the expected value ofloss given the probabilities disclosed as £900,000 II< 
8% II< 65% = £46,800. The experimental subjects appear to have judged that the no debt company 
(ND), having relatively small amounts of liabilities, was in a better position than others to support such 
losses and that the high debt company (HD) was in an even poorer position given such losses. Similarly, 
the mean confidence that Group L3 expressed in their assessment was significantly higher than other 
groupS with respect to NO. This increased confidence derived mainly from the increased confidence of 
those who used financial statements in group L3 relative to those who did not (see Tables 10.9 and 
10.10). These differences in co~dence and assessments based on experience first identified in chapter 8 
are explored further in chapter 11. 
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Table 10.9: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Expressions of confidence in the assessment of 
position of the reporting entities: those who use financial statements v. those who do not. 
Ll' LZ' L3' 
UseFS NotuseFS UseFS NotuseFS UseFS Not use FS 
(1/~9) (1/~12) (1/~12) (1/~17) (I/~JO) (1/= lJ) 
High debt (lID) 72.8 65.0 62.5 62.3 72.0 61.0 
Declining (DEC) 63.3 65.4 60.8 60.6 77.0 60.0 
Stability (ST A) 67.8 71.2 65.8 62.9 88.0 60.0 
High gnM1h (HG) 65.0 66.2 65.0 66.5 78.0 60.9 
No debt (ND) 73.3 65.4 6.5.8 62.4 88.0 75.5 
Total 68.4 66.6 64.0 62.9 80.6 63.S 
Table 10.10: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Expressions of confidence in the assessment of 
performance of the reporting entities: those who use financial statements v. those who do not. 
LI' L2' L3' 
UseFS Not use FS UseFS Not use FS UseFS Not use FS 
(1/=9) (11=12) (11=12) (1/=/7) (1/=10) (I/~JJ) 
High debt (lID) 72.2 69.6 68.3 62.4 78.0 70.9 
Declining (DEC) 70.6 75.4 67.7 55.9 75.0 61.8 
Stability (STA) 67.8 67.9 64.2 58.8 78.0 65.5 
High growth (HG) 70.0 68.7 60.0 62.4 85.0 60.0 
No debt (ND) 64.4 67.5 62.5 57.1 70.0 61.8 
Total 69.0 69.8 64.S S9.3 77.2 64.0 
DEC and STA were relatively unaffected by the disclosure L3. However, the assessments of the 
performance and position by group L3 of the high growth company (HG) was markedly higher than 
those of group L2 (consistent with the assessment of groups A3 vis-a-vis A2 in chapter 9). As was 
noted in chapter 7, the characteristics ofHG are ambiguous particularly with regard to its position: it is 
characterised by high growth in turnover but also by high debt which is wlderpinned by a high level of 
assets and the growth in turnover. As discussed in chapter 5, the research attempts inter alia to assess 
the effects of the disclosures of uncertainty on the perceived ambiguity concerning financial statements 
and the entities in question. The disclosure in L3, by narrowing the potential misunderstanding of such 
losses, may help to reduce the ambiguity concerning HG. 
The ambiguity with respect to HG may be measured as the standard deviation of the assessments of 
performance and position. Such ambiguity is measured in Tables 10.11 and 10.12. In this case, it may 
6 For key to disclosures, see footnote 1. 
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be seen that there is most consistent disagreement among experimental subjects conceming HG and HO. 
In the case ofHG, however, this ambiguity is lowest in the case of group L3. Hence in the context of 
the assessment of position, the disclosure of L3 served to reduce the ambiguity conceming the position 
of HG (ie. given the estimability of outcome). It also served to restore the perception of the 
performance of HG to the level it was assessed at prior to the disclosure L2. In other words, 
explanations for the increased assessment of the perfonnance of HG emanate from the diminished 
perception of its performance given L2 (discussed earlier): disclosure L3 merely reinstates the 
perception of its performance by clarifYing the potential extent of loss. Given such varied results 
between reporting entities, hypothesis H3e is unsupported although it is clear that the disclosure had 
some inconsistent effects given the characteristics of the reporting entities. 
The experimental subjects' expressions of confidence in their assessments were consistently greater ill 
group L3 than in other groups. This confirms hypothesis 83r. It is consistent with the expectation that 
disclosure L3 is the clearest, most crisp (in Chesley's (1988) phrase) of the disclosures. TIle increased 
confidence is most marked (significant at a 95% level of confidence) in the case of the position of NO. 
This is consistent with the assessment of perfOlmance and position of NO which also increased 
significantly in the light of disclosure L3. Hence, the perception of perfonnance and position of NO, 
which was always clearcut and strong, became even more so given L3. 
There appeared to be no significant difference between the assessment of position of those who use 
financial statements in Group ~ and those who do not (Tables 10.9 and 1O.1O). In the context of the 
performance of the reporting entities, however, those who use financial statements assessed the 
performances of RD, DEC and STA as significantly lower than those who do not use financial 
statements, while they assessed the performances of HG and ND as significantly higher. Overall, 
however, there was no marked difference in the assessment of perfonnance of both groups. Any 
differences between them were confined to differences between their assessments of the reporting 
entities rather than overall differences resulting from the disclosure of the range of outcomes. TIlOse 
252 
who use financial statements attached more importance to growth and decline of turnover in assessing 
performance than those who did not use financial statements. 
It would appear, given such varied results, that hypotheses 1I3e is unsupported while there is some 
evidence to support hypothesis H3f. As in the case of assets, the most marked differences in the mean 
assessments of the experimental subjects appear to arise from the disclosure of the range of probability 
of a remote event rather than the range of outcomes of the event. TIle implications of such a finding are 
similar to the findings in chapter 7: that the range of outcomes disclosed (35% - 65%) did not add to or 
alter the impression of inestimability attached to the disclosure given and that the more concrete effect 
seems to have arisen from the clarification of the remote probability ofloss. 
10.3.4 Comparison with ot/rer studies 
These results, in the case of both assets and liabilities, concur with Chen's tentative conclusion that 
(Chen, 1974, pp. 163 and 204) 'removing the appearance of certainty from accowlting is not without 
effect.' (The background to Chen's study and his modus operandi are discussed in chapter 4). lIe fowid 
that subjects tended to allocate significantly higher levels of (hypothetical) investment funds to the 
reporting entities which presented their financial statements in probabilistic fonn leading him to suggest 
(p. 204) that 'evidently subjects overestimate risk on the basis of data with the appearance of certainty'. 
The overall results (although like Chen's not having a strong significance) are consistent with Chcn's 
findings that subjects gave a slightly stronger assessment of the performance and position of the 
reporting entities disclosing the uncertain nature of certain aspects of financial statements. There is a 
clear exception, however, in the case of the clarification of the Directors' estimate of remote (groups A2 
and L2). 
Chen, however, found a (non-significant) reduction in the confidence ofthe experimental subjects givcn 
increased information regarding uncertainty. He found this 'important . . . when the kind of data 
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provided was supposed to have more information' (p. 165). Confidence is relatively wlaffected by the 
increased infonnation concerning the Wlcertainties whch are the subject of this research except, once 
more, the disclosures A2 and L2. Overall confidence decreases in each of these instances, significantly 
in the case of some reporting entities. Hence, there is some consistency betWeen the findings in this 
research and those of Chen (1974). The varied nature of the findings here, however, appear to offer a 
richer explanation of such diminishing confidence: that the expressed confidence is based on the 
clarification of the disclosure of remote relative to a benchmark perception or preconception of 
'remote'. 
Oliver (1972) argued (p. 165) that 'it can be concluded that the bankers [who were the subjects of his 
experiments] did not significantly alter their hypothetical loan decisions, even though the two study 
groupS received different types of financial statements [one 'conventional', the other 'probabilistic']'. 
(Again, this work is introduced in some detail in chapter 4.) Bimberg and Slevin (1976) draw on and 
extend the work of Oliver (1972). (As noted in chapter 4, they used skewed confidence intelVals where 
Oliver used a symmetrical distnbution. Bimberg and Slevin's context was not an accounting one.) Like 
Oliver, they fOWld little difference between the assessments of those users who received point-estimate 
financial statements and those who received confidence intelVal statements. The findings of this research 
differs from those of Oliver and Bimberg and Slevin and is closer to those of Chen. 
The research itself differs, however. The hypotheses developed are not limited to measuring only the 
reaction to the disclosures outlined. The nature of consensus given the need for inference, and the 
messages which may be dra\W from such consensus, are also explored. The research also examines any 
differecnes between these inferences in the context of assets and liabilities. The next sections discuss the 
research results in the light of these objectives. 
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10.3.5 Test of Hypothesis H3g and Hypothesis H3h 
Hypotheses H3g and H3h deal with the intersubjective understanding of the concepts included in the 
disclosures in question. Tables 10.11 and 10.12 present the standard deviations of the experimental 
subjects' assessments of the performance and position of the reporting entities. 
Hypotheses H3g and H3h proposed that the disclosure of information concerning the range of 
probability of a remote event and the range of outcomes among inestimable outcomes would lead to 
greater consensus among the experimental subjects. These propositions were based on the notion that 
greater consensus or unanimity would arise out of increased information concerning concepts such as 
'remote' and 'inestimable'. Hence, the clarification of the directors' understanding of remote and 
inestimable would lead to a more shared understanding of such disclosures. 
Table 10.11: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Standard deviations of the assessment(s) of the 
position o.fthe reporting ~ntities 
ReportinlJ: entity ControllJ:roup Ll' Ll' LJ' 
(n=29) (n=2I) (n=29) (11=21) 
High debt (lID) 19.1 24.4 22.5 15.0 
Declining (DEC) 13.7 17.0 16.4 19.4 
Stability (Sf A) 13.5 12.2 18.2 15.8 
High growth (HG) 25.3 17.6 21.9 14.3 
No debt (NO) 12.3 16.8 18.9 7.7 
Mean Standard 
17.6 19.6 Deviation 16.8 14.4 
Table 10.12: Disclosure of an uncertain liability: Standard deviations of the assessment(s) of the 
performance of the reporting entities 
ControllJ:roup 
, Lt' Ll' L3' ReportinlJ: entity 
(n=29) (11=21) (11=29) (n=21) 
High debt (lID) 12.2 19.3 17.5 13.6 
Declinins(DEC) 16.7 21.7 22.6 17.9 
Stability (Sf A) 17.6 11.2 17.6 19.5 
High growth (HG) 22.1 \5.4 22.7 21.5 
No debt (NO) 20.1 11.5 19.4 13.0 
Mean Standard 
17.7 15.8 10.0 Deviation 17.1 
7 For key to disclosures, see footnote 1. 
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The approach adopted to measure the consensus or 'intersubjective reality' of such dislosures is 
identical to that in chapter 9. The results in Tables 10.13 and 10.14 illustrate that once more the most 
marked changes in the standard deviation of the subjects' assessments of both performance and position 
occurred with respect to Group L2 (increased standard deviation). This finding is consistent with that in 
the case of assets in the sense that the most marked effect on consensus in the assets groups (in chapter 
9) was in A2. However, the disclosure resulted in decreased dispersion in the case of A2 and increased 
dispersion in the case of liabilities. This suggests that the disclosure of the range of probabilities of the 
remote event strengthened the shared understanding of Group A2 (assets) but led to less consensus 
among Group L2 (liabilities). Such differences between reactions in the domains of assets and liabilities 
are discussed in the next section to this chapter. 
Exploring the impact of the disclosures in a general sense, the effects on the standard deviation of the 
assessments of the experimental groups appears to confirm the earlier findings in this chapter that the 
disclosure of the range of probability of a remote event (disclosed to Groups A2 and L2) was more 
influential than the other disclosures whether it served to strengthen or weaken consensus. Furthermore, 
within Group L3 the strongest consensus is with regard to the assessment of the position ofND echoing 
the strong assessment given by this group to the position ofND in Table 10.3 and the significant effect 
this disclosure appeared to have on the assessment ofposition ofND. 
Hence in those instances where disclosures had an effect on the assessments of the experimental 
subjects, they also seemed to ha~e an effect on the consensus of subjects. Hypotheses H3g and R3h are 
supported to that extent. Such effects on consensus are however less marked and less consistent when 
examined for each reporting entity. With the exception of the marked effect on the assessment ofND in 
Group L3 noted above, the pattern of consensus does not follow to any significant extent the pattern of 
assessment with respect to DEC and STA. In fact, there is no discernible or consistent pattern of 
consensus in the individual entity context. 
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lOA DIFFERENCES IN ASSESSMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF ASSETS AND 
LIABILITIES 
Chapter 9 explored the results of the disclosures of a remote and inestimable event in the context of 
assets. The earlier part of this chapter explored the effect of identical disclosures of liabilities. As 
outlined in the first section of this chapter, accounting conventions demand an assymmetric approach to 
the recognition (though not necessarily the measurement) of assets and liabilities. III particular, more 
evidence is required for the recognition of an asset than the recognition of a liability. TIle assumption of 
such assymmetIy appears to be that information regarding uncertain assets will cause more concern 
than the same information regarding uncertain liabilities. This leads to the hypotheses developed in 
section 6.4.1. Further hypotheses were developed in Section 6.4.1 concerning differences between 
outcome and occurrence in the context of assets and liabilities. These hypotheses are set out in Table 
6.3 and are summarised briefly at the beginning of sections 10.4.1. 
10.4.1 Tests of Hypotheses H3i to H3p 
Section 6.4.1 suggested that the assumption of the ASB's assymmetric approach to the recognition of 
assets and liabilities (ASB, 1995b; ASC, 1980) is that there would be more concern regarding wlcertain 
assets than uncertain liabilities. As a result, the disclosure of an uncertain asset would lead to lower 
assessments of the position and performance of the reporting entities than the disclosure of an Wlcertain 
liability (hypotheses H3i and H3k) and / or a lower level of confidence in those assessments (hypotheses 
H3j and H31). Furthermore, hypotheses H3m and 830 proposed that these lower assessments of 
position and performance respectively would not differ between outcome and OCCWTence. Hypotheses 
H3n and H3p made similar proposals regarding the expression of confidence in the assessments of 
position and performance. 
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The assessments of the petfonnance and position of the reporting entities and the expressed confidence 
in those assessments are given in Tables 10.13 to 10.16. These assessments are divided between those 
who received disclosures of assets (the 'assets group') and liabilities (the 'liabilities group'). Chapter 9 
and the earlier part of this chapter discussed the differences between the nature of each disclosure (ie. 
between AI, A2 and A3 in chapter 9 and LI, L2 and L3 ill this chapter). This discussion is concerned 
with the differences between the disclosures in the domain of assets and liabilities (i e. between A I and 
LI, A2 and L2 and A3 and L3). 
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Table 10.13:8 Mean assessment of the position of the reporting entities: asset groups to liability groups. 
Reportine entity Group Al GroupLI GroupAl GroupL2 GroupAJ GroupL3 
(,,=29) (,,=21) (,,=32) (,,=29) (,,=26) (,,=21) 
% change % change %wange 
High debt (lID) 45.3 -9% 41.0 39.1 +17% 45.9 47.4 -31%@ 32.5 
DecliWng(DEC) 59.8 -25% 44.8 46.5 +10% 51.4 44.3 +21%@ 53.8 
Stnbility (STA) 62.4 +6% 66.4 54.8 +160/o@ 63.5 53.7 +220/o@ 65.7 
High growth (HG) 50.7 +33%@ 67.4 54.8 -6% 51.6 61.5 -2% 60.0 
Nodebt(ND) 72.1 +2% 73.3 71.2 71.9 72.5 +14%11 82.4 
Overall 58.1 +S'Y. 60.9 53.3 +4% 55.4 55.9 +7% 59.9 
@ .. ai&nif:icant at 95% level of confidence. 
f .. ai&nificant at 90% level of confidence. 
Table 10.14:8 Mean assessment of the performance of the reporting et1tities: asset groups toJiability_gr()ups. 
Reportine entity Group Al Group Ll Group Al Group L2 Group AJ Group L3 
(n=29) (,,=21) (,,=32) (,,=29) (,,=26) (,,=21) 
% change %chsnge % change 
High debt (lID) 47.5 +1% 47.9 41.5 +130/011 46.9 44.7 -3% 43.3 
DecliWng (DEC) 55.4 -17% 46.0 38.7 +16% 44.8 39.2 +150/o@ 45.2 
Stability (ST A) 54.5 +28"/o@ 69.8 56.8 +6% 60.2 51.5 +270/o@ 65.2 
High grCM1h (HG) 59.5 +160/o@ 69.3 59.2 +1% 59.7 62.8 +13% 71.0 
Nodebt(ND) 64.6 +110/011 71.7 67.7 -4% 65.3 64.5 +160/011 74.7 
Overall 56.3 +4'11. 58.6 52.8 +8% 56.9 52.5 +12·'. 58.9 
@= si enificant at 95'11. level of c:on1l.dence. 
#= sienlficant at 90% level of confidence. 
8 AI: profit and loss account and balance sheet with the disclosure of the remote possibility of a remote event which may cause an inestimable decrease in stock 
with a maximium exposure of £900,000 as in Figure 7.2. 
A2: as AI, quantifying the remote probability as between 5% and 8% as in Figure 7.4. 
A3: as A2, quantifying the inestimable outcome as between 35% and 65% of the maximum exposure as in Figure 7.6. 
Ll: as Al except that disclosure relates to the remote possibility of an inestimable increase in a guarantee as in Figure 7.3 rather than a decrease in stock. 
L2: as A2 except that disclosure relates to the remote possibility of an inestimable increase in a guarantee as in Figure 7.5 rather than a decrase in stock. 
1..3: as A3, except that disclosure relates to the remote possibility of an inestimable increase in a guarantee as in Figure 7.7 rather than a decrase in stock. 
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Table 10.159: Expression of confidence in the assessment of the position of the reporting entities: asset groups to liability groups. 
Reportine entity Group Al GroupLI GroupAl GroupL1 GroupAJ GroupL3 
(n=29) (n=21) (n=32) (n=29) (n=26) (n=21) 
%dlange o/odlange %dlange 
High debt (lID) 67.4 +1% 68.3 62.3 62.4 62.0 +7% 66.2 
Declining (DEC) 67.2 -4% 64.S 63.2 -4% 60.7 64.S +6% 68.1 
Stability (ST A) 65.9 +6% 69.8 62.4 +3% 64.1 69.8 +5% 73.3 
High growth (HG) 67.1 -2% 65.7 63.7 +3% 65.9 65.7 +5% 69.0 
No debt (ND) 68.8 68.8 69.1 -8% 63.8 68.8 +18%# 81.4 
Overall 67.3 67.4 64.1 -1% 63.4 64.1 +12% 71.6 
#= si2J1ificant at 90% level of confidence. 
Table 10.16:9 Expression of confidence in the assessment of the performance ofthe reporting entities: asset groups to liability groups. 
Reportine entity Group Al Group Ll GroupAl GroupL1 GroupAJ GroupL3 
(n=29) (n=21) (n=29) (n=32) (n=26) (n=21) 
%dlange % dlange %dlange 
High debt (lID) 62.5 +6% 66.2 63.5 -7% 59.3 63.3 +4% 65.7 
Declining (DEC) 65.2 +12% 73.3 60.5 60.8 63.7 +7% 68.1 
Stability (ST A) 63.7 +7% 67.9 62.3 -2% 61.0 66.8 +7%# 71.4 
High growth (HG) 66.1 +5% 69.3 56.3 +9% 61.4 63.7 +13%# 71.9 
No debt (ND) 68.0 +4% 70.7 65.6 -1% 64.8 68.8 +8%# 74.3 
Overall 65.1 +7% 69.5 61.6 61.5 65.1 +S% 70.3 
# = si:ruficant at 90'Y. level of confidence. 
9 For explanations of levels of disclosure, see footnote 8. 
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TIle assessments of those receiving the disclosure regarding assets are consistently lower on an overall 
basis than the assessments of those receiving disclosures concerning liabilities. Overal~ this suggests that 
ceteris paribus lUlcertain decreases in assets cause greater concern than wlcertain increases in liabilities. 
Resulting assessments, given the disclosure oflUlcertainty, are lower in the case of the assets group than 
the liabilities group. TIlls concern extends also to the expressions of confidence of the groups. 
Tables 10.13 to 10.16 show the differences within each disclosure including those differences that are 
significant at a 90% and 95% level of confidence. These tables illustrate that the subjects' overall 
assessments of the reporting entities where lUlcertain assets are disclosed are consistently lower than 
those of the reporting entities where the corresponding lUlcertain liabilities are disclosed. Analysing the 
differences between the reporting entities, there are two marked exceptions to this overall trend: that of 
DEC (assessment of Al > LI) and HD (assessment of A3 > 13). In the case ofHD, this is intuitively 
sensible as the defining characteristic ofHD is its high level of debt and hence one would expect that the 
disclosure of a potentially greater liability in HD would concern the experimental subjects to a greater 
extent than the disclosure of an lUlcertain asset. 
The situation is less clear in the case of DEC. As noted in chapter 9, the assessment of group A I 
represents a significant increase over the assessment of the control group. Similar to the analysis in that 
context, perhaps there is already heightened concern regarding stock in group A I (in the light of 
declining sales in a volatile sector), that the focus in DEC is on stock as a result and that the disclosure 
alleviates some of the concerns' of the experimental subjects with regard to DEC. TIle LI disclosure 
would not serve to alleviate such concerns and, therefore, the assessment of group A I is greater than 
that ofLl. 
This research concerned itself with an lUlcertain recognised asset (a potential loss) and an lUlcertain 
unrecognised liability (also a potential loss). The disclosures differ in two respects. First, one set of 
disclosures relates to assets, the second set to liabilities. Secondly, one set reveals information about 
recognised items, the odler about lUlfecognised items. The heightened effect dlerefore of the different 
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disclosures may either be due to heightened concern about uncertain assets relative to wlcertain liabilities 
or a concern that uncertain items (even though the level of uncertainty is remote) have been recognised. 
Further analysis of the differences in assessments, however, offers more insight into the source of the 
differences in the assessments. 
The previous chapter noted significant differences between the type of disclosure in the context of the 
probability of the occurrence of the loss (ie. groups 2). The findings discussed earlier indicated that the 
experimental subjects' understanding of what constitutes a remote event was lower than the range 
disclosed in the experiments (5% to 8%). This difference existed in the context of both assets and 
liabilities. When comparing the assessments of groups A2 and L2, the assessments of group A2 are 
lower than L2 overall with some relatively minor and non-significant exceptions. Hence while the 
definition of remote (as less than 5% to 8%) is consistent between assets and liabilities, the disclosure 
again. causes more concern when it relates to assets than liabilities. lhls suggests either that the 
definition of remote is even less for an asset than a liability or that once the threshold of definition is 
breached, this causes greater concern when it is breached for an asset than for a liability. Both of these ' 
conclusions run counter to the ASB's views (and the requirements of accounting standards) regarding 
the asymmetric recognition (or non-recognition) of assets and liabilities. 1hls finding is explored in more 
detail later in this chapter in the light of the perceptions of the reliability of assets and liabilities. 
However, the most significant differences appear to occur in the context of the initial, general disclosure 
of the uncertainty of the assets and liabilities (ie. groups I) and in the context of the clarification of the 
range of inestimable loss (ie. groups 3). The differences between Groups Al and LI indicate, further, 
that the disclosure of a possibility of a remote decrease in a recognised asset concerns the experimental 
subjects more than the possibility of a remote increase in a recognised liability. 
When Groups A3 and L3 are considered, the disclosure of the range of the inestimable loss appears to 
have had an effect on the assessments of the experimental subjects with the assessment of those 
receiving the disclosure in the domain of assets significantly less than those receiving the disclosure in the 
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domain of liabilities. This effect was particularly significant and persistent in the context of the stable 
company (STA) and the company with no debt (ND). In both instances, the perception of the reporting 
entities recovers in the case of Group L3 to the level of Group Ll having fallen in the case ofL2. 111ere 
is also a recovery in the case of the assessment of A3 but not to the level of A 1 and not to the same 
extent as the recovery in the context of liabilities. Therefore the clarification that an inestimable loss is 
potentially between 35% and 65% allows for a recovery of the perception of the reporting entities when 
the uncertainty concerns a liability to a greater extent than when that same Wlcertainty concerns an asset. 
These findings suggest that the experimental subjects allow the non-recognition of an inestimable liability 
while being less tolerant of the recognition of a similarly inestimable asset. Parsing the two reasons 
outlined above, they suggest that the differences between the assessments of Groups A and Groups L 
are not due to the context of assets and liabilities (as these would differences would be marked in the 
context of occurrence alone) but are instead due to the difference of recognition and non-recognition. It 
appears, therefore, given no other factors, that hypotheses H3i to H31 are supported. Hypotheses 113m 
to H3p are unsupported. However, these findings must be treated cautiously as expectations of the 
reliability of financial statement items differ between the assets groups and the liabilities groups and 
between stock and accruals. The next section discusses the role of such expectations in forming these 
assessments. 
10.4.2 The role of expectations of reliability 
Chapter 8 discussed the role of expectations of the reliability of financial statements in the formation of 
assessments. That discussion focused in particular on the aggregate assessment of the reliability of a 
number of financial statement items. The impact of this aggregate assessment on the reaction to the 
broad disclosure of the uncertain nature offinancial statements was then discussed. 
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The focus of this section is the differences between the assessments of groups receiving infonnation 
concerning an uncertain asset (stock) and an uncertain liability (an accrual for a guarantee). A priori 
perceptions of the reliability of such items may affect the reactions of the experimental groups to the 
disclosures in question. Of fiuther interest are the perceptions of the reliability of such items given the 
prudence concept and the general principle that more evidence is required for the recognition of an asset 
than the recognition of a liability. This principle implies that recognised assets are at least as rcliable, if 
not more reliable, than recognised liabilities. 
Table 10.17 presents the mean assessments of the reliability ofparticular financial statemcnt items by the 
experimental groups. 
Table 10.17:18 Mean assessment of the reliabilit~ offinancial statement items 
A3 Ll 
Finandal Control group At A2 L2 LJ 
statement item 
79.1 67.6 72.2 72.3 68.8 Trade debtors 65.0 75.7 
Prq>aymmts 70.9 64.1 n.5 60.0 64 . .5 64.3 78.1 
Stock 6.5.0 
5.5.5 52.0 51.1 54.0 49.6 61.9 
NBVoffixedassds 52.6 .51.6 48.1 47.3 51.2 44.7 .57.1 
Asset items 66.9 59.7 61.2 57.8 59.6 55.9 68.2 
Trade aeditors 74.0 70.5 68.3 70.4 66.0 65.0 73.3 
Accruals 59.8 59.5 
.59.7 56.9 68.8 56.7 63.3 
Liability items 66.9 65.0 64.0 63.6 67.4 60.8 68.3 
TOTAL 66.9 61.5 62.1 59.7 62.2 57.6 68.3 
No significant differences emerge between the two broad groups' mean assessment of the reliability of 
financial statement items. Liabilities are generally viewed as more reliable than assets. (Differences 
within the groupS, based for example, on experience, are discussed in chapter 11.) l1lis is the converse 
of what might be expected given the prudence concept. The constraints of prudence imply (ASB, 
1995b, p. 46) 'that income or assets are not overstated and expenses or liabilities are not Wlderstated'. 
Reliability, however, is not limited to recognition / non-recognition. It includes 'faithful representation' 
and 'substance'. Faithful representation of the effect of a transaction or other event includes the 
consideration of recognition and valuation (ASB, 1995b, p. 45). The evidence here may justify in a 
10 For explanation of levels of dislosure. see footnote 8. 
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certain context the ASB's concerns regarding the valuation and broader reliability of assets (particularly 
tangtble fixed assets). 
The experimental disclosures in this research involve the disclosure ofWlcertainty regarding the asset of 
stock and, separately, regarding the liability of accruals. There is a significant difference (at a 99% level 
of confidence) between the overall perception of the reliability of stock (mean 54.2, standard deviation 
20.2) and of the reliability of accruals (mean 59.6, standard deviation 18.4). Hence, the differing 
assessments of the disclosures of uncertainty relating to stock and accruals may be influenced by the 
differing initial perceptions of the reliability of stock and accruals. 
Extending this analysis further, the assessment of stock by the asset groups (AI to AJ) averages 52.9 
while the assessment of accruals by the liability groups (LI to L3) averages 62.2 (Table 10.17). Hence, 
the two groups have quite different perceptions of the reliability of the financial statement items that are 
the subject of the disclosure of uncertainty. Groups A I to A3 receive the disclosure of Wlcertaillty 
regarding stock while groups LI to L3 receive the disclosure ofWlcertainty regarding accruals. 
As was noted earlier (Table 10.13 and 10.14 ), the assessments of the perfonnance and position of the 
asset groupS are lower than those of the liability groups. Hence, the direct comparison of these two 
broad groups should consider pre-dispositions towards the Wlcertainties which are disclosed. For 
example, stock is generally perceived as being less reliable than accruals. TIle disclosure of Wlcertaillty 
regarding stock leads to a lower assessment of reporting entities than the disclosure of wlcertainty 
regarding accruals. Given the relative perceptions of these financial statement items, it appears that the 
disclosure regarding stock renders the position more Wlcertain than does the same disclosure regarding 
accruals. There is less confidence regarding stock to begin with: the disclosure of its related Wlcertainty 
selVes to undermine the reliability of stock still further. Accruals are perceived as more reliable. 
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Hence, the differing assessments of the reporting entities may stem from different anchors of perception 
regarding stock and accruals. This does not weaken the earlier arguments. In fact, it strengthens and 
explains the conclusions dra\W that uncertainty regarding stock leads to more concern regarding the 
reporting entities. There is initially more concern anyway regarding stock TIle disclosure of an 
uncertainty of that stock therefore creates more concern (and a weaker assessment of the reporting 
entities) than a similar disclosure regarding liabilities. The results in Table 10.17 explain the origins of 
such concerns. 
10.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored two aspects of the experimental results. First, the experimental results in the 
context of the disclosure of uncertain liabilities were discussed (in Sections 10.2 and 10.3). Second, 
following from this discussion, Section 10.4 explored the differences, if any, arising fi'om the disclosure 
of uncertainty in the domain of assets and the domain of liabilities. 
Chapters 2 and 6 discussed the origins of the assymetric approach to the recognition of disclosure of 
assets and liabilities in financial statements. Such an approach is symptomatic of the fundamental 
accounting principle of prudence. This concept has evolved to embrace more recently the principle that 
more evidence is required for the recognition of an asset than for the recognition of a liability. As a 
result of such fundamental concepts, Section 6.4 hypothesised that it may be expected that uncertainty 
regarding liabilities would cause more concern (and hence lower assessments of the performance and 
position of reporting entities and lower expressions of confidence in those assessments) than similar 
disclosures in the case of assets. Section 10.2 restated these hypotheses. 
Section 10.2 also outlined the research results in the context of the disclosure of uncertain liabilities. 
Section 10.3 then explored these reactions in some detail The direction (but not the extent) of such 
reaction was broadly similar to that noted in the case of assets (in chapter 9). TIle disclosures affected 
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the assessments and expressed confidence of groups L2 adversely, consistent with the suggestion in the 
disclosure of assets that the experimental subjects had a lower expectation of 'remote' than 5% to 8%. 
Hypotheses 113c and 113d were therefore supported. In the other disclosures (and hypotheses 113a, 
113b, 113e and 113f), however, the results were less clear with the reaction to the disclosures differing 
between reporting entities. This was again consistent with chapter 9 and consistent with the findings of, 
for example, Danos et af. (1989) who found dissimilar patterns of response between weak and strong 
reporting entities. As regards the effects of the disclosures on the level of consensus or 'intersubjective 
reality' as expressed in hypotheses H3g and H3h, the results on an overall level showed some support 
for these hypotheses although these results were not consistent across all reporting entities. 
Differences between the assessments of the reliability of financial statement items between the asset 
groupS and the liability groups were discussed further in Section 10.4. The overall assessment of 
financial statement items did not differ between these groups. However, all groups viewed assets as 
being less reliable than liabilities. This conflicts with the ASB's view and the generally accepted 
accounting principle that more evidence is required for the recognition of an asset than a liability. In 
particular, stock (which was the focus of disclosure in the asset groups) is viewed as significantly less 
reliable than accruals (which was the focus of disclosure in the liability groups). 111is particular finding 
has two implications: one specific to the findings of this research (and hypotheses Il3i to H3p), the 
second general to the framework of accounting. 
The implications specific to this research are that the differences in the assessments of the asset groups 
and the liabilities group do not arise from a view that assets should be more reliable and finn than 
liabilities. These differences may, in fact, arise from a heightened, reinforced concern for the reliability of 
assets. In other words, the disclosure of the uncertainty relating to assets may not necessarily wldermine 
the experimental subjects' faith in the reliability of assets but may selVe to reinforce their perception 
regarding the reliability (or relative lack of reliability) of assets. As a result, the findings supporting 
hypotheses H3i to H31 result from initial perceptions of the wlfeliability of assets relative to liabilities 
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rather than from any undennining of faith regarding the reliability of assets: the disclosure of the 
uncertain assets selVes to heighten the subjects' perceptions rather than undermine thent 
This finding has general implications for the accounting field also. It appears from the perceptions of the 
reliability of assets and liabilities expressed by the experimental subjects that the notion that assets are 
more reliable, requiring a higher threshold for recognition, is not be shared by the experimental subjects. 
It would appear, therefore, that this principle of asymmetric recognition is largely aspirational in the 
eyes of the experimental subjects. 
The notion of reliability, however, transcends recognition issues alone. Reliability includes 
representational faithfulness: that the item represents what it purports to represent (ASB, 1995b, p. 44). 
ReliabiIity therefore includes reliability of measurement also, in which case the experimental findings 
would support the ASB's focus on the measurement of assets (through, for example, its Discussion 
Paper on the Measurement of Tangible Fixed Assets (ASB, 1996» as well as their recognition. nle 
following chapter will analyse these findings in more detai~ looking in particular at any differences 
between assessments deriving from experience and gender. 
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11.1 INTRODUCfION 
Previous chapters (ie. chapters 8, 9 and 10) explored the effects of the disclosure of uncertainty on the 
assessments and confidence of the experimental subjects. This chapter discusses the effects of some of 
the characteristics of the experimental subjects on their assessments. As such, the chapter does not 
focus, as heretofore, on differences between groups but on the experimental subjects as a whole, 
categorising them in accordance.with several key characteristics and exploring differences between the 
assessments of these different categories. 
The chapter draws broadly on the findings of Birnberg (1976, p. 212) that 'the users or consumers of 
financial outputs are not a homogeneous class. They differ in their ability to handle abstract concepts, 
their expertise in the areas of accounting and financial analysis, the data sources open to them and their 
experience in dealing with the infonnation available for financial decisions'. More recently, Maines 
(1996, p. 98) has commented that 'research on external users has not thoroughly exploited the 
heterogeneity of user$ of financial reports'. This chapter attempts to address this absence in the 
particular context of this research. 
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The chapter is in three sections. The first section (Section 11.2) identifies the main characteristics of 
the experimental subjects, in particular those common characteristics which render statistical analysis 
meaningful. In particular, Section 11.2 draws on some of the characteristics of the experimental 
subjects identified in chapter 5. Section 11.3 discusses the literature with regard to the potential impact 
of these characteristics on assessments and confidence. Some research· hypotheses in this particular 
context are also established. The testing of these hypotheses is then discussed and some comparisons 
are made between the research results and the literature in the area. The third,and final section, Section 
11.4, sunnnarises the resUlts and draws some broad conclusions from the results. 
11.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS 
Chapter 5 discusses the experimental method and the characteristics of the experimental subjects in 
some detail To reiterate, there were 291 experimental subjects in aIL The first section of the 
experimental instrument (in the appendix to chapter 7) identified some broad characteristics of the 
experimental subjects. These included age, gender, educational background., workplace, employment 
experience and the use of financial statements during employment. The experimental subjects were 
also asked five multiple choice questions to determine their aptitude in the use of financial statements. 
They were also asked their opinion concerning the reliability of a number of financial statement items. 
The results of the 'aptitude test' are set out in Table 11.1. 
Table 11.1: Aptitude scores of experimental subjects 
SCORE ~BER 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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OF SUBJECTS 
1 
20 
55 
102 
96 
17 
221 
% 
7 
19 
35 
33 
~ 
221 
In the exploration of the experimental results in chapters 8 to 10, those experimental subjects who 
achieved less than 3 out of 5 of the aptitude questions correct (i.e. those scoring less than or equal to 
40%) were excluded from consideration. The number of experimental subjects excluded in that 
manner totalled 76, the remainder being 215. The experimental subjects were allocated randomly 
between the experimental groups. With few exceptions (these exceptions are dealt with in chapters 8 
to 10) there was no significant difference between the characteristics of the members of the 
experimental groups. These characteristics do not therefore represent potential extraneous variables on 
a widespread scale. 
This chapter will assess differences, if any, between subjects based on their scores in the aptitude test. 
The literature concerning the effects of ability (and I or what is termed in this contex1 'aptitude') on 
assessments and confidence will also be discussed (specifically in Section 11.3.2). It would appear 
reasonable to establish three categories of aptitude: low aptitude (0 - 2 inclusive) containing 75 
subjects, modal aptitude (the mode = 3) containing 102 subjects and high aptitude (4 and 5) containing 
113 subjects. Having established research hypotheses in this context in the Section 11.3, these 
hypotheses will be tested using comparison of means across these categories. As a by-product of these 
results, the consideration of aptitude will include the differing characteristics, if any, of the different 
categories of aptitude scores. 
As the exploration of the main body of the research (in chapter 8 to 10) excluded those scoring less 
than or equal to two out of five, for the pwposes of consistency, the remaining discussion in this 
chapter similarly excludes these subjects. Of the 215 cases remaining, their overall characteiTh1ics are 
as presented in Table 11.2 to 1 (9: 
Table 11.2: Gender of experimental subjects. 
GENDER 
Male 
Female 
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No. 
125 
90 
ill 
0/0 
58 
42 
Table 11.3: Current course attendance by experimental subjects. 
COURSE A TfENDANCE No. % 
None 77 36 
BA in Accounting&Finance 59 27 
MBS in Accounting 25 12 
MSc. in Investment&Treasury 33 15 
MBA ~ 10 
ill 
Table 11.4: Graduate composition of experimental subjects. 
GRADUATE OF No. % 
None 70 33 
BA in Accounting&Finance 29 13 
MBS in Accounting 58 27 
M Sc. in Investment&Treasury 18 8 
Other 40 19 
ill 
Ta ble 11.5: Professional membership of experimental subjects. 
- PROFESSIONAL BODIES No. % 
None 168 78 
Institute of Investment Management & 
Research 9 4 
Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Ireland 
Certified Institute of Management 
Accountants 
Other (mainly engineers) 
24 
2 
-11 
ill 
11 
1 
6 
Table 11.6: The use of financial statements by the experimental subjects. 
- USE OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS No. % 
Not in employment 91 42 
In employment - use financial statements 98 46 
In employment - do not use financial statements 26 12 
ill 
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Table 11.7: Age of the experimental subjects. 
AGE No. % 
Less than 20 44 20 
21- 25 131 61 
26 - 30 24 11 
31- 35 8 4 
36- 40 6 3 
Over 40 ~ I 
ill 
Table 11.8: Place of employment of experimental subjects 
EMPLOYMENT No. % 
None 91 42 
'Big 6' accountancy firm 36 17 
Other accountancy firm 12 6 
Financial institution 37 17 
Manufacturing firm 15 7 
Service organisation 6 3 
Other (mainly state I semi-state) ~ 8 
ill 
Table 11.9: Years in employment of the experimental subjects. 
YEARS IN EMPLO~IENT No. % 
None 91 42 
Less than one year 45 21 
Between one and two years 33 15 
Between two and three years 20 9 
More than three years (up to 23 years) 26 13 
ill 
Differences between those employed and not employed will be explored in the context of the use of 
financial statements (Table 11.8). Within the category of those employed it would appear reasonable 
to examine differences between those working in accountancy firms (48), financial institutions (37) and 
elsewhere (36). 
The main (and most populated) characteristics of experimental subjects are, therefore, gender, 
eroployment category"and experience, course attendance and use of financial statements. TIle main 
characteristics which this chapter will consider are gender and experience. TIle fonner is clearly 
. 
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defined. The latter will comprise the consideration of various factors such as employment category, 
experience and use of financial statements. There is some overlap between, for example, course 
attendance, employment and use of financial statements as all of those attending undergraduate courses 
were not in full-time employment (and not therefore classified as employed) and furthennore, did not, 
therefore, use financial statements as part of their employment. These differences will be teased out as 
part of the consideration of the effect of the experience of the experimental subjects. 
As the age of the experimental subjects is centred around the 21 - 25 age group (comprising 61 % of 
the experimental subjects), it is not proposed to examine the effects of age on the assessments or 
expressed confidence of the experimental subjects. For the same reason, professional membership will 
not be considered as only 12% of those participating were members ofa professional accowlting body 
with a further 4% being members of the llMR. Similarly, the current year of study of those attending 
courses of study will not be considered due to the relatively small numbers involved and the fact that 
such attendance comprises different milestones: the courses involved involve one, two and three years, 
part-time and full-time, undergraduate and post-graduate study. TIle consideration of years of study 
without the further consideration (and dilution of numbers) of those other characteristics would be 
potentially misleading and meaningless. Instead, the overall educational experience of subjects will be 
considered including the effect, if any, of courses of study pursued currently and in the past. 
11.3 EFFECTS OFTlIE CHARACTERISTICS OFTflE EXPERIMENTAL 
SUBJECTS 
11.3.1 Gender 
Several studies have been carried out on the effects of gender of ratings and self-confidence although 
none of these has been in the context of accounting tasks. These studies have been carried out in both 
laboratory and organisational contexts. FIrst, Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) in a comprehensive review 
of the literature referring to the laboratory setting at the time found that women have less positive' self-
referent' attitudes than men in differing contexts. In particular, they concluded that women have lower 
expectations of their~ own performance, value their abilities lower and also evaluate their own 
completed perfonnance lower than their male counterparts. 
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Deaux and Farris (1977) and Lenney (1977) drew similar conclusions. Deaux and Farris (1977) and 
Loodeberg, Fox and Puncochar (1994) concluded that men rated their own performance higher than 
women even when more objective scores of their performances were similar. Furthermore, Lenney 
(1977) argued that where feedback is absent or where social cues are salient, men tend to overestimate 
and women tend to ooderestimate their own performance. However, Lenney (1977) suggested that 
gender differences are unlikely to occur where the individuals in question are given clear information 
regarding their ability to perform the task. Similarly, a subsequent study (Lenney, Browning and 
Mitchell, 1980) found that gender differences in self-evaluation were less marked when performance 
criteria were clear. 
On the other hand, Snyder and Bruning (1979) and Shore and Thornton (1986) observed no gender-
based differences in self-ratings. Lundeberg et. al. (1994, p. 119) concluded, albeit in a narrow 
context, that there was 'scant evidence to support the notion that women have low confidence'. Shore 
and Thornton (1986) argue, however, that in organisational settings, various factors, such as feedback 
for example, may influence such ratings, rendering these findings consistent perhaps with those of 
Lenney (1977) in the laboratory setting. 
The literature therefore does not suggest a hypothesis regarding differences between the actual 
assessment of men and women. It does however suggest that the expressions of confidence of women 
in their assessment of the performance and position of the reporting entities will be lower than those of 
men. This is particularly so in the light of the ambiguous context described in chapter 7: that 'correct 
answers' are oosought and that little feedback is given in this research. Furthermore, it may be 
hypothesised (after Deaux and Farris, 1977) that this difference will be evident even when their 
assessments are similar. 
Tables 11.10 to 11.14 outline the research results categorised by gender. It may be noted that, in the 
case of the assessment of position and performance, the assessments of males and females are broadly 
similar. No consistent pattern emerges in the assessment of position. The assessment of the position of 
the stable company by females is, however, significantly higher (at a 95% level of confidence) than 
those of the males. ~ There is a similar difference (though not as significant) in the context of 
perfonnance. The reason for this is unclear, although perhaps it arises from the observation that STA 
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is one of the entities concerning which there is most disagreement (see chapters 8 to 10). TIlere is 110 
significant difference in the assessment of performance although the females' assessment of the 
petformance of the petformance of the reporting entities is consistently higher and higher overall than 
that of males. 
The differences in the expressions of confidence are more marked. The expressions of confidence by 
females are consistently lower than those of males in the case of both position and performance. TIley 
are significantly lower (at a 95% level of confidence) in the case of the petfonnance and position oftlle 
stable (STA) and no debt (ND) reporting entities. These findings are consistent with those in chapter 8 
in particular where the same reporting entities manifested significant differences in the assessments of 
the experimental subjects given the disclosure of uncertainty. More pertinently, however, these 
findings strongly support those elsewhere in the literature outlined above. This is the case even where 
the assessments of male and female are similar confirming the findings of Fennema and Shennan (1978) 
and Zukerman (1987) that 'even when female students achieve as well or better tllan their male 
counterparts, they tend to underestimate themselves'. (in Lundeberg et. al., 1994, p. 114). Lundeberg 
et. al. (1994, p. 120) comment that 'perhaps the question that should be pursued is not why women are 
less confident than men, but why in our culture we hesitate to recognise and admit uncertainty'. Such a 
question underpins the rationale of this research in the culture of accounting which introduced this area 
(chapters 2 and 3). 
Table 11.10: Mean assessment of position: gender. 
GENDER 
Male % change Female 
(n = 123) (n=89) 
High debt (HD) 42.2 -4% 40.5 
Declining (DEC) 47.1 +4% 49.2 
Stability (ST A) 57.9 +9%# 63.2 
High growth (HG) 55.6 +2% 56.5 
No debt (NO) 74.4 -2% 72.6 
55.4 +2% 56.4 
# = significant at a 95% level of confidence. 
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Table 11.11: Mean assessment ofperfonnance: gender. 
GENDER 
Male % change Female 
(n= 123) (n=89) 
High debt (HD) 43.6 43.6 
Declining (DEC) 44.0 +4% 45.6 
Stability (ST A) 56.3 +7% 60.0 
High growth (HG) 61.2 +5% 64.5 
No debt (NO) 67.2 +1% 68.0 
54.5 +3% 56.3 
Table 11.12: Mean confidence in assessment of position: gender. 
GENDER 
Male % change Female 
(n= 123) (n=89) 
High debt (HD) 66.3 -2% 64.9 
Declining (DEC) 66.0 -5% 62.8 
Stability (ST A) 68.0 -7%# 63.0 
High growth (HG) 67.1 -4% 64.4 
No debt (NO) 71.4 -7%# 66.6 
67.8 -5% 64.3 
# == significant at a 95% level of confidence. 
Table 11.13: Mean confidence in assessment ofperformance: gender. 
GENDER 
Male % change Female 
(n= 123) (n=89) 
High debt (HD) 64.4 -2% 63.3 
Declining (DEC) 65.5 -3% 63.4 
Stability (ST A) 66.7 -8%# 61.4 
High growth (HG) 66.0 -4% 63.6 
No debt (NO) 70.8 -8%# 64.8 
64.7 -2% 63.3 
# == significant at a 95°/. level of confidence. 
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11.3.2 Aptitude 
Several reviews of judgemental research m accounting (e.g. Joyce, 1989; Ashton, 1996) have 
commented on the growing need to assess the impact of ability on decision-making. As Schneider and 
Lopes (1986) comment in a broader context, 'who ... may suggest why?' The motivation for such 
suggestions involve using an understanding of the effects of different factors 011 decision-making to 
improve decision-making. As explained in chapter 7, the research instrument in this particular research 
does not indicate or contain a 'correct' answer. Therefore, the discussion that follows does not set out 
to suggest that ability or aptitude, as measured by the aptitude test in this experiment, leads to better 
answers. It merely explores whether it leads to different answers and differing expressions of 
confidence. 
Tables 11.14 to 11.17 set out the mean assessments of performance and position of the reporting 
entities by the different groups defined earlier in the chapter and their expressions of confidence in 
those assessments. The results indicate that the assessments and expressions of confidence generally 
increase with aptitude. There are some exceptions to this overall trend particularly in the assessment of 
position of lID by those with high aptitude (Table 11.14). The rankings of the position and 
perfonnance of the reporting entities remain broadly the same between the categories. Again the 
exception is the case of lID where those with high aptitude appear to have differentiated quite 
markedly between the performance and position of HD. The high aptitude group assess the 
perfonnance of lID as significantly healthier than do the other groups having assessed its position 
markedly lower relative to the other aptitude groups. As such, the high aptitude group assesses the 
perfonnance oflID as marginally higher than DEC. The profits of the latter are higher, but declining. 
This may indicate a greater attention to potential future trends in the assessment of performance by the 
high aptitude group. 
On the other hand, the low aptitude group assesses the performance of DEC as significantly lower than 
the other groups. This is in line with the overall trend towards lower assessment of position and (less 
consistently) performance by the low aptitude group. The lower assessment of position is mirrored 
(and perhaps driven) by lower confidence regarding these assessments. The expressions of confidence 
concerning the perfonbance of the reporting entities is also mirrored somewhat in the assessment of 
perfonnance. In the case of aptitude, therefore,'it would appear that lower aptitude effects confidence 
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in the assessment of position primarily and that that confidence also effects the assessment of position 
and penonnance, injecting a measure of caution where confidence is diminished. 
Table 11.14: Mean assessment of position: aptitude. 
APrITUDE SCORE 
Low "I. chan\:e Mode 
(Score <3/5) (Score 3/5) 
(n=75) (11=102) 
HipJt debt (lID) 41.7 +3% 43.0 
Declining (DEC) 43.1 +9% 47.1 
Stability (STA) 55.4 +8% 59.6 
HipJt grCMth (HG) 52.6 +7% 56.5 
No debt (ND) 68.4 +5% 71.7 
52.2 +6.;' 55.6 
Table 11.15: Mean assessment of performance: aptitude. 
APrITUDE SCORE 
Low "I. change Mode 
(Score <315) (Score 315) 
(11=102) 
40.7 
(n = 75) 
HipJt debt (lID) 44.2 
Declining (DEC) 38.2 
Stability (STA) 55.2 
HipJt gr~ (HG) 61.1 
No debt (ND) 67.7 
53.3 
# = sil:flificant at a 95"1. level of confidence.' 
-8"/0 
+18"/0# 45.3 
+5% 58.0 
60.9 
-3% 66.0 
+2% 54.2 
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% change 
-8% 
+3% 
+2% 
-2% 
+5% 
% change 
+13% 
-2% 
-1% 
+5% 
+5% 
+4% 
Hi\:h 
(Scor e> 315) 
(11=104) 
39.7 
48.5 
60.5 
55.2 
75.5 
55.9 
High 
(Score> 315) 
(1/=104) 
45.9 
44.2 
57.6 
63.9 
69.4 
56.2 
Table 11.16: Mean expression of confidence in assessment of position: aptitude. 
APTITUDE SCORE 
Low % change Mode 
(Score <3/5) (Score 3/5) 
(1/=102) 
66.7 
(n=75) 
Higp debt (lID) 63.0 +6% 
Declining (DEC) 61.5 +5% 64.7 
Stability (STA) 65.3 -1% 64.4 
Higp growth (HG) 64.7 +1% 65.6 
No debt (NO) 64.5 +6% 68.6 
63.S +3% 66.0 
II = significant at a 95"1. levef of confidence. 
% change 
-2% 
+5% 
+2% 
+3% 
+2% 
High 
(Score >3/5) 
(1/=104) 
65.1 
65.1 
67.7 
66.7 
70.6 
67.0 
Table 11.17: Mean expression of confidence in assessment ofperformance: aptitude. 
APTITUDE SCORE 
Low "I. change Mode 
(Score <3/5) (Score 315) 
(1/=/02) 
61.9 
(1/=75) 
High debt (lID) 61.8 
Declining (DEC) 61.5 +5% 64.4 
Stability (ST A) 65.0 -2% 63.5 
High growth (HG) 64.2 63.9 
No debt (NO) 63.3 +3% 65.4 
63.2 63.S 
II = significant at • 95% level of confidence. 
.;. change 
+7% 
+1% 
+4% 
+4% 
+80/011 
+5°/. 
Ingh 
(Score> 315) 
(1/=/03) 
66.2 
65.3 
65.9 
66.4 
70.8 
66.9 
Generally aptitude does not differ significantly based on the other characteristics of the experimental 
subjects. The most marked differences are between those in employment (mean score = 3.24) and 
those not in employment (mean score = 2.96) and between those attending (mean score = 3.0) and 
those not attending (mean score = 3.32) a course of study at Dell. Both of these differences are 
significant at a 95% level of confidence indicating, as suggested in chapter 7, that the aptitude test Ilmy 
have captured elements of the 'real' environment to a greater extent than the 'classroom' environment. 
There were no other significant differences in the aptitude scores recorded. 
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11.3.3 Experience 
This section examines the effect of experience on the assessments and confidence of subjects. It is not 
intended to define experience as a single factor or obsetvation or to filter a number of factors into one 
variable termed 'experience'. Experience will be defined as a number of separate characteristics which, 
together, present a picture of the effect of experience on the assessments and expressions of confidence 
of subjects. Experience in this instance may be classified as work experience and educational 
experience. The former may be defined by a number of factors including, for example, sector of 
employment, use of financial statements and years in employment. Educational experience includes 
attendance at a course of study and whether the subject is graduate or non-graduate. 
The discussion that follows will focus only on those areas where there are adequate numbers to render 
any differences between subjects based on these characteristics meaningful These areas comprise 
(under work experience) employment, use of financial statements as part of that employment and area 
of employment. WIth regard to educational experience, they comprise the issue of whether the subject 
is a graduate or not, whether he I she is currently attending a course of study and whether that course 
of study is a post-graduate or undergraduate course. Year of study will not be considered as all the 
subjects who were attending a course of study at the time of the experiments were in the third and final 
year of a full-time undergraduate course or in post-graduate programmes of one (full-time) or two 
years (part-time) duration. Any differences between these groups will be adequately captured by the 
undergraduate I post-graduate dichotomy. 
11.3.3.1 Employment . 
Tables 11.18 to 11.21 in the appendix to this chapter present the experimental results categorised 
betWeen subjects in employment and not in employment and, of those in employment, those using (not 
using) financial statements as part of that employment. The assessment of position and perfonnance 
of those not in employment is generally higher than those in employment and significantly higher (at a 
95% and 90% level of confidence) in the case of a number of reporting entities (lID and DEC). 
Conversely, the level of confidence expressed by the subjects not in employment is consistently and (in 
some instances) significantly lower than the level of confidence expressed by those in employment. 
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By way of explanation of these findings, the prior expectations of position and perfonnance of 
reporting entities may differ between those in employment and those not in employment. In particular, 
the experience and, hence, expectations of the extent of failing films in particular may differ. 111 is 
would be particularly true oflID and DEC, both firms whose position and perfonnance are assessed as 
marginal by both groups. For example, the effect of such expectations is advanced by Lev (1974, p. 
141) as one of the weaknesses of a study by Beaver (1966) regarding corporate failure as, he argues, 
prior expectations colour judgement regarding corporate failure. 
Of those in employment, the mean assessment ofposition of those who do not use financial statements 
is lower overall and significantly lower in the case of lID and HG than those who do use financial 
statements as part of their employment. On the other hand, the assessment of performance differs 
significantly only with respect to STA and in this instance, the assessment of those not using financial 
statements is significantly higher. There is little difference between the confidence expressed by these 
two groupS in their assessments. 
These findings can be further explored by observing the nature of the employment of those in 
employment: those who do not use financial statements are predominantly in sectors other than 
aCCOunting firms (96% of those subjects employed in accounting firms use financial statements as part 
of their employment against 66% in the other categories). 
Further analysis of those in employment is presented in Tables 11.22 to 11.25 in the appendix. These 
are classified as those working in accounting firms (48), those in financial institutions (37) and those 
working elsewhere (36, mainly iIi manufacturing and service organisations). Those working in financial 
institutions generally (with the exception of the position of STA) assess the performance and position 
of the reporting entities less favourably than those working in accounting firms. This is significant in 
the case of the position ofHD and DEC and the performance ofSTA In contrast, those working in 
financial institutions view ST A's position as significantly better than those working in accounting firms. 
This appears to be primarily because those working in financial institutions distinguish sharply between 
the position and performance ofSTA viewing its position vel)' favourably (ranked third) relative to its 
performance (ranked fourth). This would appear to contradict the view proposed by Ronen and Sadan 
(1981) and Dye (1988) regarding the importance of growth in the assessment of performance and 
con finn the findings of chapter 8 where stable growth is devalued. These findings suggest that this 
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may be particularly so in the case of those working in financial institutions. 1l1ere is no significant or 
consistent difference between the confidence of those in financial institutions and those in accowlling 
firms. 
There are further nwnerous and significant differences between the assessments of those employed in 
financial institutions and those employed elsewhere. Differences in the assessments of perfonnance and 
position are quite inconsistent and significant in the case of the position of HD and STA and the 
performance of STA Once more differences or disagreement between the employment categories 
appear to be focused on lID and STA There also appear to be significant differences between those 
employed in accounting firms and others with regard to the positions of DEC (-13%) and HG (-12%). 
These findings suggest that, as discussed in chapters 4 and 6, the perception of the reality of a 
reporting entity's position and performance can differ significantly given the same infOlmation (Hines, 
1988) and, furthermore, that that reality is strongly informed by the background and experience of the 
readers of the financial statements. 
The findings are consistent with the findings of Firth (1978, p. 69) who also found that there were 
significant differences between the assessments of 'finance directors and auditors, on the one hand, and 
financial analysts and bank loan officers on the other'. This may be for a nwnber of reasons. First, as 
Chandra (1974) commented (p. 741) 'accountants generally do not value infonnation for equity 
investment decisions the same way as security analysts do'. He suggests that tlns may be due to a lack 
of communication between the two groups, a time lag between the identification of needs by analysts 
and their adoption by accountants and a (p. 69) 'tendency by accountants to adhere to the established 
order'. 
Second, as Chesley (1986) points out the interpretation of words such as likely by preparers and users 
of financial statements may differ. Chesley and Wier (1985) found that these differences persisted 
between employment groups. In the case of their researc~ these groups comprised the accounting and 
legal professions. Hence, the understanding of remote and the perception of its subsequent clarification 
may differ between those employed in accounting firms and those in financial institutions. 
A more fundamental reason in this case, however, may be that the assessment of performance and 
position carries a different meaning for both groups .. Those in financial institutions may be interested in 
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such assessments as a means to decide investment and I or loan decisions. 11lOse in accounting finlls 
(mainly involved in auditing) may perfonn such assessments as part ofthe consideration of audit risk. 
analytical review and going concern. Both the conceptual tests and the threshold of materiality is 
different in both cases, with that for loan commitment or investment being lower (more sensitive) than 
a going concern or analytical review threshold. By tins logic, those employed in financial institutions 
are more likely to downgrade reporting entities with lllgh debt or declining growth relative to those in 
accounting firms. The one exception is the case of STA where those employed in financial institutions 
appear to value stability relative to those in accOlUlting firms who may view such stability as a signal of 
income-smoothing. 
The expression of confidence of those employed in employment otller tllan in accOlUlting finns and 
financial institutions is consistently and in some instances significantly lower titan the confidence 
expressed by those employed in accounting firms and financial institutions. This is influenced to a 
certain extent by the extent to which those in financial institutions and accounting finns are familiar 
with accounting information, particularly with additional conceptual infonnation such as that disclosed 
in these experiments. O'Connor (1989, p. 157) found evidence that 'familiarity with the topic of 
interest' provides 'some insight into the variation in calibration of expressions of confidence in the 
accuracy of human judgement'. As argued by Bradley (1996) 'familiarity breeds confidence'. Such 
views are supported by Mautz (1990) in a study concerning inflation-adjusted disclosures (also 
discussed in chapter 4) when he suggests (p. 289) that lower confidence may result from unfamiliality 
with the information disclosed. Mautz comments that such a suggestion requires furtlter research. To 
the extent that this research represents a limited, if incidentaL extension of Mautis research and that of 
O'Connor, it offers some support for such suggestions regarding the role of familiarity in fonning 
confidence. 
Part of the consideration of experience includes age. Tables 11.26 to 11.29 in the appendix present the 
assessments and expressions of confidence of the experimental subjects classified by age. TIlcre 
appears to be little discenuble or significant pattern or difference across the age groups. Furthermore, 
tile numbers involved categorised by age are lllghly-skewed (with over 60% of the subjects between 21 
and 25 years of age). There appears little pattern and little trend based on age. Age is therefore 
considered only to the extent that it appears to have little influence and to the extent that more detailed 
consideration does not add value to the consideration. of experience. 
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11.3.3.2 Education 
The use of student subjects in experiments concerning judgments in accowlting has been discussed by 
several authors (e.g. Dickhaut, Livingstone and Watson, 1972; Abdel-K11alik. 1974 and Ashton and 
Kramer, 1980). As outlined in chapter 5, such discussions appear to discourage the use of student 
subjects. As studies of judgment in accoWlting are context specific, the literature suggests in particular 
that the judgment processes and values of students do not replicate or represent those oE: for example, 
auditors, accountants, bank lenders or investment analysts. 
Nevertheless in a wide-ranging swvey of the literature, Snowball (1986) fOWld that students 
participated in 70% of the sample studies (published in particular in The Accounting Review, The 
Journal of Accounting Research and Accounting, Organizations and Society). TIle reasons for such 
findings are explored in Section 5.4.3. This chapter, however, discusses whether the decision 
outcomes (as opposed to the processes) of participants differ based on their educational status. In 
particular, differences, if any, in the assessments and expressions of confidence of those attending 
courses of study in DeU will be compared with those who are not (Tables 11.30 to 11.33 in the 
appendix). A further exploration will consider differences between graduates and non-graduates in the 
same context (Tables 11.34 to 11.37 in the appendix). The existence (or not) of such differences may 
be interesting in the light of LWldeberg et al. 's (1994) tentative finding that graduates were gcnerally 
more confident than Wldergraduates. 
As may be noted in Tables 11.30, 11.31, 11.32 and 11.33, the only significant difference betwecn the 
assessment of performance and position of the reporting entities is with respect to BD. Such a 
difference (among others) was also observed when comparing those in employment with those 110t in 
eroployment (Table 11.18). A substantial percentage of(54%) of those attending a course of study in 
DeU were not in employment. The explanations for the difference in assessment of the position ofHD 
may therefore be similar to that offered in the context of the employment of the subjects (i.e. a greater 
awareness by those in employment of the implications of high debt). On an overall basis, however, 
eroployment status r~ther than educational status would appear to create differences between the 
assessments of subjects to a greater and more numerous extent than educational status. 
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More consistent and significant differences may be fOlmd in the confidence expressed by the subjects 
based on their educational status. Those not currently attending a course of study in DCU expressed a 
consistently and significantly higher confidence in their assessments than those who are attending a 
course of study at DCU. Further, educational status is a more significant and consistent 'driver' of 
confidence than any of the other variables discussed in tins research. 
Further exploration oftlUs finding through Tables 11.34 to 11.37 embraces whether tile subjects are 
graduates: all of tltose not attending a course of study at DCU are graduates while 46% of those 
attending a course of study at DCU are graduates. Intuitively, it may be til at graduation and / or 
completion of a course of study may create confidence and tIlat this would explain some of the 
differences observed between tltose attending / not attending a course of study. While Tables 11.36 
and 11.37 illustrate consistent differences between tlte confidence of graduates / non-graduates, these 
differences are not significant and not as significant as those found based on course attendance. 
Furthermore, a further breakdown of the composition of those attending courses of study between 
IDOse who are graduates and non-graduates (in Tables 11.38 and 11.39 in tile appendix) reveals no 
significant difference in confidence between graduates and non-graduates who are attending a course 
of study. 
It would tlterefore appear that the main influence on confidence in this context is course attendance and 
not graduation. In other words, the influence of attendance outweighs that of graduation. Attendance 
at a course of study diminishes confidence even among those who have already graduated. Hence 
while tlte literature is largely unsupported concerning differences between the decision outputs of 
student / non-student subjects, there is a significant difference between the confidence felt by student 
and non-student subjects in those decision outputs. 
1 4 CONCLUSION 1 • 
11lls chapter set out to explore differing influences on the assessments of the reporting entities and the 
expressions of confidence. TIlcse influences were based on the characteristics of the experimental 
subjects as gleaned in the research instrument. TIle chapter discussed tIlese characteristics in three 
broad categories in Sections 11.3.1, 11.3.2 and 11.3.3 resectively: gender, aptitude (as measured by the 
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research instrument) and experience. The last of these comprised an amalgam of characteristics 
including category of employment, use of financial statements and current educational status. 
A number of these factors proved influential with regard to the overall assessments and expressions of 
confidence of experimental subjects. With respect to gender, females were significantly and 
consistently less confident than their male counterparts. nlis was consistent with the other studies 
which found women generally less confident than men. TIus difference in confidence concemed 
assessments which did not differ significantly. Hence, although the assessments of position and 
performance by men and women were broadly similar, nevertheless, women were less confident of 
those assessments. 
Aptitude did not appear to be a consistently significant influence on assessment or confidence. TIlOse 
with a higher aptitude appeared more confident in their assessments (although not significantly so). 
This is intuitive and is also consistent with the literature in the area of ability and its influence on 
confidence. As noted, several items were considered in the exploration of experience. The most 
marked influence appeared to be, first, the effect of employment category on assessments and, 
secondly, the effect of course attendance on confidence. The chapter discussed the reasons for such 
findings in the light of this and other research. 
There were a number of other, more isolated differences, between the categories of subjects taking part 
in the research. These appeared to revolve in particular around the reporting entities where there was 
disagreement based on the disclosures of information which was at the heart of the research. 11le 
following chapter summarises 'the implications of this particular finding with regard to differing 
reporting entities. In broad terms, the implications oftllls chapter appear to confirm the comments of 
Denner (1973, p. 512) that 'it appears that information usage is an idiosyncratic or subjectively 
determined process', and that that detennination is distilled by gender and elements of experience. 
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Appendix to Chapter 11 
Tables 11.18 to 11.39 
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Table 11.18: Mean assessment of position: those not in employment I in employment I using financial statements. 
In employment 
Not in In Not Use 
employment employment use FS FS 
(n=9J) % change (n=J24) (n=26) % change (n=98) 
• 
High debt (HD) 44.7 -13%# 39.0 31.8 +28%# 40.9 
Declining (DEC) 50.7 -9%# 46.0 46.0 46.0 
Stability (ST A) 62.1 -6%@ 58.6 59.0 -1% 58.5 
High growth (HG) 55.5 +1% 56.3 40.8 +48%# 60.4 
No debt (NO) 73.8 73.S 71.0 +5% 74.2 
57.4 -5% 54.7 49.7 +13% 56.0 
# ~ significant at a 95% level of confidence. 
@= significant at a 90% level of confidence. 
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Table 11.19: Mean assessment of performance: those not in employment I in employment I using financial statements. 
In employment 
Not in In Not Use 
employment employment use FS FS 
(n=9J) % change (n=J24) (n=26) % change (n=98) 
• 
High debt (lID) 45.4 -7% 42.3 43.5 -3% 42.0 
Declining (DEC) 48.8 -14%# 41.8 49.0 -19%# 39.9 
Stability (ST A) 59.5 -2% 58.5 56.0 +6% 59.2 
High growth (HG) 61.7 +2% 63.2 59.6 +8% 64.2 
No debt (NO) 66.3 +3% 68.6 71.8 -6% 67.7 
56.3 _20/0 54.9 56.0 _3% 54.6 
# := significant at a 95% level of confidence. 
@= significant at a 90% level of confidence. 
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Table 11.20: Mean expression of confidence in assessment ofposition: those not in employment I in employment I using financial statements. 
In employment 
Not in In Not Use 
employment employment use FS FS 
(n=9J) % change (n=J24) (n=26) % change (n=98) 
High debt (HD) 62.1 +10%# 68.4 70.6 -4% 67.8 
Declining (DEC) 62.4 +6%@ 66.3 65.9 +1% 66.4 
Stability (ST A) 64.0 +5% 67.3 64.2 +6% 68.1 
High growth (HG) 64.0 +5% 67.4 69.3 -3% 66.9 
No debt (NO) 68.2 +3% 70.3 71.9 -3% 69.9 
64.1 +6 % 67.9 68.4 67.8 
# = significant at a 95% level of confidence. 
@= significant at a 90% level of confidence. 
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Table 11.21: Mean expression of confidence in assessment of performance: those not in employment J in employmentl using financial statements 
In employment 
Not in In Not Use 
employment employment use FS FS 
(n=9J) % change (n=J24) (n=26) % change (n=98) 
High debt cHo) 59.9 +12%# 66.9 68.8 -3% 66.5 
Declining (DEC) 62.2 +7%@ 66.4 65.4 +2% 66.7 
Stability (ST A) 60.7 +11%# 67.3 67.4 -1% 66.7 
High growth (HG) 62.7 +6%# 66.7 66.1 +1% 66.9 
No debt (ND) 66.5 +5% 69.5 68.8 +1% 69.7 
62.4 +8% 67.4 67.3 67.3 
# = significant at a 95% level of confidence. 
@= significant at a 90% level of confidence. 
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Table 11.22: Mean assessment of position by employment category. 
E~LOYMENTCATEGORY 
Accounting <%,> Financial <%.> Other 
Institution 
(n=48) (n=37) (n=38) 
High debt (HO) 44.7 -19%# 36.2 +11%# 40.1 
Declining (DEC) 49.5 -11%# 44.0 -2% 43.4 
Stability (STA) 57.5 +120/0# 64.5 -160/0# 54.4 
High growth (RG) 59.5 -5% 56.2 -7% 52.5 
NQdebt(ND) 74.0 -1% 73.1 73.5 
57.0 -4% 54.8 -4% 52.8 
# = significant at a 950/0 level of confidence. 
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Table 11.23: Mean assessment of~erformance b:y category of employment. 
E~LOYMffiNTCATEGORY 
Accounting <0/0> Financial <0/0> Other 
Institution 
(n=48) (n=37) (n=38) 
• High debt (lID) 42.4 -9% 38.6 +19%# 46.0 
Declining (DEC) 44.8 -120/0# 39.3 +3% 40.3 
Stability (STA) 55.7 +4% 58.1 -3% 56.4 
High growth (HG) 64.4 -3% 62.2 +1% 62.9 
No debt (ND) 69.5 -5% 66.3 +4% 69.2 
55.4 -5% 52.9 +4% 55.0 
# = significant at a 95% level of confidence. 
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Table 11.24: Mean expression of confidence of assessment of position by category of employment. 
EMPLO~aNTCATEGORY 
Accounting <0/0> Financial <Ofc~ Other 
Institution 
(n=48) (n=37) (n=38) 
High debt (lID) 69.3 -1% 68.6 -2% 67.1 
Declining (DEC) 67.1 +3% 68.8 -8% 63.1 
Stability (STA) 69.0 -3% 66.8 -1% 65.8 
High growth (HG) 67.8 +5% 71.1 -11%# 63.3 
No debt(ND) 74.0 -1% 73.1 73.5 
69.4 69.7 -5% 66.6 
295 
Table 11.25: Mean expression of confidence of assessment of performance by category of employment. 
EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 
Accounting <0/0> Financial <0/0> Other 
Institution 
(n=48) (n=37) (n=38) 
High debt (lID) 69.2 -5% 65.4 65.7 
Declining (DEC) 68.1 68.3 -8% 62.5 
Stability (STA) 68.5 +2% 69.6 -9% 63.4 
High growth (HG) 67.1 +1% 67.6 -3% 65.5 
No debt(ND) 69.0 +3% 71.3 -4% 68.4 
68.4 68.4 -5% 65.1 
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Table 11.26: Mean assessment of position: age 
AGE 
<=20 21·25 26·30 31·35 36·40 >40 
(/1=44) (/1=130) (/1=24) (/1=6) (/1=6) (/1=2) 
High debt (lID)' 47.5 38 . .5 42.7 66.7 40.0 15.0 
Declining (DEC) 51.1 47.7 48.8 33.8 41.7 65.0 
Stability (STA) 60.7 60.9 57 . .5 46.2 70.8 50.0 
High growth (HG) .55.7 57.2 51.7 52.5 58.3 40.0 
No debt (NO) 71.4 74.7 73.3 62.5 85.8 65.0 
57.3 55.8 54.8 52.3 59.3 47.0 
Table 11.27: Mean assessment of performance: age. 
AGE 
<=20 21·25 26·30 31·35 36·40 >40 
(/1=44) (/1=130) (/1=24) (/1=6) (/1=6) (/1=2) 
High debt (lID) 47.7 42.3 39.6 61.7 41.7 40.0 
D~"Clining (DEC) 46.9 45.3 43.0 36.3 35.0 40.0 
Stability (ST A) .58.7 .58.6 52.9 .51.3 66.7 40.0 
High grOYoth (HG) 61.1 62.7 61.7 6.5.0 67 . .5 90.0 
No debt (ND) 6.5.2 68.6 68.1 .58.8 75.0 40.0 
.5.5.9 .5.5 . .5 .53.1 .54.6 .57.2 .50.0 
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Tab\e 11.1S! Mean assessment of confidence in position: age. 
AGE 
<=20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 >40 
(n=44) (n = 130) (n=24) (n=6) (n=6) (n=2) 
High debt (lID) 59.9 67.2 66.0 75.0 56.7 80.0 
Declining (DEC) 60.8 66.0 64.8 57.5 70.8 75.0 
• Stability (ST A) 61.0 67.8 64.6 56.3 80.0 60.0 
High gTO\\1b (HO) 62.3 66.2 70.6 61.3 78.3 60.0 
No debt (ND) 65.5 70.0 72.7 61.3 76.7 85.0 
61.9 67.4 67.7 62.3 72.5 72.0 
Table 11.29: Mean assessment of confidence in performance: age. 
AGE 
<=20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 >40 
(n = 44) (n = 130) (n=24) (n=6) (n=6) (n=I) 
High debt (lID) 58.4 65.8 61.5 76.3 60.0 50.0 
Declining (DEC) 60.3 66.4 66.5 57.5 64.2 40.0 
Stability (ST A) 60.5 64.8 66.5 68.8 78.3 40.0 
High gTO\\1h (HO) 62.5 64.7 69.6 63.8 72.5 70.0 
No debt (ND) 65.3 68.3 70.4 70.0 76.7 70.0 
61.4 66.0 66.9 67.3 70.3 54.0 
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Table 11.30: Mean assessment of position: course attendance. 
Yes 
(n=129) 
High debt (HD) 43.8 
Declining (0 EC) 48.3 
Stability (STA) 59.8 
High growth (HG) 54.8 
No debt (NO) 74.0 
56.1 
#::= significant at a 95 % level of confidence. 
COURSE ATTENDANCE 
% change 
-13%# 
-2% 
+1% 
+5% 
-1 % 
-1% 
Table 11.31: Mean assessment ofEerformance: course attendance. 
- COURSE ATTENDANCE 
Yes % change 
(n=129) 
High debt (HD) 45.2 -9% 
Declining (0 EC) 45.7 -5% 
Stability (STA) 57.1 +3% 
High growth (HG) 62.7 
No debt (NO) 67.5 
55.6 -2% 
# = significant at a 95 % level of confidence. 
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No 
(n=83) 
37.9 
47.5 
60.6 
57.8 
73.1 
55.4 
No 
(n=83) 
41.0 
43.2 
59.0 
62.4 
67.7 
54.7 
Table 11.32: Mean expression of confidence in assessment of position: course attendance. 
High debt (HD) 
Declining (DEC) 
Stability (STA) 
High growth (HG) 
No debt (NO) 
Yes 
(n=J29) 
62.5 
62.0 
63.3 
63.3 
68.4 
63.9 
# = significant at a 95 % level of confidence. 
COURSE A ITENDANCE 
% change 
+13%# 
+11%# 
+11 %# 
+11%# 
+4% 
+10% 
No 
(n=83) 
70.7 
68.8 
70.0 
70.0 
71.0 
70.1 
Table 11.33: Mean expression of confidence in assessment of~erformance: course attendance. 
COURSE A ITENDANCE 
Yes % change No 
(n=129) (n=83) 
High debt (HO) 60.4 +15%# 69.4 
Declining (DEC) 61.5 +13%# 69.4 
Stability (STA) 60.1 +18%# 71.1 
High growth (HG) 62.6 +14%# 68.8 
No debt (NO) 67.4 +3% 69.6 
62.4 +12% 69.7 
# = significant at a 95 % level of confidence. 
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Table 11.34: Mean assessment of EO sit ion: Braduate / non-Braduate. 
GRADUATE 
Yes % change No 
(n=145) (n=70) 
High debt (HD) 38.9 +19%# 46.4 
Declining(D EC) 46.8 +7% 50.3 
Stability (ST A) 59.5 +3% 61.3 
High growth (HG) 57.2 -6% 53.6 
No debt (ND) 73.6 73.7 
55.2 +3% 57.1 
# = significant at a 95 % level of confidence. 
Table 11.35: Mean assessment of performance: waduate / non-waduate. 
- GRADUATE 
Yes % change No 
(n=145) (n=70) 
High debt (HD) 41.2 +17%# 48.4 
Declining (DEC) 43.4 +9% 47.4 
stability (STA) 58.7 -4% 56.2 
High growth (HG) 63.7 -5% 60.4 
No debt (ND) 67.0 +3% 68.7 
54.8 +3% 56.2 
# = significant at a 95 % level of confidence. 
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Table 11.36: Mean expression of confidence in assessment of position: graduate / non-graduate. 
Yes 
(n=145) 
High debt (HD) 66.9 
Declining (DEC) 65.4 
Stability (STA) 66.9 
High growth (HG) 66.7 
No debt (NO) 70.1 
67.2 
# = significant at a 95 % level of confidence. 
GRADUATE 
% change 
-5% 
-3% 
-4% 
-3% 
-3% 
-4% 
No 
(n=70) 
63.3 
63.3 
63.9 
64.4 
68.1 
64.6 
Table 11.37: Mean expression of confidence in assessment of performance: graduate / non-
~aduate 
Yes 
(n = 145) 
High debt (HD) 65.1 
Declining (DEC) 65.4 
Stability (STA) 65.3 
High growth (HG) 65.3 
No debt (NO) 69.0 
66.0 
GRADUATE 
% change 
-5% 
-3% 
-4% 
-1 % 
-3% 
-3% 
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No 
(n=70) 
61.6 
63.2 
62.9 
64.4 
66.7 
63.8 
Table 11.38: Mean expression of confidence in assessment of position: graduate / non-graduate 
attending a course of study. 
GRADUATE ATTENDING A COURSE OF STUDY 
High debt (HD) 
Dedining(DEC) 
Stability (STA) 
High growth (HG) 
No debt (ND) 
Yes 
(n=6J) 
62.3 
60.9 
63.6 
63.1 
69.4 
63.9 
% change 
+3% 
-1 % 
+1% 
-3% 
No 
(n=68) 
62.6 
62.9 
63.0 
63.5 
67.4 
63.9 
Table 11.39: Mean expression of confidence in assessment of performance: graduate / non-
uaduate attending a course of study. 
High debt (HD) 
Ded ining(D EC) 
Stability (STA) 
High growth (HG) 
No debt (ND) 
GRADUA TE ATTENDING A COURSE OF STUDY 
Yes 
(n=6J) 
59.5 
60.7 
58.2 
61.5 
68.8 
61.7 
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% change 
+3% 
+2% 
+6% 
+3% 
-4% 
+2% 
No 
(n=68) 
61.1 
62.2 
61.9 
63.5 
66.0 
62.9 
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12.1 INTRODUCTION 
11ris thesis explored the implications of uncertainty for financial reporting and, in particular, how 
uncertainty might be disclosed in financial statements. In doing so, it drew on suggestions or 
requirements currently in the domain offinancial accounting standard-setting in the UK and Ireland 
and in the US. As such the conclusions of the thesis have implications for policy-setting in the 
realm of accounting standards. This chapter, the concluding chapter of the thesis, has among its 
themes the identification and exploration of those implications. 
As noted in chapter I, the thesis evolved from a consideration of the relevance and importance of 
uncertainty to financial reporting (in chapter 2) through an exploration of the literature in the areas 
of decision-making and accounting (in chapters 3 and 4) to the concretised of the research (in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7) and a discussion of the research results (in chapters 8 to 11). 
11ris chapter is in three main sections reflecting the development of the thesis. Section 12.2 outlines 
the development of the conceptual background to the research. In particular, this section discusses 
the main contnbution of chapters 2 to 4 to the evolution of the central tenets of the thesis. These 
central tenets are implemented in chapters 5 to 7. Section 12.3 addresses the limitations raised by 
the manner of that implementation. From such limitations grow some further research 
opportunities. These research opportunities are also explored in this section. 
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The concepts and framework of the research are moulded substantially by contemporary 
suggestions in accounting policy and the research is focused to a great extent by those suggestions. 
As a result, the conceptual framework of the research lays the foundations for the consideration of 
uncertainty in the context of accounting choice and policy-making. The concluding section, 
Section 12.4 explores the main implications of the thesis findings for accowlting policy and for the 
development of accounting practice. These implications are discussed in the context of the nature 
of financial statements and the disclosure of uncertainty in such financial statements. 
12.2 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Chapter 2 argued that uncertainty is central to financial reporting. This is particularly so given a 
view of financial reporting which increasingly portrays the objectives of financial statements as the 
provision of 'information about the financial position, performance and financial adaptability of an 
enterprise that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions' (ASB, 1995b, p. 
35). Users are characterised as seeking 'economic relevance' (Tweedie and Whittington, 1990). 
Such relevance is fashioned in an increasingly uncertain world. 
The chapter then went on to identifY the needs of the wide range of users identified by the ASB in 
its draft Statement of Principles (ASB, 1995b). A common component of such a consideration is 
that users' needs are influenced, to varying degrees and in different contexts, by uncertainty. 
Connnenting that while financial statements existed because of uncertainty they were also 
constrained by uncertainty, a number of suggestions were then explored regarding how financial 
statements might better reflect uncertainty. These suggestions were contemporary and historical, 
cautious and radical, pragmatic and conceptual The research drew on more contemporary, 
pragmatic approaches to the disclosure of uncertainty to make concrete the examination of the 
effects of the disclosure of WI certainty on decision-making. To be true to their objectives, financial 
statements, it was argued, need to include an indication of the uncertain world. 
Chapter 3 traced the development of theories of decision-making under uncertainty. It drew, in 
particular, on more recent theories such as those of Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) and Kahnemall 
and Tversky (1979) to illuminate the influence of wlcertain contexts on the decision-making of 
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individuals. These theories evolved in the context of individual decision-making. Such theories 
introduced, in particular, the need for 'closure' or inference in the face of incomplete infonnation. 
This need became a foundation of some of the hypotheses (particularly concerning the variability of 
assessments) in later parts of the thesis. The institutional context of decision-making was also 
considered before the chapter concluded by emphasising the importance of uncertainty to decision-
roaking and the potential influences of information regarding uncertainty on decision-making. 
Chapter 4 explored the literature regarding decision-making in financial accounting. 111 is 
exploration was distinct from that in chapter 2, which considered alternative approaches to the 
disclosure of uncertainty. Chapter 4 began, however, by drawing on chapter 2 to develop a 
specific, narrower framework of disclosure. This framework comprised on the one hand the 
disclosure of the uncertain nature of financial statements and, on the other, the increased and 
increasing disclosure of specific estimates within the financial statements. 
Such estimates constitute two elements: the uncertainty of occurrence and the uncertainty of 
outcome. The research sought to examine disclosure of more information concerning these 
estimates. Furthennore, drawing on conventions concerning d1e evidence required to recognise 
assets and liabilities (for examples that the recognition of assets requires more evidence than the 
estimation of liabilities (ASB, 1995a, 1995b and 1997b), part of the research objective was to 
consider any differences in the assessments of decision-makers in the light of an wlcertain asset 
(potentially obsolete stock) and, separately, an uncertain liability (potential crystallisation of a 
guarantee). 
The chapter concluded by identifYing the characteristics of the thesis which rendered it Wlique: for 
example, its contemporary, policy focus, its consideration of differences in the perceptions of 
uncertain assets and liabilities, and its consideration of what chapter 3 identified as 'intersubjective 
reality'. 
Chapters 3 and 4 helped in the identification of a behaviouraL experimental approach to the 
research in chapter 5. The identification of the framework within which the research question 
would be approached illlowed the establishment of specific research hypofueses in chapter 6. 111Cse 
in turn fashioned the research instrument developed in chapter 7. 
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Having outlined the manner in which the research is constructed both with regard to the research 
concepts and the framework within which such concepts are developed, it is worth noting that 
there are, however, a number of limitations to the research. These limitations constrain the 
application of the research and suggest the need, in some instances, for further research. TIle 
following section discusses these limitations, the manner in which they are addressed and the 
potential of further research before the final section identifies the main findings of the research and 
their implications for accounting policy-makers. 
12.3 LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF TIlE RESEARCH 
Baving embarked on research in the general area of accounting and uncertainty, the manifestation 
of this research is relatively narrow. The strength of experimental research is the level of control 
which can be exercised. This is also its weakness as, very often, the exercise of such control 
requires a narrow focus. This leads to several doubts regarding the manner in which the research 
developed. The discussion of these limitations encompasses the broader concerns of the research. 
These limitations are in certain instances mitigated by the objectives and design of the research. 
They also offer opportunities for further development of research in the area of uncertainty. 
The first limitation concerns the financial statements supplied to participants. One of the aims of 
recent accounting standards has been to encourage a focus on a broad range of information 
available within financial statements. Users take a broad, non-myopic view offinancial statements. 
Surveys by, for example, Lee and Tweedie (1977 and 1981) and Arnold and Moizer (1984) have 
found that users do not rely simply 011 the profit and loss account and balance sheet. Yet the 
research instrument proposed provides only a profit and loss account and balance sheet and the 
selected disclosures. tittle background information and no annual report is provided. 
Much of the previous accounting work which has used experiments has taken this approach (e.g. 
EliaS, 1972; Hendricks, 1976; Birnberg and Slevin, 1976; Libby, 1979a and 1979b and Chen and 
SUJllll1ers, 1981). It is like establishing a bridgehead on a narrow front before moving beyond to 
wider fields. Utterer (1965) suggests that decision-makers perceive infonnation by selecting from 
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the broad infonnation set. This selection is influenced, for example, by the e"'.'pelicnce of the 
decision-maker. The broader the information set that is provided, therefore, the greater the 
variation that may occur not because of the information itself: but because of its variety and the 
experience of the decision-makers. A focus on a narrow information set limits the potential for 
variation in such selection mechanisms. This does not necessarily mean that research ends having 
established a bridgehead: having found that the bridgehead is tenable, further research may 
legitimately expand beyond its limited boundaries. 
The second limitation concerns the subjects involved in the research, their representativeness and, 
hence, the external validity of the research. This limitation was discussed in some detail in Section 
5.4.3. In this research, the experimental subjects were not homogeneous but constituted subjects 
with differing experiences and characteristics as do the users of financial statements descnbed in 
chapter 2. Chapter 11 explored the variances between the performance of participants and finds 
that this variance is only significant in the case of the effects of gender and current educational 
status on their expressions of confidence only. Little difference was perceived in the assessments 
of the different participating groups. Thus the nature of the subjects and their random allocation to 
the experimental groups serves to limit the external invalidity of the research while not weakening 
its internal validity. 
The third limitation is related to the second. As outlined in chapter 5, the disclosure of additional 
information exposes participants to information of a nature and in a fonn possibly not seen by them 
before. Birnberg (1976) and Chang and Birnberg (1977), for example, comment that additional 
disclosures may lead to 'information overload' and 'functional fixation'. Users may require a 
period of learning and adaptation to new forms of accounting treatment and disclosure. On the 
other hand, Thaler (1987) argues that users do not in fact have the opportunity to learn. They are 
instead sporadically exposed to new information which they are expected to understand without 
necessarily having the time to absorb and learn its significance. Furthennore, the research does not 
concern itself with changes in accounting treatment which has been the subject of numerous other 
pieces of research in accounting. It involves the disclosure of new information. The feedback from 
the pilot group (who would not be more sophisticated than the participants of the actual 
experiments) in chapter 7 indicates that the information disclosed is not difficult to understand or 
apply. 
308 . 
A fourth and final issue concerns the nature of the disclosures. One wonders whether the research 
has become concerned with accounting for remote and inestimable contingencies rather than with 
uncertainty in general In particular, for the reasons of control outlined in clapters 5 and 6, the 
diclosures concerning assets and liabilities related to limited (or 'capped') losses only. In addition, 
constrained by current accounting cOllventions (e.g. in SSAP 18), this led to the assymetric 
consideration of recognised assets but unrecognised liabilities. 
Uncertainty affects financial statements in many ways. The exclusion of business risks and the 
focus on the uncertain nature of financial statements and remote contingencies represents a 
significant narrowing of the research. However, having decided to focus on proposals that are in 
the domain of current standard-setting, the means of making the hypotheses concrete became 
narrower. Furthermore, perhaps the focus should be on the end rather than the means: that the 
research instrument is simply a way (and not the only way) of testing the hypotheses outlined. The 
research then becomes indicative and not definitive. Having descnbed the world as a complex and 
changing place which accounting struggles to reflect, perhaps research also can only capture a 
comer of the confusion. 
12.4 THE CLARITY OF FULLNESS: MAIN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
RESEARCH 
Only fullness leads to clarityl 
Chapters 8 to 11 identified in considerable detail the main findings of the research. These findings 
were summarised in each of these chapters (8 to 11) in the context of the research questions and 
previous research in the area. In general, the effects of the disclosure of uncertainty varied 
depending on the nature of the disclosures and on the characteristics of the reporting entities. As 
this research was policy-driven in the objectives set out in chapter 2 and, hence, in the focus 
adopted in chapter 5, the findings have a number of implications both in the support and lack of 
I From Schiller's 'Sayings of Confucius'. 
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support for the research hypotheses. Ibis section will explore some of the implications for 
accounting policy-makers (rather than in a theoretical sense) of the research findings. As noted in 
chapters 2 and 4, policy-makers (e.g. the ASB, the AICPA and the CICA) have been particularly 
active in considering these issues. Therefore, these findings are of interest not only in Ireland and 
the UK but also in those other jurisdictions such as the US and Canada. 
12.4.1 Effects of disclosures 
The broad finding of the research is to confinn the view propogated in chapter 2: uncertainty 
matters. Uncertainty is relevant to the development of financial reporting. Generally, the research 
found that, to varying and differing degrees, the disclosure (or lack of disclosure) of uncertainty had 
an impact on decision-making and confidence. Policy-makers should continue to address the 
nature of uncertainty when framing financial statements which will be relevant and which will 
portray the complex and uncertain reality of modem business. 
Uncertainty, however, is not homogeneous. It afilicts financial statements generally, but also 
particular items in financial statements, their occurrence and their outcome. Furthermore, 
therefore, it would appear that different types of uncertainty have a different flavour, a different 
potency and that the framing of the disclosures of such uncertainty also matters. 
Essentially, two types of disclosure had particular effects on the assessments of the experimental 
subjects of the financial perfo~ce and position of the reporting entities. First, the disclosure of 
the uncertain nature of financial statements led to poorer perceptions of the reporting entities. This 
leads one to support the view of: for example, the AICPA (1994) that the judgmental. uncertain 
nature of financial statements should be disclosed in financial statements. Such a finding indicates 
that such a disclosure may serve to educate users regarding the nature of financial statements rather 
than to inform them of the reporting entity which they perceive through the prism of financial 
statements. The disclosure would, therefore, serve perhaps a short-term role which would dissipate 
as users became more aware of the uncertain nature of financial statements. 
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Secondly, the clarification ofthe potential occurrence of a 'remote' event had a more marked effect 
overall on the assessments and confidence of the experimental subjects. TIle range of the remote 
event that was used (5% - 8%) was less than that suggested, for example, by the CICA (1993) 
(who define remote as less than 15%). The implications of this finding are manifold: 
a) the disclosure of (in Sterling's terms (1985» numerals rather than words to denote phenomena 
would appear to add power to the descriptions of probability. Chesley (e.g. 1986) argues that the 
mapping of words to phenomena can be a subjective process with quite divergent notions or 
definitions of the meaning of words such as remote, probable or possible. As this disclosure also 
appeared to strengthen the consensus between the experimental subjects, it appeared to create a 
stronger shared or 'intersubjective' reality. For these reasons, the disclosure of ranges of 
probability would appear to add to the ability of the financial statements to communicate meaning. 
This supports moves, however disparate or tentative, by the ASB, for example, in FRS 6 (1994b) 
and FRED 14 (1997b ) and the AICPA (1994) towards such disclosures of contingencies. 
b) the definition of remote of the experimental subjects would appear to be less than 15% (in fact 
less than 50/0-8%) in the case of both assets and liabilities. This may appear to lll1dennine the 
attempts by the CICA (1994) to define 'remote' as such a level of probability. However, it may 
paradoxically support some definition of phrases such as remote in financial statements and / or 
accounting standards so that standard-setters, preparers and users can share a mutual Wlderstanding 
of what such concepts mean. In other words, if standard-setters define remote as less than 15 %, 
this level of probability may come to be accepted as meaning 'remote'. 
c) The lack of effect in the context of the general disclosure of the remote event with an 
inestimable outcome (AI and LI) and also of the clarification of inestimable outcome (A3 and L3) 
indicates that users are more interested in occurrence than outcome. This finding is however 
tempered by the capping or limiting of the outcome (for the reasons outlined in chapters 5 and 7) at 
£900,000. This limitation was addressed in Section 12.3. 
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12.4.2 Effects of the characteristics of the reporting entities. 
The effects of the disclosures ofWlcertainty were fOWld to differ between the reporting entities. In 
some instances, for example, the extent of debt appeared to create a particular focus on 
uncertainties regarding liabilities, the extent of growth a concern regarding guarantees etc. ll1ese 
varied, sometimes inconsistent results created a wider consideration of the effects of the disclosures 
of uncertainty. 
Disclosures are generally, though not exclusively (those required by company law being one 
exception) detetmined by the materiality of the item(s) in question. The ASB (1995b, p. 42) 
defines materiality as information which could influence users' decisions. It includes among the 
aspects to be considered in assessing materiality 
the events and transactions giving rise to it and the particular financial 
statement headings that are affected. Circumstances that are considered 
include other elements of the financial statements taken as a whole and other 
information available to users that would affect their evaluation of the financial 
statements: this involves, for example, a consideration of the implications for 
the evaluation of trends. 
Thus materiality, and as a result the recognition and / or disclosure of financial statement items, is 
driven by judgments of their relative size, their context, their potential to influence judgments. 
These findings suggest that considerations of disclosure should consider the characteristics and the 
perceptions of the reporting entity which the characteristics of the reporting entity create: that 
xnateriality should also explicitly embrace the context and nature of the particular reporting entity. 
For example, highly geared firms may need to disclose more information regarding the uncertainty 
of debt than less highly geared firms. It may be useful for firms with static or declining turnover 
whose stock is of a kind that may become obsolete over a relatively short period to disclose 
information concerning the uncertainty of such obsolescence. This strengthens the ASB's 
suggestion (ASB, 1995b, p. 42) that considerations of materiality should include, for example 'the 
iIllPlications of the item for the evaluation of trends'. 
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Not alone does this broaden the consideration of materiality, it also raises the issue of what triggers 
the disclosure of uncertainty. The ASB in its draft Statement of Principles (ASB, 1995b), as well 
as the CICA (1993) and the ASB's FRS 6 (ASB, 1994b) suggest that the trigger for such 
disclosures should be a lack of sufficient evidence to allow the recognition and / or measurement of 
particular items in the financial statements. This finding, further, suggests that this trigger should 
also incorporate the nature of the uncertainty and its potency in the context of the particular 
reporting entity. Essentially, therefore, the findings concerning the different effects between 
reporting entities calls for a wider consideration of disclosure which would include the nature of the 
reporting entity itseI£ 
12.4.3 Uncertainty of assets vis-a-vis liabilities 
One of the research questions concerned whether disclosures of uncertain assets would have 
different effects than the disclosure of uncertain liabilities given the asymmetric approach of 
accounting conventions to the recognition of assets and liabilities. Differences in this regard were 
not significant. The research did not support the notion that assets and liabilities per se, and 
uncertainties therein, are perceived differently by the users of financial statements. 
'Ibe research did, however, reveal the importance of perceptions of the reliability of financial 
statement items generally and certain items in particular to the disclosure of uncertainty. Assets 
were universally perceived as being less reliable than liabilities. As discussed in chapter 10, this 
conflicts with the view of the ASB that more evidence is required for the recognition of an asset 
than a liability. However it does support the subtle shift away from the focus on evidence 
supporting the recognition of assets and liabilities alone which characterised an early version of the 
ASB's Statement of Principles (1992b, para. 24) to a consideration of gains and losses and their 
associated assets and liabilities in later documents (for example in a later draft of the Statement of 
Principles (ASB,1995b) and in FRED 14: Contingencies and Provisions (ASB, 1997b). 
'Ibis finding indicates that the idea of reliability is broader than recognition alone. Reliability 
encompasses representational faithfulness: that the item faithfully represents what it purports to 
represent, not alone its existence (and hence recognition) but also its value (and hence its 
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measurement). Valuation also, it would appear, is part of the tapestry of reliability. Chapter 10 
argued that this supports the ASB's current preoccupation with the valuation of assets in financial 
statements (through, for example their Discussion Paper The Role of Valuation in Financial 
Reporting (ASB, 1996». 
Furthermore, it would suggest that reliability includes completeness as noted by the ASB (1995b, 
p.41). Many of the proposals outlined in chapter 2 and those comprising the research instrument 
(being subjective), on the face of it, appear less reliable or objective than the current recognition 
and disclosure in financial statements. However, if reliability is deemed to include such 
characteristics as 'faithful representation', 'substance' and 'completeness' (ASB, 1995b, pp. 44-46) 
such disclosures are more reliable than single point measures which do not represent the substance 
of doubt completely. 
Imposing more stringent tests regarding the existence of assets in the face of uncertainty leads to 
more reliable evidence regarding recognised assets than recognised liabilities. It also results 
however in unrecognised assets and an incomplete portrayal of the assets (recognised and 
unrecognised) of the finn. Hence, imposing stricter hurdles on the recognition of assets does not 
necessarily lead to more reliable, complete assets. Disclosure ofWlcertainty, this research suggests, 
mitigates such lack of completeness. 
'Ibis, in a sense, encapsulates the findings of this thesis. Uncertainty matters: it is at the heart of the 
recognition of assets and liabilities. The framing and context of the disclosure of uncertainty 
matters. Moreover, its disclosUre adds to a clearer and fuller representation of the assets and 
liabilities of the reporting entity. 
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